Burundi:
Capturing the Complexity
of the Conflict in the 1990s

Sezai ÖZÇELİK

Abstract. *There have been different conflict mapping approaches to understand the complex and chaotic nature of ethnic conflicts. Sandole's three pillar approach (1998) can be applied to capture the complexity of the Burundi conflict in terms of causes and conditions perspective. In this paper, the Burundi conflict is examined within the time frame of until the 1990s by the conflict analysis of Sandole's conflict mapping. First, the conflict parties are investigated with the emphasis on conflict issues, objectives, means, orientation and environment. This paper explains how the Burundi conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi involves factors at each of the four levels of analysis. The suggested conflict mapping addresses the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at each of these levels and captures the complexity of the conflict in order to affect negative and positive peace. It is important to note that Sandole's conflict mapping can provide an important tool to shed light on the deep-rooted and protracted nature of the Burundi conflict to be understood by the conflict resolution and peace science theorists and practitioners.*

Keywords: *Conflict mapping, Burundi, Sandole's Three Pillar Approach, the complexity of the conflict, conflict analysis, conflict causes, conflict typology.*

Sezai ÖZÇELİK
Çankırı Karatekin University,
The Faculty of Economics and
Administrative Science, The
Department of International
Relations, Çankırı, Turkey
Email: sezaiozcelik@gmail.com
or sozcelik@karatekin.edu.tr

Introduction

This paper aims to analyze a multi-level theory of the causes and conditions of violent conflict, to examine the likely causes and conditions of the violent conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Burundi and, hopefully, to set forth a possible intervention design that addresses the complexity of the conflict. There are certain causes and conditions of violent conflict that can potentially be operative in any conflict. These causes and conditions can be found at four levels of analysis: individual, societal, inter-

national and the ecological level. In order to analyze the roots causes of the Burundi conflict in terms of "explanation" and "understanding", the Sandole's Conflict Mapping Model can be used to combine four different orientations to conflict, Realism, Idealism, Marxism and non-Marxist Radical Thought (NMRT) and two approaches dealing with conflict (competitive and cooperative) (Sandole, 1999; Waltz, 1959). These factors include: elements of human nature, which include certain physiological/ psychological factors; the structures of domestic society which include political, economic and social systems; international (Sandole, 1999; Waltz, 1959; North, 1990) and the effects of the local and world ecological system (Sandole, 1999; North, 1990).

The theory of conflict–as-startup conditions and conflict–as-processes is applicable at all levels of conflict. Conflict–as-startup conditions are the original factors that instigated the conflict. Beyond a certain critical stage of the escalation of a conflict, a conflict can become self-perpetuating and through an interactive process become an independent source of the continuation and development of the conflict itself (Lund, 1996; Sandole, 1999). If the conflict–as-start-up conditions are not addressed, even when the conflict, as process, comes to an end, the conflict may periodically resurface until the underlying causes and conditions that started the conflict are resolved (Sandole, 1999). In the Burundi conflict, the conflict–as-start-up conditions have never been resolved. Consequently, although there have been peace agreements and reforms intended to resolve the conflict, the resolutions have been short-lived and the conflict continues (Burton, 1997). Sandole's model has been applied to analyze other conflicts in different parts of the world (Özçelik, 2006; 2014; 2015).

In Sandole's conflict mapping model of the three-pillar framework, the conflict can be analyzed and resolved at any level. Under Pillar 1, the model underlines parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict environment and conflict orientation and handling. Under Pillar 2, the model emphasizes the causes and conditions of the conflict. Pillar 3 is about conflict intervention design and implementation. Under parties, it is possible to distinguish between individuals, groups, organizations, societies, states and regions. Sandole underlines that the decision makers are always individuals within any type of party. Under issues, the parties present the reasons why they wage conflict with one another. In a structural conflict, the parties focus on the issues that aim to change or maintain existing political, economic, social or other systems (beliefs/values, biological or physical systems). Nonstructural conflicts are only dealt with tools to achieve some objectives within existing systems. Issues can be categorized in realistic such as territory or nonrealistic such as emotional and psychological issues. When the parties attempt to use conflict over certain issues, their objectives can be territorial, physical or psychological. Their objectives are also status-quo-changing or status-quo-maintaining. If the party wants a change of system, it can be the status-quo-changing. If a minority attempts to use conflict for achieving self-determination, it has status-quo-changing objective. If the party wants stability or preservation of the system, it can be catego-

rized as the status-quo-maintaining. When a nation-state aims to preserve territorial integrity, it has status-quo-maintaining objective (Sandole, 2007).

The conflict means refers to the application of violent and nonviolent tools in the conflict to achieve the parties' objectives. Sandole applies Rapoport's Fights, Game and Debates concepts to explain the conflict means. When the parties are in fight mode, they see each other as enemies and exert to destroy each other. When they are in debates mode, they perceive each other as opponents and try to cheat each other. In debates form, the parties consider each other as opponents and attempt to persuade each other with the help of third-party. Conflict handling orientations could be between competitive-cooperative continuum including five main conflict resolution styles: competition, avoidance, accommodation, compromise and collaboration. Competitive parties are more inclined toward a Realpolitik approach with the mixture of Hobbesian and Machiavellian views of human being and philosophy. This approach can be associated with destructive outcomes. Cooperative parties are related to the Idealpolitik approach that believes the mixture of Wilsonian idealism and Kantian liberalism with a good view of human nature. Parties usually get involved in negotiations and the Idealpolitic approach is associated with constructive outcomes.

There are two significantly different schools of thought concerning the nature of man. One is that man is inherently aggressive and potentially violent by nature, the other is that aggression and violence are a result of nurture. The theorists under the nature school of thought attribute man's aggressive behavior to his natural biological, physiological and psychological make-up (Öğretir-Özçelik, 2017b). This school of thought is personified in *Realpolitik* thinking. Under the *Realpolitik* thinking, man's inherent aggressiveness derived from primal evolution and violent behavior is the underlying cause of violent conflict. According to the *Realpolitik thinking*, mankind's behavior can just be controlled and contained as much as possible by competitive, deterrent strategies, such as through punishment, police power and power politics, but can never be eliminated (Sandole, 1999; Vasquez, 1993; Burton, 1997). In contrast to the *Realpolitik school* of thought is the *Idealpolitik* school of thought which includes those theorists who argue that aggressive and violent behavior is learned and therefore can be modified and replaced with more constructive, cooperative behavior through learning and changing the environment (Sandole, 1999). A change in environment can be effectuated through a change in structures. Conflict environment refers to multiple environments such as cultural, religious, economic, political and institutional in which conflict emerges, escalates, and de-escalates in a cyclical manner. Sandole cites endogenous and exogenous environments typology of conflicts. Conflicts are endogenous when they are the parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for maintaining a steady state within the conflicting systems. Parties use mechanisms and strategies for controlling or resolving the conflict between the subsystems. Conflicts are categorized as exogenous when there are no larger systems to exercise control or resolve the conflict (Sandole, 2003).

On the individual, societal, international and ecological level, the lack of non-competitive, adversarial, coercive processes and structures designed for conflict resolution can in itself be an underlying cause and condition of violent conflict (Vasquez, 1993; Burton, 1997). However, it is sometimes necessary to use both competitive and cooperative conflict resolution processes in order to affect negative and positive peace. The endogenous conflict environment in which the Burundi conflict has occurred has been a critical factor in the duration and intensity of the conflict. This paper only focuses on the Burundi conflict up until the 2000s. This paper explains how the Burundi conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi has been escalated by using the Sandole's conflict mapping approach with Pillar 1 and 2. The suggested conflict mapping addresses the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict and captures the *complexity* of the conflict in order to affect negative and positive peace.

Conflict Analysis

Parties

In the conflict analysis field, it is common to make a distinction between the roles of primary, secondary and third parties. It is necessary to find answers the question who are the parties – primary, secondary and third parties. The primary actors are directly involved in the conflict, for example as warring parties. They are central to the conflict. They interact directly with one another. They can escalate, de-escalate or resolve the conflict during the conflict cycle. In the Burundi conflict, the primary parties were as follows: the Burundian government, Tutsi and Hutu rebel groups, the Burundian armed forces and civilian Burundians. The secondary parties are thought to be supporting the primary actors of the conflict, such as allies or supporters. They have an interest in the conflict but are not interact with other parties directly. In the Burundi conflict, the secondary parties are labeled as Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and regional actors in the Great Lake Region (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania). Other secondary parties are extra-regional and international actors like the United States, France, Belgium, South Africa and Canada. The third party is not directly involved in the conflict. However, it aims to work toward a solution of it. One of the most important roles of the third party is to establish direct contact between the primary parties. Third-party interveners were the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU) and Nelson Mandela. When we analyze the parties in the conflict, it is important to describe the nature of power relations between or among the parties, their leadership, their main goals in the conflict and the potential for coalitions among the parties.

The relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi is asymmetrical and unbalanced in terms of power, access to resources and access to authority (Sandole, 1999). The Tutsi and Hutu have shared a common history in Burundi since the 14th Century. At that time, the Tutsi

cattle-herders migrated into Burundi, which had already been inhabited by the Hutu cultivators for several centuries. The Tutsi established a feudal system over the Hutu that was structured as a unified kingdom in approximately 1550 A.D. Between 1885 and 1962, Burundi was colonized by the German and Belgium. The Belgium ruled through a neo-colonial system in which they placed the Tutsi as the ruling class. The Europeans injected their value system in which superiority was imputed to the Tutsi because their physical features more closely resembled the Europeans. However, up until that time, the terms *Tutsi* and *Hutu* were considered a form of identification of social class, as opposed to ethnicity. The Tutsi were the ruling class and Hutu the peasant class. It was even possible, although rare, for a Hutu to rise to the Tutsi class. During this time, Rwanda and Burundi were ruled by the Belgium as one principality, Ruwanda-Urundi. Both Burundi and Rwanda obtained their independence in 1962. The Tutsi have continued to hold the dominant position in society, except during brief periods of democratic reform followed by the re-establishment of control by the Tutsi by force (International Business Publication, 2013). By the end of 1965, a distinct Hutu political consciousness began to form in response to increasing exclusion from politics. Sandole would characterize the perceived socio-political inequality and power imbalance between the Tutsi and the Hutu and accompanying events up to this point as conflict-as-start-up conditions (Sandole, 1999).

In 2000, there was an interim government with a power-sharing arrangement between the Tutsi-dominated ruling party, the UPRONA and the Hutu-dominated party, FRODEBU, pending further negotiation and implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord of August 2000. Both Hutu and Tutsi government officials and delegates at the peace talks have been accused by more militant Hutu and Tutsi of "selling out" to the opposing party and not representing the true interests of their respective populations (Reyntjens, 2000; Dravis & Pitsch, 1998). This, no doubt, places many of these government and peace talk representatives in a quandary. Such a quandary could create a type of intrapsychic conflict characterized by Thompson and Van Houten as a *multiple position* conflict (Sandole, 1998). The representatives must serve their duties as government officials or peace talk delegates. In doing so, at least ostensibly, they must give some credence to the validity of the process. At the same time, as an individual Tutsi or Hutu, they are subject to experiencing the same fears, distrust and insecurities of other members of their communal group based on the history between the Tutsi and Hutu.

In 1972, Hutu insurgents killed Tutsi civilians during an attempted coup. In response, the Tutsi-dominated army initiated systematic massacres of Hutu. Approximately 80,000 to 100,000 Hutu were killed by the genocide of the government. Educated and young Hutu were particularly targeted in the genocide in order to incapacitate a future Hutu leadership cadre. The Burundi government radio broadcasted messages after the deaths that the recent *tribal* clashes were due to a "psychosis of fear" which pervaded the population (Dravis & Pitsch, 1998).

Subsequently, in 1988, as many as 50,000 Hutu were massacred by the Tutsi-dominated army. In 1993, an estimated 150,000 civilians, the majority of whom were Hutu, were cited as victims of genocide by the Tutsi. Since 1996, approximately 250,000 Hutu have died during the armed conflict (Dravis & Pitsch, 1998).

The original genocide has become incorporated into the identity of the Hutu as a chosen trauma, which is reinforced by the subsequent genocide. The massive genocide of over 800,000 Tutsi by the Hutu-dominated government in neighboring Rwanda in 1994 is the chosen trauma for the Tutsi (Özçelik, 2013). The leadership of each group invokes the memory of these events in their constituency as convenient to marshal the support of the people. Many Hutu and Tutsi have deep-rooted enemy images of each other as despicable sub-humans. On the other hand, many Hutu and Tutsi are intermarried with each other and have historically often shared the same villages. The physical features of many people in Burundi are not distinguishable as either Tutsi or Hutu (Cyr, 2001).

Issues

The conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu involves issues of structure, relationship and control over resources and interests. The conflict can be characterized as a realistic conflict with an unrealistic component involving a chosen trauma and role defense. The power imbalance as the conflict-as-start-up condition is real (Lund, 1996; Sandole, 1999). However, the fear of genocide and extermination by each group has a real conflict-as-start-up condition component and an unrealistic component that has become part of the conflict-as-process. The chosen trauma is then used by certain Tutsi leadership in *role defense* to polarize Burundians and thereby strengthen their support and quell any dissatisfaction with their leadership. Hutu leaders invoke the chosen trauma of the genocide of the Hutu as a basis for their insistence that no Tutsi can be trusted in power over Hutu (Özçelik, 2016).

Objectives

The Tutsi and the Hutu in Burundi appear to have diametrically opposed goals in the conflict. Both groups seek control over the nations' political and economic resources and fear extermination by the other if they do are not in control. The Tutsi in Burundi are seeking the maintenance of the status quo under which they control the government. The Hutu, realizing that they are in a structurally violent relationship with a hegemon, are seeking the revolutionary goal of changing the form and leadership of the government from a military regime to a democracy in which the Hutu would enjoy majority rule.

Means of Pursuing

The conflict is at an aggressive manifest conflict process stage. That is, the parties are seeking mutually incompatible goals by physically injuring each other and destroying the high-value symbols of each other. There are between 1,000 to 2,500 people dying monthly as a result of alleged genocide, armed rebel attacks and counter-attacks. Over 400,000 Hutu civilians have been internally displaced from their villages and homes. There are over 350,000 refugees in Zaire and Tanzania (Minority at Risk, 2004).

However, the conflict is also being pursued on another level as a manifest conflict process. Since the inception of the conflict, in addition to the use of assassinations and military coups, the Hutu and Tutsi are seeking control over the government through the political process and policy. The Tutsi have historically denied the Hutu equal access to jobs, especially jobs of any authority in the government, and the Hutu are virtually excluded from the military. After certain attempts were made for democratic reform, there was increased inner dissension between Tutsi subgroups because some Tutsi opposed the reforms. In response to internal dissatisfaction amongst the different Tutsi political parties, leaders have used the Hutu as scapegoats. The leaders point to the Rwanda genocide of the Tutsi as an example of what will happen if the Hutu gain control. For the same reasons, the government has also used their neighboring countries as scapegoats and accused them of instigating the conflict and of harboring and supporting Hutu rebels. Foreign missionaries and Catholics have also been blamed as scapegoats for Burundi's problems.

Conflict Orientation

The parties have used a predominantly competitive conflict orientation that is exemplified in the armed conflict, but also in their approach to the political process. *Realpolitik* is the predominant mode of thinking of both parties. Given the fact that the Hutu were not historically known as an aggressive, violent people and made their living by cultivating the land, it is arguable that they initially resorted to a competitive conflict orientation as a result of the prolonged frustration of their basic human needs which resulted in frustration-aggression driven violence as a means of seeking relief (Burton, 1997; Öğretir-Özçelik, 2017a).

Notwithstanding the history of overthrows of governments by force through assassination or military coupe, even the electoral process has been adversarial in nature. All of these approaches have been on a zero-sum basis because the win of an election by the Tutsi-dominated party or the Hutu-dominated party has been perceived as a lost by the non-prevailing party even when there is provision for representation in the parliament and on other seats in the government.

However, ever since independence, at various points in time, certain leaders and other members of the society have attempted to resolve the conflict through consensual

means. The most recent effort was in the Arusha Peace Talks facilitated by Nelson Mandela, which led to the Arusha Peace Accord. Delegates to these talks and others are still meeting to attempt to end the conflict by a negotiated agreement. However, there is much resistance to the process by certain rebel groups who refused to participate in the talks and by the government which has not made much progress in implementation since the Agreement's signing in August 2000 (Bentley & Southall, 2005). In fact, the Agreement had not even been officially endorsed by the Burundian parliament yet. One of the most contentious issues has been whether a Tutsi or Hutu will head the interim transition government contemplated by the accord until certain structural changes are made and an election is held. There are also issues remaining concerning the release of political prisoners, the shutdown of the regroupment camps and the percentage of guaranteed representation of Tutsi in the Parliament. Mandela convened another meeting of the delegates in Arusha in December, 2000 to attempt to move the peace process forward. Mandela has questioned the sincerity of the delegates in actually implementing the Agreement. No cease-fire was achieved (Southall, 2016).

Conflict Environment

The conflict environment is exogenous. That is, there is no super system to exercise control or to resolve the conflict (Sandole, 1998). There are no internal mechanisms for controlling or resolving the conflict because the Hutu do not recognize the legitimacy of the Tutsi-dominated government. The Tutsi dominates the executive branch, parliament, military and court system. Therefore, the Hutu have no confidence in either of these branches as mechanisms for resolving the conflict. The international community has taken a tangential role in the conflict by taking non-coercive positions against acts of genocide and violations of human rights reported in Burundi. The neighboring countries in the region imposed economic sanctions on Burundi in response to the overthrow of the democratic government by a military coup headed by the President. However, these sanctions were removed after the President made promises of instituting minimal and superficial reforms to the government to allow greater participation by the Hutu. What is more, the international community has not provided Burundi with mechanisms for resolving the dispute except to the extent of the non-binding participation of world leaders in peace talks. Direct physical intervention by peacekeeping troops has been either resisted by the international community or not insisted upon when Burundi has offered any resistance to external involvement.

All of the nations of the Great Lakes region, including Burundi, are involved in the ongoing civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Burundi's troops are fighting in opposition of Congo's government and pursue Hutu rebels from Burundi over the border. There are allegations that the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo is covertly subsidizing and controlling the Hutu rebel forces.

A peace agreement was signed in 1997 after secret meetings between leaders orchestrated by the Catholic Church. The peace agreement did not address calling for the restoration of the constitution, government reform and other terms and was not successful in ending the violent conflict. However, a year later, the Arusha Peace Talks, that began in 1998 culminated in a Peace Accord in August 2000. The Arusha Peace Accord called for, but has not affected, a ceasefire and has not included two significant Hutu rebel groups in the negotiations. The Agreement set goals for an inclusive government but only established an interim government while the terms of implementation of the Peace Accord are further negotiated (Reyntjens, 2001).

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is an organization of African nations of which Burundi is a founding member. The organization considers itself an organization of heads of states and traditionally has accepted the status quo of its members. In fact, the OAU has a policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of its members. Therefore, unless invited, the OAU is very limited in the role that it can play as an intervener in Burundi. In 1996, the OAU did approve sending a peacekeeping force into Burundi composed of troops from neighboring states; however, this initiative was subsequently thwarted by the Burundi military by blockading access into the country (Akonor, 2017).

However, even though the U.N. strongly condemned the killings instigated by the coup attempt and threatened sanctions, the U.N. refused to send in peacekeepers to Burundi. In the Security Council, the U.S. argued that such a mission should not be undertaken because it would constitute an open-ended commitment with no definite plan for withdrawal. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) of which Burundi was a founding member, the European Council and CEPGL, a regional economic cooperation union, joined in threatening sanctions. Also, outside actors urged that a multi-national force of African troops should be sent in to help restore order in Burundi. OAU eventually dispatched a small force to Burundi, which was logistically supported by Belgium, to protect the government and the UN sent a fact-finding mission to Burundi to investigate the events surrounding the coup. The Tutsi-dominated army and other opposition forces objected to this "foreign intervention" and protesters set up a barricade in the capital to signify their objection. The government backed away from seeking OAU intervention forces and OAU subsequently set aside its plans for maintaining a peacekeeping unit for Burundi (Lansford, 2014).

Under the present international structure, one of these actors has the power to mandate the terms or actual implementation of any agreement unless they are willing to follow through with a showing of force which they have not done. This is both because of their limited actual authority in the situation as well as the limits of their willingness to get involved in the affairs of Burundi.

Causes and Conditions of the Burundi Conflict

Ethnic conflict occurs between representatives of groups, each of whose members share significant aspects of history, tradition, language and worldview, race, religion and an in-group identity which includes "the other" (out-group) as out to get them (Sandole, 1999). Sandole also defines ethnic conflict as when a member of a linguistic, ethnic or racial group attempt to prevail against and at the expense of each other. Sandole (1999) points out that these conflicts have other dimensions, political, economic and environmental.

The conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu is by this definition an ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts are not necessarily confined to the boundaries of a nation-state. The primary actors in the Burundi conflict, the Hutu and the Tutsi, share ethnicity with citizens of Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and other neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In addition, there are some Hutu and Tutsi refugees and rebel bases throughout the entire Great Lakes region. Each government in the region has accused the other of harboring or assisting rebels in their country. Consequently, the conflict is *interlocked* with the Rwanda and Great Lakes conflict. However, the nucleus of the conflict is confined to the Hutu and Tutsi of Burundi who have their own unique history in that country (Minorities at Risk, 2004).

An underlying issue throughout the conflict has been who will have the right to control the territory of Burundi, the Hutu or the Tutsi. Vasquez (1993) has stated that fights over territory are the most compelling causes of war or violent conflict. As an agrarian society with a subsistence economy, the Burundian people's primary source of livelihood is the land upon which they live. The government controls all of the resources of the country and is the only other significant source of revenue and employment. These facts have only contributed to the intractability of the conflict because of the relationship between the Burundian's very survival and control over the country. The failure of power politics as a mechanism to resolve Burundi's territorial conflict has reinforced the Burundian's innate tendency to resolve such conflicts by aggression and violence (Vasquez, 1993). In addition, it has triggered the *frustration of needs aggression cycles* of violence that is a natural outcome of *Realpolitik* thinking and that has made the conflict very difficult to resolve by cooperative means.

The first post-colonial Tutsi king initially seemed to attempt to balance competing ethnic interests by dividing top government posts between Hutu and Tutsi. The level of value expectations of the Hutu for equality was even further heightened by the reforms to the political structure (Sandole, 1999). However, when the Hutu won a majority in the Parliament and elected a Hutu Prime Minister, the King nullified the election and appointed a Tutsi Prime Minister. The king also attempted to transfer power from parliament to the Tutsi King. The actions of the King created a feeling of *relative deprivation* on the part of the Hutu. The appointment of Hutu to government posts also may have

created a sense of *rank disequilibrium* when membership in parliament was not also allowed. The Hutu, as a group, were in the contradictory position of being on top in one stratum and yet not allowed to do so in another, even after trying to achieve legitimacy within the existing political structure (Sandole, 1999). Consequently, the King's actions prompted a failed coup by Hutu to overthrow the government. This violent response is consistent with the theories of Ted Robert Gurr (1970), Galtung (1969) and Sandole (1999) that once minorities recognize structural violence and fail in attempts to fulfill their need for identity, recognition without success and frustration-aggression will cause the conflict to escalate from a latent conflict into a manifested one. If not controlled, the manifest conflict process then evolves into an aggressive manifest conflict process (Sandole 1999). The attempted coup also may be indicative of Sandole's observation that the limbic system described by McLean under his theory of schizophysiology may operate to predispose victims of structural violence toward physical violence when they become conscious of the discrepancies. Frustration-aggression may have invoked the ascendancy of the limbic brain in the Hutu coup members.

Although Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001) do not agree with the applicability of frustration–aggression theories, which were originally designed for individuals to group processes, they do recognize the applicability of cognitive dissonance to internal revolutions within societies. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff would therefore undoubtedly recognize that the dissonance created by the wide gap between the individual Hutu's ideals and operating reality provoked individual Hutu to seek to reduce the dissonance by gravitating toward a revolutionary movement and rebel activity. Similarly, Galtung (1969) observed that when rank disequilibrium is present in a system of groups such as the Hutu and Tutsi, the resulting aggression and violence may take the form of revolutions.

After the 1988 massacres, Belgium terminated its security cooperation pact with Burundi but France continued to train Burundi troops. In response to pressure from Belgium and others in the international community, military regime president Buyoya instituted reform measures with the stated objective of addressing the nation's *ethnic conflict*. These reforms included: the establishment of an equal number of cabinet positions for Hutu and Tutsi, recruitment of Hutu into the civil service and the appointment of a Hutu Prime Minister. The reforms also included the establishment of a national commission to study ethnic violence described as a commission on "national unity" with an equal number of Tutsi and Hutu appointed to serve on the commission, the repeal of previously promulgated anti-Catholic Church policies and the appointment of ethnic Hutu soldiers to the President's personal guard. Before 1988, reform efforts had primarily consisted of hollow appeals for unity with little or no substantive follow through. These reform measures were met with the resistance of many Tutsi but raised the expectations of Hutu to new heights. There was also great discord among ruling elites in response to Buyoya's liberalization program. Local Tutsi administrators continued repressive and discriminatory measures against the Hutu (Prendergast & Smock, 1999).

In 1991, a National Unity Code was endorsed by 89.1% of the voters. The Charter called for the ending of military rule, restoring the constitution and ensuring harmony between Hutu and Tutsi. A National Unity Code was subsequently issued which pledged equal rights for Hutu, Tutsi and Twas and which condemned political violence. A national reconciliation committee composed of politicians, church figures and ordinary citizens prepared the Code. Later that same year, a series of small incursions were carried out by Hutu exiles operating from Tanzania. Burundi accused the Rwandan press of orchestrating a propaganda campaign against the country and of supporting Hutu rebels. The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) launched attacks in northern towns that were done in some people's view with the hope of provoking a general Hutu uprising. These attacks and the government's counter-attacks resulted in 300 Tutsi civilians being killed and 1000 Hutu killed by the army (Amnesty International, 1997).

In 1992, a new constitution was adopted which vested executive power in a directly elected president who serves for 5 years. Ethnically based political movements were banned under the constitution. This ended the official political monopoly by the Tutsi-dominated political party UPRONA for 26 years. Discontented Tutsi soldiers unsuccessfully attempted a coup to overthrow the government. In 1993, democratic elections were held in which a Hutu president from the Front for Democracy was elected with 72% of the votes, primarily Hutu. The new president sought to transform the country's political structures by naming a female Tutsi Prime Minister and opening the government to all groups. Tutsi held Nine out of 23 cabinet seats. The FRODEBU party won 68 out of 81 seats in parliament in 1993 (Cervenka & Legum, 2004). The following month supporters of the former Tutsi president attempted a coup to overthrow the new government. Later that year, disgruntled military forces revolted and assassinated the new Hutu president (Butenschon, Stiansen, & Vollan, 2015).

In 1993, a new cycle of violence began involving both Tutsi and Hutu civilians and the Tutsi-dominated military units resulting in three new waves of massacres. Both Hutu and Tutsi engaged in the massacre of innocent civilians with an estimated number of deaths at 150,000 (majority Hutu), with over one million refugees fleeing into the neighboring regions, Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Another 100,000 were internally displaced. By 1994, 375,000 Burundians were registered as refugees in Zaire, Rwanda and Tanzania. By late 1994, there were an estimated 400,000 internally displaced people in Burundi, 180,000 Burundi refugees in Zaire and 150,000 Burundi refugees in Tanzania. An ethnic war ensued between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-dominate army and security units. The conflict included individual killings and assassinations of government officials at the local, provincial and national levels, massacres of up to 400 people, including women and children. Both the Burundian and Rwandan Hutu presidents were assassinated in a plane that was shot down by a military rocket. As the genocide of Tutsi swept through Rwanda, smaller-scale violence occurred in Burundi (Scherrer, 2002).

Former military ruler Buyoya assumed power again. Economic sanctions were imposed on Burundi by other African countries consisting of an embargo on oil imports and coffee exports. Government troops subsequently killed approximately 6,000 Hutu in so-called follow-up operations. Many civilians were killed during army military initiatives against Hutu rebels. During one month, 1,000-3,000 civilians were reported killed by the army. In 1996, analysts claimed that violence in Burundi was taking between 1,000 to 2,500 lives each month. President Buyoya has remained the head of state for a long time with no permanent democratic government in place (Doxtader & Mosomothane, 2003).

In the mist of the various reforms of the political system, however, the violent conflict has continued. The question may be posed why the violent conflict appears to have not only continued but also actually escalated during the political reform period. Gurr's theory of *relative deprivation* provides a possible explanation. Under this theory, Gurr explained that the likelihood that the victims of structural violence will respond with violence is directly affected by the correlation between their value expectations and value capabilities (Sandole, 1999). The Hutu's sense of entitlement was enhanced by the reforms. Observing another Hutu rise in the government contributed to an increased expectation of greater access to the resources of Burundi. Yet, the local Tutsi 's resistance to reform coupled with their previous experience with unfulfilled previous promises of reform resulted in the Hutu feeling that there was a discrepancy between what they were entitled to and what they, in fact, were going to obtain. Moreover, the Hutu's be-havior is also illustrative of Dollard's frustration-of needs-aggression theory that when people perceive structural violence, they will respond with violence particularly when the Hutu then perceived any continued discrimination against them as interference with their goal of fair participation in society at a time when they fully expected it to occur (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The fact that the Hutu continued to lodge an armed struggle against the Burundian government in the face of the harsh retaliation of the Burundians is also demonstrative of Burton's premise that when basic human needs are not met, people will resort to any means, no matter what the cost to seek to have the needs fulfilled (Burton, 1997).

Another explanation for the fact that violence did not subside, even at times when apparent progress was being made, is that the conflict had already transformed from a conflict, as start-up, to become a conflict-as-process and a quasi deterministic spiral consisting of a series of action-reaction processes. This could not be terminated at this stage with just changes in the start-up conditions (Sandole, 1999).

The patterns of these cycles of violence also demonstrate how frustration and aggres-sion are stimulated by and in turn stimulate ethnocentrism and *Realpolitik* thinking. The violence also is illustrative of how the more people become involved in the process, the more they tend to perceive and overreact to threatened and actual assaults which then lead to negative self-fulfilling prophesies (Sandole, 1999). A culture of violence had

developed in Burundi at this point as a result of the self-perpetuating/self-stimulating conflict processes that had been created by the action-reaction processes (Sandole, 1999; Vasquez, 1993). The limbic brain of both parties seemed to be dominating the neocortical brain in the conflict. The Hutu were obviously suffering the most losses from the conflict because of their military inferiority. However, even recognition of inferior capability is not enough to deter a nation or communal group from violent aggression once perceptions of anxiety, fear, threat and injury are of the magnitude as those of the Hutu in this deterministic and escalatory spiral of violence in Burundi (Sandole, 1999).

Another explanation for the continuing violent conflict and refusal of some of the armed rebels to participate in the peace process in the face of seeming progress and reform is that the Hutu had come to accept the Tutsi as their enemy as part of their sense of identity as explained in the functions-of conflict thesis. Consequently, they were psychologically invested in the continuation of the conflict as suggested by Montville (Sandole, 1999). The same could be said to be true of the Tutsi-dominated government who have not ratified the peace accord, agreed upon an interim President or made any other significant progress in implementing the Agreement.

Moreover, by way of further explanation, discriminant learning, the violent conduct had become a learned response to conflict for the rebel groups and the recalcitrant military that sabotaged the democratic government through their actions which was reinforced in the culture of violence (Sandole, 1999; Vasquez, 1993; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).

Similarly, George Modelski's demonstration-effect and bandwagon effect theories of international behavior are also applicable to the continuing cycle of violence in Burundi (Sandole, 1999). Burundians had conducted their political life throughout their entire post-colonial history on the basis of power politics or *Realpolitik thinking*. Just as Bandura and other learning theorists have observed about individual behavior, it can be seen how the Burundian's followed the violent model which they knew concerning how to effectuate political change, notwithstanding attempts by some Burundians to effect change through the use of cooperative processes. The demonstration-effect was exemplified by the periods of remission of the violent behavior that would then be followed by a rapid spread of a new cycle of violence that would start with a single incident, which was then emulated by others throughout Burundi.

Moreover, the Burundi conflict has been taking place in the context of a regional environment where violent conflicts have been ongoing, setting a norm and model for emulation under these theories. Burundi is actively involved in the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to protect its own borders. The effect of the surrounding conflicts is further explained in the *spillover* or Sandole's multiplier-effect systemic contagion theory of international/intercommunal conflict (Sandole, 1999). The possible impact of the Rwanda genocide in 1996 on Burundi cannot be ignored. The president of Burundi and the President of Rwanda were assassinated at the same

time. It was also during the same period and after the massive genocide was occurring in Rwanda that the Burundian president was overthrown by a Tutsi military coup and a new cycle of violence began in Burundi and that the Hutu President in Burundi was overthrown (Cohen, 2007).

The uneven distribution and scarcity of resources in the region create an interdependency that enhances the likelihood of involvement of regional actors in the affairs of each other. Moreover, the influx of refugees and rebel camps over the borders of neighboring countries, all of the countries in the Great Lakes Region are also directly impacted by what happens in the other. Based on available information, it appears that the Singer and Small hypothesis that multi-polarity correlates positively with the probability of war is more likely operative in the Great Lakes Region than Waltz's premise that bipolarity increases the outbreak of war (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). However, the kin-country syndrome may be a contributing factor in the continuation of the conflict due to the indirect involvement of neighboring countries in Burundi's conflict through the support of the government or the rebels and presence of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic populations in all of the countries.

Conclusion

Answering the fundamental question of the cause of war, political philosopher Rousseau stated that war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it (Waltz, 1959). In the context of the international level, the same could be said of the Burundi war. Waltz posited that wars erupt because existing political structures do not provide mankind with a consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise. Waltz went further to state that at a minimum, the government should provide protection to the person and property of mankind. Although the international community has been involved in the Burundi conflict, the involvement has been at best tangential and equivocal. Notwithstanding the fact that over 250,000 people have died in the conflict since 1993 (Harkavy & Neuman, 2001) and 350,000 civilians were forcibly detained in 53 regroupment camps that have been described to have deplorable conditions and that there have been over approximately 475,500 internally displaced persons in cities and countryside. In early 2002, approximately 7 percent of the 6.8 million Burundians were displaced (Danevad & Wates, 2002). The international community has essentially made its involvement optional and minimal in the course of the conflict. Waltz believed that wars erupt because existing political structures do not provide man with a consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise.

The landlocked location of the country increases its dependence on other countries for imports and limits its export ability, thereby decreasing its economic self-sufficiency. At least two million Rwandans and Burundians rely on international aid for sustenance. Tea and coffee production account for 70% or more of foreign exchange since independence

but occupies much of the fertile land area also needed for subsistence food production. This is an example of how neo-colonialism induced dependency on the former colonial markets and thereby limits the nation's opportunity for developing a diverse economy, strong local trade and a competitive position on the world market. North, Sandole and Burton have all recognized this type of induced dependency relationship between the Third World countries and developed countries that is an incident of imperialism and the world economy as a form of structural violence that will ensure that the developing nations stay in a state of dependency for the benefit of the industrialized nations (North, 1990; Sandole, 1999; Burton, 1997). The demand for coffee production contributes to environmental degradation and conflict over scarce land. The consequential economic decline and stagnation can cause frustration, resentment and the political turmoil that leads to violent conflict. Michael Lund (1996) has recognized that population growth, refugee flows and poverty can pose clear and present threats to international security. Indeed, on the international level, studies have supported a finding that strife increases with an increase in economic deprivation and that there is a correlation between political instability and systemic frustration.

This interdependency on other countries can potentially draw Burundi into the other countries conflicts and thereby become another cause of violent conflict. Burundi's scarcity of resources raise the stakes of the conflict for control over those resources and increase its readiness to enter into the conflict of its neighbors, such as has it has done in The Democratic Republic of Congo to protect its territory. The Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) are fighting on the side of the Congo government against Congolese rebels who are backed by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. FDD may be prevented by Congo President Laurent Kabilia from honoring a ceasefire.

Burundi's landlocked unproductive territory also results in little interest in the conflict by other countries that yield power that might otherwise have intervened to resolve the conflict. This has directly affected the lack of tangible assistance and intervention that Burundi has received from Western powers and the U.N. in resolving the conflict.

The Tutsi and Hutu have been involved in an asymmetrical unbalanced relationship in a structurally violent domestic and international society. The conflict between the two groups was latent up until post-colonial times when it evolved into a manifest conflict process. The conflict has been an aggressive-manifest-conflict process for the past thirty years. The conflict-as-start-up conditions have now escalated into to a self-perpetuating, negative self-fulfilling conflict-as process. The conflict erupted into a deterministic conflict spiral with action-reaction processes that can only be ended by addressing both the underlying conditions and the dynamics of the conflict f as a separate cause and condition of the conflict.

On an individual level, the causes and conditions of the Burundi conflict include the inability of the Hutu to fulfill certain basic physical and intra-psychic human needs, such

as, for identity, recognition and security because of structural violence. This has resulted in the Hutu suffering from cognitive dissonance, relative deprivation, rank disequilibrium and frustration-aggression that then lead to violent conduct. The violent conduct of both parties in dealing with the conflict may also be caused by the phenomenon of schizphiology wherein the reptile emotional part of the brain overtakes the rational part of the brain (neo-cortical) and causes the individual to act in destructive, irrational ways in response to certain stimuli.

On a societal level, the causes and conditions involve territory, distribution of scarce resources and structural violence with the emphasis on socio-psychological perspectives, namely stereotypes, prejudices and inter-group biases (Öğretir & Özçelik, 2008). The enemy may be treated as a scapegoat and blamed for the problems of the accusing government, or the focus may be on the enemy's threat to the nation or group (Özçelik, 2010). Lederach (1997) has observed that the presentation of an enemy to a group by a leader who is threatening the groups' survival equates to the uncritical support of the group leader. Therefore, Lederach posits that leaders encourage the development of enemy images and subgroup identities, fear and deep polarizations in society in order to increase the internal cohesion of the group behind the leader. As previously discussed, individuals may be particularly susceptible to such manipulation by leaders because of their individual need for enemies for their self-identity. In addition, the Tutsi have engaged in promoting negative stereotypes of the Hutu and fostering enemy images in role defense and to promote cohesion and harmony within Tutsi society. Multiple-effect contagion factors such as the demonstration-effect and bandwagon effect have contributed to the perpetuation and intractability of the conflict in Burundi.

On an inter-communal and international level, the conflicts in adjoining regions, particularly Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have had a spillover effect on the conflict in Burundi. The colonial drawn boundaries between the nations have created an unnatural imbalance in the distribution of resources between nations and artificially divided ethnic identity groups. The multi-polarity of the region has been producing conflict. The economic exploitation of Burundi by the Germans and Belgian during colonial times, when the land was used for coffee and tea plantations and subsequent global economic practices, have left Burundi economically dependant and unable to sustain its rapidly increasing population with its agricultural sustenance economy. The ecological factors of the scarcity of resources created by overproduction of the land, overpopulation and environmental degradation also constitute causes and conditions of the conflict.

The *Realpolitik* conflict orientation of the society has not only served as a cause of the conflict but also has prevented its permanent resolution. Interventions in the past based on competitive processes have been unsuccessful. Many of the conflict actors have a self-serving interest in perpetuating the conflict and others have incorporated the con-

flict into their very identity. The conflict environment in the past was exogenous. The anticipated implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord could have created endogenous mechanisms for conflict resolution in Burundi. However, it will not be possible to implement these or any other peace processes while the conflict is in its present stage of a quasi-deterministic conflict spiral. Therefore, in order to affect a successful intervention into the Burundi conflict, it will be necessary for the intervention to first accomplish negative peace by ending the ongoing violence, by force if necessary. The intervention must also address immediate humanitarian needs created by the conflict. In addition, in order to bring about positive peace, the intervention must also effect structural changes at the societal and trans-societal levels. In order to affect positive peace, the relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu and the relationships between Burundi and the regional and international actors must also be transformed. Lasting structural and relationship changes can only occur with cooperative processes. In short, the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at the individual, societal and trans-societal levels must be addressed in order for conflict transformation to occur in Burundi. In summary, in Burundi conflict, intervention must be multi-faceted in approach. The tools required must encompass both competitive and cooperative long-term processes.

The recent developments in Burundi conflict can be analyzed within the post-conflict peacebuilding perspective. Burundi conflict can be categorized as negative peace. It is also a cyclical interethnic conflict that needs to implement a future, comprehensive peace treaty that reaches the civil society and addresses the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. One of the peace initiatives has focused on peace education that seeks to open interethnic discourse from the perspectives of educators and students in elementary and secondary schools to educate Burundi's youth for peace. Such efforts would engage the future leaders in critical conversations about their individual and collective responsibilities toward peace building and societal reconstruction and transformation (Ndura-Ouedraogo, 2009).

In Burundi, there have been the post-conflict peacebuilding projects with intense international engagement. Because of the same sociopolitical context (Tutsi minority, Hutu majority, civil war, post-independence Tutsi control) like the experience of genocide in neighboring Rwanda, international community has advocated peacebuilding investments after the Arusha Peace Agreement (2000) with specific emphasis on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). Burundi has become an example country for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The World Bank made it eligible for the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for DDR. The DDR and SSR projects follow a holistic approach all of the armed forces and security sector were specifically the object of negotiated reform efforts. The DDR was part of efforts to re-establish a new security sector that include the creation of a new Burundian National Police (BNP) and the Defense Force to reach the acceptable maximum strength of 15,000 police and 25,000 soldiers and the application of strict

50-50 quotas for Hutus and Tutsis throughout the armed forces agreed upon by the government and the international community (Rumin, 2012).

Today, Burundi is in a post-conflict stage following decades of repetitive cycles of violence. However, the experience of other post-conflict countries suggests that one should be very cautious with regard to Burundi's conflict situation. The risks of failing back into conflict remain a significant possibility. Burundi's security situation is very fragile. Like any country undergoing a post-conflict, risks of times of conflict are high. It is a good news that the work of demobilization of former combatants has been completed and the last rebel movement has been integrated into the regular army. The Burundian government and the UN Peacebuilding Commission have established a strategic framework for peacebuilding with these main objectives:

1. Promotion of good governance: to restore the credibility of state, uphold the Constitution and laws, fight against corruption, strengthen national institutions and increase the quality of government services;
2. The implementation of the cease-fire between the government and former rebel factions: To continue the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants;
3. Improving security throughout the territory: To strengthen the forces and security services for their work in the general population;
4. Justice, respect for human rights, and the fight against impunity: Establish transnational justice to fight against impunity for crimes in order to enable national reconciliation;
5. The search for solutions on the land issue and the relief of the socio-economic population returnees;
6. The mobilization and coordination of international aid: The involvement of financial and technical international community is important for Burundi to be able to make progress in its peace process, stability, and reconstruction;
7. The sug-regional dimension of peace: Conflict countries in the Great Lakes region affect each other. It is, therefore, crucial to involve the countries of the subregion in the peace process in Burundi;
8. The integration of gender: Women were among the first direct victims of the conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to promote mechanisms to integrate them fully in decision-making processes and in economic life (International Business Publication, 2013).

References
1. Akonor, K. (2017). *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Examination and Recommendations for Improvement*. New York: Springer.
2. Amnesty International. (July 1997). Amnesty International Report – Burundi. Burundi: Forced relocation; new patterns of human rights abuses. *Amnesty International 15*, 1-18.

3. Bentley, K.A., & Southall, R. (2005). *An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

4. Burton, J.W. (1997). *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence, and Crime and Their Provention*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

5. Butenschon, N.A., Stiansen, O., & Vollan, K. (2015). *Power-Sharing in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Challenges for Building Peace and Democratic Stability*. London: Routledge.

6. Cervenka, Z., & Legum, C. (2004). *Can National Dialogue Break the Power of Terror in Burundi?*. Uppsalla: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

7. Cohen, J. (2007). *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

8. Cyr, R. (2001). *Twentieth Century Africa*. New York: Writers Club Press.

9. Danevad, A., & Wates, O. (2002). *Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey*. New York: Earthscan.

10. Dougherty, J., & Pfaltzgraff, R. Jr. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. New York and London: Addison Wesley Longman.

11. Doxtader, E., & Mosomothane, Y. (2003). Burundi: Permanent Deadlock or Tentative Peace?, In E. Doxtader and C. Villa-Vicencio (Eds.), *Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa* (pp. 65-89). Cape Town: ABC Press.

12. Dravis, M., & Pitsch, A. (1998). *Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi*. College Park: College of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of Maryland.

13. Harkavy, R.E., & Neuman, S.G. (2001). *Warfare and Third World*. New York: Palgrave.

14. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, *6*(3), 167-191.

15. Gurr, T.R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

16. International Business Publication (IBP). (2013). *Rwanda Business Law Handbook Volume 1: Strategic Information and Laws*, Washington D.C.: IBP.

17. Lansford, T. (2014). *Political Handbook of the World 2014*. London: Sage.

18. Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

19. Lund, M.S. (1996). *Preventing Violent: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

20. Minority at Risk. (2004). Chronology for Hutus in Burundi. *Refworld*. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38731e.html.

21. Ndura-Ouedraogo, E. (2009). Grassroots Voices of Hope: Educators' and Students' Perspectives on Educating for Peace in Post-Conflict Burundi. In C. McGlynn, M. Zembylas, Z. Bekerman and T. Gallagher (Eds.), *Peace Education in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Comparative Perspectives* (pp. 27-43). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

22. North, R. (1990). *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*. Oxford: Westview Press.

23. Öğretir-Özçelik, A.D. (2017a). Explanation and Understanding of Human Aggression: Freudian Psychoanalytical Analysis, Fromm's Neo-Freudian Perspective, and Bandu-

ra's Social Learning Theory. *International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research*, *2*(1), 2151-2164.

24. Öğretir-Özçelik, A.D. (2017b). Aggression Theories Revisited: Lorenz's Neoinstinctivism, Wilson's Socio-Biology and Skinner's Behavioral Theories. *Journal of Asian Scientific Research*, *7*(2), 38-45.

25. Öğretir, A.D., & Özçelik, S. (2008). The Study of Ethnocentrism, Stereotype, and Prejudice: Psycho-Analytical and Psycho-Dynamic Theories. *Journal of Qafqaz University*, *24*, 236-244.

26. Özçelik. S. (2006). Theories, Practices, and Research in Conflict Resolution and Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, *XXVI*(2), 133-153.

27. Özçelik, S. (2010). The Analysis of Intergroup Bias: Socio-Biology, Evolutionary Psychology, and Social Cognition Theories. *Journal of Qafqaz University*, *30*, 1-9.

28. Özçelik, S. (2013). Border Creation in Cyprus: Contested History and the Psychodynamic Perspective of Vamik Volkan. *Peace and Conflict Review*, *7*(2), 1-11.

29. Özçelik, S. (2014). Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: A Psychological Conflict Analysis. In J. Martin Ramirez, C. Morrison and A. J. Kendall (Eds.), *Conflict, Violence, Terrorism, and Their Prevention* (pp. 2-16). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

30. Özçelik, S. (2015). Analysis of the Crimean Tatars Situation During the Occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 with Conflict and Peace Studies Approach. *E-Journal of Law*, *1*(1), 11-19.

31. Özçelik, S. (2016). The Triangular Conflict of Russia, Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatars: Analysis of the 2014 Crimean Occupation and Annexation. In S. Demir (Ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in the 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges* (pp. 143-167). Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press.

32. Prendergast, J., & Smock, D. (1999). *Post-Genocidal Reconciliation: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi, USIP Special Report*. Washington D.C.: USIP.

33. Reyntjens, F. (2000). *Burundi: Prospects for Peace*. London: Minority Rights Group International.

34. Reyntjens, F. (2001). *Again at the Crossroads – Rwanda and Burundi, 2000-2001*. Current African Issues, No. 24. Uppsalla: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

35. Rumin, S. (2012). Burundi. In A. Bryden and V. Scherrer (Eds.), *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform: Insights from UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (pp. 71-115). Zurich: LIT Verlag.

36. Sandole, D. (1998). A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, *5*(2): 1-30.

37. Sandole, D. (1999). *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era*. London and New York: Pinter.

38. Sandole, D. (2003). Diagnosing Conflict: Typology. In S. Cheldelin, D. Druckman and L. Fast (Eds.), *Conflict: From Analysis and Intervention* (pp. 39-54), New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.

39. Sandole, D. (2007). *Peace and Security in the Postmodern World: The OSCE and Conflict Resolution*. New York: Routledge.
40. Scherrer, Ch. (2002). *Genocide and Crisis in in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
41. Southall, R. (2016). A Long Prelude to Peace: African Involvement in Ending Burundi's War. In O. Furley and R. May (Eds.), *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace* (pp. 201-220). London: Routledge.
42. Vasquez, J. (1993). *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. Waltz, K. (1959). *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.