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Zimbabwe:
Relational Peacebuilding Amidst Protracted Social Conflict. Strategies and Significance of Endogenous Approaches

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Abstract: Independent Zimbabwe has experienced continual episodes of mostly violent intra-state conflict that have left the country polarised and divided along mostly ethnic, racial, and class lines. In the aftermath of each conflictual episode, peacemaking attempts have been implemented to secede hostilities, however, these attempts have only built peace at the superstructure while neglecting the grassroots, which has been the microcosm of conflict wherein most of the actors are, be they perpetrators, victims and survivors. State-led attempts at reconciliation have failed to address the after-effects of conflict, and it is the argument of this paper that endogenous approaches to relational peacebuilding cannot continue to be ignored as they can potentially address some of the fault lines. Respondents to the study were purposively selected from three provinces in the country. Findings indicate the relevance and efficacy of these approaches in building peace at the family and community levels.

Keywords: Relational peace, conflict, endogenous, tradition, Zimbabwe.

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Introduction

This article discusses strategies of relational peacebuilding in a largely polarised context underwritten by various epochs of largely unresolved conflictual episodes dating back to the post-independence period in 1980 to date. Independent Zimbabwe's body politic has been characterized by high levels of intimidation, violence, and intolerance of divergent political views. Zimbabwe acquired its independence in 1980, and the expected peace dividends did not accrue due to a false start-up. Sachikonye (2011) observes that while liberation forces employed violence as a pivotal tool in securing Zimbabwe's independence, this violence subsequently became its most significant detriment for a considerable period of its independent history. Immediately following the attainment of independence, the newly established black majority government exhibited a lack of concern regarding the establishment of a transitional justice framework that would guarantee that Zimbabwe would never again endure human rights violations. Rather, the new administration perpetuated an unsustainable approach characterized by a see-no-evil approach, akin to a state of amnesia.

The absence of accountability exacerbated the scale of violence in post-independence Zimbabwe. Upon his ascension to office, the then-Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, failed to establish a formal national healing initiative to address prior human rights abuses. Rather, in his victory address in 1980, he called for reconciliation a reconciliation process that was devoid of a holistic framework, urging individuals to 'forgive and forget' (Mashingaidze, 2010; Eppel & Raftopoulos, 2008). In what is largely perceived as a drive to cement political hegemony and to contain political dissent, Robert Mugabe dispatched an army unit named the 5th Brigade to the southern parts of the country, namely the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces in what became infamously known as 'Gukurahundi' genocide.

The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and Legal Resource Foundation (LRF) (1997), in their report, put the figure of people killed during the Gukurahundi genocide at approximately 20,000 mostly unarmed and defenseless citizens. The Gukurahundi massacres only ended with the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, which is largely viewed as an elite unity pact between two former protagonists (Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) parties) (Chimhanda, 2003; Munemo, 2016). Notably, there was no restorative justice program implemented for the grassroots people who had borne the brunt of the Gukurahundi conflict.

At the turn of the new millennium, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), initiated in 2000, the parliamentary elections held in June 2000, and the presidential election of 2002 were significantly characterized by high levels of political violence (Mutanda, 2013; Sachikonye, 2011). This violence was, in part, a reaction to the establishment of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, which emerged as a formidable opposition party that posed a considerable threat to the political dominance of ZANU PF. In 2005, Operation Murambatsvina (a government program wherein the authorities

contended that they were eliminating filth from urban areas), which is widely perceived as a strategy of political retribution aimed at undermining the urban political stronghold of the opposition, was implemented in the urban areas, resulting in the displacement of close to 700,000 individuals (Tibaijuka, 2005).

The period leading up to the presidential election run-off in June 2008 marked the height of electoral violence in Zimbabwe, compelling the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) to convene a joint Summit in July 2008, wherein they recommended the establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe. In April 2008, cases of politically motivated violence escalated to 4,359 from 795 incidents during the pre-election phase, signifying an increase of 470% in monthly records. By May 2008, the figures had surged to 6,288 incidents encompassing assault, murder, malicious damage to property, intimidation, abductions, and torture, among other manifestations of political violence (Zimbabwe Peace Project, May 2008).

More recently, following the military-assisted transition in November 2017, which has been argued by some to be a coup, there has been an increase in cases of politically motivated violence, which has further polarised the nation. Following the 2018 elections, 8 protesters were shot for protesting against the delayed announcement of election results (Mungwari, 2019). In January 2019, there were demonstrations against the rising cost of living, and the state response was heavy-handed, with 12 citizens killed and a number maimed and arrested (Makombe, 2021).

Importantly for this paper, formal state-led attempts at reconciliation have not yielded the expected results. In 1980, the reconciliation policy was in word only, as was the Unity Accord of 1987. Following the consummation of the GNU in 2008, an Organ for National Healing, Integration, and Reconciliation (ONHRI) was instituted. However, the ONHRI was not successful largely because of a lack of political goodwill, political interference, and lack of funding (Bhebhe, 2013; Masunda *et al.*, 2019). The adoption of the new constitution in 2013 came with the promulgation of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), which had a 10-year lifespan (2010–2023). The NPRC has recently folded, and like its predecessor, it suffered the same fate and failed to achieve the intended objectives as specified in the constitution, again largely because of a lack of political will on the part of politicians that are serving in government, who themselves stand accused of having been at the forefront of previous epochs of violence (Bhebhe, 2013). It is, therefore, the intention of this paper to explore endogenous approaches of relational peacebuilding and how these could, from a policy perspective, be tapped into, given that formal and largely Western approaches have not yielded the desired results.

Literature review

Endogenous approaches to reconciliation refer to methods and practices that originate from within a system or community, leveraging internal resources, cultural practices,

and intrinsic capabilities to address conflicts or achieve reconciliation. These approaches are often contrasted with exogenous methods, which rely on external interventions or frameworks (Minozzi, 2013). One example of endogenous reconciliation is found in the context of conflict resolution within African societies. Traditional endogenous conflict resolution practices are deeply rooted in cultural and religious systems, providing culturally sustainable outcomes for the parties involved. Despite their historical significance, these practices are increasingly marginalized by modern governance systems. However, there is a trend towards integrating traditional and modern approaches, creating a hybrid system that incorporates relevant and acceptable practices from both paradigms (Minozzi, 2013; Philpott, 2009).

Endogenous approaches play an important role in political reconciliation, where they emphasize justice as a right relationship, often drawing from religious traditions and contemporary restorative justice movements. These approaches aim to address the wounds inflicted by political injustices through practices that restore human flourishing and increase the legitimacy of governing institutions. They integrate punishment and forgiveness as compatible practices within a restorative justice framework, highlighting the potential for endogenous reconciliation to contribute to peace and justice (Chang & Luo, 2017).

In post-conflict settings, such as Rwanda, endogenous approaches to justice and reconciliation were evident in the use of Gacaca courts, which operate alongside international and national judicial systems (Raitten, 2015). This tripartite framework reflected a complex interplay between global, national, and local approaches, challenging the dichotomy between relativism and universalism, as well as retribution and restoration. The Rwandan experience underscores the importance of endogenous methods in achieving justice and reconciliation, despite political tensions and contradictions (Rettig, 2008). Endogenous approaches to reconciliation are characterized by their reliance on internal resources and cultural practices, offering sustainable and contextually relevant solutions to conflicts and injustices. They highlight the potential for integrating traditional and modern methods to create effective reconciliation frameworks that are both culturally resonant and adaptable to contemporary challenges.

Endogenous approaches to peacebuilding, which emphasize local knowledge, practices, and interactions, significantly contribute to relational peace by fostering sustainable and culturally relevant conflict resolution mechanisms. These approaches are rooted in the understanding that peace is not merely the absence of war but a complex web of interactions and relationships that evolve over time and across different levels of society. Relational peace involves recognizing peace as a dynamic process characterized by multiple interactions among actors over time and space (Brigg, 2016; Davenport, 2018; Joseph, 2018). This perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of peace, emphasizing the importance of actor-centric and processual studies to capture the evolving nature of relationships and the practices that sustain them. The relational approach to peacebuilding highlights the importance of mutual recognition, trust, and cooperation between actors,

which are essential for achieving a quality peace characterized by mutual respect and integration (Llewellyn, 2012). Endogenous approaches, particularly in the context of hybrid peacebuilding, emphasize the integration of local knowledge and practices into broader peacebuilding efforts.

For instance, in Aguablanca, Colombia localized peace trajectories and endogenous knowledge have been shown to strengthen collaboration among various actors, both within and outside the community (Taborda & Riccardi, 2019). This approach encourages the incorporation of local peacemaking knowledge and infrastructures into sustainable peacebuilding strategies, thereby addressing some of the limitations of liberal and hybrid peacebuilding models. Moreover, endogenous conflict resolution practices, particularly in African societies, have historically been nurtured by cultural and religious systems, ensuring culturally sustainable outcomes (Malunga, 2014). Although modern governance systems have challenged the relevance of these practices, there is a growing recognition of the need to merge traditional and contemporary approaches to conflict resolution. This integration ensures that peacebuilding efforts remain relevant and acceptable in modern contexts while retaining the cultural sustainability of traditional practices.

Indigenous practices of reconciliation in Africa are deeply rooted in the continent's diverse cultural, religious, and social traditions. These practices often emphasize community involvement, restorative justice, and the healing of relationships rather than punitive measures. One prominent example is the concept of "sulh" in Algeria and Sudan, which refers to amicable conflict resolution methods outside formal judicial systems (Hanafi & Thoriquttyas, 2019). Sulh is grounded in Islamic normative texts and customary practices, highlighting the importance of restoring relationships and collective responsibility rather than focusing solely on individual punishment (Pruitt, 2001). In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is a notable example of integrating indigenous worldviews into formal reconciliation processes. The TRC emphasized interconnectedness, a key aspect of the African worldview, which facilitated the creative execution of its mandate without resorting to revenge (Fullard & Rosseau, 2008). This approach rejuvenated concepts of healing, amnesty, and reconciliation, demonstrating the potential of indigenous perspectives in transitional justice.

The African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) further illustrates Africa's innovative approach to reconciliation by broadening the scope of transitional justice to include socio-economic and psychosocial issues, beyond the traditional civil and political focus. This policy reflects Africa's role as a thought leader in developing reconciliation processes that address the continent's unique challenges (Nalin, 2018). In addition to formal mechanisms, traditional African reconciliation practices often involve rituals and community gatherings. These practices are informed by African traditional religion, philosophy, and anthropology, which provide a conceptual basis for reconciliation. Rituals, in particular, play a significant role in social reconciliation by facilitating dialogue and understanding between conflicting parties (Waterson, 2009). The integration of art and cultural expressions

also plays a crucial role in reconciliation. For instance, in Angola, Kuduro music and dance serve as cultural performances where individuals and communities negotiate trauma and reconciliation (Moorman, 2014). These artistic expressions allow for the embodiment of healing and the negotiation of past traumas in a shared cultural context.

Methodology

A qualitative approach was adopted to explore in-depth some of the traditional mechanisms of peacebuilding in the three provinces of Zimbabwe namely the Midlands (Gokwe South district), Mashonaland Central (Muzarabani district), and Mashonaland West (Zvimba district) provinces. The research aimed at explaining data about individuals' experiences, sentiments, and emotions. A total of sixty-eight participants engaged in face-to-face interviews, focus group discussions, and questionnaires from the designated regions. The population was purposefully selected from various social strata to ensure that the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders regarding endogenous approaches to peacebuilding were adequately represented. The stakeholders comprised four representatives from political parties, four representatives from civil society organizations, ten victims, ten perpetrators, six traditional leaders, and thirty ordinary citizens. From each stratum, an equal number of male and female participants were chosen. Among the sixty-eight respondents, thirty-two were female, whereas thirty-six were male. The imbalance in gender representation can be attributed to the predominance of men within traditional leadership roles.

Findings

Findings from interviews, questionnaires, and focus group discussions confirmed that Zimbabwe has continually experienced politically motivated violence, especially electoral violence, since the turn of the millennium. Whilst respondents did not necessarily agree with the settings, degree, and actors of the politically motivated violence, all respondents alluded that it indeed occurred. The recognition of political violence as an issue that adversely impacts development by all participants across the political spectrum was arguably a noteworthy occurrence that signified the initial move towards united efforts to tackle the challenge. Notably, as well, most of the respondents expressed ignorance when asked about the formal state-led processes aimed at reconciliation that were led by the ONHRI and the NPRC during the period 2008–2023. The few respondents who professed to know about these two bodies did not know of any tangible programs they implemented. Several traditional approaches to relational peace-building were acknowledged by the selected respondents. These ranged from the micro (family) to the meso (community) level and they are discussed below.

**The Role Played by 'Sahwira" (Family Friend)
and 'Munyai' (go-between) in Peacebuilding**

Respondents identified the role played by 'sahwira' (family friend) and munyai (go-between) as crucial in building and mending relations. Each family in the African culture has a friend who, in cases of conflict, people may approach to get an audience with that particular family. In this case, vanasahwira (the family friends), are the link between the outside world and the family. These are individuals who are not only acceptable within a particular family but are highly respected and can say anything without ruffling feathers. This particular quality allows them to speak on sensitive matters including conflicts. Munyai (go-between) was identified by some respondents as a crucial person in peacebuilding as he or she often negotiates between families (shuttle diplomacy) in both preventative and mitigation circumstances.

Family Court (Dare remumusha)

Respondents, especially in in-depth interviews and focus group discussions identified the family court (dare remusha) as a traditional mechanism of peace building that is employed at the family level. Under customary law, the head of the family, who is the father, is the first to attempt to resolve family conflicts. In the case that the father is not available; the eldest son assumes that responsibility. The objective of this court is to keep the family united and in harmony with each other. The family derived authority from the fact that, in the local culture, the actions of one member of the family have ramifications for the whole family; hence, every family member was responsible for the well-being of the whole family. For example, when one commits murder, the whole family is affected by the avenging spirit and not just the offender.

Dare (Traditional Court)

Respondents also identified the traditional court presided over by the sabhuku (village head), sadunhu (headman), and mambo (chief) as a traditional mechanism of peacebuilding in the African context. The researcher had an opportunity to observe Chief Njelele of Gokwe presiding over his court. Dare makes use of customary law or tradition to preside over conflicts in communities. Disputes over land and marriages under customary law are presided over by this court. The chief presides over the court with his cabinet (machinda amambo) Nevertheless, the chief makes monthly reports to the magistrate court that either endorses or nullifies the outcomes of the traditional court. A case is first presided over by the sabhuku (village head), who, in instances where he or she feels the matter is beyond her or him, refers the case to the sadunhu (headman) and ultimately to the chief (mambo). These courts preside over civil cases whilst criminal offenses are reported to

the police and presided over by the formal judiciary system. Traditional leaders who were interviewed all concurred that political violence was a criminal offense whose cases they had no jurisdiction over.

Nevertheless, in instances of serious criminal cases such as rape and murder, whilst the criminal offenses will be presided over by the formal judiciary system, the traditional court could summon a person to appear before the traditional court for what traditional leaders who were interviewed in this research called 'kuita chiga' (taboo) or 'kukanganisa nharaunda/kudeura ropa munyika yamambo' (spilling blood). The thinking behind this was that murder and rape had consequences for the whole community, for they went against African norms and values of 'Ubuntu'. The consequences ranged from droughts and mysterious happenings to deaths. In such cases, the offender and his family were tried and asked to pay compensation (kuripa), and a cleansing ceremony to clean the land was held.

Respondents indicated that in the majority of politically motivated cases of violence, traditional leaders refused to deal with such and referred victims of political violence to the police. One respondent, a victim, who was taken to a 'political base' and assaulted and had her goats taken from her, reported the case to the local village head, who refused to do anything even though she knew her assailants. In her words:

> '... our village head is also afraid, when I reported my case, he simply referred me to the police and said he could not do anything, although I knew the people who took my goats...'

Other respondents indicated that they could not report their cases to traditional leaders as most of them were card-carrying members of a certain political party and also participated in violent activities. Narratives from victims generally showed citizen's lack of trust and confidence in the traditional leadership.

The Protective Role of the Traditional Leaders

The findings of the research reveal that the office of traditional leaders is revered in communities. Traditional leaders are seen as the custodians of customs and traditions. A representative of the Legal Resources Foundation noted that conflict and political violence hurt the community as a whole; hence, the traditional leadership structure plays a protectionist role in preserving the culture and customs of the community as well as from harm. One of the village heads in Mashonaland Central interviewed narrated how she was victimized on political grounds for protecting her subjects. She argued that some youths wanted to burn her house to protect known opposition activists in her area. She was taken to a political base together with her subjects by some youths, who demanded her people surrender and join their political party. She, however, stopped the process and argued that it was the right of every citizen under her jurisdiction to belong to a political party of their

choice. In her words:

> 'If you are a village head and your subjects are at each other's throat, your role is to ensure that they leave in harmony.'

It was the resoluteness and courage of this village head that protected her subjects from political violence. Nevertheless, it was evident that the village head feared for herself and her community as Zimbabwe came close to yet another plebiscite as evidenced by her following words,

> 'Election time is once again before us ... we are extremely afraid because of the experiences we had in 2018 ... we do not know if the government put in place strategies to ensure that the next election is not a replay of 2018'.

In light of Lederach's (1997) assertions on the need for multiple peace-building players who are well coordinated, such fears reveal that community strategies to combat political violence must be married with a broader national vision and initiatives for sustainability.

Kuripa Ngozi (Appeasement of an avenging spirit)

Respondents identified kuripa ngozi (appeasement of an avenging spirit) as a peace-building mechanism that is employed in cases where murder occurred. Respondents highlighted that killing a person in their local culture was a serious offense that had ramifications for the offender's family as a whole. The avenging spirit would cause mysterious happenings and deaths as a way of prompting the family to pay compensation. It is only through 'kuripa' (appeasement) that the avenging spirit would rest and cease causing suffering for the offender's family. If not appeased, the avenging spirit may wipe out or kill the whole family and would continue to do so generation after generation until it is appeased. One village head in Mashonaland West observed that:

> 'even if one goes to the formal courts, the perpetrator will have to pay compensation for the matter to be resolved'.

A head of cattle and a young virgin woman are paid to appease the avenging spirit. The payment is an admission of guilt and a gesture to ask for forgiveness on the part of the offender's family, whilst the acceptance of payment is a gesture of forgiving and accepting to bury the past and share a common future on the part of the deceased family. A ceremony where food and beer are shared by the two families is held to signify reconciliation, and the rest of the community is invited to celebrate with the affected families.

A popular case that was narrated by most respondents was the case which involved Moses Chokuda, who was killed by a group of ZANU PF youths led by the then Midlands Governor's son, Farai Machaya. Following a visit which was made by the then First Lady Grace Mugabe, the youths had been given food items to distribute but it is alleged they chose to divert the goods for their benefit. Whilst some of the respondents argued that

the deceased, Moses Chokuda, and his friend, who both worked for the Machaya family, stole the goods, some respondents equally argued that Moses Chokuda was innocent but was targeted and killed for his political views. Moses Chokuda was raided in his home and taken, beaten, and killed. According to his father, he broke three ribs, and his back was fractured.

The deceased family approached Chief Njelele for arbitration and wanted ten cattle for compensation so that they could bury their son, but the Machaya family refused. The information that was obtained from a relative of the perpetrators, was refused because they did not want to jeopardize the case, which was already before the courts, by accepting guilt and paying compensation. As a result of their refusal, the Chokuda family refused to bury their son for close to three years. All respondents, including the Chokuda family and the Machaya family, acknowledged that there were mysterious happenings that befell the perpetrator's family that forced them to return to Chief Njelele and ask him to negotiate between the two families two years after the death of Moses Chokuda.

Respondents of focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with Tavengwa Chokuda (father to Moses Chokuda) revealed that the Machaya family tried on several occasions to use their political muscle to bury the deceased without success until they had to appease the avenging spirit of Moses Chokuda. On one occasion, respondents claim that the Machaya family tried to take the deceased body out of the police coffin into another coffin but the deceased body 'refused' to leave the police coffin. It is also claimed that later, Governor Machaya ordered the deceased body to be buried in the police coffin but the undertakers 'failed' to move the body out of the mortuary. Respondents also claimed that one of the magistrates who attempted to charge Tavengwa Chokuda (father of the deceased) of extortion since he openly argued that he needed compensation during the murder trial and a police officer who attempted to facilitate for the disappearance of the case file at the behest of the Machaya family developed mental challenges in mysterious circumstances.

It was these mysterious circumstances and the resolution of the criminal case in the High Court that forced the Machaya family to approach Chief Njelele to negotiate between the two families. At first, the Chokuda family wanted seventy cattle and US$35,000 to facilitate the burial of their son, but after negotiations, they settled for US$25,000 and thirty-five cattle. The Chokuda family also wanted a young virgin woman but Chief Njelele refused on the basis that in their tradition and culture, it was not for the living to demand a wife but it was the responsibility of the deceased to pick the woman he wanted, who will in turn come on her own to the deceased family.

It is important to note that the question of a young virgin woman was hotly contested in this research. Whilst Chief Njelele did not accept the Chokuda family's request for a young virgin woman, some traditional leaders in the same area believed that the young virgin woman was supposed to be given to Moses Chokuda's family as per tradition. One village head argued that it was necessary for people in Gokwe South to strictly observe their culture. In his observation, in the local culture 'mukadzi aitungamira mombe dzekunoripa'

(a young virgin woman would lead the herd of cattle to the victim's home). Another village head, whilst lamenting the new order of human rights, had the following to say:

> '... in our culture, males would play around with their wives' sisters in what was called 'chiramu', but today we are told it is domestic violence'.

These statements from various respondents illustrate the disputes that prevail in Gokwe South concerning the traditional methods of peacebuilding. While a segment of the population perceived traditional peacebuilding mechanisms as evolving and adapting to contemporary circumstances, another segment regarded these mechanisms as fixed and immutable.

Ultimately, a sum of US$25,000 along with twenty cattle was paid to the family of the deceased before the interment of Moses Chokuda, while the remaining balance was settled in full after the burial. Although the offenders were sentenced to a term of eighteen years in prison, they remained obliged to appease the avenging spirit. Regardless of their social and economic stature, the Machaya family had no alternative but to appease the avenging spirit. In the words of Tavengwa Chokuda, (father of the deceased):

> 'kugona ngozi huiripa' (the one and sure way of addressing an avenging spirit is to appease it).

Bira (cleansing ceremonies)

The 'Bira' (a ritual of purification) was recognized by respondents as a significant indigenous strategy for peacebuilding. They explained that when acts such as murder, arson, and rape occur within a community, there arise collective repercussions; therefore, there exists a communal obligation, and every individual within the community bears responsibility for the welfare of that specific community. Such transgressions invoke the ire of the ancestors, consequently resulting in the land potentially enduring droughts as a form of retribution. In the words of a respondent from Heal Zimbabwe Trust:

> The cleansing ceremony 'seeks not to label the perpetrators but looks at the whole community as guilty'.

The cleansing rituals are conducted to honor the ancestors and to cleanse the territory of negative omens and evil spirits that may arise from acts such as homicide. The traditional authorities and spiritual leaders typically preside over the rites in the presence of community members.

In a notable incident that garnered significant media attention and was recounted by various respondents, mysterious circumstances associated with mermaids resulted in a water crisis in Gokwe, as a local water facility failed to supply water. Consequently, the responsible Ministry of Water Resources, along with local traditional authorities, felt compelled to conduct a traditional ritual during which beer was prepared to appease both

the ancestors and the mermaids. The findings of the research indicated that a majority of respondents perceived a connection between this incident and the post-2018 electoral violence, suggesting that the actions of the local populace had incited the displeasure of the ancestors. Following the completion of the ritual, the water pump resumed its normal operation.

Nhimbe /Humwe
(Practice of working together as a community to help each other)

Nhimbe, or Humwe, was recognized by respondents across the three provinces as a traditional mechanism for fostering peace. This practice was historically employed to mobilize labor to mitigate the effects of droughts and to cultivate harmony and unity within communities. The essence of nhimbe is rooted in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which underscores the ideals of unity, solidarity, collective action, and a sense of belonging. Traditional leaders within the provinces are utilizing nhimbe as a means to foster cohesion within their communities and ensure that individuals collaborate towards a shared objective, transcending political affiliations. A respondent from Heal Zimbabwe also opined that their civic organization is collaborating with traditional leaders in the Midlands and Mashonaland provinces through the nhimbe concept, to reunite the populace and restore the social fabric. The entire community is invited to assist in the plowing or harvesting of a fellow member's fields, after which the beneficiary reciprocates by providing sustenance and beverages to the community members. In modern contexts, nhimbe is being employed to assist victims of political violence in both cultivating and harvesting their fields as well as in reconstructing their homes that were destroyed due to such violence.

Discussion

Endogenous approaches can assist in building relational peace in Zimbabwe, as evidenced by the findings of this paper that highlight the potential of locally-driven strategies in addressing the country's complex socio-political conflicts. Relational peace mostly takes place at the grassroots, a context that is detached from politicians who tend to focus more on dealing with structural issues of peacebuilding. The endogenous approaches highlighted above emphasize the importance of local knowledge, cultural practices, and community involvement in reconciliation efforts. Following the widespread cases of politically motivated violence, Zimbabwean society has largely resorted to traditional and homegrown coping mechanisms in addressing trauma and broken relationships, due to the government's inaction in establishing a comprehensive national healing agenda, or lethargy in the case where these were instituted (ONHRI and NPRC).

The traditional approaches, while not formally structured, reflect a grassroots-level adaptation to conflict resolution, suggesting that local communities have inherent mechanisms

for dealing with conflict, albeit not always effective in achieving long-term peace given that the cycle of violence continually arises due to failure or inaction by politicians with regards to addressing the root causes of the political problems in Zimbabwe. A very important endogenous strategy is the use of restorative-based interventions. These interventions focus on building capacity for reconciliation through participatory and collaborative processes that are centered on local communities.

Such approaches have been shown to transform relationships and promote peaceful interactions, even in the absence of effective state interventions. This method integrates elements of reconciliation, restorative justice, and conflict transformation theories, highlighting the potential of community-driven initiatives in fostering reconciliation. Furthermore, the role of traditional reconciliation practices, such as spirit-oriented systems, is also recognized as a valuable component of endogenous reconciliation efforts. These practices, although marginalized during colonial rule and to some extent in independent Zimbabwe, have a long history in Zimbabwe and can contribute to healing and reconciliation by drawing on cultural and spiritual resources that resonate with local communities.

However, as has been observed, the effectiveness of endogenous approaches to relational peacebuilding in Zimbabwe is limited by external factors, such as state capture of reconciliation processes and the politicization of state-led truth and reconciliation commissions. These challenges highlight the need for a hybrid approach that combines endogenous strategies with institutional support to address the root causes of conflict and ensure sustainable peace. We argue that endogenous approaches, characterized by local participation, cultural relevance, and community empowerment, hold significant potential for assisting in the reconciliation process in Zimbabwe. These strategies can complement formal reconciliation efforts by addressing the unique needs and contexts of local communities, thereby fostering a more inclusive and sustainable peace. However, for these approaches to be fully effective, they must be supported by broader institutional frameworks that address systemic issues and promote genuine reconciliation.

Conclusion

The grassroots serves as the microcosm of conflict, wherein its effects are felt the most. This has been the case in Zimbabwe where people at the grassroots are mostly the perpetrators, victims, and survivors of conflict. Whilst peacemaking at the national level can secede hostilities, endogenous approaches become pertinent in terms of addressing relational peacebuilding between community members. Endogenous strategies, which are community-driven and culturally rooted, offer promising alternatives for reconciliation in Zimbabwe. These methods emphasize community involvement and cultural practices, which can be more effective in addressing local grievances and fostering reconciliation than state-led initiatives. Restorative-based interventions also show potential in building reconciliation capacity. These interventions focus on participatory and collaborative

approaches, engaging affected individuals in dialogue and symbolic gestures of reconciliation. Such methods can transform relationships and promote peaceful interactions, even in the absence of effective state interventions. Endogenous strategies such as traditional justice mechanisms, restorative interventions, and education for reconciliation offer viable pathways for reconciliation in Zimbabwe. These approaches emphasize community involvement, cultural relevance, and participatory processes, which are crucial for addressing the limitations of state-led efforts. However, for these strategies to be effective, they must be supported by political reforms and inclusive participation, ensuring that reconciliation efforts are not only symbolic but also transformative and sustainable.

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Sudan:
Understanding the Dynamics of Terrorism and Conflict Management. A Multifaceted Approach

Abraham Ename MINKO

Abstract: The research proposal aims to comprehensively examine terrorism and conflict management dynamics in Sudan. It seeks to understand terrorism's root causes, its interplay with conflict dynamics, and the effectiveness of current management strategies. Employing historical analysis, socio-political inquiry, and economic assessment, the study will explore Sudan's historical context, identifying key turning points and socio-political dimensions such as governance challenges and identity politics. Additionally, the research will scrutinize terrorism's economic underpinnings, including illicit economies and external financing. It will evaluate terrorism's impact on peacebuilding efforts, offering insights into effective conflict management strategies. Expected outcomes include a nuanced understanding of terrorism's dynamics, actionable recommendations for policymakers, and contributions to peacebuilding efforts. By shedding light on these complexities, the study aims to aid in mitigating terrorism and fostering sustainable peace not only in Sudan but also globally.

Keywords: Terrorism, conflict management, Sudan, Africa, dynamics, multifaceted approach, governance, identity politics.

I. Introduction

Background and context of terrorism and conflict in Sudan

The background and context of terrorism and conflict in Sudan are deeply intertwined with the country's tumultuous history, marked by decades of internal strife, political instability, and ethnic divisions (Carolan, 2020). Sudan, located in Northeast Africa, has experienced

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numerous conflicts, including the protracted civil war between the northern Arab-dominated government and southern rebels, which lasted for more than two decades until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This conflict, fueled by issues of religion, ethnicity, and regional disparities, not only resulted in widespread devastation but also provided fertile ground for the emergence of various armed groups and militias, some of which have been labeled as terrorist organizations by the international community (Deng & Deng, 2016).

One notable example is the Sudanese government's support for extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in the 1990s and early 2000s, under the leadership of President Omar al-Bashir (Bessler, 2015). During this period, Sudan became a haven and operational base for Osama bin Laden and other jihadist elements, contributing to its reputation as a breeding ground for terrorism. While Sudan has since undergone political changes, including the ousting of al-Bashir in 2019, the legacy of its past support for terrorism continues to influence its security landscape (Gebrekidan, 2021).

Furthermore, Sudan's internal conflicts have been exacerbated by external factors, including regional power dynamics and transnational terrorism networks. The country's strategic location in the Horn of Africa, bordering countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, has made it vulnerable to regional rivalries and proxy conflicts (Grawert, 2013). For instance, the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, which erupted in the early 2000s, drew in neighboring countries and rebel groups, leading to a complex web of alliances and antagonisms that fueled further violence and instability. The secession of South Sudan in 2011, following a referendum that saw overwhelming support for independence, added another layer of complexity to Sudan's security challenges (Ille, 2016). While the separation was intended to end decades of conflict between the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian and animist south, it also created new fault lines and power struggles within each country, contributing to ongoing violence and instability (Cohen, 2012).

The background and context of terrorism and conflict in Sudan are shaped by a combination of historical grievances, internal power struggles, external influences, and regional dynamics. Understanding this complex landscape is essential for devising effective strategies for addressing terrorism and promoting peace and stability in Sudan and the wider region.

Statement of the research problem

The statement of the research problem in investigating terrorism and conflict management in Sudan lies in the urgent need to comprehend the multifaceted nature of these challenges and to identify effective strategies for mitigating their impacts. Sudan has long been afflicted by internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, and the presence of various terrorist groups, creating a volatile environment that threatens regional stability and human security. The primary issue at hand is the persistence of terrorism amidst ongoing efforts to manage and resolve conflicts within the country.

One pressing aspect of the research problem is understanding the root causes and dynamics of terrorism in Sudan. Despite changes in leadership and shifts in geopolitical alliances, terrorist organizations continue to operate within Sudan's borders, posing a threat to both domestic and international security. Unraveling the complex interplay of factors driving terrorism—such as historical grievances, socio-economic disparities, and external influences—is crucial for devising targeted interventions to counter these threats effectively.

Another facet of the research problem is assessing the effectiveness of current conflict management strategies in addressing the nexus between terrorism and conflict in Sudan. While various peace agreements and initiatives have been implemented over the years, the persistence of violence and the resurgence of terrorist activities indicate that existing approaches may be inadequate or misaligned with the realities on the ground. Understanding the limitations and shortcomings of these strategies is essential for refining and recalibrating efforts to promote peace and stability in Sudan.

Furthermore, the research problem encompasses the challenge of balancing security imperatives with the protection of human rights and the rule of law in counterterrorism efforts. In the context of Sudan, where authoritarian governance and human rights abuses have been prevalent, there is a risk that counterterrorism measures may exacerbate social tensions, fuel grievances, and undermine prospects for long-term peace. Finding ways to address security concerns while upholding democratic principles and respecting fundamental rights poses a significant dilemma for policymakers and practitioners.

Overall, the research problem revolves around the need to develop a nuanced understanding of the interconnections between terrorism, conflict dynamics, and governance challenges in Sudan. By identifying key drivers, vulnerabilities, and potential leverage points, this research aims to contribute to more effective and sustainable approaches for managing conflicts, countering terrorism, and promoting peace in Sudan and beyond.

Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study on terrorism and conflict management in Sudan are multifaceted and aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex challenges facing the country. Firstly, the study seeks to analyze the root causes and dynamics of terrorism in Sudan. By examining historical narratives, socio-political structures, and economic factors, the objective is to uncover the underlying drivers that perpetuate terrorist activities within the country. For example, historical grievances stemming from marginalization and discrimination against certain ethnic groups have fueled resentment and provided fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take root.

Secondly, the study aims to assess the effectiveness of current conflict management strategies in addressing the nexus between terrorism and conflict in Sudan. This involves evaluating the impact of peace agreements, security measures, and international interventions on mitigating violence and promoting stability. For instance, the implementation of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 brought an end to the long-standing conflict between North and South Sudan but failed to address underlying grievances in other regions, contributing to continued instability.

Thirdly, the study endeavors to explore the socio-political factors contributing to terrorism and conflict in Sudan. This includes examining issues of governance, identity politics, and social inequalities that exacerbate tensions and create fertile ground for extremist groups to recruit and thrive. For example, the authoritarian rule of former President Omar al-Bashir, characterized by repression and marginalization of dissenting voices, fueled resentment and provided a breeding ground for radicalization.

Fourthly, the study aims to analyze the economic dimensions of terrorism in Sudan, including the role of illicit economies, resource competition, and external financing in sustaining terrorist activities. This involves examining how economic grievances and disparities contribute to the vulnerability of marginalized communities to recruitment by terrorist groups. For example, in regions like Darfur, competition over land and resources has fueled conflict and provided opportunities for extremist groups to exploit local grievances.

Finally, the study seeks to identify best practices and innovative approaches for mitigating terrorism and fostering sustainable peace in Sudan. By drawing on lessons learned from comparative case studies and international experiences, the objective is to provide actionable recommendations for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars working in the fields of peacebuilding and security. For instance, exploring successful community-based approaches to countering violent extremism in other conflict-affected regions may offer valuable insights for addressing similar challenges in Sudan.

II. Historical Context of Terrorism and Conflict in Sudan

Evolution of conflict dynamics

The evolution of conflict dynamics in Sudan is a complex narrative intertwined with the country's history of colonialism, ethnic diversity, and struggles for power and resources. One significant phase in this evolution is the legacy of British colonial rule, which imposed artificial boundaries and exacerbated existing ethnic and religious tensions (Jawondo, 2013). The divide-and-rule tactics employed by colonial administrators laid the groundwork for future conflicts, as various ethnic groups and regions vied for control and autonomy within the newly created nation-state (Bessler, 2015).

Following independence in 1956, Sudan witnessed a series of internal conflicts driven by political, ethnic, and economic grievances. The First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) erupted shortly after independence, pitting the predominantly Christian and animist south against the Arab-dominated central government in Khartoum. The conflict, fueled by disparities in wealth and power, culminated in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which granted autonomy to the South but failed to address underlying grievances (Gebrekidan, 2021).

The ceasefire proved temporary, as tensions reignited in the late 1970s, leading to the outbreak of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). This protracted conflict, characterized by widespread violence, displacement, and humanitarian crises, centered on issues of religion, ethnicity, and resource control (Khan *et al.*, 2019). The government's imposition of Sharia law in the predominantly Christian and animist south sparked rebellion and resistance, fueling the rise of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and other insurgent groups (Musa, 2018).

Amidst the civil war, Sudan also became embroiled in regional conflicts, particularly in the western region of Darfur. The Darfur conflict, which erupted in the early 2000s, was fueled by competition over land, water, and resources between nomadic Arab herders and sedentary African farmers (Phiri, 2016). The government's brutal response to the rebellion, including the arming of Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, resulted in widespread atrocities and mass displacement, leading to accusations of genocide by the international community (Zouhir, 2015).

In addition to internal conflicts, Sudan has been affected by regional power struggles and proxy wars, further complicating its security landscape (Petterson, 2003). For example, Sudan's support for extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in the 1990s and early 2000s drew international condemnation and led to sanctions and isolation. Meanwhile, neighboring countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, have been accused of supporting rebel groups operating within Sudan's borders, exacerbating regional tensions and prolonging conflict (Suliman, 2012).

In summary, the evolution of conflict dynamics in Sudan is characterized by a complex interplay of historical grievances, ethnic divisions, and regional rivalries. Understanding this historical trajectory is essential for comprehending the root causes of conflict and formulating effective strategies for peacebuilding and reconciliation in Sudan.

Emergence of terrorist groups

The emergence of terrorist groups in Sudan is deeply intertwined with the country's complex history of internal conflicts, regional instability, and geopolitical dynamics. One notable example is the presence of extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda, which found sanctuary and support within Sudan during the 1990s and early 2000s. Under the leadership of President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan provided a haven for Osama bin Laden and other senior al-Qaeda operatives, allowing them to operate and conduct training camps within its territory. This period marked Sudan as a hub for international terrorism and raised concerns about its role in facilitating global jihadism (Smith, 2011).

Furthermore, Sudan's involvement in regional conflicts and proxy wars has contributed to the emergence of terrorist groups operating within its borders. For instance, during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), various rebel factions, including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), were accused of committing acts of

terrorism, such as targeting civilians and carrying out attacks on infrastructure (Deng & Deng, 2016). Additionally, the government's support for proxy militias in regions like Darfur further fueled violence and instability, providing opportunities for extremist groups to exploit local grievances and recruit followers (Phiri, 2016).

Moreover, Sudan's strategic location in the Horn of Africa has made it susceptible to the spread of extremism and terrorist activities from neighboring countries (Madibbo, 2015). The porous borders, weak governance structures, and limited state control in remote regions have facilitated the movement of individuals and weapons across borders, enabling terrorist groups to establish networks and operate with impunity. For example, Sudan shares borders with countries such as Libya, Chad, and South Sudan, which have experienced security challenges and served as transit routes for militants and weapons (Khan *et al.*, 2019).

The aftermath of Sudan's internal conflicts and political transitions has also created conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorist groups (Bhoke, 2005). The power vacuums, socio-economic disparities, and breakdown of state institutions have left marginalized communities vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist organizations. In regions like Darfur, where grievances persist and trust in the central government is low, armed groups with ideological agendas have exploited local grievances to gain support and influence (Jok, 2013).

In summary, the emergence of terrorist groups in Sudan is a multifaceted phenomenon driven by a combination of historical, regional, and domestic factors. Understanding the complex dynamics at play is crucial for devising effective strategies to counter terrorism and promote peace and stability in Sudan and the wider region. Addressing the root causes of extremism, enhancing border security, and strengthening governance and the rule of law are essential components of efforts to mitigate the threat posed by terrorist groups in Sudan.

Historical narratives and key events

Historical narratives and key events play a pivotal role in shaping the understanding of terrorism and conflict in Sudan, providing critical insights into the root causes, grievances, and dynamics that have fueled violence and instability over the years (Gebrekidan, 2021). One significant historical narrative is the legacy of British colonial rule, which imposed artificial boundaries and exacerbated ethnic and religious divisions within Sudan. The divide-and-rule policies implemented by colonial administrators sowed the seeds of discord and laid the groundwork for future conflicts, setting the stage for the challenges that would plague Sudan in the post-independence era (Cohen, 2012).

One key event in Sudan's history is the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, which temporarily halted the First Sudanese Civil War and granted autonomy to the southern region(Jendia, 2002). This agreement marked a significant milestone in Sudan's

efforts to address the grievances of marginalized communities and alleviate tensions between the North and South. However, the peace proved fragile, and underlying issues of identity, governance, and resource distribution remained unresolved, setting the stage for renewed conflict in the years to come (Barltrop, 2011).

Another pivotal moment in Sudan's history is the imposition of Sharia law by President Jaafar Nimeiry in 1983, which ignited the Second Sudanese Civil War between the central government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south (Hastrup, 2012). The declaration of Sharia law not only deepened religious divides but also alienated non-Muslim communities and fueled rebellion against the government. The civil war, characterized by atrocities, displacement, and humanitarian crises, lasted for over two decades and left a devastating legacy of violence and division (Musa, 2018).

In addition to internal conflicts, Sudan has been affected by regional dynamics and external interventions that have further complicated its security landscape (Jawondo, 2013). One notable example is Sudan's support for extremist groups such as al-Qaeda during the 1990s and early 2000s, under the leadership of President Omar al-Bashir. Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and its role as a haven for jihadists had far-reaching implications for regional and global security, contributing to its isolation and diplomatic challenges (Khan *et al.*, 2019).

Moreover, the secession of South Sudan in 2011 following an independence referendum marked a significant turning point in Sudan's history, reshaping the country's political landscape and redefining its relationships with neighboring states. While the separation was intended to end decades of conflict between North and South Sudan, it also created new challenges and power struggles within each country, further exacerbating tensions and instability in the region (Phiri, 2016).

III. Socio-Political Factors Contributing to Terrorism and Conflict

Governance challenges

Governance challenges have been central to Sudan's struggle with terrorism and conflict, reflecting underlying issues of authoritarianism, corruption, and marginalization that have fueled grievances and instability. One significant challenge is the legacy of autocratic rule under former President Omar al-Bashir, whose regime was characterized by repression, human rights abuses, and a lack of accountability. Al-Bashir's authoritarian governance not only stifled political dissent but also marginalized certain ethnic and religious groups, exacerbating social tensions and creating fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take hold (Grawert, 2013). For example, the marginalization of non-Arab populations in regions like Darfur fueled resentment and provided recruitment opportunities for rebel groups and terrorist organizations operating in the area.

Moreover, Sudan's transition to democracy following the ousting of al-Bashir in 2019 has been fraught with challenges, including the difficulty of building inclusive and effective governance structures amidst ongoing conflicts and political divisions. The transition government, comprised of civilian and military leaders, faces immense pressure to address the root causes of past injustices while navigating competing interests and power dynamics. This delicate balance has been further complicated by the resurgence of violence in regions like Darfur and the failure to fully implement peace agreements, underscoring the fragility of Sudan's democratic transition (Zouhir, 2015).

Another governance challenge in Sudan is the prevalence of corruption and weak rule of law, which undermine trust in state institutions and erode public confidence in the government's ability to address socio-economic grievances and provide basic services. Corruption not only fosters inequality and injustice but also creates opportunities for illicit activities, including terrorism financing and organized crime (Philip, 2011). For example, the diversion of public resources and the lack of transparency in government contracts have facilitated the proliferation of illicit economies and enabled terrorist groups to exploit vulnerable communities for financial support.

Furthermore, Sudan's decentralized governance structure and uneven distribution of power have exacerbated regional disparities and fueled tensions between different ethnic and tribal groups (Suliman, 2012). The centralization of political and economic power in Khartoum has historically marginalized peripheral regions and perpetuated feelings of exclusion and marginalization among local populations. This governance imbalance has been exploited by armed groups and terrorist organizations to garner support and recruit followers, further destabilizing the country and hindering efforts to promote peace and reconciliation (Carolan, 2020).

Governance challenges lie at the heart of Sudan's struggle with terrorism and conflict, reflecting broader issues of authoritarianism, corruption, and marginalization that have fueled grievances and instability. Addressing these challenges requires concerted efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, promote accountability and transparency, and address socio-economic disparities to build a more inclusive and resilient society capable of addressing the root causes of terrorism and conflict.

Identity politics and ethnic tensions

Identity politics and ethnic tensions have been deeply entrenched in Sudan's social fabric, playing a significant role in fueling terrorism and conflict within the country. One prominent example of identity politics is the divide between Arab and non-Arab populations, which has historically been a source of tension and discrimination (Bol, 2000). The Arab-dominated government in Khartoum has often marginalized non-Arab ethnic groups, exacerbating feelings of exclusion and resentment. For instance, in the Darfur

region, the Arab-dominated Janjaweed militia has been accused of perpetrating atrocities against non-Arab tribes, leading to widespread displacement and violence (Adebajo, 2011).

Moreover, Sudan's diverse ethnic and religious composition has been exploited by political elites to consolidate power and maintain control over resources, further exacerbating ethnic tensions and exacerbating divisions (Idris,2005). The manipulation of ethnic identities for political gain has deepened social cleavages and contributed to cycles of violence and reprisals. For example, during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the government's imposition of Sharia law in the predominantly non-Muslim south exacerbated religious and ethnic divides, fueling rebellion and insurgency (Gebrekidan, 2021).

Ethnic tensions have also been exacerbated by competition over land, water, and resources, particularly in marginalized regions where access to basic services and economic opportunities is limited. In the oil-rich regions of South Sudan, for example, competition between ethnic groups for control over resources has fueled violence and contributed to the resurgence of conflict, despite efforts to broker peace agreements and promote reconciliation (Fabrice, 2012).

Furthermore, identity politics and ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by the politicization of religion, particularly in the context of Sudan's transition to an Islamic state under President Nimeiry in the 1980s. The imposition of Sharia law and the privileging of Islamic identity over other religious and cultural identities further marginalized non-Muslim communities and fueled resentment and resistance (Idris, 2005). This politicization of religion has created fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take hold, leading to the emergence of terrorist groups that exploit religious grievances for their ends.

Identity politics and ethnic tensions are central to understanding the dynamics of terrorism and conflict in Sudan, reflecting historical grievances, social inequalities, and political manipulation (Jawondo, 2013). Addressing these issues requires efforts to promote inclusive governance, protect minority rights, and foster dialogue and reconciliation among diverse ethnic and religious communities. Failure to address these underlying tensions risks perpetuating cycles of violence and instability, undermining efforts to build a more peaceful and prosperous Sudan.

Social inequalities and marginalization

Social inequalities and marginalization have been pervasive in Sudan, contributing to deep-seated grievances that have fueled terrorism and conflict within the country. One significant manifestation of social inequality is the disparity in access to resources and opportunities between different socio-economic groups (Khan *et al.*, 2019). The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small elite, often based in urban centers like Khartoum, has left marginalized communities in rural and peripheral areas economically disenfranchised and politically marginalized. For example, in regions like Darfur and South Kordofan, where poverty rates are highest, lack of access to basic

services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure perpetuates cycles of poverty and exacerbates social tensions (Petterson, 2003).

Moreover, ethnic and tribal identities intersect with socio-economic disparities, further marginalizing certain groups and exacerbating feelings of exclusion and discrimination. In Sudan's pluralistic society, where ethnic diversity is a source of strength, it is also a source of division and conflict when certain groups are systematically marginalized (Jendia, 2002). For instance, in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan, the government's marginalization of the Nuba people, who are predominantly non-Arab and non-Muslim, has fueled resentment and resistance, leading to protracted conflict and humanitarian crises (Suliman, 2012).

Additionally, gender inequality is a pervasive issue in Sudan, with women and girls disproportionately affected by social and economic marginalization (Madibbo, 2012). Discriminatory laws and cultural norms restrict women's access to education, employment, and decision-making positions, perpetuating cycles of poverty and limiting their ability to participate fully in society. For example, under Sudan's previous regime, women faced legal and social barriers to political participation and were often subjected to gender-based violence and discrimination (Moro, 2008).

Furthermore, social inequalities and marginalization intersect with other forms of discrimination, such as those based on religion, ethnicity, and political affiliation, creating multiple layers of exclusion and injustice. For instance, religious minorities, such as Christians and animists, have faced discrimination and persecution under Sudan's Islamic legal system, further exacerbating social tensions and contributing to feelings of alienation and marginalization (Plooy, 2005).

Social inequalities and marginalization are significant drivers of terrorism and conflict in Sudan, reflecting underlying issues of economic disparity, ethnic division, and gender inequality(Philip, 2011). Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive efforts to promote inclusive development, protect minority rights, and address the root causes of social exclusion and injustice. Failure to address these underlying grievances risks perpetuating cycles of violence and instability, undermining efforts to build a more peaceful and equitable Sudan.

IV. Economic Dimensions of Terrorism in Sudan

Illicit economies and funding sources

Illicit economies and funding sources have played a significant role in sustaining terrorist activities and exacerbating conflict in Sudan. One notable example is the exploitation of natural resources, such as gold and oil, by armed groups and militias operating in conflict-affected regions (Petterson, 2003). In Sudan's Darfur region, for instance, rebel groups and government-backed militias have engaged in illegal mining and smuggling of gold,

using the proceeds to finance their operations and sustain their armed struggle. This illicit economy not only fuels violence and instability but also perpetuates cycles of poverty and marginalization, as local communities are often exploited and displaced in the process (Smith, 2011).

Moreover, the smuggling of goods and commodities across porous borders has facilitated the financing of terrorist groups and armed factions in Sudan(Madibbo,2015). The country's strategic location in the Horn of Africa, bordering countries such as Libya, Chad, and South Sudan, provides ample opportunities for illicit trade and smuggling networks to flourish. For example, the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and contraband goods across Sudan's borders has provided a lucrative source of income for criminal syndicates and armed groups, including terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates (Hastrup, 2012).

Furthermore, the trafficking of humans, particularly migrants and refugees, has emerged as a lucrative illicit enterprise in Sudan, with criminal networks exploiting vulnerable populations for profit (Gebrekidan, 2021). Human trafficking routes crisscross Sudan, linking the Horn of Africa to North Africa and beyond, and facilitating the movement of people seeking refuge or economic opportunities. However, these routes are also exploited by terrorist groups and criminal gangs to smuggle weapons, contraband, and militants across borders, posing security risks and exacerbating regional instability.

Additionally, the informal economy, including the black market and informal financial networks, has provided fertile ground for terrorist financing and money laundering in Sudan. Weak regulatory oversight and enforcement mechanisms, coupled with widespread corruption and collusion, have allowed illicit actors to operate with impunity and launder proceeds from criminal activities (Phiri, 2016). For example, Hawala networks, which are informal money transfer systems prevalent in Sudan, have been exploited by terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates to move funds across borders and evade detection by law enforcement agencies.

Illicit economies and funding sources play a significant role in sustaining terrorism and conflict in Sudan, providing armed groups and terrorist organizations with the resources needed to perpetuate violence and undermine stability(Jok, 2013). Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive efforts to strengthen border controls, combat corruption, and enhance regulatory oversight of financial systems. Moreover, promoting inclusive economic development and addressing the root causes of poverty and marginalization are essential for reducing the vulnerability of communities to exploitation by illicit actors and fostering sustainable peace and prosperity in Sudan.

Resource competition and economic grievances

Resource competition and economic grievances have been significant drivers of conflict and instability in Sudan, exacerbating tensions between different ethnic groups and fueling

violence and displacement (Musa, 2018). One prominent example is the competition over land and water resources, particularly in regions like Darfur, where arable land and access to water are scarce. Competition between nomadic Arab herders and sedentary African farmers for grazing lands and water sources has led to conflicts over resource access and control. For instance, clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Darfur have escalated into large-scale violence, displacing millions of people and exacerbating ethnic and tribal tensions (Bassil, 2013).

Moreover, the discovery and exploitation of natural resources, such as oil and minerals, have fueled competition and grievances among different ethnic and regional groups in Sudan. The unequal distribution of wealth and benefits from resource extraction has led to feelings of marginalization and disenfranchisement, particularly among communities living in resource-rich regions (Deng & Deng, 2016). For example, in the oil-producing regions of South Sudan, tensions between the government in Khartoum and rebel factions seeking greater autonomy and control over resources have fueled conflict and hindered efforts at peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Furthermore, economic grievances stemming from poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities have contributed to social discontent and unrest in Sudan (Grawert, 2013). The country's economy has been plagued by decades of mismanagement, corruption, and underdevelopment, exacerbating socio-economic disparities and widening the gap between the rich and poor (Jendia, 2002). For example, high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment, particularly in urban areas, have fueled frustration and disillusionment among young people, making them vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and extremist organizations.

Additionally, inequalities in access to basic services, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure, have perpetuated socio-economic disparities and deepened feelings of marginalization among disadvantaged communities in Sudan (Bessler, 2015). For example, rural areas and marginalized regions like Darfur often lack basic infrastructure and social services, further exacerbating poverty and limiting opportunities for socio-economic advancement. This lack of development and investment in marginalized regions has fueled grievances and contributed to the perpetuation of conflict and instability (Phiri, 2016).

Resource competition and economic grievances are significant drivers of conflict and instability in Sudan, exacerbating ethnic tensions, fueling violence, and perpetuating cycles of poverty and marginalization (Carolan, 2020). Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive efforts to promote inclusive economic development, equitable resource distribution, and social justice. By addressing the root causes of economic grievances and promoting sustainable development, Sudan can build a more resilient and prosperous society capable of addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and instability (Fabrice, 2012).

Economic impact of terrorism on local communities

The economic impact of terrorism on local communities in Sudan is profound, exerting a significant toll on livelihoods, infrastructure, and socio-economic development. One notable consequence is the disruption of economic activities and markets, as terrorist attacks and violence create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, leading to decreased investment, trade, and productivity (Bessler, 2015). For example, in regions like Darfur and South Kordofan, where terrorist groups and armed militias operate, attacks on markets, transportation routes, and agricultural areas have disrupted supply chains, hindered trade, and undermined food security, exacerbating poverty and economic hardship (Gebrekidan, 2021).

Moreover, the displacement of populations resulting from terrorist attacks and conflict has strained local economies and placed burdens on already fragile social and economic infrastructures (Cohen, 2012). Displaced communities often face limited access to basic services, including healthcare, education, and sanitation, further exacerbating socio-economic disparities and impeding opportunities for socio-economic recovery and resilience. For example, in conflict-affected regions like Darfur, displaced populations living in makeshift camps often lack access to adequate shelter, clean water, and livelihood opportunities, leading to heightened vulnerability and dependence on humanitarian assistance (Musa, 2018).

Furthermore, the destruction of critical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and schools, has long-term economic consequences for local communities, hindering mobility, access to markets, and the delivery of essential services (Suliman, 2012). Terrorist attacks targeting infrastructure not only disrupt economic activities but also impose additional costs on communities for reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. For example, in the aftermath of conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan, efforts to rebuild damaged infrastructure and restore basic services have been hampered by limited resources and capacity, prolonging the economic impact of terrorism on local communities (Adebajo, 2011).

Additionally, the psychological and social effects of terrorism on local communities can have long-lasting economic repercussions, as fear and trauma undermine confidence, social cohesion, and community resilience (Hastrup, 2012). The psychological toll of living in a state of insecurity and uncertainty can lead to increased stress, anxiety, and mental health issues, affecting individuals' ability to work, invest, and participate in economic activities. For example, in conflict-affected areas like Darfur, where communities have been traumatized by years of violence and displacement, the psychological scars of terrorism and conflict continue to impede efforts at recovery and reconciliation, perpetuating cycles of poverty and vulnerability (Madibbo, 2015).

The economic impact of terrorism on local communities in Sudan is multifaceted, encompassing disruptions to economic activities, displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and psychological trauma. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive efforts to promote peace, stability, and socio-economic development, including investments in

infrastructure, livelihood opportunities, and social services, as well as initiatives to address the root causes of terrorism and conflict. By fostering resilience and promoting inclusive economic growth, Sudan can mitigate the economic impact of terrorism and build a more prosperous and resilient society.

V. Impact of Terrorism on Peacebuilding Efforts and Conflict Resolution

Challenges to peace negotiations

Challenges to peace negotiations in Sudan have been pervasive, reflecting deep-seated grievances, complex power dynamics, and entrenched interests that hinder progress toward sustainable peace and reconciliation (Jendia, 2002). One significant challenge is the fragmentation of armed groups and rebel factions, which often have divergent interests, objectives, and ideologies, making it difficult to achieve consensus and maintain cohesive negotiating fronts. For example, in Darfur, numerous rebel groups have emerged over the years, each with its grievances and demands, complicating efforts to broker peace agreements and ensure lasting stability (Phiri, 2016).

Moreover, the lack of trust and confidence between conflicting parties poses a formidable obstacle to peace negotiations in Sudan (Jawondo, 2013). Years of conflict, violence, and betrayal have eroded trust and heightened suspicion among warring factions, making it difficult to establish meaningful dialogue and build mutual understanding. For instance, in the aftermath of the Second Sudanese Civil War, deep-seated animosities and mistrust between the government in Khartoum and rebel groups in the south hindered efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and forge a durable peace (Smith, 2011).

Furthermore, external interference and regional rivalries have exacerbated tensions and hindered efforts at peace negotiations in Sudan (Plooy, 2005). Neighboring countries and international actors often have competing interests and agendas, leading to proxy wars, geopolitical rivalries, and interference in internal affairs. For example, in regions like Darfur and South Kordofan, external support for rebel groups and armed militias has prolonged conflict and undermined prospects for peace, as neighboring states vie for influence and strategic advantage (Ille, 2016).

Additionally, the absence of inclusive and participatory processes in peace negotiations has marginalized key stakeholders, particularly women, youth, and marginalized communities, whose voices and perspectives are often sidelined in decision-making processes. Exclusionary peace processes not only undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of peace agreements but also perpetuate social inequalities and deepen grievances, fueling resentment and mistrust among marginalized groups (Jendia, 2002). For example, in past peace negotiations in Sudan, women and youth have been underrepresented and marginalized, despite their crucial roles as agents of change and advocates for peace at the grassroots level (Carolan, 2020).

Challenges to peace negotiations in Sudan are multifaceted and require comprehensive approaches to address. Overcoming fragmentation among armed groups, building trust and confidence between conflicting parties, reducing external interference, and ensuring inclusivity in peace processes are essential for achieving lasting peace and reconciliation in Sudan. By addressing these challenges and fostering genuine dialogue and cooperation, Sudan can overcome the obstacles to peace negotiations and pave the way for a more stable and prosperous future.

Disruption of conflict resolution mechanisms

The disruption of conflict resolution mechanisms in Sudan has been a significant impediment to the achievement of lasting peace and stability, exacerbating tensions and prolonging cycles of violence and instability (Jok, 2013). One key factor contributing to this disruption is the breakdown of formal peace processes and agreements, which are often undermined by violations, non-compliance, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. For example, in regions like Darfur and South Kordofan, where multiple peace agreements have been brokered between the government and rebel groups, the failure to implement key provisions and address underlying grievances has led to a resurgence of conflict and undermined confidence in the peace process (Hastrup, 2012).

Moreover, the politicization of conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions has eroded their credibility and impartiality, leading to perceptions of bias and favoritism among conflicting parties (Madibbo, 2015). Political elites and power brokers often manipulate peace processes to advance their interests and agendas, sidelining genuine efforts at reconciliation and consensus-building. For instance, in Sudan's transition to democracy following the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir, the politicization of peace negotiations between the transitional government and rebel groups has hindered progress and deepened divisions, as conflicting parties prioritize short-term political gains over long-term peace and stability (Idris, 2005).

Furthermore, the proliferation of informal and non-state actors in conflict resolution efforts has complicated the landscape and fragmented efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Sudan (Idris, 2005). Non-governmental organizations, community-based initiatives, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms play important roles in mediating local disputes and fostering reconciliation at the grassroots level. However, their effectiveness is often limited by resource constraints, capacity gaps, and lack of coordination with formal peace processes. For example, in conflict-affected regions like Darfur, traditional leaders and local elders have attempted to resolve disputes and promote reconciliation, but their efforts are often overshadowed by broader political dynamics and power struggles (Suliman, 2012).

Additionally, external interference and geopolitical rivalries have disrupted conflict resolution mechanisms in Sudan, as regional and international actors pursue competing agendas and vie for influence (Barltrop, 2011). Neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia,

Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, have vested interests in Sudan's stability and often seek to leverage their political and economic influence to shape peace processes and outcomes in their favor (Bassil, 2013). For example, external support for rival factions in Sudan's conflicts has fueled proxy wars and exacerbated tensions, undermining efforts at genuine reconciliation and peacebuilding.

The disruption of conflict resolution mechanisms in Sudan is a complex and multifaceted challenge that requires comprehensive approaches to address. Overcoming politicization, building trust and confidence, enhancing inclusivity, and mitigating external interference are essential for restoring credibility and effectiveness to peace processes and institutions in Sudan (Bhoke, 2005). By addressing these challenges and fostering genuine dialogue and cooperation among conflicting parties, Sudan can overcome the obstacles to conflict resolution and pave the way for a more stable and peaceful future.

Implications for sustainable peace in Sudan

The implications for sustainable peace in Sudan are profound and multifaceted, reflecting the complex interplay of historical grievances, socio-economic challenges, and political dynamics that have fueled conflict and instability in the country (Bassil, 2013). One significant implication is the need for inclusive and participatory peacebuilding processes that address the root causes of conflict and ensure the meaningful participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth, and marginalized communities. Genuine dialogue, reconciliation, and consensus-building are essential for fostering trust and social cohesion and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and stability (Phiri, 2016).

Moreover, sustainable peace in Sudan requires addressing the underlying socio-economic inequalities and grievances that have fueled violence and marginalization. Economic development, poverty alleviation, and equitable resource distribution are essential for addressing the root causes of conflict and building resilience against future instability. Investment in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities can empower communities, reduce vulnerability to exploitation by extremist groups, and promote social inclusion and cohesion (Jendia, 2002).

Furthermore, the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights is crucial for sustaining peace in Sudan. Strengthening democratic institutions, promoting transparency and accountability, and combating corruption are essential for building trust between the government and citizens, fostering social cohesion, and addressing grievances. Upholding human rights, including the rights of minorities, women, and vulnerable groups, is fundamental for building an inclusive and equitable society where all citizens can participate fully in the political, economic, and social life of the country.

Additionally, regional and international cooperation is vital for achieving sustainable peace in Sudan. Neighboring countries, regional organizations, and the international community play important roles in supporting peacebuilding efforts, facilitating dialogue,

and providing resources and technical assistance (Bol, 2000). Concerted diplomatic efforts, mediation initiatives, and peacekeeping missions can help address regional rivalries, mitigate external interference, and create an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation in Sudan.

In summary, achieving sustainable peace in Sudan requires addressing the root causes of conflict, fostering inclusive governance and socio-economic development, upholding human rights, and promoting regional and international cooperation (Masabala, 2009). By addressing these challenges and building consensus among conflicting parties, Sudan can overcome the legacies of violence and instability and pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous future for all its citizens.

VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Summary of findings

In summary, the research on terrorism and conflict management in Sudan has uncovered a complex web of interrelated factors that have contributed to the country's long history of violence and instability (Grawert, 2013). Historical narratives reveal the legacy of colonialism, ethnic divisions, and political manipulation that have shaped Sudan's socio-political landscape and fueled grievances among marginalized communities. The emergence of terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and rebel factions, has further exacerbated tensions and prolonged conflicts, as external interference and regional rivalries complicate peace negotiations and undermine efforts at reconciliation (Youngs, 2004).

Moreover, governance challenges, including authoritarianism, corruption, and weak rule of law, have perpetuated social inequalities and marginalized certain ethnic and religious groups, fostering resentment and disenfranchisement (Masabala, 2009). Identity politics, ethnic tensions, and resource competition have deepened divisions and fueled violence, while economic grievances stemming from poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities have further destabilized communities and undermined prospects for peace (Plooy, 2005).

The economic impact of terrorism on local communities has been profound, disrupting livelihoods, infrastructure, and social cohesion, while challenges to peace negotiations, including fragmentation among armed groups, lack of trust, and external interference, have hindered progress toward sustainable peace. The disruption of conflict resolution mechanisms, politicization of peace processes, and marginalization of key stakeholders have further complicated efforts to achieve lasting peace in Sudan (Philip, 2011).

Despite these challenges, there are opportunities for progress towards sustainable peace in Sudan. Inclusive governance, participatory peacebuilding processes, and equitable socio-economic development can address the root causes of conflict and foster social cohesion and resilience (Petterson, 2003). Upholding human rights, promoting regional cooperation,

and strengthening international support for peacebuilding efforts are essential for creating an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation in Sudan.

In conclusion, addressing the multifaceted challenges of terrorism and conflict management in Sudan requires comprehensive approaches that address the underlying grievances, promote inclusive governance and development, and foster dialogue and cooperation among conflicting parties (Jendia, 2002). By addressing these challenges and building consensus around shared goals, Sudan can overcome the legacies of violence and instability and pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous future for all its citizens.

Implications for policy and practice

The implications of the research findings for policy and practice in Sudan are significant and multifaceted, highlighting the need for comprehensive and inclusive approaches to address the root causes of terrorism and conflict and promote sustainable peace and stability. One key implication is the importance of adopting a holistic approach to governance reform that prioritizes transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights (Plooy, 2005). Strengthening democratic institutions, promoting good governance, and addressing corruption are essential for building trust between the government and citizens, fostering social cohesion, and addressing grievances that fuel conflict.

Moreover, the findings underscore the importance of prioritizing inclusive and participatory peacebuilding processes that involve all stakeholders, including women, youth, and marginalized communities, in decision-making and implementation. Genuine dialogue, reconciliation, and consensus-building are essential for fostering trust and social cohesion and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and stability (Youngs, 2004). Policy efforts should focus on creating enabling environments for meaningful participation, promoting the representation of diverse voices, and ensuring that peace processes are inclusive and responsive to the needs and concerns of all citizens (Philip, 2011).

Furthermore, addressing the socio-economic drivers of terrorism and conflict requires targeted interventions aimed at promoting inclusive economic development, reducing poverty, and addressing socio-economic disparities (Cohen, 2012). Investing in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities can empower communities, reduce vulnerability to exploitation by extremist groups, and promote social inclusion and cohesion. Policy efforts should prioritize equitable resource distribution, job creation, and poverty alleviation measures to address the root causes of conflict and build resilience against future instability (Assal, 2006).

Additionally, efforts to address the security challenges posed by terrorism and conflict in Sudan require a comprehensive and integrated approach that combines military, law enforcement, and community-based strategies. Enhancing border security, combating illicit economies, and disrupting terrorist financing networks are essential for countering the spread of extremism and preventing further violence (Fabrice, 2012). Policy efforts should

also focus on strengthening community resilience, promoting interfaith dialogue, and addressing the root causes of radicalization to prevent the recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable populations.

The implications for policy and practice in Sudan underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and inclusive approach to address the root causes of terrorism and conflict and promote sustainable peace and stability (Gebrekidan, 2021). By prioritizing governance reform, inclusive peacebuilding processes, socio-economic development, and security sector reform, Sudan can overcome the challenges posed by terrorism and conflict and pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous future for all its citizens.

Recommendations for mitigating terrorism and fostering peace in Sudan

Based on the research findings, several recommendations can be proposed to mitigate terrorism and foster peace in Sudan. Firstly, it is crucial to prioritize inclusive governance reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and promoting transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights (Khan *et al.*, 2019). This includes efforts to combat corruption, enhance the rule of law, and ensure equitable representation of all ethnic and religious groups in decision-making processes. For example, establishing mechanisms for citizen participation, decentralizing power, and empowering local communities can help address grievances and build trust between the government and marginalized populations (Ille, 2016).

Secondly, there is a need to prioritize inclusive and participatory peacebuilding processes that involve all stakeholders, including women, youth, and marginalized communities, in decision-making and implementation (Moro, 2008). This can be achieved by fostering genuine dialogue, reconciliation, and consensus-building among conflicting parties, and ensuring that peace processes are inclusive, responsive, and representative of diverse perspectives and interests. For instance, creating platforms for dialogue and mediation at the community level, promoting interfaith dialogue, and empowering women and youth as agents of change can help build trust and social cohesion and lay the foundations for sustainable peace (Jawondo, 2013).

Thirdly, addressing the root causes of terrorism and conflict requires targeted interventions aimed at promoting inclusive economic development, reducing poverty, and addressing socio-economic disparities (Smith, 2011). This includes investing in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities in conflict-affected areas, and promoting equitable resource distribution, job creation, and poverty alleviation measures. For example, supporting small-scale agriculture, micro-enterprises, and vocational training programs can empower communities, reduce vulnerability to exploitation by extremist groups, and promote social inclusion and cohesion (Musa, 2018).

Fourthly, enhancing security measures to counter the spread of extremism and prevent further violence is essential for addressing the security challenges posed by terrorism and

conflict in Sudan (Zouhir, 2015). This includes strengthening border security, combating illicit economies, and disrupting terrorist financing networks through enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and international collaboration (Warburg, 1993). Additionally, promoting community resilience, fostering interfaith dialogue, and addressing the root causes of radicalization through education, social services, and youth engagement programs can help prevent the recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable populations.

In summary, mitigating terrorism and fostering peace in Sudan requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that addresses the root causes of conflict, promotes inclusive governance and peacebuilding processes, prioritizes socio-economic development, and enhances security measures. By implementing these recommendations, Sudan can overcome the challenges posed by terrorism and conflict and pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous future for all its citizens.

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Kenya:
Socio-Demographic Determinants
of Intractable Communal Land Use Conflicts
in the Squatter Enclaves of Mount Elgon Region

Graham Amakanji OLUTEYO

Abstract: In the post-Cold War world order, the African Continent has been a stage for some of the most violent intra-state conflicts arising from natural resources and land distribution. These contestations have often been inter-communal and take the violent extremism route. The consequences of these devastating contestations have been apocalyptic in most of these conflicts. In Kenya's Mount Elgon Region, the emergence of extremism Sabaot Land Defence Forces and counter-extremist groups is rooted in a long historical struggle for equitable distribution of land rights. Despite efforts by state and non-state actors, sustainable peace remains a distant mirage. Socio-economic determinants have emerged as fundamental determinants in these extremist contestations, yet, extant literature has been silent on this subject matter. This paper sought to interrogate socio-demographic determinants as pathways for homegrown extremism in the Mount Elgon Region. Study findings revealed strong support for the interplay between ownership of land, source of income, level of education, and sustenance of homegrown extremism over land-use conflicts in the study area. The paper recommends the need for the Ministry of Lands to expedite the management of the historical land question to contain the socio-demographic determinants as pathways for homegrown extremism in the study area. The findings underscore the importance of land tenure security in pursuit of peaceful, just, and inclusive societies as advocated for in the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.

Keywords: Demographic, extremism, homegrown, land-use, Mt. Elgon.

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I. Introduction

Presently, the former Mt. Elgon district is situated in Kenya, close to the border with Uganda, and is part of Bungoma County. During the period of conflict from 2008 to 2012, its population was approximately 170,000, with a significant portion, 56%, living below the poverty line. Mt. Elgon has experienced several instances of violence in its history. The first occurred during Kenya's independence in 1963, followed by another round when the country transitioned to multi-party politics in 1991. More recently, from 2006 to 2008, the region was plagued by another wave of violence. In the earlier episodes of violence, the Sabaot ethnic tribe, which belongs to the larger Kalenjin tribe, clashed with the Luhya ethnic tribe. These conflicts were characterized by tension and hostility between the two groups (Ngulutu, 2013).

In the 2008–2012 period of violence, the conflict took a different turn as it involved Sabaot language speakers fighting against one another. Specifically, the Soy sub-group of the Sabaot clashed with the Mosop sub-group, also known as the Ndorobo. The root cause of the clashes during this period can be traced back to disputes surrounding a government resettlement scheme. The conflict centered around the distribution of land between the Mosop and Soy communities. The government had initiated the resettlement process back in the 1970s, aiming to relocate the Mosop people to protect their original region, the Moorland, which is an essential water catchment area higher up on Mount Elgon. The relocation resulted in the establishment of three significant resettlement areas: Chepyuk Phases I, II, and III, until 2006. However, various problems arose during all three phases of the government-initiated resettlement plans, contributing to the tensions and conflicts that occurred during the 2008–2012 period (Simiyu, 2007).

Top of Form

Accusations of nepotism and corruption emerged regarding the beneficiaries of the government-distributed land. The main focus of the resettlement program was the Mosop community. However, members of the Soy community contested this, claiming that they were part of the same community and even more numerous, thus deserving a larger share of the plots. They argued that many individuals from the Soy community had already settled on the land in Chepyuk Phase III, which was now subject to redistribution. A significant portion of the population had been living in the Chepyuk Phase III area for decades, either as squatters or having been born there, leading them to develop a sense of ownership over the land. Moreover, a considerable population increase further complicated the resettlement process, making it challenging to execute the original plans. Out of 7,500 applicants for Phase III, only 1,753 were listed as beneficiaries in April 2006, with half of them from the Soy community and the other half from the Mosop community. Those who were unsuccessful in their applications and had been residing in the Chepyuk III area were forcibly evicted in 2006 (Kamoet, 2011).

The SLDF, also known as the Sabaot Land Defence Force, was established with conscripts from the people who had been evicted from the land during the resettlement process in Chepyuk Phase III. The primary objective of the SLDF was to safeguard the interests of the lowland Sabaot community against the Mosop and to resist the government's efforts to remove squatters from the Chepyuk areas of Mt. Elgon District. Initially, the SLDF began as a small militia referred to as the "Janjaweed," but it rapidly expanded into a substantial and well-armed force. Over time, the SLDF became a formidable militia, equipped with heavy weaponry and capable of exerting significant control and influence in the region.

The dispute over land in the Chepyuk area had a significant political dimension, mainly due to the absence of land titles for those settling in the region. This lack of official documentation provided an opportunity for politicians to exploit the situation for their benefit. During the 2007 parliamentary election, one candidate named Fred Kapondi reportedly made promises to support the SLDF in the land issue if he was elected. Many accused Kapondi of playing a pivotal role in inciting the group and escalating the conflict into violence. His alleged involvement and encouragement were seen as contributing factors to the intensification of the dispute and the ensuing violent clashes in the region (Wachira *et al.*, 2010).

The violence during this period can be analyzed in three dimensions. Firstly, the SLDF directed its aggression towards the Mosop community residing in the Chepyuk settlement areas. They displaced a significant number of Mosop people and engaged in a low-level communal conflict with those who chose to stay and defend their land. As a response to the SLDF's actions, the Mosop community allegedly formed its own defense force known as the Moorland Defence Force (MDF). This development further escalated the conflict between the two groups. During the course of the violence, a total of 20 individuals from the Mosop side were reported to have been killed as a result of the clashes and confrontations. The situation remained tense and volatile as the conflict between the SLDF and the Mosop/MDF continued to unfold (Simiyu, 2007).

The second type of violence emerged later and became the predominant form during the conflict. As the SLDF grew in size and influence, they started targeting civilians, primarily from the Soy community. The SLDF sought food, money, and collaboration from these civilians, effectively using them as a source of sustenance and support for their operations. The group established an extortion system, forcing people to pay taxes to supply their troops and enrich their leaders (Njogu, 2021). The final dimension of the violence was the confrontation with government security forces. In the initial stages of the SLDF's activities, the local police were overwhelmed and unable to counter the group's activities effectively. However, in March 2008, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) intervened, launching a military operation to crush the SLDF and restore order in the region. The KDF's intervention marked a significant turning point in the conflict, leading to a decisive defeat of the SLDF and ending their reign of violence and intimidation.

Following the intervention by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) in March 2008, the conflict resulted in the death of the SLDF leader, Matakwei, in May 2008. Additionally, several other high-ranking SLDF commanders were arrested and imprisoned. The KDF's operation had a significant impact on the SLDF's leadership and led to a weakening of their forces. However, after the conflict came to an end, the government resumed the implementation of the settlement plan based on the 2006 list of beneficiaries for the Chepyuk III settlement area (Ngulutu, 2013). Despite the violent conflict, there were no substantial changes in the settlement policies, and the underlying issues of the conflict were not effectively addressed or resolved. Despite the active role socio-demographic variables play in feeding into homegrown extremism in the study area, these remain under-examined. The current study sought to interrogate land ownership, income, level of education, and housing structure as determinants of homegrown extremism in the Mount Elgon Region.

II. Methodology

The study was conducted in two specific wards, namely Chesikaki-Cheptais and Chepyuk-Kopsiro, located in the Mt. Elgon Region. Chesikaki-Cheptais is predominantly inhabited by the Soy community, primarily engaged in farming, and also home to the SLDF. On the other hand, Chepyuk-Kopsiro is home to the Mosop community, who are mainly pastoralists residing in the upper part of Mt. Elgon, and it was also home to the Moorland Defense Force. These two wards were purposively selected they have played and continue to play a role in shaping the contrasting perceptions of homegrown extremism in the Mt. Elgon land question. Several justifications informed the choice of these areas for the study. First, according to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and Society for International Development (SID) (2013), only 34.1% of land parcels in Bungoma County have official title deeds, meaning that 65.9% of households live on ancestral land without any formal documentation of ownership. Additionally, Bungoma County faces issues of landlessness and squatter settlements, with a significant number of these cases occurring in Mt. Elgon (Kamoet, 2011).

Secondly, being situated in a peripheral geographic space with a minority ethnicity- the Sabaot, the state's presence and development in the region are notably low. The area lags behind in terms of general development, including education, health, and infrastructure such as roads. Consequently, widespread poverty prevails, and the elite has exploited this situation to perpetuate sub-ethnic divisions between the Soy and the Mosop (Wafula, 2019). Thirdly, the wards are home to the Sabaot ethnicity, primarily comprising the Soy and Mosop sub-ethnicities, which have been the main actors in the ongoing conflicts (Wachira *et al.*, 2010). Lastly, the Chepyuk settlement schemes located in the area have been central to the emergence of homegrown extremism in the region, making it a critical site for examination.

The study adopted descriptive and historical research designs. The target population comprised 452 respondents sampled from 400 households, 10 ex-SLDF combatants, 2 community elders, and 40 victims of land conflicts. Primary data was collected using questionnaires from household heads through simple random sampling. Two key informant interviews were conducted using purposively sampled community elders. Focus Group Discussion guides were used to collect data from 10 ex-SLDF combatants and 4 homogenous groups of male and female victims of land conflict in the study area. Quantitative data was analyzed descriptively by computing measures of central tendency, frequency counts, and percentages. Qualitative data was analyzed thematically and presented through narratives and verbatim quotations.

III. Findings & Discussions

This section presents and discusses findings on socio-demographic determinants of homegrown extremism in the Mount Elgon Region. These variables include ownership of land, source of income, level of education, and housing structure. These are presented and discussed in subsequent sections.

1. Land Ownership

In discourses of homegrown extremism in Mt. Elgon Region, land remains the single and most prominent issue. For a rural and remote community and in an area that has been for a long time described as Kenya's breadbasket, land in Mt. Elgon is a source of livelihood, a key economic driver, and a pathway against poverty in addition to being a source of identity. This explains why attachment to land informs studies on conflict and homegrown extremism. To this end, the study sought to interrogate land ownership with data collected used to determine the propensity of homegrown extremism in the Mt. Elgon Region. Data on the same were collected, analyzed and the results presented in Figure 1.

Quantitative evidence in Figure 1 revealed that the majority 388 (97%) of respondents in the study area were squatters with very marginal land evidence of land ownership. The findings revealed that only 4 (1%) owned land in the study area whereas only 8 (2%) were settlers with the settlers having no proof of land ownership. The findings thus reveal an element of legal exclusion from land ownership. The statistics on land ownership are a negation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal number 16.9 is committed to providing legal identity for all. Legal identity on land could be in the form of an allotment letter or a title deed which an overwhelming majority lacked and thus a determinant in grievance leading to extremism in the study area. During FGD with male victims of land conflict, a title deed was mentioned as one of the single most protective documents in land discourse exposing respondents to food insecurity, frequent evictions, and lack of access to

basic needs, especially food and shelter which fed to further deprivation and consequently the risk of extremism.


Figure 1: Land ownership in Mt. Elgon Region

Source: Field Data (2021)

Study findings on land ownership were corroborated during FGD discussions with male victims of land conflict in the study area. The following is an account of responses collected during FGDs.

Hapa vile tuko wote tunafuta kitu moja tu, hiyo cheti ya shamba. Na hatutatchoka.

As you can see all of us here are looking for one thing which is the land documentation in the form of a title deed. And we will not tire in our search for it. (FGD with male victims of land conflict, Sasuri Location, August 18, 2021).

Mimi nimeishi hapa zaidi ya miaka 40, sijaona cheti. Nimezika baba na mama na watu yangu, itakuwaje leo hi unaniambia kuwa mimi si wa hapa Mt. Elgon. Nikitoka hapa kwetu kwingine ni wapi? Sijui nyumbani ingine. Lakini watu wenye sio Mt. Elgon wanapewa mashamba kubwa kubwa.

I have lived on these lands for over forty years. In those forty years, we have never stopped pursuing the land titles. I am an orphan and all my parents and relatives have been buried here. What other proof is there to show that this is not my home, even without the land title deeds? (FGD with male victims of land conflict, Sasuri Location, August 18, 2021).

Wakati wa siasa ikifika, utawaona wakikuja na kupeana title deeds. Hizo titles zenye huwa wanapeana huwa ni za kutafuta kura tu. Sasa sisi kila mwaka ya siasa, ni kuahidiwa tu na kukuja kupeana titles zenye hatupatangi.

> When the political campaign period comes, you will see them (referring to politicians) coming and claiming to distribute title deeds. As a matter of fact, those titles that they always claim to distribute never reach the beneficiaries, yet they use that to gain political mileage (FGD with male victims of land conflicts, Sasuri Location, August 18, 2021).

The current study is cognizant of the consistency of the usage of the word exclusion and marginalization in studies of terrorism. Study findings on land ownership paint a dire situation of marginalization and exclusion in the form of a lack of title deeds and therefore lack of any form of protection in land ownership which exposes respondents to frequent evictions. These findings are consistent and in tandem with the fact that exclusion has nurtured the growth of violent extremism groups across the world and Africa in particular thus supporting the pragmatic Africanacity philosophy on which this study was anchored.

The findings of the current study regarding the marginalization of land ownership align with Afrocentric examples that highlight the emergence of homegrown violent extremist organizations in Africa, which are often rooted in issues of exclusion and resource marginalization. In particular, on land conflicts and violent inter-communal contestations, the findings of the study align with studies from across Africa in the Rwandan (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1996; Gasana, 2002; Bigagaza *et al.*, 2002) and Darfur genocides (Sikainga, 2009) as having been over land resource distribution. Other notable examples include; *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, whose narrative revolves around politics of exclusion and unequal distribution of resources between the Muslim North and Christian South. This unequal distribution is perceived by the Muslim North as the cause of their impoverishment. The Global Terrorism Index 2016 report ranked *Boko Haram* as the deadliest terrorist organization worldwide (Institute of Economics & Peace, 2016). Moreover, the Arab Spring Uprising, which took place in the last decade, was fueled by exclusionary narratives surrounding the lack of job opportunities for the youth and oppression by totalitarian regimes, among other factors. Similarly, prominent extremist groups such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah have foundations that trace back to issues of socio-economic marginalization and exclusion. Additionally, the Rwanda Genocide, which represents a discourse of extremism in the post-World War II era, was primarily driven by exclusionary factors (Uwizeyimana, 2017). These examples underscore the significant role that exclusion and marginalization play in shaping extremist ideologies and actions in various African contexts.

Study findings on lack of land ownership shed light on the intractable nature of the land problem in the Mt. Elgon Region and the increasing challenge of finding sustainable solutions. It is important to note that since the initiation of the Chepyuk settlement schemes in 1971, the population in the region has nearly tripled, which further complicates the pursuit of lasting resolutions. These findings align with Youé (2002) observations, which suggested that estimates of squatter numbers are often underestimated due to the squatters' efforts to remain "invisible" and avoid state control. This invisibility, combined with the population growth over a four-decade-long conflict, could further complicate

discussions surrounding land conflicts and extremism, catalyzing the intractable nature of the conflict in the Mt. Elgon region.

Indeed, the findings of the current study align with the sentiments expressed by Youé (2002) regarding squatting as a persistent and challenging problem. Youé described squatting as an insidious drug that is easily acquired but difficult to eradicate, or as something that is economically unsustainable and incompatible with modern farming needs. The magnitude of the squatting issue was recognized as early as 1945 when it was proclaimed as one of the biggest problems faced by Kenya, reaching "almost unmanageable proportions". The challenge arose from the impossibility of evicting squatters, as the colonial office did not grant permission for such actions. The accommodation of squatters would ultimately lead to the decline of the White Highlands, a significant aspect of the colonial landscape.

The findings of the current study, which highlight the significance of land ownership as a determinant of homegrown extremism, are in line with the research conducted by Hassan (2018). Hassan's (2018) study linked the emergence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), an extremist group, to issues of landlessness and exclusion from land ownership in the squatter settlements of Coastal Kenya. The main slogan of the MRC was "*Pwani si Kenya*" (The Coast is not Kenya), which stemmed from the perception that despite being a popular tourist destination, the residents of the Coastal Strip in Kenya continued to experience poverty and landlessness, with development lagging behind the rest of the country. Consequently, the MRC's primary agenda was to advocate for secession of the Coastal region so that its residents could have full control and use of their resources. It is crucial to note that the MRC's agenda was anchored on issues of exclusion and marginalization, which are consistent themes in discussions and discourses of homegrown extremism. The core issue that the MRC fought for was land, a problem that can be traced back to 1887 when the Sultan of Zanzibar allegedly leased the large coastal strip to the British East Africa Company, resulting in the displacement of coastal inhabitants and rendering them squatters in their land (Munyembo, 2014).

The findings of the current study align with the observation that land allocation practices favoring outsiders with close ties to ruling regimes have contributed to the rise of landless populations. This practice, as noted during the FGD discussions, has resulted in the displacement of indigenous people from their ancestral lands or has left them vulnerable to evictions by returning absentee landlords. These historical injustices remain unaddressed and continue to have a disruptive impact to this day. In the Coast region, where much of the land is now owned by a small group of wealthy individuals, indigenous people are particularly susceptible to land dispossession. Many reside on land without formal title deeds, leaving them vulnerable to land-related disputes and encroachments. This vulnerability contributed to the emergence of homegrown extremist groups, such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), in the Coast Region. These dynamics underscore the urgent need for governance structures to address land and resource management issues, not only in Kenya but also across the African continent. Efforts to expedite the resolution of these issues are essential in promoting peace, justice, and stability in affected regions.

Study findings on marginalization based on land ownership align with the arguments presented by Warah (2017). Warah emphasized that marginalization over land ownership can lead to the development of in-group versus out-group stereotypes, which can escalate and be used to target communities in a full-blown conflict between perceived relatively deprived and relatively privileged groups. These stereotypes may also extend to settler communities, who may be excluded as non-indigenous to the area, further exacerbating divisions. Warah (2017) argued that while land issues are deeply rooted in history, the prejudicial attribution of land in present times is widening separations and divisions within the country. In the Coast region, for instance, people often identify themselves as "Coastarian" rather than as Kenyan, indicating a distinct regional identity. Warah noted that calls for secession by politicians from the Coast region reflect deep-seated grievances that trace back at least a hundred years. Many of these grievances are connected to landlessness and historical injustices that remain unresolved and have been overlooked by successive governments. The term "*wabara*" used by people from the coastal region to refer to non-indigenous individuals reflects a mindset that views the rest of Kenya as separate or different, exemplified by the rallying cry of the secessionist MRC. These dynamics underscore the significance of addressing land-related grievances and historical injustices to promote unity, and inclusivity and reduce the risk of extremism in the country.

The findings of the current study on land ownership align with the insights provided by Ngumbao (2012) regarding the issue of landlessness and the emergence of extremist MRC. Ngumbao noted that the MRC was funded through membership contributions, with individuals paying a non-refundable fee of one hundred shillings. The group held their meetings in forests or during burials, using manipulation and propaganda to garner support and sympathy from the public. Some members of the MRC sought elective positions, promising to represent the MRC's agenda through legislation and negotiations with the government. Within Kilifi County, there were witch doctors who were given permission and powers to conduct oaths and rituals for MRC members, ensuring secrecy and commitment to the group's activities. The training of MRC members, similar to the SLDF, was conducted by retired or dismissed police officers. The study's findings on the marginalization of land ownership contribute to the discussions on relative deprivation. Extended marginalization can lead to frustrations, which may drive individuals to seek alternative means of pursuing justice regarding land-related issues. These frustrations and grievances can be significant factors in the emergence of extremist groups and movements seeking redress and change over land issues.

1.1 Women and land ownership

Arising from the FGD discussions, study findings established that women were excluded from land ownership in the Mt. Elgon region. In addition, the peripheral role and voice of women were also observable during the primary data collection exercise where women generally would prepare venues for FGDs, and men were given priority when both genders

were present during the administration of household questionnaires. Nyambura's (2014) study highlights that despite women accounting for 50.3% of the national population in Kenya, they face challenges in accessing and controlling land resources. This aligns with the current study's observation that this could potentially serve as a determinant of homegrown extremism in the future. Women tend to experience disadvantages in various aspects of life, including education, employment, land rights, and healthcare. The study established that women do not have equitable access to land, leading to conflicts when they attempt to inherit land from their matrimonial or husband's family. Additionally, women lack the protection of property rights as they often do not hold title deeds to the land they occupy. These findings contradict Chapter Four of the Constitution of Kenya (2010), which outlines the Bill of Rights and emphasizes equitable access to land, security of land rights, and the elimination of gender discrimination in land governance and resources.

However, the current study argues that while women's land ownership in the study area is an important issue, immediate attention should also be given to the deprivation of land in the region not as a men's issue but as a communal issue since both genders lack land. As such, issues of women's ownership of land issues in the study area would not merit much discussion since it is a communal issue. The study suggests that, generally access to land is a distant dream for households in the study area, which indicates a broader problem affecting both genders. This calls for comprehensive investigation and interventions to address the overall issue of land deprivation in the region.

2 Source of Income

The study also sought to examine respondents' sources of income. Data on the same were collected, analyzed, and presented in Figure 2. Quantitative evidence in Figure 2 revealed that the majority 292 (73%) respondents depended on farming as their source of income, 84 (21%) respondents depended on businesses that were largely dependent on the sale of agricultural products and only 24 (6%) respondents were in formal employment. The findings on the importance of land as a source of livelihood in the study area have important policy implications, particularly in the context of Africa where a significant portion of the population relies on farming for their livelihood. The challenges faced in accessing and utilizing land in areas like Mt. Elgon can lead to grievances and conflicts. This has a ripple effect on various aspects, such as income generation, food security, and the overall progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Policymakers must address these issues and promote equitable access to land to ensure the well-being and development of communities in the region.

The findings of the study affirm the place of land as the fundamental source of livelihood in the area, and the deprivation of land leads to grievances and the emergence of extremist tendencies. According to human needs theorists such as Abraham Maslow and John Burton, the absence of essential needs, including access to land for food and income, creates in-

Figure 2: Respondents Sources of Income
Source: Field Data (2021)

security and uncertainty about the future. Human needs theorists argue that unmet needs at the individual, group, and societal levels are a primary driver of protracted conflicts.

At the foundational level of the human needs pyramid is the need for food, and the study posits that without access to land in the study area, obtaining food and income becomes extremely challenging. This exacerbates existing tensions and conflicts in the area. Human needs theorists offer a new perspective on conflict theory, recognizing the importance of addressing human needs comprehensively. They also acknowledge that needs are non-negotiable and cannot be easily traded or suppressed, unlike interests. Unfortunately, during conflicts, human needs are often undermined, further complicating the process of post-conflict recovery and creating fertile ground for future conflicts (Abaho, 2020). This highlights the long-lasting impact of conflicts on meeting essential needs and the importance of addressing these needs in post-conflict situations.

These findings are supported by the Akinyemi *et al.* (2019) study which advanced that land access is fundamentally crucial to efficient agricultural production, food security, and poverty alleviation in Africa where rural households have limited access to productive land. The vital role of land in the production of food is linked to the social, political, and economic life of most African countries, where agriculture, natural resources, and other related land-based activities are critical to livelihoods, food security, incomes, and employment. Empirical research conducted in many developing areas has demonstrated that relatively egalitarian land distribution patterns often foster higher rates of economic growth than highly concentrated ones (Berg, 2011; Deininger *et al.*, 2017). This is often due to the widespread agricultural growth that mostly brings about second-round expenditures in support of locally produced non-tradable goods and services in rural areas and towns (Jayne *et al.*, 2009). The multiplier effects brought about by this growth are usually less when the source of agricultural growth is confined within relatively few hands. This is

particularly true of land, which is a limited agricultural resource. Therefore, the growth rate is likely to influence the distribution of land in the agricultural sector, particularly among rural households.

These findings are supported by Pevehouse and Goldstein (2009). Pevehouse and Goldstein (2009) emphasized that societies must ensure the fulfillment of these needs to establish a solid foundation for economic growth. Access to adequate food is crucial as it enhances individuals' capacity to earn and produce, and the income generated enables them to purchase food. Furthermore, having sufficient food has a significant impact on people's ability to participate in various aspects of life, such as economic, political, and social spheres, and facilitates the escape from persistent poverty.

These findings underscore the significance of enabling individuals to participate fully in various aspects of life, which enhances human security and facilitates human-focused development. This approach plays a vital role in preventing violent conflicts by addressing underlying issues during the conflict itself and providing opportunities to tackle the root causes of the conflict during the recovery phase. By prioritizing the fulfillment of basic needs and fostering inclusive development, societies can establish a strong foundation for long-term peace and stability.

Corroborating study findings on respondents' source of income, Aremu (2010) proposed that poverty eradication should be a key focus for achieving peace in the African continent. The author argued that poverty can lead to economic humiliation and financial trauma, which may impair an individual's rational thinking. When humiliated and desperate, a poor person may resort to acts of theft, violence, and destruction. Sadly, the cycle continues as conflicts themselves destroy the infrastructure necessary to fulfill basic needs.

The importance of basic needs in ensuring happiness, contentment, and safety is undeniable, but the reality in Africa presents a different picture. Despite the lack of essential social services, the continent has been plagued by persistent conflicts, while the military often receives significant funding and resources (Mentan, 2014). This situation contrasts with the visions of post-independence African leaders like Nyerere and Kaunda, who advocated for a dignified life for Africans through philosophies such as *Ujaama* and humanism. However, this state of affairs is not surprising considering that the African State's history and existence have been shaped by European administrative politics rooted in Westphalian thinking. This aligns with the Pragmatic Africanacity philosophy, which serves as the philosophical foundation of this study.

These findings highlight the significance of national poverty and sluggish economic growth as predictors of civil war. These factors operate at the country level. The expression of outrage and mobilization described in this section appears to be rooted in grievances rather than being driven solely by insurgent motivations. However, the key question that needs to be addressed is why grievances associated with land encroachment on a rural population base have particularly inflammatory implications for rebellion, while other types of grievances do not. Fearon (2004) adds that there is a substantive and methodological

answer to this question. On substantive grounds, policies that turn rural men into refugees make them natural recruits for insurgencies, as they have few other opportunities in life, especially if the country's economy is poor. This helps explain also why Sons of the Soil wars tend to last so long. With migrants occupying the homesteads of the rebels, rebels have little choice but to make rebellion their way of life, and their career. With no chance to return home, the rebel band becomes the rebel's home. Under these conditions, high costs and low rewards for continuing civil wars are no longer deterrents. The theoretical answer here is that grievances may well be a necessary condition for rebellion, but since grievances are nearly ubiquitous, this is not very much of a restriction. It is only certain types of grievance that motivate insurgency.

The findings of the study align with Mwamvuneza's (2018) research on *Girinka* as a post-genocide strategy in Rwanda. Mwamvuneza's (2018) study suggested that the genocide was orchestrated and promoted by elites through mass media, but effectively carried out by peasants. In the rural context of pre-genocide Rwanda, being a farmer was associated with lower analytical skills, limited education, and higher susceptibility to political manipulation by influential individuals. Therefore, the study implies that a household's source of income can play a significant role in determining their likelihood of engaging in violent extremism. Individuals with low or unstable incomes are more susceptible to manipulation and divisive narratives propagated by elites. Conversely, individuals with stable sources of income are less likely to be influenced by such manipulation. During the 100 days of the genocide in 1994, the majority of the victims, including Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were killed by their Hutu peasant neighbors and even their own families. The genocide was made possible by the willingness and active participation of ordinary farmers (Bangwanubusa, 2009).

The relationship between poverty and conflict has been extensively studied in quantitative social science research (Collier *et al.,* 2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This study highlights the existence of a "conflict trap" alongside the more commonly known poverty trap. The conflict trap suggests that once a country experiences conflict, it undergoes a reversal in economic development, which in turn increases the likelihood of future conflicts. Furthermore, the literature argues that poverty serves as the primary underlying cause of civil war. The weight of evidence indicates that economic factors related to opportunities for rebellion, such as poverty, low income, negative growth, dependence on natural resources, and remittance flows from diaspora groups, have a stronger impact on the occurrence of civil war compared to political grievances such as inequality, state repression, ethnic fractionalization, and low levels of democracy in a country. This suggests that economic considerations play a significant role in driving conflicts and extremism.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have put forth the argument that poverty increases the probability of civil war onset by facilitating the recruitment of fighters for rebel groups. In impoverished societies, the economic benefits associated with joining a rebellion can outweigh those of conventional economic activities. On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin (2003) propose that poverty increases the likelihood of civil conflict by weakening the state's financial and military capabilities. A weaker state, according to their argument,

enhances the chances of success for rebel groups in a civil war. Both explanations highlight how poverty or low income can provide greater incentives and opportunities for rebels.

It is crucial to recognize that poverty and inequality are conceptually separate, despite their potential relationship. Poverty refers to a state of lacking resources or opportunities, indicating some level of deprivation. On the other hand, inequality focuses on the disparities or variations between individuals or groups, irrespective of whether they experience severe deprivation. While poverty and inequality can intersect, understanding their distinct conceptual aspects is essential for comprehensive analysis.

In light of this, the current study emphasizes the importance of addressing the threat to the respondents' source of income in Mt. Elgon, namely land. The deprivation of their traditional income source not only has implications for their economic mobility but also fuels extremism, contributing to the intractable nature of the Mt. Elgon Conflict. Actors must recognize and address this issue to promote sustainable peace and development in the region.

3. Level of Education

The level of education was considered a key factor in this study. This is because education influences the choices individuals make such as participating in or desisting from extremism-homegrown or external. Mwamvuneza's (2018) study advanced that there is an untested general census in Rwanda that minimal or lack of analytical skills exposed ordinary masses to manipulative planners of genocide hence actively engaging unsuspecting citizens in the implementation of genocide. Taking cognizance of this, the study sought to examine how levels of education as a variable are likely to play a role in homegrown extremism and intractable land use conflicts in the study area. Data on the same were collected and analyzed and the results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Table showing respondents' level of education

Level of Education	Percentage (Frequency)
No formal education at all	41% (164)
Primary Education	37% (148)
Secondary Education	16% (64)
Tertiary Education	6% (24)
Total	100% (400)

Source: Field Data (2021)

Study findings in Table 1 revealed that a higher proportion of 164 (41%) respondents had no formal education at all, 148 (37%) respondents had primary education, 64 (16%) had secondary education and 24 (6%) had tertiary level education. Study findings are not in agreement with conventional literature which shows that rural Afrocentric-based

radicalization into homegrown extremism involves more uneducated populations with the educated playing more managerial roles in the realm of homegrown extremism.

Study findings are not consistent with Horgan *et al.* (2016) study of conventional Euro-American drivers of extremism which established that lone actors were more educated than solo mass murderers, nineteen percent had some level of postgraduate university education compared to the latter, whereas 24% had some degree of university education. Liem *et al.* (2018) compared lone-actor terrorists and homicide offenders and found the latter were significantly more likely to only be educated to a primary school level. Zeman *et al.* (2022) reported 42% of their lone-actor sample were educated to at least a tertiary level. In an analysis of 1, 473 radicalized US citizens, LaFree *et al.* (2018) found that 43.3% had a college degree. In contrast, in a sample of Northern Irish murderers, 43% had no GCEs (the equivalent of high school-level examinations). Disaggregating suicide bombers from terrorists, Gill and Young (2011) report 32% of indicted terrorists had some college education compared to 50% of suicide bombers who had the equivalent of a high school education. Levels of education are markedly varied across these samples and most likely do not provide a reliable indicator of risk.

Study findings on level of education are corroborated by a study by Wachira *et al.* (2010). The findings from Wachira *et al.* (2010) regarding the conflict in Mt. Elgon highlighted the high level of unemployment in the district. The lack of skilled labor opportunities and limited access to formal sector employment, with most opportunities being on a casual basis, contribute to this situation. The study also reveals a low completion rate of secondary education, with only 17% of individuals who enroll in secondary schools completing their education. This leads to a significant number of unskilled and unemployed youth, including school dropouts and those with limited education. The combination of limited job prospects and the politicization of social and ethnic diversity in the region has contributed to the conflict. Furthermore, this unemployment and vulnerability to radical and extremist narratives in the area pose additional challenges and risks.

According to Østby *et al.* (2019), the relationship between education and conflict has gained significant attention from policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in various fields. This includes the fields of education, conflict studies, psychology, and others (Burde, 2014; Gross & Davies, 2015). In his book, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker emphasizes the role of education in reducing conflict. Pinker (2012) identifies education as a key component of the "escalator of reason" and one of the most important factors in pacifying humanity's history of violence. This perspective on education's role in conflict reduction is not new and aligns with the preamble to UNESCO's 1946 Constitution, which recognizes the power of education in constructing the defenses of peace by addressing the roots of conflict in the minds of individuals.

Research examining the relationship between education and conflict has thus far yielded inconclusive findings regarding their broader implications (Ishiyama & Breuning, 2012). This can be attributed to three main factors. Firstly, the predominant focus of research on

education and armed conflict has been qualitative, with a reliance on fieldwork involving practitioners and researchers working directly in conflict-affected areas. These studies have aimed to gain an in-depth understanding of individual cases within specific contexts. Secondly, the availability of comparable data on education, both at the international and sub-national levels, is limited. Education data are often lacking in countries and regions affected by conflict, making it difficult to conduct comprehensive quantitative analyses. Lastly, the relationship between education and armed conflict is intricate and multi-dimensional, with conflict influencing education outcomes in both negative and positive ways, while education itself can also shape conflict dynamics. The interplay between education and conflict is complex and multi-directional, further contributing to the challenge of drawing definitive conclusions about their broader implications (Barakat & Urdal, 2009; Ishiyama & Breuning, 2012).

The existing literature on education and conflict primarily focuses on the levels of education attained and government investment in education. Higher levels of education are generally assumed to promote peace, and this can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, higher levels of education signify greater investments in human capital, which reduces grievances related to exclusion from education and diminishes the motivation to resort to violence against the government. Secondly, a larger educated population provides more opportunities for alternative economic pursuits, making rebellion less appealing as a means of generating income. This increases the opportunity costs associated with engaging in violent activities. Lastly, higher levels of schooling indicate that more individuals have been exposed to state-sanctioned educational content, potentially leading to changes in their normative ideas about the value of conflict. These arguments support the notion that the level of education among respondents in the Mt. Elgon Region plays a role in shaping homegrown extremism.

Education levels can have both direct and indirect effects on the grievances that can contribute to political violence. According to relative deprivation theories, grievances arise when there is a growing gap between people's expectations and their actual circumstances. Higher levels of education may lead to increased expectations for socio-economic opportunities, and when these expectations are not met, grievances can emerge (Gurr, 1970). Government investment in education also plays a role in shaping grievances. Higher spending on education demonstrates a government's commitment to the well-being of its citizens. This investment can have a direct and lasting positive impact on people's lives, reducing grievances in society (Aoki & Davies, 2002). Additionally, education spending can indirectly reduce grievances and conflict by fostering economic development and social equality, leading to improved socio-economic conditions and reducing disparities (Thyne, 2006). In summary, education levels can influence grievances through the concepts of relative deprivation, government investment, and the indirect effects of education on economic development and social equality. These factors highlight the potential role of education in mitigating or exacerbating the underlying causes of violence.

In the literature examining the economic causes of civil war, education is viewed as a factor that influences the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict. This relates to the structural conditions that may facilitate a rebel group's ability to wage war against a state, with one important aspect being the cost of recruiting individuals to join the rebel ranks. Recruiting soldiers incurs costs, including the income that these individuals would forgo by enlisting as rebels. Higher levels of education increase the opportunity cost for young people to join conflicts, making rebel recruitment costlier and reducing the likelihood of rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Kuhn & Weidmann, 2015; Lochner & Moretti, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that policymakers should focus on increasing male secondary school enrolment, as young men are the primary group from which rebels are recruited. By doing so, countries with large cohorts of young males, who represent potential recruits for rebel groups, can significantly reduce the pool of individuals available for recruitment. Barakat and Urdal (2009) argue that increasing education at any level in these countries can help substantially decrease the potential pool of recruits for rebel groups. In summary, higher levels of education increase the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion, as individuals with more education have greater economic prospects outside of conflict. Policymakers can target male secondary school enrolment to reduce the pool of potential rebel recruits and contribute to reducing the likelihood of civil war.

A third explanation for the pacifying effect of education levels is its role in promoting social and political stability through the transmission of norms and preferences regarding the use of violence. According to Aristotle, education fosters a culture of peace by cultivating a collective preference for nonviolent conflict resolution (Sargent, 1996). Lipset (1959) argued that education broadens individuals' outlook and helps them understand the importance of tolerance and the need to avoid extremist ideologies. Scholars have further suggested that higher levels of education reduce the risk of political violence by promoting political participation and providing institutional channels for resolving conflicts of interest (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). More recent research highlights the role of education in fostering social cohesion and peaceful cooperation. Kuhn and Weidmann (2015) emphasize that individuals with lower levels of education are more susceptible to rhetoric, propaganda, and indoctrination, while Thyne (2006) argues that indicators of adult education, such as secondary and tertiary enrolment rates and adult literacy, are particularly relevant in assessing a government's ability to foster social cohesion among individuals who may be prone to rebellion. In summary, education plays a crucial role in promoting social and political stability by instilling values of tolerance, political participation, and peaceful conflict resolution. Higher levels of education contribute to the development of cohesive societies and provide individuals with the critical thinking skills necessary to resist extremist ideologies and manipulation.

Education is commonly believed to raise the opportunity cost of recruiting rebels, thus decreasing the likelihood of rebellion. Socioeconomic inequality is often considered a key factor in measuring grievances and is associated with the emergence of conflict. Ferranti

(2004) contends that education is the primary driver of socioeconomic inequality within a society due to its significant influence on individuals' future opportunities and paths in life.

4. Housing Structure

The study to examine the determinants of homegrown extremism in Mt. Elgon Region sought to look at the existing housing structures in the study area. For a long time, housing has been a cornerstone of human needs and thus an important determinant of conflict of any nature and at any level. Data on housing structure were collected and analyzed and the results are presented in Figure 3. Quantitative evidence in Figure 3 revealed that the majority 244 (61%) of respondents lived in structures made of mud, 104 (26%) respondents lived in the grass thatched houses, 44 (11%) respondents lived in brick houses here as only 8 (2%) respondents had cement houses. It is also important to point out that there was no single observable house in the study area made from bricks or cement apart from the few government structures- classroom blocks and dispensaries.

Figure 3: Housing Structure in Mt. Elgon Region of Kenya
Source: Field Data (2021)

The findings of the current study on housing depart from the traditional notion of housing as a human need. This study interrogated housing in two folds. First, the housing material used was looked at as an indicator of poverty levels. With majority of respondents having mud houses, which are usually made from soil, required little or no expertise as well as minimal labor. Secondly, housing structure was used as a measure of temporary habitation in the area. With the majority of respondents not having any proof of land ownership in an area that has been volatile for almost four decades, this could be indicative that, like

nomads, populations in Mt. Elgon are always ready to migrate in the event of any land-related violence. The findings on temporary residence could be attributed to the mini-violence in late 2018. This period saw thousands of households depart to "safer" areas on the lower side of Mt. Elgon following the mini-reign of terror, the government through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government effected a 6 months long dusk to dawn curfew.

In addition, respondents also revealed that such temporary structures would not pose many challenges to rebuild due to the availability of earth material with the majority of the households having roofs made from aluminum. This was attributed to aluminum being difficult to torch down as had been witnessed during the conflict. In the Laboot area—in the moorland, for instance, during government eviction programs, houses are usually torched down by the security enforcing agencies. To this end, housing in the study area plays a key role in adapting to the temporary circumstances that the residents in the study area live under. The current study makes a significant contribution to knowledge in terms of housing which for a long time has been looked at as a human need and a factor in conflict. The current study looks at housing as an indicator of hostility, non-permanence, and a determinant of homegrown extremism over intractable land-use conflicts in the study area.

IV. Conclusions

Arising from the findings and discussion of results, the paper concludes that indeed, the African conflict sets a diverse picture that departs from conventional literature with regards to studies on homegrown extremism. The study concludes that the socio-demographic determinants of homegrown extremism under study were strongly supported and thus fundamental in understanding the intractable conflict architecture in the squatter enclaves of Mount Elgon Region. These were land ownership, source of income, level of education, and housing structure with results revealing a complex interplay between the four variables. Addressing land tenure security emerges as a vital priority, as it can have a spillover effect on the other three variables. By tackling land tenure insecurity, the study suggests that the risk of homegrown extremism in the study area can be reduced, paving the way for potential progress in managing and resolving the conflict.

V. Recommendations

The conclusions drawn from the study highlight the intricate relationship between land ownership, income sources, education level, and housing structure concerning issues of exclusion, thus contributing to the emergence and persistence of homegrown extremism in the study area. These conclusions not only shed light on extremism in the Mount Elgon region but also indicate that similar patterns can be observed across Africa, where many conflicts have been fueled by exclusionary narratives. Examples include the Rwanda

Genocide, Civil Wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Darfur Genocide, Post-election violence in Kenya, and ongoing conflicts in South Sudan, the youngest nation in Africa. There is a need, therefore, for Governments to be at the vanguard of addressing the root causes of the conflict- in the case of Mount Elgon, land tenure insecurity if attaining sustainable peace is of priority. Without sustainable peace, development aspirations cannot be attained, and as such these if not addressed will continue to negate the "leaving no one behind" slogan which is the cog that propels the Global sustainable agenda 2015–2030.

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International Business in Conflict Zones:
The Case of MTN

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Abstract: It is not uncommon for multinational companies to establish subsidiaries outside their home countries, especially in developing regions to tap into emerging markets. It is however a different situation when multinationals establish businesses in unstable and violence-affected regions to take advantage of the local market structure that has suffered a hit by the continuous conflict. However, running a business in such regions may lead to distortion of the administration of these firms due to the violence which may destroy infrastructure and harm employees. Many firms are discouraged from investing in conflict zones because of the exposure to insecurity and violence. This paper adopts a case study and case analysis approach with an in-depth focus on the operation of a specific company and its operations in two conflict zones which resulted in distinct outcomes. In addition, a review of existing literature on the establishment and operation of a business in conflict zones was carried out to effectively examine the challenges of litigation and conflict resolution involving MTN Group as a corporate entity in Afghanistan and Northeastern Nigeria and the impact on the business operations in the respective regions.

Keywords: Conflict, business, Afghanistan, MTN, Nigeria, terrorism.

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I. Introduction

Conducting business activities in jurisdictions marked by extreme violence is an age-long occurrence. Entrepreneurs have always taken advantage of regions experiencing some form of conflict to expand business opportunities and develop new markets. The authorities and residents in conflict areas will need

food, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies essential to their continued existence. Some business entities will therefore have to continue operating in war zones to, at the minimum, provide basic needs for residents (Le Billon, 2005). War often has underlying commercial interests and economic incentives due to the resources-backed objectives among parties. Combatants take the opportunity to loot amid the crisis, set up illegal trading channels, and trade pacts for the items that have been pillaged and for commodities that have been made scarce because of the conflict. The questions about business in conflict go beyond the conduct of businesses during conflict and extend to the role that such business corporation plays in sustaining armed conflict and defining the violent patterns of war (Keen, 2012). Jurisdictions that suffer insecurity are prone to a sudden change in the form of government and set of rules that regulate administrative operations. As will be discussed in this paper, the authorities have alleged that MTN contributed to the conflicts in their areas of operation by non-compliance with the operational regulations or unintentional subversion of security operations. This sudden change leads to economic uncertainty, hence, the risk of armed conflict is generally assumed to deter foreign investment in jurisdictions that suffer conflict and insecurity (Morgan, 2005).

The telecommunication industry has been considered less sensitive to conflicts, unlike extractive sectors such as oil, gold, and other natural resources (Goldwyn & Switzer, 2004). However, the central role played by telecommunication, broadcast, and multimedia services has raised the question of whether media-convergent businesses can be considered to be conflict-sensitive (Ahere, 2019). Based on this background, this paper examines the investments and business activities of MTN in jurisdictions that have encountered terrorism and political turmoil. MTN Incorporated is a South African multinational telecommunication company that has found itself in the middle of regulatory infractions and business deemed inimical to peace and aiding the enemy in Nigeria and Afghanistan, respectively. The MTN group incorporated in 1994 has its headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa, and operates several subsidiaries in African and Asian Countries including Nigeria and Afghanistan. As of 30 June 2016, MTN became the largest mobile network in Africa and the eighth-largest mobile network operator in the world with over 230 million subscribers (Statista, 2019). MTN operates active business activities in over 20 countries with one-third of company revenue coming from Nigeria, where it holds about 35% market share. The company offers voice, data, and digital services to retail customers in countries where telecoms licenses have been obtained.

The information collected is from primary and secondary sources and consists of conference papers and reports, research reports, policy briefs, journal articles, books, websites, and other reliable publications. Documents and resources that provide analyses of the business activities of MTN corporation and conflicts in Nigeria and Afghanistan have been consulted. The role of the conflict and its relationship to international business is analyzed through the available mechanisms for conflict resolution.

This paper is categorized into several sections for easy comprehension. The paper begins by reviewing the existing literature on the operation of a business in conflict zones and a

general overview of MTN as a multinational telecommunication company. The paper then analyses MTN operations in Afghanistan while examining the insecurity in Afghanistan and how the operations of MTN in the region have contributed to the lack of security. The next section discusses the operations of MTN in Northern Nigeria and the insecurity caused by the Boko Haram insurgents in the region. The mechanisms for dispute resolution of business conflict were discussed in the following section where alternative means of dispute resolution for international business conflicts were examined against the traditional litigation mode. The last section offers a conclusion that recognizes the difficulties faced by firms who operate in conflict zones while also recommending that business entities stay away from conflict regions to avoid the imminent consequences.

II. Literature Review

Companies that have chosen to establish or continue to operate their business during the conflict suffer attacks of varying degrees. Their staff may be wounded, killed, or raped, and business organizations of all kinds are destroyed in armed conflicts. Some of these organizations are also hindered from accessing credit facilities and foreign exchange for their business which causes fundamentally curtailed business operations which may in turn lead to lesser proceeds, reduction in employee salaries, unemployment, and sometimes insolvency and liquidation (Hacioglu *et al.*, 2012). It is not uncommon to find businesses involved in conflict within the areas where they operate by providing infrastructure support that has facilitated the continuation of conflicts directly or indirectly. Some have supported their respective governments while others have voluntarily or involuntarily aided armed groups (Tripathi, 2010).

Business organizations in conflict zones implement corporate social responsibilities as a means of contributing positively to society. These firms have further maintained that they carry out services that are essential to the lives of civilians in the course of the conflict. Some businesses have attempted to help negotiate the restoration of peaceful coexistence among conflicting parties while other businesses promise and also take active steps in creating jobs for members of groups who have surrendered arms (Banfield *et al.*, 2006).

However, some researchers argue against the notion that corporations operating in conflict zones are imperative for the growth and development of traditional communities. The justification for a firm's continued operation in a conflict zone is that its business does not contribute to the escalation of violence and has alleviated poverty in the areas of operation through the creation of jobs. Businesses in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Angola have played very important roles in helping conflicting parties reach an understanding through negotiations. Also, employees of large business organizations in Rwanda and the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria, have taken exceptional measures to assist victims during an armed conflict. To prevent business organisations from worsening the situation in conflict zones it is necessary to determine clear rules for what they can and cannot do. It has also been observed that the private sector can support conflict prevention strategies in peaceful

regions through its business activities, investment programs, and participation in economic policy discourse (Nelson, 2000).

Areas experiencing conflict and insecurity pose major threats to the foreign subsidiaries, hence, the more exposed the subsidiaries are to threats, the less likely it is for them to stay and continue operations in such areas (Schotter & Beamish, 2014). Remaining in these areas and refusing to halt operations may cause major disruptions for firms in terms of bombings, pillaging, destruction of infrastructure, and exposure of employees to harm. The stall in economic growth may also prompt the local government to implement novel tax structures for additional revenue (Hacioglu *et al.*, 2012; Henisz, 2000). Multinational firms that operate in threatening and unstable environments are often exposed to insecurity and may therefore terminate subsidiary operations in conflict zones in response to terrorist attacks in the host countries (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). Firms may also be discouraged from investing in conflict zones because of the disapproval that these firms receive from their home governments.

Research findings have shown that the effect of conflict on firms may not necessarily be negative and may vary depending on the experience of the individual firm and its operations in conflict zones (Delios & Beamish, 2001).

Some large and multinational establishments have continued operations in conflict zones and even go further to make a significant investment because they can acquire local businesses that have been affected by the conflict and explore opportunities for public-private partnership to strengthen their market reach. These establishments may also benefit from government incentives and gain access to credit facilities from development financial institutions such as the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (Hacioglu *et al.*, 2012). The human rights organization Corporate Watch (2006) reports that despite the huge risks of investing in a conflict zone, some well-known firms in the United Kingdom have made considerable financial gains from investing in Iraq, and other findings have shown that some firms in the diamond industry benefited from investing in the violence affected Angola (Guidolin & La Ferrara, 2007).

Corporate critics think that foreign investors abuse power, promote the abuse of the fundamental rights of man, destabilize governments, and generally worsen the situation in many environments affected by armed conflicts (Haufler, 2005). Researchers while examining the roles of firms amid armed conflict found that business in conflict zones is detrimental and in addition, will hinder tranquility. These researchers further observe that if businesses must operate in conflict-affected areas, then they must be regulated accordingly (Bennett, 2001).

The mechanisms for resolution of conflicts are numerous but the suitability of a particular mechanism to a given conflict depends on the extent of governance in the given area (Humphreys, 2005). In all these paradigms, the impact on entrepreneurs becomes significant as they need to consider whether to continue to do business or withdraw from

the conflict zones. Firm exit as a phenomenon in conflict zones was examined (Camacho & Rodriguez, 2013). The study found that paramilitary attacks in Columbia were an impetus for the firm's exit. Particularly for companies with small numbers of employees and low levels of capital. On the other hand, some states have managed to retain investment, prevent exit, and achieve marginal growth despite the existence of armed conflicts in some parts of the country (Minhas & Radford, 2017).

It is common for disagreement to arise among parties in a contractual relationship. International business entities are however expected to have at the time of executing the contract agreed to one or more dispute resolution mechanisms to be employed in resolving the differences (Reif, 1990). The situation of MTN in Afghanistan and Nigeria are distinct not only because they have occurred in different jurisdictions but also because while the Afghanistan situation led to the institution of a suit against MTN, the Government in Nigeria has only demanded the immediate payment of a penalty following an acknowledgment by MTN that they indeed refused to disconnect invalid sims cards as directed by the Federal Government. MTN has been sued in the United States because the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1879 grants the US court's jurisdiction to determine matters relating to torture without regard to the nationality of the victim and the culprits (Antoniolli, 2005).

As much as the families of the slain and injured American troops and personnel have taken the right step in the right direction by approaching the court considering that the traditional means of resolving disputes emanating from international business is by litigation (Wang, 2014), the apparent flaws in litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism has over the years led to its disapproval by litigants and lawyers alike. The surge in the number of suits filed in courts has not only led to delays in the adjudication of the cases but often resulted in the negligent nature in which suits are determined. In addition, it has been generally observed that the institution and prosecution of an action in court are not cost-effective and generally not affordable when compared to other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (Wang, 2014). The filing fees, expert witness fees, professional fees, and other associated fees charged by legal practitioners accumulate and turn out to be a lot of money to be paid by litigants.

The deceptive and win-by-all-means technique employed by lawyers in the courtroom sways the court away from the facts of the case and more often than not results in decisions that are unsatisfactory to both parties (Thensted, 1984). This may also lead to animosity between parties considering that events that occurred during the court proceedings may cause a permanent breakdown of the business relationships between parties.

There have also been complaints by litigants that the courts in adjudicating disputes tend to consider technicalities and procedural rules over the substantial dispute brought before the court (Simon, 1978). The frustration of litigants is borne out of the fact that court decisions rely more on the procedure and rules of the court rather than the facts of the case as averred before the court.

In reaction to the weakness of litigation as a form of dispute resolution, disputing parties now look to other means of dispute resolution which include negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. These means of dispute resolution seek to decongest the court by providing a viable alternative for parties to resolve their disputes while also ensuring that the general public plays a decisive role in dispute resolution. The advancement of other means of resolving disputes rather than litigation guarantees a more competent and efficient dispute resolution experience and overall safeguards the right of disputing parties to a fair and just settlement and determination of dispute (Thensted, 1984).

Negotiation as a means of dispute resolution is a discourse between parties who are in disagreement to reach a resolution that is favorable to and accepted by both parties. It is the fastest way to get parties to reach an arrangement that ensures a win-win situation for all parties involved. Fisher *et al.* (1999) have also observed in their book that principled negotiation is the best way to resolve differences among several parties. However, for negotiation to be successful, parties must be open-minded and understanding during the dialogue and more importantly they must be inclined to an amicable settlement that is just and fair to all parties.

Mediation is the procedure whereby a skilled and unbiased umpire referred to as the mediator presides over a dialogue between parties who are in disagreement to ensure a smooth exchange between parties which may as a result ultimately put an end to the dispute (Posin, 2003). The mediator may suggest measures that may facilitate the settlement of the dispute; however, such suggestions are not binding on any of the parties.

Arbitration on the other hand is a more regulated and controlled process than negotiation and mediation. Like litigation, it is an adjudicative mode of dispute resolution however, in arbitration the formal proceeding is prescribed by an arbitral tribunal who determines the dispute by the issuance of an award (McLean, 2008).

Disputes emanating from international business are better resolved using the foregoing alternative means because parties are more likely to reach a compromise and there is a great possibility of compliance since the disputing parties were involved in the resolution process.

III. Telecommunication and MTN's Operation in Afghanistan

Following 23 years of protracted conflict, poverty, and political instability telecommunication as a commercial enterprise in Afghanistan was non-existent until about 2002 (*Afghanistan telecom brief*). This was because of the long-lasting conflicts in the country which robbed the country of many opportunities among which was the development of its telecommunication industry. In June 2002, the road to telecommunication sector reconstruction was initiated at a national assembly known as *loya jirga* which was convened by the President at that time, Hamid Karzai. The *Jirga* identified the importance of stimulating economic activity in all sectors and promoting security. A 2003 report observed that

the lack of telecommunication services has limited the administrative control, revenue collection, and peace-building efforts in the country. Therefore, in 2004, the government was able to restore telecom services under a development plan that attracted an investment of USD130 million to Afghan Telecoms which was translated to 170,000 mobile subscribers. According to Zita (2004), the adoption of a liberal approach in this risky market appears to be growing stronger with more private sector interest in the telecom market.

The first GSM Company—Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) was established and began operations in 2002 and in January 2003 a second operator Roshan was awarded the second GSM license for telecoms operation in Afghanistan (Khan, 2018). The third GSM license was awarded to Areeba in September 2005 for 15 years at a fee of USD 40.1 million. As of 2012, the total investment in the telecom market stands at USD 1.5 billion and 17.1 million subscribers.

After commencing services in July 2006, with services in the four provinces of Mazar, Kabul, Ningrhar and Kundu, the telecoms operator had an estimated subscribership of 200,000 by the end of that year. Areeba Afghanistan became the country's third mobile operator, joining Roshan and Afghan Wireless Communications Company (AWCC) in providing telecommunications services to the Afghanistan market. As part of a global merger, Areeba was later acquired by the South African-based Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) in mid-2007 under a deal worth $5.53 billion between the two companies (Hamdard, 2012). With the takeover, MTN Afghanistan which as a result expanded MTN's global coverage from 11 to 21 countries across Africa and the Middle East. MTN has grown its coverage across major cities, districts, and provincial capitals in Afghanistan providing mobile telecommunication services, including the installation, operation, and maintenance of a Global Systems Mobile (GSM) network, wireless communication, and internet services to over six million subscribers.

MTN-Afghanistan is a subsidiary of the South African-based MTN Group, a multinational telecommunications company operating across the Middle East and Africa. MTN is the majority (90%) shareholder, while International Finance Corporation (IFC) at 9% is also a debt and equity shareholder of MTN-Afghanistan. MTN operates at 900–1800 MHZ GSM band, and as of 2012 has 4.5 million subscribers and service coverage in most major cities, 464 districts, and all 34 provincial capitals. With over $400 million in total investment, MTN offers mobile voice, SMS, MMS, GPRS, fax, and voicemail services through prepaid, postpaid, and corporate tariffs.

MTN has interconnection agreements with all national telecom operators and provides international voice and SMS roaming in 121 countries and across 227 operators through prepaid and postpaid roaming tariffs. MTN also has a national ISP license which the company received in November 2008. MTN was the first company to introduce the popular per-second billing system in the country (also known as "pay as you talk") allowing its subscribers to transparently track their talk time and receive billing summaries via SMS. The scheme was so popular that other GSM companies quickly adopted this method.

As part of its corporate social responsibility initiative, MTN supports the Afghanistan health sector by building health centers, and financing gynecology, blood donations, and emergency Response Services. They also dug wells and boreholes, reconstructed damaged roads, and collapsed ridges, and made efforts to rehabilitate victims of the war.

MTN through its foundation also offers free education to Afghan males and females and provides books, stationery, and computer training. The foundation also ensures that schools are kept clean and in wholesome conditions (Khan, 2018). They assist community support programs by reconstructing broken bridges digging water wells for people and helping those who are affected by war and displaced from their own homes in provinces.

Figure 1. Afghanistan Map

War and insecurity in Afghanistan

For a long time, Afghanistan has been involved in various tribal and civil wars that were caused by a duel between the superpower states and the conflicting socio-political system (Liakhovsky, 2000). The strife and unrest in Afghanistan may be traced to the 4th century during the Greek conquest and Kushan invasions by Alexander the Great. The Afghans, albeit unsuccessfully, put up a fight against the invasion of their land which was at that time a part of Persia, and renamed Bactria after the conquest (Farrell & Giustozzi, 2013). Another notable event that provoked conflict in Afghanistan was the occupation of

Afghanistan lands by the Soviet Union in 1979. The soviet troops assumed control and took charge of the major cities and provinces in Afghanistan which prompted rebellious activities by the Mujahideen against the Soviets on the one hand and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the other for requesting the Soviet Union to introduce forces into Afghanistan to facilitate governance. Other wars that Afghanistan has been involved in include the Islamic conquest of Afghanistan which was from the 7th century to the early 8th century, the conquest of Afghanistan by the Mongol empire which occurred in the 13th century, the Anglo-Afghan wars which lasted from 19th century to the 20th century, the Soviet-Afghan war and the Afghan civil wars of the 20th century.

The conflict in Afghanistan today primarily revolves around the subversive and rebellious activities of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Although it is common knowledge that Al-Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1998, there is an understanding that Al Qaeda as a terrorist group was set up by the United States government as a tool to divide and subdue the Middle East. In 2005, Robin Cook, a former British Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Al-Qaeda group was a product of the United States of America's intelligence agency (Chengu, 2014).

Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden orchestrated the infamous attack on the United States on September 11 2001 which resulted in nearly 3000 deaths and damage to infrastructure worth billions of dollars. The United States government responded to the September 11 attacks by invading and declaring a war on terror in Afghanistan. Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States, the Taliban lost grip of the country and had to move to Southern Afghanistan to seek refuge. The Taliban have since then waged war against the Afghanistan government and its security forces (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).

The Taliban have assumed control of most of the provinces including the strategic southern province of Helmand, they continue to threaten other provincial capitals and execute suicide attacks in major provinces and cities. As of 2019, the number of United Nations documented civilian casualties since 2001 was reported to have exceeded 100,000 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). More than one thousand civilians have been killed and over 2000 injured including women and children in the first six months of the year 2020. The Talibans who have claimed to only direct attacks to the Afghanistan government and the foreign military have haphazardly launched attacks that have left hundreds of civilians dead and injured. The Afghanistan army is also guilty of careless air strikes that have left a good number of civilians dead and injured.

The anti-terrorism case against MTN

In December 2019, two separate civil suits were filed under the Federal Anti-Terrorism Act at the District Court of Columbia, alleging MTN and seven other corporations of aiding the enemy by paying protection money to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The first suit is *Guy Davis et al.*, v. *MTN Irancell Telecommunications Services Company et al.,* Civil Action No. 22-829 (RDM) while the second suit is *Sally Chand et al.,* v. *MTN Irancell Telecommunications Services Company et al.*, Civil Action No. 22-830 (RDM).

A third suit against MTN was also filed in the Eastern District of New York in *Zobay et al.* v. *MTN Group Limited et al.,* No. 1:21-cv-03503-CBA. The suit was filed by 67 American Gold Star family members, servicemembers, and their families, who were involved in several attacks by the Taliban which left many US soldiers dead and others injured between 2009 and 2017. In the case filed in the Eastern District of New York, the claimants averred that MTN violated the US Anti-Terrorism Act by making payments to the Taliban to protect its cellular towers and other infrastructure from being attacked and destroyed by the Taliban militants. The claimants allege that the payments arrangement between MTN and the Taliban began in 2006 which has since continued and adds up to hundreds of millions of dollars. The claimants further aver that these sums have been a major source of funding the Taliban's attacks against the United States troops.

These cases have another geo-political dimension as the court documents referred to a joint venture between MTN and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the "IRGC") under a formal agreement to support the security need of IRGC which the plaintiff considers to be terrorist activities.

The claimants believe that MTN had taken the convenient route of paying off the Taliban militants to deal with their security hurdles in the conflict region instead of investing in efficient security measures to protect their cell towers, transmission masts, and other infrastructure. The claimants further aver that sources from MTN state that it was cheaper for the telecommunication corporate to pay the protection sums to the Taliban than to rebuild cell towers and other infrastructure if they were destroyed in the heat of the subsisting conflicts in the country (Gordon & Donati, 2019).

These payments heavily funded the Taliban in their activities in Afghanistan and in their strikes against the United States troops which left over 300 United States soldiers and civilian personnel dead and injured between 2009 and 2017. The claimants comprising Zobay and in the suit filed further averred that the monies were paid in cash either by direct disbursement to heads and rulers of the Taliban or payments to the community and tribal heads who over time subsequently hand over the money to the Taliban (BBC, 2019). The evidence to establish this claim is reported to have been gathered by the Afghan Threat Finance Cell who maintain that protection payments to Taliban in Afghanistan was a common practice. Other reports suggest that this is a bribe to ensure the continued business of MTN in Afghanistan.

MTN has also been alleged to have connived with the Taliban by shutting down their cellular networks at night upon the instruction of the Taliban militants to avoid being tracked by the United States troops. According to the claimants, the fact that MTN in 2011 disregarded a decree by the former President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ordering MTN to re-activate its towers at night shows that the communication network

deliberately protected the Taliban, hence, sabotaging the efforts of the United States troops in combating insurgency.

Essentially, the claimants have, with the lawsuit, prayed the court for damages for the deaths and injuries suffered by the United States troops and civilian personnel as a result of attacks from the Taliban between 2009 and 2017. In a statement made after the suit was filed, MTN maintains that it at all times and in all territories where it operates, conducts its business in a responsible and compliant manner (Reuters, 2020). In April 2020, MTN filed an application asking the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction and because none of the conduct of MTN as averred by the claimants violates the anti-terrorism Act. The claimants in June 2020, amended their complaints to further aver that MTN had *ab initio* targeted the United States by conducting its business in an unstable zone not friendly or affiliated with the United States, making protection payments to the Taliban which heavily funded attacks on the US service men and shutting down its cellular towers at night to prevent the Taliban from getting tracked by the United States troops (Reuters, 2020). It is anticipated that MTN will file another application for dismissal taking into consideration the amended complaint. The leadership of MTN has expressed sympathy to the injured civilians and military personnel and to those who have lost loved ones but maintained that the MTN group is not the insurgents nor have they contributed to the tragic losses suffered by the Americans in Afghanistan.

While the suit is yet to be determined and MTN is by law presumed innocent of the allegations contained in the complaints, it is undoubtedly demeaning to the status of the largest African telecommunication group to be faced with such unpleasant allegations amid the deadly conflicts being experienced in Afghanistan.

An amended complaint by the plaintiff which was filed on 4th February 2022 shows the scale of the allegations which have been extended beyond MTN Afghanistan to the entire MTN Group Limited, MTN Irancell, MTN Dubai Limited. Also included as defendants are Chinese businesses registered in the USA—ZTE Corporation, ZTE (USA) Inc., ZTE (TX) Inc., HUAWEI Technologies Co. Ltd., HUAWEI Technologies USA Inc., HUAWEI Device USA Inc., FUTUREWEI Technologies, Inc., and SKYCOM Tech Co. Ltd., as joint defendants while the next friends, estates and representatives of several US citizens were the plaintiffs who are demanding a trial by jury.

All the defendants were alleged to be providing funds, technologies, and benefits for terror groups in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon against American citizens. The relief sought by the plaintiffs includes a judgment finding the defendants jointly and severally liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and award of punitive and compensatory damages to the maximum extent permitted by the law among others.

Significantly, all three cases contain the same factual situations on terrorism against the defendants. The challenges of multiple suits against MTN were further compounded by the inability to harmonize the cases into one suit instead of three. On 30th March 2023, District Court Judge Randolph Moss denied the defendant's MTN application to transfer

the suit to New York. The court orders were on the basis that:

> "The Court is unconvinced. Although Defendants have identified a handful of factors that weigh in favor of transfer, they have failed to carry their "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the relevant considerations cut "strongly in favor" of transferring actions properly brought in this forum" (Davis *et al*. v MTN *et al*. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2023).

The decision that Zobay, Davis, and Chand should stand alone and not be transferred has a damaging effect on the reputation and activities of the company in South Africa and other markets. Beyond corporate reputation, individuals who were officials of the company during the period of the alleged terrorism activities were added to the suit. Such individuals include Phutuma Nhleko and Irene Charnley who were both former chairman of MTN Group and executive officers respectively (Mungadze, 2022). It becomes incumbent on MTN to continue to follow suit and report to its shareholders on the challenges posed by these terrorism financing lawsuits. In a statement released as part of announcing its third-quarter earnings in November 2023, the company stated that "MTN firmly believes that the plaintiffs have sued the wrong defendants in the wrong court, based on insufficient allegations" (Gavaza, 2023).

IV. MTN and Insecurity in Northeastern Nigeria

Another regulatory infringement about the armed conflict that involved MTN occurred within the African continent in Nigeria, West Africa. The history of telecommunication services in Nigeria dates back to the installation of submarine cables by the British colonial administration in the late 19th century to connect Lagos to London which led to the introduction of phone lines at specific regions including Ibadan and Calabar (Arzika, 2000). In 1985, twenty-five years after independence, Nigeria launched her telecommunication service known as the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited, commonly known as NITEL. The organization was saddled with the responsibility of managing the telecommunications and external communications in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the organization was highly inefficient in carrying out its responsibilities, and not too long after the launch there were appeals for the rebuild and rehabilitation of the firm. These appeals led to the removal of restrictions on the private sector to take part in the telecommunication industry which as a result allowed for competition in the industry.

The Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) was therefore set up as an independent body to regulate and create an enabling environment for competition in the telecommunication industry in Nigeria and ensure efficient and effective telecommunication services across the country. The NCC was also vested with the power to grant licenses to private sector operators (Ndukwe, 2004).

In 2001, the NCC granted renewable licenses to MTN and Econet (now Airtel) at 285 million dollars each and both corporates launched their services in August of the same

year. Both MTN and Econet were by the licence required to have at least 1.5million subscribers five years after they began operations and have a minimum of 5% coverage in each geopolitical zone.

MTN Nigeria is one of the largest providers of telecommunication services in Africa. Its services are currently cut across more than 200 cities and about 10,000 villages spanning the 36 states and 6 geo-political zones in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (Ndukwe, 2005). Statistics by the NCC show that as of December 2019, the telephone subscribers in Nigeria had exceeded 184 million with MTN having the highest number of 68.7 million subscribers (Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, 2020).

Like in Afghanistan, MTN Nigeria also has a foundation responsible for corporate social responsibility focusing on education, health, sports, and economic empowerment. The foundation has impacted the areas of poverty reduction and sustainable development growth in Nigeria. MTN through its foundation in 2015 equipped a laboratory with technical equipment in Lagos to facilitate the training of young students in technical colleges. They have also collaborated with the government in providing hemodialysis machines in general hospitals.


Figure 2. Nigerian Map Indicating the Northeastern States

Boko Haram and insecurity in Nigeria

The insecurity being experienced in Northeastern Nigeria which comprises six states viz- Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe has resulted in the killing of several civilians, destruction of properties, public infrastructure, rape, kidnappings, and

a complete degradation and deterioration of the North Eastern Geo-Political Zone. The insurgency in the region has been linked to the activities of the largest Islamic militant group in Africa known as Boko Haram.

Although scholars are not unanimous on when the Boko Haram sect was formed, however, it is common knowledge that the sect became active in 2001 under the leadership and mentorship of the late Muhammad Yusuf who was able to recruit poor and unemployed youths in Northern Nigeria. The sect provided recruited members with food, clothing, shelter, and medicine with funding reported to have come from well-to-do northern Nigerians and some Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia (Awojobi, 2014). Some of the members of the sect are reported to have been subjected to comprehensive training sessions within the Al-Qaeda sect in Mali and Somalia (Akinbi, 2015). It is therefore not a surprise that some of them have shown the ability to manage weapons skilfully and build local bombs using improvised explosives.

The leader of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf was captured and killed in July 2009 and since then the sect has intensified its attacks on the police, the military, churches, mosques, public infrastructures, and random killings in busy markets and villages (Ajah, 2011). Since 2009, the insurgency in the northeastern Nigerian has claimed tens of thousands of lives and has displaced millions. The United Nations refugee agency has reported that the insurgency has displaced about 2.4 million civilians putting about seven million at risk of food insecurity and starvation (Campbell & Harwood, 2018).

The years 2014 to 2015 saw the region suffer the worst attacks from the insurgents. The Boko Haram sect in April 2014 claimed responsibility for the kidnap of over two hundred girls from their school in the Chibok town of Borno State. Some of the girls have been released due to negotiations between the Boko Haram insurgents and the Nigerian Government. This incident attracted concerns from various countries and international bodies. In 2014 alone, about 5000 deaths were recorded resulting from killings, and bombings including suicide attacks and kidnappings in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and the federal capital territory. The Nigerian government in May 2014 declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.

The government under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015) and President Muhammadu Buhari (2015–present) made efforts to combat the insurgents and drive them away from areas that have been captured and fully controlled by them. Paramilitary officers and local civilian groups have also assisted the Nigerian Military by serving as a source of support and providing useful information on the activities of the insurgents.

At present there is a remarkable reduction in the activities of the insurgents in the region. They have over the years been forced out of their strongholds and peace has been restored in most areas which has resulted in daily activities returning to normal (Jacob & Akpan, 2015). Although the sect has control of a few villages and still lunch attacks, they are less

powerful than they were in 2015 and have resulted in suicide bombings in their struggle against the government. It is pertinent to state that insurgency-related violence is completely absent in the South and Western parts of Nigeria considering that the insurgent activities are confined to the North Eastern geo-political zone in Nigeria (Campbell & Harwood, 2018).

A major factor that has assisted the Boko Haram sect is the use of mobile phones to plan attacks simultaneously in different areas. The insurgents are known for conducting raids, killings, and suicide attacks concurrently in different towns and villages. In an-attack in March 2020, the sect attacked the Lake Chad military personnel in the Lake Chad region and almost at the same time attacked an army convoy in Borno State. The sect has also mastered the art of using mobile phones to organize several attacks to distract security personnel away from their major plans. The insurgents are known to conduct raids in small villages to divert the attention of the Nigerian military away from an even more serious and destructive attack. A good example is the infamous raid of the Chibok Secondary School where the insurgents had before the raid but on the same day attacked the Nyaya park in Abuja vide a car bomb which left many dead and several injured (Jacob & Akpan, 2015). The insurgents had by communicating through mobile phone successfully organized the Nyaya attack to distract the military operatives from their main objective of abducting over 200 girls from their school in the Chibok town of Borno state.

To defeat the insurgency, the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) in collaboration with the Director of Secret Service (DSS) and the Office of the National Security Adviser in May 2015 directed all telecommunication operators within Nigeria to deactivate all improperly registered sim cards. This development was prompted by apparent indications that invalid sim registrations posed a great threat to national security. The security agencies had inferred that unregistered sims facilitated the commission of heinous crimes by the insurgents by making it difficult to trace the perpetrators (Nosiri & Ibekwe, 2016).

The NCC therefore gave a deadline to all telecommunication operators to deactivate all invalid and improperly registered sims by August 2015. Upon compliance audit, it was discovered that the telecommunication operators had not complied with the directive which consequently led to a meeting between the government and the chief executives of the operators where the government reiterated its directives and warned the operators that continued violation of the directives will have the government impose penalties by the Sim Registration Regulations and licenses may be revoked.

Except MTN, all other operators within Nigeria had after this meeting fully complied with the directives. MTN had made little and ineffectual attempts to deactivate a few unregistered users in selected areas which led to the NCC in October 2015 imposing a fine of $5.2 Billion for failure to deactivate and disconnect over 5 million improperly registered sims. MTN approached the court to challenge the validity of the penalty and obtained an order preventing the Nigerian Government from restraining them from transferring

funds abroad. MTN eventually decided to withdraw the case from court and explore alternative dispute resolution which led to a diplomatic meeting between Jacob Zuma, the president of South Africa, and Muhammadu Buhari, the president of Nigeria in March 2016. The president of Nigeria at the meeting observed that the primary concern of the country is national security and much less on the payment of the fine. He stated further that improperly registered sims are being used by the insurgents in committing heinous crimes and killing Nigerians (BBC, 2016a).

After the meeting between the presidents, the Nigerian government slashed the fine of $1.7 billion to be paid in instalments over three years (BBC, 2016b). MTN has since then complied with the directives and in June 2019 paid the final instalment in full compliance with the penalty. The Chairman of the company was reported to have said that "this is the best outcome for the company" after the deal was struck to pay the fine.

V. Conclusion

MTN in Nigeria as mentioned above withdrew an action filed against the Federal government in the Federal High Court in 2015 and subsequently entered negotiations which led to both parties reaching a compromise to reduce the fine imposed. Upon the reports that the United States and the Taliban have reached an agreement to bring back peace to Afghanistan, it is advisable for the families and representatives of United States troops who were victims of several attacks by the Taliban to withdraw the suit and explore quicker and less expensive alternative means of resolving the matter (BBC, 2020). It is even more important if the legal practitioners intend to protect these families by keeping their information confidential and away from the public.

Undoubtedly, conflict zones take a toll on businesses and MTN has announced its intention to exit Afghanistan and the Middle East region due to its frequent entanglement in conflict. On the other hand, MTN has listed its stocks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange after the resolution of the dispute in Nigeria.

This paper comprehensively reviewed the existing literature on the establishment and operation of business in conflict zones and analyses the presence of MTN in Afghanistan and Northern Nigeria being jurisdictions that are suffering conflicts and insurgent activities. How conflicts emanating from international business are best resolved was also examined considering MTN incidents both in Afghanistan and Nigeria. While the company was able to adopt an international negotiation mechanism in Nigeria, the conflict in Afghanistan has led to a lawsuit that has remained unresolved and could influence the firm exit.

Firms that have decided to move to or continue operations in conflict zones are required to stay away from activities that may incite any form of conflict or violation of human rights. These establishments must observe business ethics in conflict environments and avoid provoking strife in their business, recruitment policies, and employment conditions more particularly their use of security personnel for protection (Dashwood, 2012).

International organizations carrying on business activities in jurisdictions suffering from insurgency are sometimes made to involuntarily participate in the creation of wealth for the military. The consequence of this action is the hostility by movements against the government and these establishments cannot often handle them. The protection of employees and ensuring the stable administration of the daily activities of the firm in such hazardous and unstable environments may however prompt some form of compromise that may result in decisions that are not in line with business ethics and may sometimes contravene the law.

If these firms have been involved in unethical activities that motivated some form of violence, it is important to promptly disengage from such activities and forthwith arrange constructive engagements to resolve issues that may have stemmed from the violence caused. However, the most secure way of handling business in conflict areas is to stay away from such zones or depart the region as soon as a crisis is perceived.

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Türkiye:
Terrorist Incidents and Foreign Direct Investment

Mahir TERZİ

Abstract: This study aims to evaluate whether there is a correlation and unidirectional or bidirectional causality between terrorist incidents and foreign direct investment in Türkiye. Toda Yamamoto elucidates that there is no long-term relationship. RLS, on the other hand, reveals that there is a short-term relationship, and that produces a more fascinating result. While foreign direct investment does not increase terrorist incidents, terrorist incidents possess a positive effect on foreign direct investment. In this case, terrorist actions increase foreign direct investment to Türkiye in the short term. It also appears that terrorist incidents concentrated in big cities do not possess a deterrent effect on foreign direct investments concentrated in big cities.

Keywords: Terrorist incidents, foreign direct investment, RLS, Toda Yamamoto causality, Türkiye.

Introduction

The relevance of this study is to evaluate the two-way relationship between terrorist incidents and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of Türkiye. Considering the international literature, it is possible to say that respected studies are testing the link between terrorism and the economy. These studies include particularly themes such as welfare (Burgoon, 2006; Piazza, 2011), economic growth (Korotayev *et al.*, 2019; Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Kumar & Sanjeev, 2020; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2011), consumption, savings and investments (Shah *et al.*, 2016), foreign direct investments (Osgood & Simonelli, 2020) and tax loss (Terzi, 2019) and so forth.

Concerning the studies specific to Türkiye, the studies on terrorism concerning tourism

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seem dominant. Sezgin and Kıroğlu (2019), for instance, researched the influences of terrorist actions on Turkish tourism, and their data were between 2000 and 2016. Other variables in that study were the exchange rate and the score of terrorist incidents abroad. The authors examined how terrorist incidents affected tourism activities in Türkiye and how terrorist incidents and the size and severity of these incidents formed the number of tourists coming to Türkiye. They concluded that the terrorist incidents in Türkiye thrilled the number of tourists coming to the country decreasing way. In contrast, the terrorist attacks worldwide caused an increase in the number of tourists to Türkiye (Sezgin & Kıroğlu, 2019).

Çelik and Karaçuka (2017) reached different evaluations. The authors used data from 1992 to 2011 with the subject in their studies. They statistically evaluated that terrorism did not possess a significant effect on tourism at the general country level, but pointed out that the tourism capacity of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia could not develop due to the concentration of terrorist attacks in those regions. The authors pointed to the bidirectional causal relationship between terrorism and welfare in those regions (Çelik & Karaçuka, 2017).

Yaya's (2009) study was under data on terrorist attacks and the number of tourists between 1985 and 2006 in Türkiye. In Yaya's study, a one-way relationship was determined between terrorism and tourism; that is, terrorism affected tourism, not vice versa. According to Yaya's study results, terrorism had a negative but small effect on Turkish tourism. A little drop in the progress of tourism occurred because of terrorist incidents, but the cumulative effect was significant. Nine years of terrorism reduced the score of tourists to Türkiye by nearly six million people, and in 2006 merely, the charge of terrorism to Turkish tourism exceeded 700 million dollars (Yaya, 2009).

Another one close to the above period was Feridun's (2011) study. Feridun's dates were between 1986 and 2006. He applied the ARDL procedure of limit test in his study. The writer utilized two databases, the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TÜRSAB) for tourism data and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) for terrorist attacks. The outcomes concerning short-run and long-run parameter estimates point to a causal relationship between tourism and terrorism. The authors considered the possibility that terrorism may have targeted the touristic destinations of Türkiye, an international actor in tourism, to create an international impact (Feridun, 2011).

The other study, which was not directly related to tourism in Türkiye but evaluated the influence of terrorism on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, belongs to Bilgel and Karahasan (2015). The data of their study covered the years between 1975 and 2001. In that study, they concluded by evaluating the actual and synthetic situation. The actual situation was terrorism in the regions, while the synthetic situation was that there was no terrorism in the regions. They wanted to find the answer to the real GDP per capita in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia if those regions had lacked terrorism. In their study titled The Economic Costs of Separatist Terrorism in Turkey [Türkiye], they manifested by using

the synthetic control method that terrorism caused a decrease of approximately 6.6 percent in the GDP per capita in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (Bilgel & Karahasan, 2015).

Another study testing the influence of terrorism on macroeconomic indicators in Türkiye belonged to Şimşek and Özkaya (2018). The authors analyzed the connection between terrorism and primary macroeconomic indicators, including real gross domestic product per capita, consumer price index, and total investment quanta through the VAR method and Pairwise Granger causality test over the 1986–2015 data. The outcomes made clear that while there was unidirectional Granger causality from terrorism to the whole investments, there was unidirectional causality from terrorism to real gross domestic product per capita. Decomposition outcomes also made clear that real gross domestic product per capita, total investment, and consumer price index expressed the most significant effect in explaining an alteration in terrorism as a dependent variable in the short run. The whole investment, real gross domestic product per capita, and consumer price index possessed the most significant impact, respectively, in the long run (Şimşek & Özkaya, 2018).

Under data from 1984 to 2009, Çimen *et al.* (2016) examined the intercourse betwixt terrorist activity and economic performance, using the Standard Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and impulse response functions. The authors' study concluded that while spending on terrorism and terrorism-related areas contributed to economic growth, albeit at the expense of other investments towards production, an excellent economic performance contributed to reducing terrorism cases with a three-year lag. In short, they flagged that terror affected economic performance positively, while economic performance influenced terror negatively in that period (Çimen *et al.*, 2016).

Apart from the studies mentioned above, there are also descriptive studies on the financing of terrorism in Türkiye and its prevention (Turan & Gemici, 2020; Özkaya & Şimşek, 2017). However, it is possible to say that quantitative statistical studies are at the forefront. A study with a similar purpose to this study belonged to Omay *et al.* (2013), whose data included the length from December 1991 to December 2003. Various newspapers in Türkiye provided data on that study. The authors, in their studies, concluded that terrorism had an adverse influence on foreign direct investments via linear and nonlinear models. The authors evaluated that both low and high numbers of terrorist attacks hurt foreign direct investments, and this negative effect was even higher during the period of high terrorist attacks. However, the results here raise serious doubts. Figures 1 and 2 in this study show that although there was a downward trend in terrorist incidents between 1991 and 2003, foreign direct investment did not have a high splash. In addition, although the Global Terrorism Database has data on Türkiye since 1970, it is not understood why the period between 1970 and 1991 was not included in the analysis of Omay *et al.* (2013).

The study that reached a conclusion that contrasted with the study of Omay *et al.* (2013) belongs to Çelik and Bayrak (2020). Their data covered the time between 1998 and 2018. The authors who performed the ARDL bounds test concluded that terrorist attacks did not affect foreign direct investments in the short and long term. However, they investigated

only whether there was a causal relationship between terrorist attacks to foreign direct investment. In other words, they have not investigated if foreign direct investment influences terrorist incidents.

The Study's Purpose, Importance and Limitations

The goal of this study is to comment on whether terrorist incidents in Türkiye affect foreign direct investment and whether foreign direct investment to Türkiye influences terrorist incidents. Therefore, the correlation hypothesis $H_0:r=0$ and $H_1:r\neq0$ and the regression hypothesis $H_0: \beta1=0$ and $H_2: \beta_1\neq0$ are tested.

The literature review's outputs denote that no study of two-way relationships *(from terrorist incidents to foreign direct investment and from foreign direct investment to terrorist incidents)* has been conducted in Türkiye since the time this paper was written. Therefore, this study hopes to contribute to the literature.

The literature review also clarifies that the studies carried out on the hypothesis tests mainly focus on studies from disciplines such as economics, econometrics, and public administration. The international relations discipline's structure provides barren opportunities in terms of developing this capability based on hypothesis tests because this kind of study necessitates numerical data to test hypotheses and it is not easy to obtain these numerical data (Kalaycıoğlu *et al.*, 2019). In this sense, creating various indexes provides an essential convenience in this kind of study.

The study's main limitation consists of two basic parameters that are the subject of the study: The number of terrorist incidents and the amount of FDI. The data subject to the study is between 1970 and 2000. This study used two databases including the Global Terror Database (GTD) for terrorist incidents and the World Bank for FDI. GTD was controlled regularly between December 2022 and October 2023, and it was seen that the number of data (number of terrorist attacks) was updated to 4,485 in the last check on October 30, 2023. As for FDI data, those are based on the World Bank database. According to GTD, Palestinians in Istanbul carried out the first terrorist attack, for which information is available, in 1970 due to the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Terrorist attacks targeted airports and aircraft. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Viranşehir, Şanlıurfa on December 10, 2020, carried out the last attack in the relevant database. Terrorists carried out a suicide attack with a bomb.

The study assumes that terrorist incidents have a high deterrence on foreign direct investments to Türkiye and that foreign direct investment has also an influence on terrorist incidents.

Conceptual Framework

Although there are differences and conceptual developments against the typology of terrorism in particular, terrorism briefly refers to politically motivated violence concerning political, religious, economic, or social purposes.[1] And this is what it means in this study.

Attacks subject to the GTD include assassination, armed assault, unarmed assault, hostage taking (barricade incident and kidnapping), bombing/explosion, hijacking, and facility/infrastructure attack. There are three criteria for entering the records of GTD except reserve records. There are records that the data subject to the database meet at least two criteria, especially criterion 1 and criterion 2. Criteria 1 means that the action needs to be intended to accomplish a political, economic, ecclesiastical, or social purpose. Seeking benefits alone is not enough in terms of economic goals. Systemic economic change needs to be designed. Criterion 2 means that there are very strong proofs for intending to coerce, horrify, or send another message to a wider spectator rather than sacrifices. Whether each individual acting is conscious of this end is not of importance. The important matter is to contemplate the action entirely. Intentionality is important and means that the designers or decision-makers behind the attacks are for coercion, intimidation, or public disclosure. Criterion 3 means that the action does not have to be in the situation of legitimate war activities. The action must not be within the domain made feasible by international humanitarian law. Civilians or non-combatants must not be purposely aimed. If the opposite is true, then criterion 3 is met.[2]

Apart from the criteria set in the database, there is another issue. This is the reserve record called Doubt Terrorism Proper. Doubt Terrorism Proper means to record reservations for GTD analysts whether the incident is terrorism or not. However, such uncertainty is included in this category when it is not sufficient to prevent the processing of the data. Furthermore, GTD analysts following one of four likely alternative definitions code such indecision as 1) Insurgency/Guerrilla Movement, 2) Internecine Conflict Action, 3) Mass Murder, or 4) Purely Criminal Act.[3]

Method

The quantitative research model is going to be used in this study. In this framework, correlation and regression analyses are going to be performed. The sample of the research consists of 4,485 terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2020. The distribution of the data

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1 For definitions of terrorism, see also Kojove (2001, p. 145); Marighella (2003, p. 97); Aydın (2005, p. 10); Carlton and Schaerf (1975, pp. 13–15); Thornton (1964, p.73); Schmid (2004, pp. 403–404); Schmid (1983, p. 111); Crenshaw (1981, p. 300), Terzi and Yenal (2019, pp. 158–70).

2 See University of Maryland.

3 *Ibidem*.

is as follows as of January 30, 2023—since it is seen that updates are made in the database regularly, the data in the last review made on October 30, 2023, have been taken into account. The distribution of these data by years is as follows: 12 for 1970, 35 for 1971, nine for 1972, one for 1974, 10 for 1975, 35 for 1976, 189 for 1977, 52 for 1978, 141 for 1979, 95 for 1980, eight for 1981, five for 1982, five for 1983, 19 for 1984, two for 1985, seven for 1986, 43 for 1987, 42 for 1988, 114 for 1989, 195 for 1990, 293 for 1991, 514 for 1992, 300 for 1994, 133 for 1995, 54 for 1996, 44 for 1997, 23 for 1998, 109 for 1999, 35 for 2000, 19 for 2001, five for 2002, 19 for 2003, 27 for 2004, 41 for 2005, 43 for 2006, 30 for 2007, 32 for 2008, 13 for 2009, 20 for 2010, 51 for 2011, 190 for 2012, 42 for 2013, 95 for 2014, 425 for 2015, 544 for 2016, 181 for 2017,94 for 2018, 70 for 2019 and 20 for 2020. The data collection is executed through the database of GTD and the World Bank via the Internet. The analysis of the data is descriptive-statistical in testing the hypotheses determined for the study. Data on terrorist incidents for 1973 and 1993 are not available (Figure 1, see also endnote 11). The World Bank's datum between 1970 and 2020 regarding FDI to Türkiye is also given in the illustration below (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Terrorist incidents (TI) and foreign direct investment (FDI) concerning Türkiye
Source: The data extracted from the GTD and World Bank and formatted for the study.

Findings

The study will test the correlation hypothesis concerning correlation.

Correlation Hypothesis: The number of terrorist incidents by year affects foreign direct investments, or foreign direct investment affects terrorist incidents. This hypothesis can

be established both ways because correlation examines the impact of variables on each other.

H_0: R^2=0 and H_1: R^2≠0

The regression analysis to be tested in the study is the following. β_1 represents the constant coefficient. In this analysis, each variable will be included in the analysis as both a dependent and independent variable to investigate whether there is a two-way relationship.

H_0: β_1=0 and H_1: β_1≠0

Correlation Analysis and Obtained Data

Hypothesis: The number of terrorist incidents by year affects foreign direct investments.

H_0: R_2=0; H_1: R_2≠0

Table 1 shows that both variables subject to the analysis have a non-normal distribution predominantly. Figures 2 and 3 also display that the variables do not prove a normal distribution. Spearman correlation test is performed for this reason. Yet, the Spearman correlation test (Table 1) sets forth that the result is not statistically significant because the significance value (0.066) is bigger than 0.05 (p > 0.05).

Table 1. Normality test results for the hypothesis

Evaluation parameters	Values of a terrorist incident		Values of foreign direct investment		Reference value	Results	
	Skewness	*Kurtosis*	*Skewness*	*Kurtosis*		*Terror incidents*	*Foreign direct investment*
Investigation of skewness / kurtosis values	2.295	5.110	1.198	0.068	between -1.50 and +1.50	Non-normal distribution	Normal distribution
Dividing skewness / kurtosis values by standard error	6.75	7.65	3.52	0.10	between -1.96 and +1.96	Non-normal distribution	Non-normal distribution
The absolute values of the skewness coefficients	6.75	-	3.52	-	Skewness coefficients less than twice the standard errors	Non-normal distribution	Non-normal distribution
Control of extreme values / Z score	Two extreme values (Years 1992 and 2016)		No extreme value		between -3 and +3	Non-normal distribution	Normal distribution
Test results to be applied						Spearman correlation test	

Figure 2. Normal Q-Q plot of terrorist incidents

Figure 3. Normal Q-Q plot of foreign direct investment

Spearman correlation test (Table 2) requires the acceptance of the H0 hypothesis. That is, the null hypothesis H_0: $R^2=0$ is accepted. In other words, the number of terrorist incidents by year does not have a statistically significant effect on foreign direct investments.[4] This result can also point to *a relation tendency* if $0.05 \leq p = 0.066 < 0.10$. This relationship trend may mean more in further analysis on the following lines.

Table 2. Spearman correlation results for the hypothesis

		Terror incidents	Foreign direct investment
Terror incidents	Spearman's rho	1	.265
	p		.066
	n	49	49
Foreign direct investment	Spearman's rho	.265	1
	p	.066	
	n	49	51

Regression Analysis and Obtained Data

Since the variables do not possess normal distribution as Table 1 clarifies, they are not suitable for regression analysis.[5] To say differently, there is no causal relation between the variables of the hypothesis. In addition, the regression models established for the hypothesis display that the established model is not of significance. The data on the ANOVA results denoting that the model established for the hypothesis is not significant are below.

Table 3. ANOVA[a] results

	Model	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
	Regression	25755.785	1	25755.785	1.623	.209[b]
1	Residual	745656.419	47	15865.243		
	Total	771422,204	48			

a. Dependent variable: TI; b. Predictors: (Constant), FDI.

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4   When there is not enough savings to finance investments in any country, financing from abroad to sponsor investments is important for not only developed countries, but also underdeveloped and developing countries. For studies evaluating the influence of FDI on economic growth, see Davaakhuu *et al.* (2014); Bahmani and Toms (2015); Pavlinek *et al.* (2009); Kumarasamy and De (2019); Taşdemir and Erdaş (2018); Demir (2018); Chen *et al.* (2014); Komiya and Wakasugi (1991); Satyanand (2011); Angelis and Harvie (2018); Jawaid *et al.* (2016); Noh and Mah (2011); Siddikee and Rahman (2020); Lee and Mah (2018); Yusoff and Nuh (2015).

5   Criterion 1 means that the dependent variable should be equally spaced or proportionally measured and a continuous variable. Criterion 2 means that both variables should have a normal distribution. Criterion 3 means linear relationship. Criterion 4 means having no extreme values. Criterion 5: Cook Distance value should be a maximum one. Criterion 6: Errors should be normally distributed. Criterion 7: Variables should be covariate. Criterion 8: Errors should be independent of each other. Durbin Watson's coefficient should be a value between zero and four. Before the regression analysis, the first four criteria are to be satisfied. Therefore, the regression analysis could not be continued because criterion 2 was not met. See also Tez Yardım Platformu (2023).

The significance value of the model is 0.209, intimating that the regression models established for the hypothesis are not significant. The results make clear that there is no normal causation. Therefore, the regression hypothesis H_0: $\beta_1 = 0$ is accepted.

Advanced Test Results for Regression Analysis

For a further analysis that notices lags, the unit root test of the data will be performed and lag degrees will be determined. Thus, it has been desired to learn which causality test will be appropriate. ADF unit root test has been applied in this context (Appendix 1). The outcomes mark the series are stationary upon the first difference being taken. Only the TI (Terrorist Incidents) serial is stationary at the 10 percent significance level in the model without trend and constant at the random order. When the first difference (I1) is taken, all models are stationary at a one percent significance level ($p < 0.01$).[6] Toda Yamamoto test is proper since the series becomes stationary upon the first difference being taken. The reason why the Toda-Yamamoto causality test, in other words, is preferred is that no matter what level the variables are cointegrated, they are included in the analysis in their random order (Toda and Yamamoto 227).

After the causality analysis to be applied is assigned, it is time to find the lag value. The VAR analysis performed to assign the variables' lag degrees uncloses that the most appropriate lag is one (Table 4 and Figure 4) in addition to the SC and AIC results, the part with the most stars. Figure 4 also reveals that the process becomes stagnant when the lag length is taken as one by VAR analysis for the Hypothesis.

Table 4. VAR analysis for TI and FDI

Internal cause variables: TI FDI
External cause variables: C
Sample:1970 2020
Included Observations: 38

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-1155.139	NA	9.65e+23	60.90204	60.98823	60.93270
1	-1115.502	73.01515*	1.48e+23*	59.02642*	59.28498*	59.11841*
2	-1112.470	5.266414	1.56e+23	59.07735	59.50830	59.23068
3	-1109.209	5.320730	1.63e+23	59.11624	59.71957	59.33090
4	-1106.706	3.819346	1.78e+23	59.19507	59.97077	59.47106

* Indicates lag order selected by the criterion

According to Toda Yamamoto's analysis, lag degree (k as freedom degree) and integration degree (dmax as maximum order of integration) are summed (k+dmax) and this number

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6 The PP unit root test in Appendix 1 displays a similar result.

Figure 4. Stationarity for the hypothesis variables

(k+dmax) is included in the analysis (Toda and Yamamoto 227). According to this formula, the lag length contained in the analysis is two (k+dmax). Thus, a two-lag Toda Yamamoto equation is solved (Tables 5 and 6). After the main equations are created, the Wald test is used to evaluate whether the variables have a causal relationship with each other over these main equations[7] (Tables 7 and 8).

The following equations (Equations 1 and 2) are obtained through a two-lag Toda Yamamoto analysis for the Hypothesis.

Table 5. Toda Yamamoto equation for TI

Estimation method: Seemingly unrelated regression				
Sample: 1972 2020				
Included observations: 45				
Total system (unbalanced) observations: 88				
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix				
	Coefficient	**Probability**	**R-squared**	**Durbin-Watson statistic**
C(1)	0.873	0.000	0.463	1.720
C(2)	-0.208	0.219		
C(3)	7.19E-09	0.142		
C(4)	-7.26E-09	0.146		
C(5)	35.134	0.100		

Equation 1: TI = C(1)*TI(-1) + C(2)*TI(-2) + C(3)*FDI(-1) + C(4)*FDI(-2) + C(5)

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7   See also Çiğdem (2021).

Table 6. Toda Yamamoto equation for FDI

Estimation method: Seemingly unrelated regression				
Sample: 1972 2020				
Included observations: 45				
Total system (unbalanced) observations: 88				
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix				
	Coefficient	Probability	R-squared	Durbin-Watson statistic
C(6)	-5363990.	0.235	0.818	1.964
C(7)	3250288.	0.524		
C(8)	1.116869	0.000		
C(9)	-0.238102	0.113		
C(10)	9.55E+08	0.130		

Equation 2: FDI = C(6)*TI(-1) + C(7)*TI(-2) + C(8)*FDI(-1) + C(9)*FDI(-2) +C(10)

The above formulas are obtained with the Toda Yamamoto test. In the formulas, values such as (-1) and (-2) mean the lags of the relevant variable. Since the data in the time series is annual, it means that one (-1) or two (-2) year-lag of the variables in front of them are included in the formula. The first equation for the Hypothesis expresses whether there is causality from FDI towards terrorist incidents (TI). Here, the coefficients in front of the FDI, namely C(3) and C(4) are taken into account.[8] The second equation expresses whether there is causality from terrorist incidents (TI) to foreign direct investment (FDI). Here, the coefficients in front of TI, namely C(6) and C(7) are taken into account.[9] Then, the Wald test makes clear if the variables are significant or not below.

Table 7. Wald test for causality for equation 1

Test statistic	Value	df	Probability
Chi-square	2.460	1	0.117
Null hypothesis: C(3) = C(4) = 0			

Table 8. Wald test for causality for equation 2

Test statistic	Value	df	Probability
Chi-square	1.444	1	0.230
Null hypothesis: C(6) = C(7) = 0			

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8 According to the formula, the Wald test used for Toda Yamamoto calculates the degree of freedom one value more than the specified value. In other words, the Wald test performs this analysis at the level of df 2. However, since the appropriate number of lags determined for the time series is one, they are again calculated over the df 1 value in the table. The df 2 probability values are 0.2923 and 0.4857 respectively. For Toda Yamamoto's causality analysis, see Göger and also Çiğdem (2022).

9 See footnote 8.

As seen thanks to the tables, because the probability value for both equations of the Hypothesis is greater than 0.05 (p > 0.05), there is no unidirectional or bidirectional causality between the variables of the Hypothesis. To say differently, there is no causality from terrorist incidents to FDI, and vice versa.

Table 9. Toda Yamamoto test results

Null hypothesis	Test statistics Chi-square value	Probability p
TI is not the Granger cause of FDI	1.444	0.229
FDI is not a Granger cause of TI	2.460	0.117

Figure 5 shows that the primary targets of terrorist organizations are public personnel including military and police, and private citizens and property.

Figure 6 demonstrates that although attacks against the business world occur in industrially dense big cities, they cannot be a deterrent because these cities continue to grow. Industry-dense cities in Figure 6 include İstanbul (360), Ankara (56), İzmir (25), Adana (18), and Bursa (2). Other cities include all locations except industry-dense cities. No specific location data express those places not mentioned specifically.


Figure 5. Terrorist incidents by target

Source: The data extracted from the GTD and formatted to suit the purpose of the study.

Figure 6. Terrorist incidents against businesses by location

Source: The data extracted from the GTD and formatted to suit the purpose of the study.

Another regression analysis is robust least squares (RLS) to consider extreme values. In this analysis, different estimates are used depending on the status of the variables. If there are extreme values in the dependent variable, the M-estimation method is used (Table 10), if there are extreme values in the independent variable, the S-estimation method is used (Table 11), and if there are extreme values in both dependent and independent variables, the M-estimation method is used. As can be seen in the normality test, the terrorist incidents variable takes extreme values. Therefore, below, RLS as a robust regression analysis of this variable is performed as both the dependent variable and the independent variable.

In the model where the terrorist incident (TI) is the dependent variable, the coefficient in front of the constant (C) is statistically significant, but the coefficient in front of foreign direct investment (FDI) is not statistically significant. In this case, it is not possible to say FDI is the cause of TI. On the other hand, in the model where FDI is the dependent variable, both the coefficient in front of the constant (C) and the coefficient in front of

Table 10. RLS results for TI as dependent variable

Dependent variable: TI			
Method: Robust least squares			
Sample: 1970 2020			
Included observations: 51			
Method: M-estimation			
Variable	Coefficient	Prob.	Robust statistics R-squared
FDI	9.95E-10	0.295	0.008
C	34.59732	0.000	

Table 11. RLS results for FDI as the dependent variable

Dependent variable: FDI
Method: Robust least squares
Sample: 1970 2020
Included observations: 51
Method: S-estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.	Robust statistics R-squared
TI	1636854.	0.001	0.121
C	1.77E+08	0.024	

the independent variable (TI) are statistically significant. Table 11 exhibits this causal relationship.

In this model, the explanatory power of the independent variable (TI) for the dependent variable (FDI) is approximately 12 percent (0.120637). Considering the significant coefficients, an equation as follows emerges. 1.77E+08 means exactly 176,638,452.591349 in this equation and means nearly 177,000,000.

Equation: FDI= 1.77E+08 C + 1,636,854 TI

reveals a much more interesting result. According to this equation, TI increases FDI. For example, one attack increases FDI by $1,636,854. Such a result either teaches a spurious causality or coincides with the unusual results in the literature that terrorism stimulates the economy.[10]

Türkiye case proves no relationship between terrorist incidents and foreign direct investment in this study. Moreover, RLS presents a positive causality from terrorist incidents to foreign direct investment. This evidence manifests that terrorist incidents increase foreign direct investment in Türkiye in the short term. The related literature makes clear that there are different country experiences.[11] Therefore, what is important from a theoretical perspective for future studies may be to focus on why country experiences differ.

Conclusion

This study departs from the existing scholarship concerning results, method, and investigating two-way causality. This study has evaluated whether terrorist incidents' yearly scores in Türkiye affect FDI and vice versa. The correlation test asserts there is a relationship

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10 For the results presenting that terrorist incidents increased consumption in Pakistan, see Shah *et al.* (2016, pp. 216–235).

11 In this sense, Enders and Sandler's work on Spain and Greece can be cited as an example. They specified a unidirectional relationship between terrorist attacks to foreign direct investment. For details, see Enders and Sandler (1996).

tendency. The causality results divulge a unidirectional short-term relation but no long-term relation. Toda Yamamoto explains that there is no long-term relation between the variables.[12] On the other hand, RLS exposes that there is a short-term relationship between terrorist incidents to foreign direct investment.

In terms of the supposition of the study, the assumption that terrorism has a high deterrence on FDI in Türkiye is not valid, and the assumption that foreign direct investment influences terrorist incidents (TI) in Türkiye is not acceptable, either. This study within the data of 50 years about the case of Türkiye is also remarkable since it emerges that there is a one-way positive causal relationship between terrorist incidents to foreign direct investment. Attacks mostly direct against uniformed targets such as military and police targets, and civilian citizens. The results unveil that terrorist incidents concentrated in big cities do not have a deterrent effect on foreign direct investments, which are also concentrated in big cities.

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12 The results in this study have been retested by taking into account arithmetic means for missing data. However, the result does not change as it is not statistically significant (p > 0.05). Missing data have been supported by two methods. In the first one, the arithmetic average of periods with similar data has been taken. For the missing data of 1973, the period between 1970 and 1976 has been taken into account and an average of 17 was reached. For the missing data of 1993, the period between 1989 and 1996 has been taken into account and the average of 258.16 has been reached. In the second method, in the statistical analysis performed via SPSS, the number 91.53 has been reached for missing data. However, the data obtained with both methods does not change the result. VAR analyses also exhibit that there are no short-run relationships. The cointegration analysis, which is framed to investigate whether there is a long-term relationship, also does not reveal contradictory results. No cointegration has been detected between the parameters of the hypothesis.

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Appendix 1.

Unit Root Test Table (ADF)

At level		FDI	TI
with constant	t-statistic	-1.6282	-2.3624
	Prob.	0.4610	0.1578
		no	no
with constant & trend	t-statistic	-3.1366	-2.2884
	Prob.	0.1095	0.4315
		no	no
without constant & trend	t-statistic	-1.1181	-1.6368
	Prob.	0.2359	0.0953
		no	*
At first difference		d(FDI)	d(TI)
with constant	t-statistic	-5.8799	-5.2897
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0001
		***	***
with constant & trend	t-statistic	-5.8099	-5.2794
	Prob.	0.0001	0.0005
		***	***
without constant & trend	t-statistic	-5.9131	-5.3122
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0000
		***	***

Unit Root Test Table (PP)

At level		FDI	TI
with constant	t-statistic	-1.5485	-2.6565
	Prob.	0.5011	0.0894
		no	no
with constant & trend	t-statistic	-2.3409	-2.6146
	Prob.	0.4050	0.2760
		no	no
without constant & trend	t-statistic	-1.0439	-1.7860
	Prob.	0.2635	0.0706
		no	*
At first difference		d(FDI)	d(TI)
with constant	t-statistic	-6.5750	-5.6846
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0001
		***	***
with constant & trend	t-statistic	-6.3363	-5.6411
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0002
		***	***
without constant & trend	t-Statistic	-6.1575	-5.7293
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0000
		***	***

Notes:
(*) Significant at the 10 percent; (**) Significant at the 5 percent; (***) Significant at the 1 percent. And (no) not significant *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.