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Contents

Nigeria:
Interrogating the Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Approaches of the Federal Government towards Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East, 2009–2015

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Abstract: The fight against insurgency, terrorism, banditry, militancy, and other forms of criminality has been viewed from two major perspectives by scholars, security analysts and security experts in the existing literature. While some argued in favor of the kinetic approach, others supported the adoption of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The main thrust of this paper is to interrogate both the kinetic and non-kinetic approaches initiated by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan led Federal Government to placate Boko Haram terrorists in the North East geo-political zone of Nigeria between 2011 and 2015. Before the adoption of the non-kinetic approach, the government made use of a military or kinetic approach in its response to the nefarious activities of Boko Haram between 2009 and 2011. It argues that the inability of the kinetic approach to successfully address the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency forced the government to adopt a non-kinetic approach or carrot option, which took several forms such as the establishment of dialogue committees and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency. It submits that none of these kinetic and non-kinetic measures were able to curtail the heightened disruptive activities of the insurgent group as a result of inept political leadership, failure of good governance, problem of sabotage, lack of strong political will and commitment and so on.

Keywords: Non-kinetic, government, Boko Haram, Insurgency, North-East, Nigeria.

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Introduction

Insurgency or terrorism constitutes one of the social menaces confronting the world over since the birth of the new millennium. Although this form of social menace is not a new phenomenon, it generally took a new dimension since the birth of the 21st century. According to Mohammed and Abdullahi (2017), terrorism has not remained static but evolved over the years as it traces its roots back at least 2000 years. They further explain that it is an old form of warfare dating back to antiquity but rebranded in the 20th and 21st centuries to become a global phenomenon. However, September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group brought the world's attention to the phenomenon of terrorism like never before. In fact, the attack was said to have brought the world together to form a common front against terrorism (Ibrahim, 2017). The 9/11 attack forced the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution on 12 September 2011 known as UNSCR 1373, urging all member states (of the United Nations) to criminalize terrorism by legislation. The Al-Qaeda terrorist group, which was at the center stage at the turn of the 21st century, developed an ideology that later gave birth to other terrorist groups in other parts of the world such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar al-Islam, Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and on.

The emergence of this new form of insurgency or terrorism affected the nature of countries' security architecture, thus changing it from a solely military or kinetic approach to a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations. As argued by Onapajo and Ozden (2020), the military approach has contributed more to the atmosphere of violence arising from terrorism and caused extensive human rights violations rather than achieving the desired objective. They concluded that based on evidence from the extant studies, for a successful counter-terrorism/insurgency campaign to be possible, a combination of military and non-military strategies is paramount. Evidence from other countries such as the USA, Pakistan, and India, among others, revealed that the adoption of a military approach alone has increasingly been proven to be ineffective in the successive counter-insurgency operation. For example, the highly kinetic or military strategy adopted by the US Army in Vietnam did not lead to the attainment of the desired end state. As a result, the US decided to adopt a non-kinetic approach, which helped her to win the operation. With this experience, US military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially after the 2006 publication of the US Army Field Manuel 3-24, emphasized a shift from an enemy-centric to a population-centric approach. This relevance of the non-kinetic approach since then has been incorporated into the US doctrine (Ibrahim, 2019).

The adoption of a non-kinetic approach in addressing insurgency and other forms of criminality is a global practice in most democratic societies. As argued by Okoro, the implementation of the content of the constitution is not only democratic but also

provides that non-kinetic deliberations and dialogues be allowed in resolving issues and conflicts (Okoro, 2022). Following the success of the adoption of the non-kinetic approach towards the insecurity challenge posed by the Niger Delta militants through the amnesty program by the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua in 2007, after several years of unsuccessful stick approach of successive administrations (both military and civilian), the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan was equally forced to toe the apart of his immediate predecessor.

It is against this background that this paper interrogates several kinetic and non-kinetic interventions introduced by the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan towards curtailing the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East geo-political zone in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015. The North-East comprises six states, namely Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba. Although the campaign of terror of Boko Haram was felt in all these six states, it was more pronounced in only three, namely Borno (the main base of the insurgent group), Yobe, and Adamawa states. The map below shows the location of North East in Nigeria. The methodology adopted in this study is historical, analytical, and thematic, utilizing materials from both primary and secondary sources.

Map of Nigeria showing the North-East Geo-political Zone (Area of Study)

Conceptual Clarifications

In a discourse of this nature, it is imperative to conceptualize some concepts that are inherent in it. They are insurgency, kinetic and noni-kinetic approaches.

Insurgency: Insurgency is a major concept that has been viewed by scholars from different perspectives. In this paper, we argue that insurgency is a highly organized movement whose lofty goal is to weaken or undermine the existing authority and make it incapable of achieving its governance of the territory. This, therefore, qualifies the Boko Haram group in Nigeria to be classified as a violent insurgent group as well as a terrorist organization (Rosenau, 2007; Crenshaw, 1997).

Kinetic Approach: Kinetic approach is a major progressive and aggressive military action that involves active warfare and the use of physical and material means such as bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions against enemies or adversaries with the sole aim of neutralizing, capturing, or eliminating them (Marks *et al.*, 2005). The Federal Government of Nigeria, through the Armed Forces of Nigeria, had engaged and is still engaging in this form of kinetic targeting by going after the key leaders or commanders of Boko Haram terrorists.

Non-Kinetic Approach: Non-kinetic is a non-military strategy that involves the application of non-military and other capabilities against a potential enemy, like the employment of nonlethal strategies (such as civil-military operations, engagement, negotiation, information support operations, psychological operations and rehabilitation) and tactics with weapons that are "sublethal" or "weapons not intended to be lethal" (Ducheine, 2014).

Understanding the Kinetic Approach of the Nigerian State against Boko Haram Insurgency in the North East, 2009–2015: An Overview

It is imperative to point out here that the time that this insurgent group emerged in the Northeastern geo-political zone is yet unknown. This is because there were a series of conflicting reports both in the media and existing literature as regards the time the group emerged. While some argued that the insurgent group had emerged as far back as 1995, others said that it emerged around 2003 (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). However, one basic fact that is undisputable was that the campaign of terror of the group became pronounced following the slain of its spiritual leader, named Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 in Police custody, and subsequently, the emergence of a new leader, named Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad Shekau, who was said to have been the second-in-command to Yusuf Mohammed (Marc-Antoine, 2014). Since 2009, the insurgent group entered into a new transitional phase that extols extreme violence typified by bombings, kidnappings, mass killings, and destruction of symbolic public and private institutions, religious centers, and other terrorist acts, all in an attempt to repudiate western values and create an Islamic Caliphate in their North-East.

The nefarious activities of the group forced the Nigerian State to adopt several military approaches among which were the formation and deployment of military forces, the establishment of a joint task force, formation of Joint Task Force, the declaration of a state of emergency, the establishment of a new army division (7th Division in Maiduguri), training of armed forces in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, provision of more fund and new equipment and so on.

The first major combined military operation created by the government through the Nigerian Army under the leadership of the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt. General Abdulrahman Dambazau was Operation Flush II. This military operation was said to have been created by the government of Borno State, under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, against the high incidence of banditry in Maiduguri, in particular, and the entire state, in general. It was a special anti-robbery squad created purposely to flush out armed robbers that were terrorizing innocent residents of the State. The governor, who personally inaugurated the squad, which was made up of a combined team of security forces such as the army, air force, and police, tagged it "Operation Flush II" (Isa & Mustapha, 2009). In a bid to enforce and maintenance peace and security of the state, the personnel of Operation Flush II and members of the insurgent group engaged in a series of battles. Between 2009 and 2011, the personnel of Operation Flush II took frantic efforts to contain the activities of the insurgent group in Maiduguri. They succeeded in pushing them out of the State capital, Maiduguri.

The insurgent group, which temporarily went underground around 2010, later resurfaced by launching a series of attacks in 2011. The campaign of terror of the insurgent group was said to have taken another dimension in 2011. This was evident in the series of offensive attacks carried out by the insurgent group such as the bombing of police headquarters, Abuja; the bombing of the United Nations Office, Abuja; the bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, among others. This development forced the Federal Government under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in some local government areas in four states of Borno (Maiduguri Metropolis, Gamboru Ngala, Banki Bama, Biu, and Jere), Yobe (Damaturu, Geidam, Potiskum, Buniyadi-Gujba, and Gasua-Bade), Niger (Suleja) and Plateau (Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi, and Riyom) that were heavily affected by the menace of Boko Haram insurgency (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). As argued by Bamidele, the year 2011 was regarded as the deadliest year of Boko Haram's activities since 2009 in Northern Nigeria. His submission could be corroborated by the report of the United States of America on the global ranking for terrorism in 2011 (Bamidele, 2012). According to the report, Nigeria was ranked 9th in the global terrorist-country list in terms of attacks; 5th in the global ranking for terrorism-based deaths, and one of the top 15 countries in the world in terms of kidnapping and hostage-taking, suicide bombing, bomb blast and so on (which are elements of terrorism) (Oluba, 2014).

As the campaign of terror of the insurgent group continued to increase in 2011, occasioned by several attacks and bombings, the federal government took over control by creating a military-led Joint Task Force (JTF) codenamed Operation Restore Order (ORO I) under the new COAS, Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika. The JTF, which comprised personnel of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Nigeria Police, Department of State Security, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, and Nigerian Prison Service was created on 1 June 2011. The combined operation was deployed to Maiduguri and the neighboring Jere local government area to contain the Boko Haram insurgency. According to Lt. Col. Musa, the mandate of ORO I was to restore law and order to the northeastern part of Nigeria and Borno State in particular (Sagir, 2012). ORO carried out a series of operations in different locations such as Zanari and Gwange General. As the insurgent group widened its scope of attacks to other areas in the North-East, such as Yobe, Bauchi, and Gombe, the Nigeria Army created Operations Restore Order II and III. The new JTF, which is made of 3,872 personnel, comprised the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and other security agencies such as Nigeria Police, Department of State Security, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service and Nigerian Prison Service (Ogbazino, 2015). Abdulhamid explains that the mandate of the operations was to restore law and order in the affected areas (Abdulhamid, 2017). During the period of the existence of the operation relative success was attained. The JTF was able to cage the insurgents who were arrested and flushed out of Maiduguri, forcing them to find sanctuary in the Sambisa Forest, that later became their headquarters (Abdulhamid, 2017).

The campaign of terror of Boko Haram took a new dimension in 2013, in which several attacks were carried out leading to heavy causalities and monumental damage in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. For example, the insurgents attacked several schools and colleges in these states, killing and kidnapping many innocent people. There were also reports in the media that the insurgent group launched a robust attack to take over the 202 Battalion barracks in Bama, Borno State in May 2013, and subsequently razed parts of mobile police barrack in the town and set many cars and motorcycles ablaze, in which the death of 60 people, including 22 policemen, 2 soldiers, and 14 prison officials, was recorded (The News, 2014, May 26, p. 13). All these heavy attacks forced the Federal Government (FG) to declare a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States on May 14, 2013 (Osakwe & Audu, 2015). Following the declaration of a state of emergency in place in these three states, the then chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ola Sa'ad Ibrahim, was mandated by the FG to take the mantle of new operational leadership of an expanded ORO with a new coded name Operation *BOYONA*, with the mandate to restore law and order in the affected three states, including Nasarawa (which was then faced with communal and herder-farmer conflicts), created on 19 August 2013 (Abdulhamid, 2017). According to Brig Gen Christ Olukolade, the creation of *BOYONA* was in line with

the plans laid out for the conduct of the operations to execute the mandate spelled out in the state of emergency declared by President Goodluck Jonathan on May 13, 2013, which was to flush out the insurgents from the three North Eastern States (Wale, 2013). Operation BOYONA, which was a special operation, was a JTF, composed of troops drawn from the Services of the Armed Forces as well as other security agencies. Between 2013 and 2014, Operation *BOYONA* carried out counter-offensive successful operations against the stronghold of Boko Haram terrorists (like Sambisa forest) in which some were killed, arrested and several kidnaps were liberated. It was during this operation that Shekau (30th June 2013) was suspected to have been killed (Lugga, 2016).

Another major kinetic approach taken by the government in a counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram in the North-East was the creation of the New Army Division, known as the 7th Division, with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, in August 2013. The recommendation for the approval of the new Army Division by President Goodluck Jonathan was facilitated by Gen Azubuike Ihejirika. The new Army Division became the umbrella command for joint security operations in the North-East. With the creation of the new Army Division, Major General Obida Ethan was appointed as the pioneer General Officer Commanding (GOC). Its creation was to ensure the adequate presence of the military in the North-East region against the Boko Haram insurgency. The troops of the 7th Division intensified patrols deeply inside the forest areas of Damboa and Gwoza Local Government Areas to reach remote and isolated towns and villages to prevent further attacks by the insurgents in the region. Due to the success of Operation *BOYONA*, as well as the creation of the 7th Army Division, a temporary peace was said to have returned to the North-East. As a result of this development, the Nigerian Army, under the leadership of the new COAS, Lt. Gen Kenneth Minimah, decided to replace Operation *BOYONA* with Operation *Zaman Lafiya* (which translates to English *Operation Live in Peace*). The new military operation was organized and structured in the form of a close support command (Osakwe & Audu, 2015).

Despite the creation of the Army's 7th Division, the campaign of terror of the insurgent group did not subside. The insurgent group continued to launch coordinated attacks on several schools; villages and towns, which were later declared as the Islamic Caliphate, were another major campaign of terror of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in 2014. For instance, on 14 April 2014, over 270 Girls were said to have been kidnapped at the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok. The kidnapping of these girls generated the intervention of the international community. Also, on 24 August 2014, the insurgents took over Gwoza town, a vast territory in Borno State. Abubakar Shekau and his men declared the town a Caliphate and hoisted their flags in the Ashigashiya ward of the Gwoza Local Government Area. Following the capture of the town, the insurgents turned the Police College in the town into an academy for training their recruits (The News, 2014, September 15, p. 15). With

the capture of Gwoza, they marched on and maintained their suzerainty over Damboa, Bumi Yadi, Gomboru, and Dikwa Emirate. They equally invaded many villages in the Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State. Also, Mubi, the second largest city in Adamawa State, was invaded (The News, 2014, September 15, p. 15). As of November 2014, the insurgent group was said to have been in control of over 20,000 square kilometers of Nigerian territory in three Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The area under the control of the terrorists covers ten local government areas. The ten local government areas which were said to have been under full or partial control of the insurgents included Bama, Dikwa, Ngalla, Kala-Balge, and Gwoza (all in Borno State); (Madagali, Michika, and Mubi (all in Adamawa State); and Gujba and Gulani (both in Yobe State) (The News, 2014, November 24, p. 45).

As the campaign of terror of the insurgent continued to wasp stronger, with its spill-over effect in the neighboring countries, the Nigerian government decided to establish diplomatic military relations with the governments of Chad, Niger, and Cameroun to fight against terrorism and insurgency in the sub-region. With the encouragement and support of the African Union (AU), the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in May 2014. The MNJTF was set up as an offensive and stabilization mechanism to combat Boko Haram and other groups labeled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin. Its establishment under its current structure was determined by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) heads of state and government (which comprised Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, and Niger) during the Extraordinary Summit of the LCBC member states in 2014. On 25 November 2014, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) fully endorsed its activation. However, it was not until 29 January 2015 that the PSC formally authorized the deployment of the MNJTF for 12 months (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). The situation continued until the emergence of the new civilian administration, under President Muhammadu Buhari on 29 May 2015.

Understanding the non-kinetic Approach of the Nigerian State against Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East, 2011–2015

Following the inability of the kinetic approach of the Federal Government to effectively curtail the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram insurgency, it was forced to adopt a non-kinetic approach. Although the non-kinetic approach was not solely adopted by the government in its counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram in the North-East, it was adopted in conjunction with the kinetic approach. Generally, counter-insurgency operations in contemporary times comprise both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. Historically, one can trace the root of the non-kinetic approach back to the ancient Chinese theorist, Sun Tzu, who advised that direct methods were used for joining battle, but indirect methods were used to secure victory (Brimley & Singh, 2008). T.E. Lawrence and the strategist Lindell Hart echoed similar themes in the 20th century,

and the essence of their views is reflected in the latest Quadrennial Defense review:

> To succeed in (irregular warfare), the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others. The indirect approach seeks to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are the strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked (Brimley & Singh, 2008).

Owing to the success of this non-military approach elsewhere such as Pakistan, the Nigerian State, under the Jonathan-led government, resorted to its adoption in her counter-insurgency operation in the North-East. Between 2011 and 2015, the government introduced several non-kinetic interventions towards addressing the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East. Efforts would be made to identify and analyze each of the non-kinetic interventions introduced by the administration of the former President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.

The first non-kinetic effort towards defeating the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast by the Federal Government of Nigeria was traced to the administration of former President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. As the campaign of terror of the BHTs continued to increase in the North-East, the Federal government under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, in 2011, set up a 7-member Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria. The committee, which was chaired by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari, later submitted its report to the Federal Government (hereafter referred to as the Galtimari Committee Report) in September 2011. In its White Paper issued in May 2012, the Federal Government accepted the recommendation of the Galtimari Committee which suggested the option of engaging, negotiating and dialoguing with the leadership of the sect, which should be contingent upon the renunciation of all forms of violence and surrender of arms to be followed by rehabilitation (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021; Omonobi *et al.*, 2011). Although the report of the committee was considered, it was not immediately implemented. As the BHTs continued to launch deadly attacks, there emerged local and international pressures on the Federal government to find a lasting solution to the escalating insurgency. This resulted in the adoption of a Dialogue Option which culminated in the setting up of another committee known as the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North on 16 April 2013. The committee, which was headed by Taminu Turaki, Minister of Special Duties, had the mandate "to identify and constructively engage key members of the Boko Haram sect" and develop a "comprehensive and workable framework for resolving the crisis of insecurity in the northern part of the country" (Adewumi, 2014; Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). The committee was equally mandated to develop a comprehensive victim's support program and the mechanism for addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency to prevent future occurrences. The committee was also directed to develop a framework for amnesty and disarmament of the members of Boko Haram (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17).

The Committee, which initially comprised 26 members (made up of renowned Islamic scholars, academics, politicians, and retired military and police officers mostly from the northern part of the country) was inaugurated by the President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan at the Council Chamber of Presidential Villa, Abuja on Tuesday 23 April 2013, with three months mandate to carry out its assignment. Before the inauguration of the Committee, two members withdrew their membership, namely Ahmed Datti (an Islamic cleric) and Shehu Sani (a civil society activist). This development initially led to the reduction of the members of the Committee from twenty-six (26) to twenty-four (24). However, the President decided to appoint a new member to the committee, named Barrister Aisha Wakil, thus increasing the total number of the committee to twenty-five (25) (Usman, 2013). During the inauguration, the President acknowledged that the committee has an all but impossible task. He was quoted by the Nigerian press as saying:

> "all Nigerians are expecting this Committee to perform magic and I pray that Allah should give you the wisdom to do so because, without peace, we cannot develop" (President Goodluck Jonathan, 2013).

He further urged the Committee to make suggestions as to how the underlying causes of the insurgency could be addressed to prevent similar outbreaks in the future (President Goodluck Jonathan, 2013). The below table shows the detailed names of the initial twenty-six members of the committee.

Table 1. List of Committee Members

S/N	Name	Position	S/N	Name	Position
1	Malam Taminu Turaki	Chairman	15	AVM A.I. Shehu	Member
2	Sheik Ahmed	Member	16	Mr. R.I. Nkemdirim	Member
3	Dr. Hakeem Baba Ahmed	Member	17	DIG P.I Leha	Member
4	Col. Musa Shehu (rtd)	Member	18	Prof. Nur Alakli	Member
5	Sheik Abubakar Tureta	Member	19	Malam Salihu Abubakar	Member
6	Dr. Datti Ahmed,	Member	20	Alhaji Abubakar Sani Lugga	Member
7	Senator Sodangi Abubakar	Member	21	Barrister Ibrahim Tahir	Member
8	Senator Ahmed Makarfi,	Member	22	Brig-Gen Ibrahim Sabo	Member
9	Hon. Mohammed Bello Matawalle	Member	23	Ambassador Baba Ahmed Jidda	Member
10	Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim	Member	24	Group Capt. Bilal Bulama (rtd)	Member
11	Comrade Shehu Sani	Member	25	Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi	Member
12	Hajiya Najaatu Mohamme	Member	26	A Representative of the Office of the Secretary General of the Federation	Secretary
13	Malam Adamu S. Ladan	Member			
14	Dr. Joseph Golwa	Member			

Source: Usman, 2013.

The constitution of the committee generated a lot of reactions, most of which were positive from different stakeholders in the Northern part of Nigeria. For instance, while some see the FG intervention in addressing the insurgency as political means rather than with hammer or stick, which the FG had been using since the insurgent group transformed into a violent group in 2009, others saw that the intervention might create space for more political and civil engagement in peacebuilding in the North. For example, Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, welcomed the development and reasoned that the militant group would be willing to end its deadly campaign if offered amnesty (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17). After its inauguration, the committee swung into action by visiting various states in Northern Nigeria where security challenges have been prevalent by interacting with different stakeholders such as governors, politicians, traditional rulers, religious leaders and so on. The Committee was calling on BHTs to come out for dialogue. However, less than a month that the Committee began its work, the FG declared a state of emergency in three focal states in the North-East, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The declaration of the state of emergence on 14 May 2013, was said to have been premised on the intensified raids and consolidation attempts by BHTs (Adewumi, 2014).

This development undoubtedly signaled an enormous challenge before the committee to identify the supposed 'faceless group', encourage its members to the dialogue table and provide a comprehensive long-term framework for resolution. This could be corroborated by the argument of the Chairman of the Committee who said that before the declaration of the state of emergency, the committee was frequent in its negotiation, but since its declaration, the discussion was not frequent (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). Added to this vaulting challenge, which the dialogue committee was to contend with was the fact that it did not have the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the government. Before the Committee became comatose, it was reported that it met with some members of the sect including its spiritual leader, Abubakar Shekau who as well submitted a report of its findings to the FG. It was equally revealed that during the negotiation between the Committee and leaders of the insurgent group, while some of the leaders of the BHTs agreed to embrace amnesty, some refused (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17; Adewumi, 2014). It was argued that this was what led to the emergence of a splinter group known as the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), under the leadership of Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar Albarnawi. Although it was reported in the media that the Committee submitted its report on 13 November 2013, its recommendations were not made public. It was rumored that one of the key recommendations of the Committee's report was for the government 'to set up a standing committee for continuous dialogue' with the insurgents. As of March 2014, members of the committee at different platforms indicated that the government 'had not acted on any of its recommendations'. Some even alleged that FG dumped the recommendations which were vital and tied to specific things (Adewumi, 2014). In all, the initiative failed to active its objective.

Despite the failure of the initiative, the FG, under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, took another carrot step given the refusal of Boko Haram leaders to accept the amnesty deal by establishing a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), code-named National Security Corridor, to counter recruitment and mobilization into Boko Haram and rehabilitate defectors in 2013. The new agency aimed to tackle the root causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and create a process of rehabilitating defectors of the group (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). The agency was headed by Fatima Akilu, a Nigerian Muslim psychologist, who was formerly the Director of Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication at the ONSA. Akilu helped the FG to develop the Countering Violent Extremism Programme, which lasted between 2013 and 2015. The CVE Program was a multi-disciplinary intervention targeting ex-Boko Haram members, youth, and other vulnerable groups through social programs that provide them with positive alternatives to violent extremism. There was the deradicalization section of the CVE, which focused on the relationship between development and security at the community level and aimed to rehabilitate former extremists through workforce training, psychological counseling, faith-based interventions and health care. According to Felbab-Brown (2018), the CVE classified Boko Haram defectors into three categories, namely low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk defectors. While for the first two categories, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration methods were applied, the high-risk defectors were meant for prosecution. Following the assumption of a new democratic administration in 2015, under President Muhammadu Buhari, the CVE under Fatima Akilu ceased to coordinate the deradicalization and reintegration of the BH defectors. The program was later taken over by a new military-run operation, known as Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). It is important to point out here that during the period of the existence of CVE, it was reported that the program recorded limited success, especially in terms of the number of repentant BHTs that embraced it. For instance, it was revealed that the head of the program stated in her report submitted to the new administration upon assumption of office that 22 women and girls were undergoing rehabilitation after voluntarily surrendering to the program, while 305 victims of the terrorist group had been successfully rehabilitated and 47 former militants had joined the program (Onapajo & Ozden. 2020).

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing discourse has critically interrogated the two major approaches adopted by the Federal Government under the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan towards the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East geo-political zone of Nigeria between 2009 and 2015. It argued that both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches were adopted by the Nigerian State towards curtailing the nefarious attacks of the insurgent group during this period. The study revealed that the kinetic approach was the first major approach adopted by the government of President Goodluck Jonathan

toward the defeat of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. This approach was characterized by the formation and deployment of military forces, the establishment of the joint task force, formation of Joint Task Force, the declaration of a state of emergency, the establishment of a new army division (7th Division in Maiduguri), training of armed forces in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, provision of more fund and the purchase of new equipment. A thorough assessment of this kinetic approach showed that though the government made several attempts towards defeating the insurgent group through the Nigerian Army and other armed forces, the approach met limited success.

The kinetic approach could not successfully defeat the insurgent group, forcing the government to adopt a non-kinetic approach. The major non-kinetic approach introduced by the government of President Goodluck Jonathan toward defeating Boko Haram included the creation of the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria and the establishment of a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), which was code-named National Security Corridor. Despite the non-kinetic interventions introduced by the government during this period, the situation was far from being abated. The major reasons why these non-kinetic interventions failed to address the menace of Boko Haram insurgency were inept political leadership, corruption, lip service approach, lack of strong political will and commitment, the problem of sabotage and failure of good governance. It submitted that the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency can only be won if these problems are adequately addressed by the government. Evidence of countries who had encountered similar security challenges, such as Pakistan, Singapore and Malaysia, succeeded in defeating the insurgent groups through the vigorous pursuit of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.

The paper concludes that the Federal Government of Nigeria, under the leadership of former President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, introduced both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches toward defeating the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East geo-political zone of the country between 2009 and 2015. These two approaches recorded limited success. The insurgent group was neither incapacitated nor fully defeated by the government. This could be seen in several territories that were under the control of the insurgent group, described as their caliphate during this period.

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International and
Intra-State Conflicts, Peace and Sport Triangle:
Conflict Analysis, Peace Studies and
Sport Management Approaches

Sezai ÖZÇELİK

Abstract: There has been a close relationship between conflict, peace, development and sport. The use of sports for international and intra-state conflict analysis and peacebuilding proposes has become an important study subject in the 21st century. Sport can be associated with intolerance, nationalistic sentiments, and, most of time, violence. It is also true that international sport events may cause conflicts, violence, aggression and controversies (Öğretir-Özçelik, 2017). According to sport and olympic ideology, the main function of international sport is to promote international peace and development. It can be also used for a tool for societal change and social transformation. Since the ancient time, sport activities has related to the simulation of struggle between two conflicting parties and the civilized war. This study aims to analyze the link between international and intra-state conflicts, peace and sports. The objective of this paper is to examine the role of sports both conceptually and practically in conflict analysis and peace building. The first part is to present a conceptual framework in the study of sports, conflict resolution, and peace building. Second, it highlights some case studies where sports have an important role in international conflict and a tool for peace and reconciliation. Third, it focuses on the international use of sport and physical activity to attain the culture of peace and development objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Keywords: Sport, Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies.

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Introduction

When World War II ended, the Moscow Dynamo football team has taken a post-war tour of Britain in 1945. George Orwell has written a widely known essay, *This Sporting Spirit*, that described his dystopian experience of sports and games at Eton School in

which he was an athletic underachiever. He had been bullied, brutalized, and dominated by muscular sports captains. In his essay, he wrote:

"*I am always amazed when I hear people saying that sport creates goodwill between the nations and that if only the common peoples of the world could meet one another at football or cricket, they would have no inclination to meet on the battlefield. Even if one didn't know from concrete examples (the 1936 Olympics Games, for instance) that international sporting contests lead to orgies of hatred, one could deduce it from general principles. At the highest-level sport is frankly 'mimic warfare'. Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence: in other words, it is war minus the shooting. Instead of blah-blahing about the clean, healthy rivalry of the football field and the great part played by the Olympics Games in bringing the nations together, it is more useful to inquire how and why this modern cult of sport arose. Most of the games we now play are of ancient origin, but sport does no seem to have been taken very seriously (until) the nineteenth century.... If you wanted to add to the vast fund of ill will existing in the world at this moment, you could hardly do it better than through a series of football matches between Jews and Arabs, Germans and Czechs, Indians and British, Russians and Poles, and Italians and Jugoslavs (sic.), each match to be watched by a mixed audience of 100,000 spectators.*" (Orwell, 1945).*

His "war minus the shooting" phrase is considering sport as a kind of warfare without weapons. We have been told many times that sport is not political. But since the time of ancient Greece when the first Olympic Games were presented in the honor of Zeus, sport has been used as a tool for diplomacy, international politics, and conflict. The ancient Greek tradition of the *ekecheiria* or *Olympic Truce* was born at that time. After the International Olympic Committee called upon all nations to observe the Truce in 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution of 48/11 of October 1993 and urged to implement the Olympic Truce before the seventh day of the Olympics opening and the seventh day after the closing of each Olympic Games (UN, 2022).

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted two resolutions regarding sport and peace in October 2009. First, it acknowledged that the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver produce an opportunity to build a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal and to uphold support as a sector of the society concerned with, and active in, the promotion of peace, inclusivity particularly among the Aboriginal peoples of Canada and sustainable legacies for future generations (UNGA, 2009a). The second resolution recognized the 2010 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup held in South Africa for its historical, social, and developmental importance for the African continent and the world (UNGA, 2009b). These resolutions

have emphasized the social dimensions of sport by bridging and overcoming the social divides and challenges in international development. Sport has brought the different stakeholders in places where ethnic conflict, post-war reconciliation, gender inequality, income differences, and religious strife exist.

Sport, as it relates to conflict and peace, is a double-edged sword. It can cause both conflict and/or peace or reduce them. The divisive influence that sport represents in international and intra-state conflicts has been widely documented. Sport also contributes to nonviolent social change from the grassroots to international levels. In many international and ethnic conflicts, sport has been a complicating factor for the most part rather than an underlying deep-rooted cause of conflict. Most real conflicts have risen from economic competition, tangible material interests, and rising expectations. The most intractable sources of conflict are identity-based, non-material and perceived psychological differences. Religion and nationalism are important forces that have the leverage of the conflict process.

Sport has the positive potential and offers opportunities for preventing or resolving conflict. When the researchers treat the subject of conflict resolution and peace studies in a sports context, it becomes important to consider nationalism and culture as well. The Olympic Games are usually viewed as the elements of unit and cooperation in athletics. The official slogan of the Olympic games stressed the rapprochement of nations: "Sport, in its many forms, is the largest human activity on the planet that unites the people of the world".

Sport is arguably the most important and shared cultural event in the world. Professional sport produces significant revenues and has a profound impact on the lives of billions of people worldwide. It has continued to commercialize and increase its market share in the competitive business environment (Sandu, 2015). International sporting events have sometimes caused trigger event of international conflict. They have also contributed to better international relations. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany played friendly football matches with England in the 1930s. The German and English players exhibited fair play and goodwill during their matches and even English players have given the Nazi salute during the opening of the football game. In the early 1930s, American baseball players, such as New York Yankees' greats Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, attended baseball tours in Japan. The tours aimed to create an atmosphere for the "diplomats in pinstripes" in the Japanese militarized government. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States both used sporting events as in George Orwell's words, "wars minus shooting". At the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Soviets won the gold medal in basketball which is America's most important sporting activity. Similarly, the Americans have beaten the Soviet ice hockey team at the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics Games (Anderson *et al.*, 2022, p. 434).

This article surveys the relationship between sport, conflict, and peace. Sport is almost everywhere in our social, national, and international life. It has a powerful role in identity formation in a domestic and international context. It presents a theoretical framework to analyze how sport becomes a catalyst factor in many different types of conflicts at different levels of analysis. Sport can be viewed from cultural effects on conflict and peace research. Culture is power and sport is power too. Sport has an effect on three areas: language, identity, and values. It affects how a state sees itself and the ways in which it relates to other states, how it defines national security, and how it comes to understanding its interests and objectives. Sports contacts have significantly shaped both self and others' perceptions. For example, Brazil can not be understood without its international reputation in football. The rise of women's sports in international competitions should focus on the status of gender in conflict, peace, and international relations. For the sake of coherence and length, this article covers only explicitly sports events in relation to conflict and peace. It makes no attempt to present all sports, all regions of the world, and all aspects of conflict and peace. Instead, it presents major historical events during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In a political-ideological conflict like the Cold War, sports may be seen as a cultural battleground like other cultural exchanges-ballet, art, music, film, and literature. The competition between the two blocs played an important role in cultural infiltration for the Soviet collapse. Globalization has a significant effect on the flow of people, ideas, and information. Sports tourism and watching sports on TV have shown ties between sports, commerce, media, perceptions, and cultural flows. Sport has become a major element of global culture and cultural globalization. Also, the role of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) can present the sport's role via the International Olympic Committee and international sports federations such as FIFA. It is obvious that sport is everywhere and always politicized. As a result, sports must take its proper place alongside other significant topics in conflict and peace studies.

This study aims to analyze the link between international and intra-state conflicts, peace, and sports. The objective of this paper is to examine the role of sports both conceptually and practically in conflict analysis and peacebuilding. The first part is to present a conceptual framework in the study of sports, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Second, it highlights some case studies where sports have an important role in international conflict and is a tool for peace and reconciliation. Third, it focuses on the international use of sport and physical activity to attain a culture of peace and development objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Theoretical Framework

Academic research in the area of sports and international and intra-state conflicts has been neglected for a long time. The analysis of sport in social sciences has mostly focused on international political economy, neo-liberal economics, cultural globalization,

the media, national identity formation, the sociology of sport, and diplomacy. Many people may have thought that sports and international relations have little in common only international sporting events. For most ordinary people, there has been a linkage between politics and sports, Although there has been a lack of studies on sports and international and intra-state conflicts, conflict analysis and resolution specialists and practitioners may contribute a comprehensive analysis of the impact of sports on global issues and society. Sport and IR may play a major role in conflict resolution, security studies, and IR paradigms with soft power emphasis.

Global politics may have an effect on sports and sports may, most of the time, become a catalyst or intervening variable in international relations research. The modern sport and mega-sporting events may be related to the IR's neoliberal paradigm specifically Nye's soft power. The traditional realist IR theory has tended to view the international sphere of analysis between nation-states. The high politics and state-centrism view of IR have excluded the low politics and other actors in IR. The issues of military, power, diplomacy and security have excluded the economics, globalization, environment, migration, cultural, and sport nature of IR. In IR theory, defensive realists have applied "structural modifiers" or "the fine-grained structure of power" (Lowell, 2010).

Neoliberalism, constructivism, and the English School provide alternative views for our understanding of real-world events, especially low politics issues. Unlike realism theories which view sovereign states as the sole actors in IR, neoliberalism and constructivism aim to incorporate the role of domestic actors and other IR actors. Moreoever, domestic-level variables such as political culture, public opinion, state-society relations, and domestic political institutions are important factors to formulate the foreign policy analysis. Even individuals and global sports organizations may be seen as fundamental actors in international politics. The English School stresses the importance of rules, institutions, norms, and decision-making procedures to obtain shared interests among states. The concept of world society places the non-state actors and the global population at the center of IR analysis. In IR theory, social construction assumes that world politics is created through an interactive process between, on the one hand, individuals, states, and non-state actors and the structural factors in global system. The interaction process is shaped by ideational factors such as ideas, beliefs, norms, values, and identities. In international and intra-state conflicts, we can view low politics issues as constructive modifiers that I borrow from defensive realists' "structural modifiers" (Taliaferro, 2000).

Like structural modifiers, constructive modifiers have a greater influence on the likelihood of international and intra-state conflicts or cooperation than the structure of the international system and the gross distribution of power such as polarity. Constructive modifiers may be viewed as mediating factors in international and intra-state conflicts. They are defined as external and internal constraints and opportunities the conflicting

parties face. They may dominate the conflict process but they do not determine the conflict outcomes. Constructive modifiers can be dominant but not completely determinative.

In conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) research, we aim to identify and understand key factors that are thought to be related to conflict causes, processes, and outcomes. The researchers evaluate, analyze or investigate the factors and their relations to each other. In order to explain and understand any type and level of conflict, we need to develop a hypothesis with clearly and fully specifying its component factors and relations. The variables and their relationship must be defined, understood, and used by others in precisely the way the researcher wants them to be defined, understood, and used. In CAR research, we need to develop a conceptualization of the terms or variables we use. Later we must clarify an even more operational and specific definition of empirical referents. A CAR hypothesis comprises four elements: An independent variable, a dependent variable, an intervening or mediation variable, and a statement about the relationship between the variables.

In CAR research, an independent variable is a factor assumed to affect, influence, or cause variation in conflict. It always comes before the conflict behavior and outcome (the dependent variable). We hypothesize that conflict behavior and outcome depend upon or are caused by variations in the conflict cause (the independent variable). The relation between these two variables is often affected by an intervening variable. An intervening variable has a moderator variable that influences the relation between two others and thus produces an interaction effect. Or it has a mediating variable that transmits the effects of the independent variable to the dependent variable.

The fine-grained construct of ideational factors may increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict. Internal and external factors can be constructive modifiers. Individual factors, religion, mission, leadership style, international civil society, history, media, culture, human rights, ethnic identity, domestic politics, state-society relations, interest groups, perception, socio-psychological processes, and sport may be categorized as constructive modifiers. The actions of actors in international and intra-state conflicts can be explained by the intervening variables or constructive modifiers. Any effects to be exerted on the international and intergroup conflict systems may come from an intervening factor. The causes of international and intergroup conflicts interact with the conflict system through a process. In international and intra-state conflicts, the conflict causes influence the external conflict behavior of conflicting parties. The conflict process can be labeled as an intervening variable.

Early researchers in the CAR field have rarely treated sport as one of the many variables that give shape conflict. In the later research, thus, sport is seen as mediating and moderating the effects of other conflict variables such as culture, gender, or orientation on conflict management. As a mediator variable, sport affects conflict outcomes by

altering conflict parties, conflict issues, conflict objectives, conflict means, conflict resolution orientation and environment. As a moderator variable, sports change conflict outcomes by structuring conflict and determining the conflict resolution tactics that the conflict interveners and third parties used (Sandole, 1998). Without mediating and the moderator's variables acting as a conduit, the independent variable would not affect the dependent variable. The question we address is: what effects does sport have on international, intra-state, and intergroup conflicts?

Sport can be one of the constructive modifiers or catalysts. It operates as the antecedent condition in which conflict occurs. Thus, sport influences conflict outcomes directly. In the area of intergroup conflict, sports may increase hostility and anxiety in highly diverse groups. It has also the potential to improve the relationships between conflict parties by mitigating differences. Studies of conflict styles also treat sport as an intervening variable that shapes conflict predispositions in particular ways. Sport is treated as a conflict communication and culture system that is dynamic and multifunctional. It performs particular conflict management functions. CAR researchers might code sports activities as threats, putdowns, confrontation, and hostility or as performing the roles of concession-making, procedural messages, or problem-solving. Sport, as an interaction variable, may be linked to conflict goals and outcomes. If sport is viewed as a distributive or win-lose approach, it forces the conflicting parties for unilateral concessions.

Sport is usually viewed as a cooperation tool among nation-states. But it can be considered a contested social interaction. It may strengthen hostility and antagonism between conflict-ridden countries. The historical events in international conflict have taught us that sport can have the social functions that differences, social discrimination, and social exclusion are generated and/or reinforced with respect to nationality, physical ability, gender, social class, ethnic origin, race, and /or sexual orientation. Sports events mostly focus on connecting hostile groups but they seldom aim to deal with the deep-rooted causes of the conflict such as racism, relative deprivation, and ethnic rivalry. In daily life, ethnic differences can be strengthened through sporting events rather than by building connections between conflicting parties. Sport and conflict studies scholars argue that recreational and professional sports may also encourage nationalism, sexism, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia. They can produce conflict behaviors that led to conflict escalation where ethnic tensions are experienced, demonstrated, and performed.

Competitive international sporting events may cause fluctuations of nationalist sentiments. They consolidate national identities and national unity and increase animosity toward other nations and countries. Although international sports have been considered out of political life, but they are catalyst factors to surge nationalism. They mostly ignite conflict fire between ethnic groups. Sometimes sporting events directly cause military or political conflict between nations and countries. For example, the 1969 Football War

(El Salvador–Honduras), the 2009 Egypt–Algeria World Cup Conflict, and the 2014 Serbia–Albania Drone Conflict.

International and Intra-State Conflicts and Sport

In all international and intra-state conflicts, there are three types of causes of war: deep-rooted causes, mid-term causes, and ignition causes. Imagine a bonfire. Deep-rooted causes are the logs in the bonfire. Firewoods and papers are mid-term causes in the bonfire. The lighter or the match is accelerating cause. The assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife by Serbian terrorist, Gavrilo Princip, was an ignition cause in August 1914 when World War I started. Deep-rooted causes of World War I are militarism, alliance systems, imperialism, and nationalism (MAIN). Mid-term causes are the Balkan Wars (1912–13), Libya invasion by Italy (1911), Bosnia Herzegovina annexation by Austria–Hungary (1908), and the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905).

The deep-rooted causes of the Football War or the 100-Hour War can be taken back to the beginning of the 20th century. The reason for the conflict is more complex and deep-rooted than the given name implies. Like many post-colonial Latin American countries, the two Central American countries – El Salvador and Honduras – have had border disputes even though they have signed numerous demarcation treaties. In the early 19th century, two countries signed the Bonilla–Velasco agreement that was never ratified by both states. The second important factor is the trade imbalance between the two countries. The Central American Common Market (CACM) has given significant advantages to El Salvador because it is more industrialized than Honduras (Tillema, 1991).

The immigration from El Salvador to Honduras and the land reform in Honduras were mid-term causes. El Salvador is more densely populated than Honduras. For many years, the Salvadorian peasants have been migrating to Honduras to live and work. In 1968, Oswaldo Lopez Arellano was in office and confronted an economic crisis, widespread strikes, and political unrest in Honduras. The Honduran Government has put the blame on 300,000 illegal Salvadoran immigrants in Honduras. In order to regulate the border between Honduras and El Salvador, there was the 1967 Bilateral Treaty on Immigration with El Salvador. The Honduran Administration not only refused to renew the treaty but also began to expel Salvadorians even if they live and reside legally (Lugo, 2011, p. 37).

The ignition cause was the second North American qualifying round for the 1970 World Cup soccer match that was held in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, on June 8, 1969. Honduras won the match 1 to 0. When an 18-year-old Salvadorian girl shot herself because she was upset about the defeat, both countries' fans fought. The series' second game was taken place on June 15, 1969, in San Salvador which was a win by El Salvador 3–0. There was violence against Salvadorian citizens in Honduras with an unknown number of Salvadorans killed and tens of thousands started fleeing the country. When the third football match was held on June 26 in Mexico City, the results were decided

over time by the winner of El Salvador 3–2. With the rising nationalist ties after the football match, El Salvador cut its diplomatic ties with Honduras. El Salvador accused Honduras of genocidal land reforms against Salvadorians by displacing them without any compensation. The full-scale war started on July 14 when Salvadorian Army crossed into the Honduran territory (MHN, 2019).

The Salvadoran Air Force has launched the targets inside Honduras. The Salvadoran Army attacked the Honduran islands in the Fonseca Gulf and crossed the border for the offensive push toward the main road connecting the two nations. Because it is larger and better equipped, the Salvadoran Army captured the city of Nueva Ocotepque and entered over eight kilometers into the Honduras territory. The Honduran Air Force assaulted El Salvador's fuel and ammunition facilities (Nauright & Parrish, 2012, p. 107).

Another example of how soccer match has involved conflict and international politics is the soccer riot in 1990 in former Yugoslavia. It happened in Maksimir Stadium in the Croatian capital of Zagreb between two teams: The Croatian Dinamo Zagreb and the Serbian Belgrade Red Star. Unlike soccer hooliganism, sports violence in Croatia has been categorized as political violence. There were two fan groups which were almost paramilitary organizations of these two teams: the Bad Boy Blues from Croatia and the Serbian Delije fan groups. Before the match, both fan groups had clashed in the Zagreb streets. When both fan groups entered the stadium, the Red Star fans began singing Serbian nationalistic songs and shouted verbal abuse at the Croatian fans such as *we will kill Tudjman*. Two weeks before the match, Franco Tudjman was elected as the President of Croatia. The Croatian fans, the Bad Boy Blues, have gotten angry because of the Serbian fans' verbal abuse and attacked them. The Serb-dominated police in the stadium intervened with force. As a result, the violence erupted with many injuries and the match was canceled. Since World War II, Serbs, and Croatians have had ethnoreligious and political differences which is the Ustasha-Partisan conflict. This soccer match is important for Croatians because it they celebrated their nationalism and gained international legitimacy. Following the Maksimir soccer riot, the Croatian government under Tudjman created an escalating conflict between Serbs and Croatians in Croatia. He declared Croatia as the homeland of the Croatians and eliminated the national minority status of the Serbians and other minority groups. Croatian became the national language and the Serbs were purged from the court system, the police, and the civil service. One of the precipitating factors of the Balkan conflict was the Maksimir soccer riot (Sack & Suster, 2000).

Up until Tito's death, both Red Star and Dinamo Zagreb followed the Yugoslavian socialist ideology. The collapse of Yugoslavia has also related to the above-mentioned match on 13 May 1990. Both Croatian and Serbian nationalism has become an absolute ideology of both the two soccer clubs as well as two states: Serbia and Croatia. There were two Serbian soccer clubs that had different approaches to Serbian nationalism and

the Balkan conflict. The Red Star has had a closer relationship with the Arkan's Tiger paramilitary group and ultra-nationalist war criminals such as Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, and Radovan Karadzic. The most famous slogan of the Red Star fans was: "Kosovo is the heart of Serbia", "Kill the faggot", or "Kill a Croat, so Albanian loses a brother" (Dordevic, 2016, p. 117). On the other hand, another Serbian soccer club is FC Partisan which represented the diverse nature of Yugoslavia by emphasizing not only ethnic Serbs but also Muslim Bosnians and Albanians. It is interesting to note that the Serbian Red Star's eternal rival is one of the most diverse clubs in ethnic Yugoslavia: Partizan FC which shows the supranational understanding of Yugoslav nationalism. With the death of Tito on May 4, 1980, Yugoslavia gradually turned into the effect of Serbian super nationalism. In different sporting events during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, we have seen that emotional components of nationalism and psycho-dynamic processes such as us versus them, resentment and anger toward others and an emphasis on in-group similarities and outgroup differences, dehumanization, scapegoating, and a strong sense of superiority (Ogretir & Ozcelik, 2008). The upper identity of Yugoslav has been replaced by sub-identities such as Orthodox Serbian, Catholic Croatian, and Muslim Bosnians and Albanians (Develi, 2022).

The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia has been tense. The top Serbian political parties, the Progressives, Socialists, and Radicals, all played a part in the Milosevic regime. The current President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, has regularly negotiated with Kosovo in order to normalize relations. The current position of Belgrade about Kosovo is "agree to disagree" with the EU and the United States. The Serbian government has given a priority to negotiating less intractable issues. There is a lack of large-scale manifestations of aggressive Serbian nationalism. But sporting events have increased tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. In October 2014, Albania and Serbia has played a football match at Belgrade's Partizan Stadium. A mysterious drone have flown over the stadium and carried an Albanian flag with a banner showing Kosovo as part of Greater Albania. During the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) 2016 qualifying football game between Serbia and Albania in 1967, the drone got close to the playing ground, and a Serbian defender, Stefan Mitrovic, grabbed and ripped the Albanian flag off. As a result, a fight between both teams and their fans occurred. The football match was abandoned. The tensions between the Serbian and Albanian governments have escalated and intensified. Because of the incident, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama postponed his visit to Serbia on October 20, the first official visit by an Albanian leader for nearly 70 years (Mitchell, 2014). The Albanian national football team was fined 100,000 Euros by UEFA because the Albanian fans flew a drone. The Football Association of Serbia was subject to a three-point deduction and a 100,000 Euros fine because its supporters made brutal chants, threw rocks, chairs, flares, and other dangerous objects from the stands, confronted Albanian players, invaded the playing field, attacked the Albanian players and interrupted the football match.

The 1986 World Cup quarterfinals football match between Argentina and England was significant both for sport and conflict studies. Since the Falkland War in 1982, both nation-states faced each other for the first time. Football is a national obsession in Argentina that was interestingly first introduced by British sailors who arrived in the late 19th century. English diplomats, railway workers, and citizens formed the first local Argentine teams. For the Argentines, their 2–1 victory over England is a revenge for the insulting loss they faced in the Falkland/Malvinas War. The root causes of the War can be traced back to the 1966 World Cup match between Argentina and England. The English football manager Alf Ramsey has made the infamous remark about the Argentine team playing like "animals". Sport and politics were intertwined when the British government refused to transfer the sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas. The British media defined Argentina's public imagination by stating that Argentina did not play by the rules. The negotiations between the two countries have failed to prevent the 1982 Argentine invasion (Dodds, 2003, p. 183). In the 1986 World Cup, Argentine team captain and star player, Diego Maradona, had his first goal by using his hand rather than his head. He famously said "the Hand of God" had sent the ball into the net. In 2005, he accepted on an Argentine television program that he deliberately used his fist to score the goal. He felt that he was only stealing from a thief because in his view, the English had stolen the Malvinas/Falkland Islands from the Argentines. "We said we shouldn't mix football and politics, but that was a lie. I got hold of the ball to take revenge on the English who had got hold of the Falklands". For Maradona, "it was as if

Table 1: Conflicts With Sport Dimension

1	1936 Berlin Olympics
2	1972 Munich Olympics
3	1969 Football War El Salvador–Honduras
4	1986 Argentina UK Football Match
5	13 May 1990 Dinamo Zagreb–Red Star Football Match
6	20 August 1990 Yugoslavia–USSR Basketball Match
7	November 2009 Egypt–Algeria World Cup Violence
8	14 October 2014 Serbia–Albania UEFA Cup Drone Conflict
9	1934 Italian World Cup
10	1932–33 Bodyline Ashes Series Britain Australia Cricket
11	02 December 1998 Galatasaray–Juventus Football Match
12	1980 Moscow Summer Olympics
13	1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics
14	22 June 1994 USA Columbia Football Match
15	02 July 1995 Yugoslavia Lithuania Basketball Match
16	1967 Muhammed Ali Vietnam War

Source: Güzelipek (2017).

we had beaten a country, not just a football team. So this match was revenge". His second goal was declared by the Federation Internationale Football Association (FIFA) as the greatest goal ever in World Cup competition, the Goal of the Century in 2002 (Goal, 2016). Although Maradona followed the official Argentine statement declaring that the match was purely football, he later claimed the victory as revenge for the Argentinian lives lost in the Falkland/Malvinas conflict (Maradona, 2005, p. 130).

Peace Catalyst: Sport

Recreational sport is viewed as a tool for peace and reconciliation as a cultural practice to enhance interethnic contact and social cohesion. When divided conflict-ridden societies have suffered from armed conflicts and civil wars, cultural conflict intervention and issues of interethnic tolerance have become the center of conflict resolution and peace initiatives. Sport is usually considered to improve inter-community interaction and encourage mutual respect and intercultural understanding between divided communities. The Conference on the Contribution of Sport to Intercultural Dialogue in İstanbul on 9–10 September 2004, organized by the Council of Europe Sports Departments in cooperation with the Directorate for Youth and Sport of Turkey and the Economic Research Foundation of Istanbul, has underlined that "properly promoted and delivered, sport can constitute a first step in the efforts to achieve inter-cultural dialogue by bringing together different nationalities and cultures in a common game with common rules" (Dorokhina, Hosta, & Sterkenburg, 2011, p. 11). United Nations also recognized the social value of sport and decided to use the social power of sport in the UN's Human Rights agenda. In 2005, the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan declared the International Year of Sport and Physical Education and stated that: "Sport is a universal language. At its best sport can bring people together, no matter what their origin, background, religious beliefs, or economic status. And when young people participate in sports or have access to physical education, they can experience real exhilaration even as they learn the ideals of teamwork and tolerance. Sports can bridge difficulties. Sports can bridge conflicts. Sport is the best school of life. We need desperately this international year... to spread the message that sport offers values to the younger generation" (Annan, 2004).

Sport, specifically football, has always been able to bring people and unite people together. The Olympics is held every four years to bring people from all over the world with different races, gender, age, ethnicity, color, and social background. The Football World Cup, Rugby World Cup, and other international sporting events have done the same thing by making participants put aside their political opinion and come together for the love of the game. They compete against each other as fellow human beings and do not consider race, religion, skin color, and ethnic origin as issues that divide them (Paul & Ocheng' Ong'ondo, 2018).

Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) has become a worldwide known conflict intervention process for deep-rooted conflicts. In the conflict-torn societies in the developing

and less developed world, SDP has been used to combat conflict and poverty. Football, the world's most popular sport, has been used as a catalyst for conflict resolution, peace, social inclusion, and sustainable development. Sport has a huge capability to stimulate tolerance and friendship and unite different conflicting parties around a common sports activity. When German and English troops declared a ceasefire by silencing weapons during World War I to play a game of football and give each other gifts at the famous Christmas Truce of 1914 (Crocker, 2015, p. 51).

Table 2: Peace With Sport Dimension

1	2006 World Cup Ivory Coast and Drogba
2	06 September 2008 Armenia–Türkiye Football Diplomacy
3	1972 Hockey Diplomacy Canada–USSR
4	10 April 1971 Ping Pong Diplomacy USA–China
5	22 March 2016 USA Cuba Baseball Game Havana, Cuba
6	1995 Rugby World Cup – South Africa
7	21 June 1998 USA Iran Football Match
8	1958 Football World Cup Pele effect
9	1968 Mexico Olympics Black Power Salute
10	2013 FC Barcelona Peace Tour

Sources: Güzelipek (2017).

Beginning in the 1950s, South Africa had been the subject of international condemnation because of apartheid. After many African states have become independent during the 1960s, they put pressure on the United Nations and international sports organizations to ban South African participation in international sporting events. As a result, South Africa and Rhodesia became the first country formally expelled from the Olympic Games in 1968 because the apartheid is against Section 3 of the Olympic Charter which forbids discrimination on the basis of race. Similarly, the United Nations General Assembly call for all its members to suspend sporting links with South Africa (Toohey & Veal, 2007, p. 99).

The 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa was used by Nelson Mandela to combat post-apartheid racial tensions and unite South Africa. After the dissolution of the apartheid regime, Nelson Mandela was elected the first black president of South Africa in 1994. However, racial tensions have threatened to submerge into civil war and spread into race conflict. The black majority mostly played and watched football. The White Afrikaner minority has followed rugby, specifically the Springboks that is associated with apartheid by black, Indian, and colored South Africans. In 1995, South Africa was chosen to host the 1995 Rught World Cup. In order to unite the black population behind the rugby team, President Mandela visited the white Springboks captain François Pienaar.

The Springboks had the World Cup final match against the heavily favored New Zealand All Blacks. President Mandela just walked on the pitch wearing a Springbok cap and number 6 shirt – the rugby captain's shirt. He wished each player well and symbolized the birth of a new nation: 43 million South Africans. When Mandela presented the championship trophy to all TV audiences in the world, it produced a moment of pride and unity by promoting the "rainbow nation" and racial harmony. The team walked around the stadium with "Shoshalosa" (literally meaning pushing or running), the Zulu work song playing over the speakers, and holding the World Cup (Jaksa, 2011, p. 40; Steenveld & Strelitz, 1998).

Ivory Coast or Cote d'Ivoire has been known for cocoa, coffee, and football. In 2002, the country has been affected by a civil war that was divided between North and South as a result of religious, political, and ethnic differences. The Northern part of the country is mostly Muslim, and the southern part of the Ivory Coast is mostly Christian. The conflict is similar to many other African conflicts such as Sudan and Sierra Leone where citizens live in their ethnic majority regions. It is usually almost impossible to cross from one side to the other in the same country because there is an unofficial border that separates both ethnic groups. Many Ivory Coast players have played in the world's top professional leagues. The civil war created a danger to split the country in two. The country football stars were on different sides of the conflict. Drogba is a Christian from the southern part of the country and his wife is Muslim. He was playing London's Chelsea team and was the captain of the Ivory Coast team, the Elephants. Two brothers' football stars, Kolo Toure and Yaya Toure, are Muslims from the north. Although the Ivorian national team comes from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, they represented the entire Ivory Coast as Drogba said, "In the national team, we are all brothers". In 2005, the team captain Drogba decided to use football to unite the country by qualifying for the 2006 World Cup. Excitement was high when the World Cup qualification started. The national colors (orange, white and green) were omnipresent. In the rebel area and Bouake, the matches were shown on a big screen. In their group match, Ivory Coast finished ahead of African football powerhouse: Egypt and Cameroon. On October 8, 2005, the Ivory Coast won their final game and Cameroon lost its final game. Drogba made a speech in the changing room with a TV camera urging "The one country in Africa with so many riches must not descend into war. Please lay down your weapons and hold elections". He said that the national team had just proved that Ivorians could cohabit and play together to reach a common goal. He then made the players kneel and called for an end to the conflict (McDougall, 2012, pp. 4–14). As a result, Ivory Coast qualified for the first time World Cup. The President praised Drogba who was selected the African Player of the Year 2006, as a symbol of national unity that put his country on the international media. He took his award to Bouake and renewed his call for peace. To use football to unite the country, Drogba had another idea. For the 2007 African Nations Cup qualifying game, Drogba announced that the game would be played in Bouake, the rebel capital

of the Muslim North of the country and Ivory Coast's second-largest city, and not in Abidjan as scheduled. This region is off-limits not only to people from the South but also to government security forces. Drogba hoped to encourage the national team and all Ivory Coast citizens to cross this physical, political, and ideological border by playing a football game there to bring the country together again after the 2006 World Cup. The game was played on 3 June 2007 with 25.000 spectators including soldiers from both camps, the Ivorian team beat Madagascar 5-0 with the final goal scored by Drogba. He became known as the footballer who stopped a civil war. Ivory Coast newspaper headline explained all: "Five goals to erase five years of war" (Hummel, 2012). Many scholars believe that football qualification matches were able to unify people across political, ethnic, and religious lines. Football victories made it possible to enable the manifestation of a national collectivity. When the Ivory Team won the 2006 World Cup qualification, it has shown that glorious successes can be achieved when political and ethnic differences are set aside. There are also skeptical voices such as the Ivorian Minister for National Reconciliation, Sebastien Dano Djedje stated in the BBC interview: "Football and the World Cup can be a major fact in bringing us together... But we shouldn't have too many illusions – we have deep problems here and football cannot solve all of these" (Künzler, 2018, p. 394).

Conclusion

Sport no longer exists in the margins of conflict and peace studies. Although some scholars still argue that sport is not related to politics and poses no interesting questions for the student of politics and society. But it has been realized that sport plays in the lives of untold millions across the globe, poor and rich alike. Because low political issues in IR have become an important subject, the transnational nature of the sport has led to the study of emotion, pleasure, and the sense of identity that is taken from sporting activities. The analysis of the relationship between sport and conflict is one of the most neglected issues in the field of both conflict and sports studies. Research has focused more on the historical analysis of sporting events in terms of international relations. We know that sport, conflict, and peace are intertwined and related to each other. The relationship between conflict and sport has existed on both the horizontal and vertical levels from intergroup to international conflicts. Conflict is more than just a single incident. It is a process and should also be examined as the sources of conflict. Sport is an important intervening variable in the conflict process.

The hosting of mega-sporting events such as the current FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 has been an important tool for the host country to increase its international status and image. Sport can be associated with Nye's concept of soft power to explain the importance of conflict, peace, and rapprochement in hostile environments. In addition to states, important sports individuals, non-governmental sporting organizations (NGOs) and domestic sporting actors may play important roles emphasizing the importance of

norms, rules, and institutions for shared win-win interests among states. The English School's concept of world society can be associated with sport and world society in which individuals, non-state actors, and the global population. Sports may both play escalators and de-escalatory roles in deep-rooted and protracted conflicts. Sports give information about personal norms and ideational attributes that carry conflict forward. Apart from sport's negative aspects such as driving forces for aggression and competition among nations, performance-enhancing drugs, corruption, and match-fixing, "sport has the power to unite, to build bridges between divided communities and to motivate marginalized young people" (Woodhouse, 2016). The Olympic Games and the Olympic Truce has both become an important political process for peace. The Olympic Games such as Berlin 1936, Barcelona 1992, Lillehammer 1994 Winter Games, Sydney 2000, Athens 2004, Torino 2006 Winter Games, Beijing 2008, London 2012, and Rio 2016 has all shown the power of the modern Olympic Games for dialogue, understanding, inspiration, and opportunity for the conflict resolution and peace. However, the Russian aggression against Ukraine during the 2022 Winter Beijing Olympics has been strongly condemned by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as a breach of the Olympic Truce because the Russian government has acted against the UN resolution on 2 December 2021 adopted by consensus of all 193 UN Member States stating that the Olympic Truce began seven days before the start of the Olympic Games, on 4 February 2022, and ends seven days after the closing of the Paralympic Games on March 13, 2022 (Olympics, 2022).

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India:
Conflict with Minorities
in the Conventional Political System.
The Status of Muslims

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Abstract: Hindu-Muslim conflict and riots in India are enduring intergroup conflicts in south Asia, destabilizing the region for a long time. Despite having federal democracy and secular nationalism in the political system of India, the state and its various technology of power take sides with religious groups abetting the persecution of minority Muslims as religious or ethnic groups. Among the various ethnic groups and communities living in India, Muslims are among the most deprived communities in contemporary times. In the issue of minority conflict, a permanent solution in the federal system of government has become a dream. This paper analyses India's divergent political systems and state ideology and its failure and success in respective cases to counter communal and ethnic violence. We argue that, rather than focusing on the weakness of the existing political systems of India, the common failure to adequate power sharing can better explain these conflicts and successive persecution of minority Muslims.

Keywords: Minority, Conflict, India, Political System, Muslim, Community.

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Introduction

Regarding intergroup violence within the national territory, India is a very complex case drawing the enormous attention of academics to study and analyze. India possesses enormous multiplicity in terms of ethnic and religious diversity, creating much tension across the groups and leading to enduring hostilities. In our current time, communal and ethnic violence between Hindus and Muslims in India has become an issue of global and regional discussion, which makes them exciting subjects to compare and contrast.

We will analyze the situation in neighboring Myanmar better to understand the situation of India's Muslim minority. Amid the overwhelming overlapping of religious and other ethnic elements, conflict in Myanmar occurs on the line of cultural and ethnic categories; similarly, India experiences religious and ethnic identity as a dominant demarcating line for constituting violence. There are numerous similarities and parallels between these two cases regarding context, history, and group characteristics; especially one significant similarity is that both oppressed groups in their respective cases are Muslims. In Myanmar, Rohingya are one of the minor minority groups, and their sufferings are disproportionately large in terms of substantial external displacement and disproportionate killing relative to their demography (Kipgen, 2014). In India, in terms of the number of casualties and several incidences of communal violence, Muslim suffering surpasses all other religious groups (Majid, 2020). While the political systems of these two countries are different, they are both not only non-functioning but rather ill-functioning and flawed as far as communal or ethnic violence is concerned, which contributes to, sometimes shapes, and ignites hostilities in the respective countries.

In this article, we would like to analyze India's divergent political systems and state ideology and its failure and success in respective cases to counter communal and ethnic violence. In this regard, our quest will be to understand, despite the democratic system and secular state ideology, why India failed to contain communal violence. Is it the problem in the nature of the system or due to inadequacy in the development of the system? Is the system immature or inherently flawed?

Literature Review

In the case of India, the regularity in the literature regarding communal violence bears enormous diversity both at the level of issues and causes. Literature that is relevant to our analysis could be divided into two categories. Some relevant literature ascribes the reason for communal violence to the complex material and immaterial social and political reality and denies any single cause to be the dominant factor for this hostility. So, their approach is a case-by-case analysis of riots and figuring out the reason in that existing context. In this type of literature, historians and political scientists, such as Basu (1995), Brass (1998), Ludden (1996), Raychaudhuri (2000), Heehs (1996), and

Thapar (1989) examined specific cases. They crystallized the complex structural and material bases of communal conflict.

On the other hand, some literature tried to figure out specific and dominant causes that might explain the communal conflict across India, in general. In this type of literature, some tried to use the Rational Choice Theory, ascribing different incentives regarding power and resources as the primal cause of conflict. Steven Wilkinson (2006) and Anjan Bose (2009) identify electoral incentives as a significant cause of communal violence. In some other literature, Khaliq Hasan (1982) stressed the economic completion and resultant discord as the most interpretative single variable behind the ethnic conflict. Apart from the Rational Choice Theory, some authors, such as Baber (2004), emphasize that the racialization process consummated through history was the principal cause, while others, like Beteille (1994), Engineer (1989), Ganguly (1996), and Tambiah (1997) focused on the identity consciousness crystallized in the colonial and post-colonial period. Besides, some other literature, like Ashish Nandy (1997) and Madan (1987), focused on the state institutions and claimed their weakness as a fundamental reason.

An analysis of this category of the literature shows that no literature attempts to analyze Muslims as a distinct ethnic entity and make a case study. Why has India failed to control ethnic or communal violence despite being a federal system of government and a secular state? Whether the Indian state, with its existing political system and state ideology, is capable or will be capable of solving this problem is not dealt with much considering its long history of failure.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This study will use qualitative case study methodology with the different theoretical frameworks needed to understand different aspects of the conflict. In our analysis, conflict mapping frameworks generated by Shay Bright (2001) will be used to an extent. In understanding genealogical similarities and dissimilarities, colonial history will be examined. The issue of comparative political institutions and their success or failures in their respective context will be examined using a qualitative framework. At the same time, some discourse analysis framework will be used to understand the underlying causes of failure or success. In this regard, the theory of nationalism by Anderson (1983) and the nature of Indian secularism articulated by Ashish Nandy (1997) will be used.

The biggest challenge facing Muslims in India at present is the Citizenship Act. Through the National Register of Citizens (NRC) Act, the current government of India decriminalized a large section of Muslims in the state of Assam (Saberin, 2017). Many Bengali Muslims in Assam live in anxiety and fear and are deprived of their fundamental rights. Muslims face similar problems in Myanmar regarding structural discrimination; apparently, Muslims in India and Rohingya in Rakhine are on equal footing. Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar were coercively stripped of citizenship through the citizenship

law in 1982. Questions remain as to whether the Indian government has taken inspiration from neighboring Myanmar for its de-citizenship approach. Since 1947, there have been many riots in India among the Hindu Muslim community, which have been accused of incitement by Indian state institutions.

Similarly, Myanmar's state apparatus was directly involved in suppressing the Rohingyas of Arakan (Mahmudul, 2017). Besides, due to ethnic conflict in Rakhine, Rohingya are faced with large-scale expulsion and ethnic cleansing attempts in their habitat (Wade, 2017); in terms of absolute condition, Muslims are not better off in India compared with the Rohingya plight. If we look at them in their respective national boundary, Muslims in India and Rohingya in Myanmar are on an equal footing.

Muslims in India face policies regarding their economic, social, and political participation; Indian Muslims are the worst-off groups in Indian societies. In fact, Muslims are faced with a coercive policy with systemic deprivation of jobs, education, and health, resulting in being the most marginalized and impoverished group. Muslims are the poorest of all religious groups in India, with 32 rupees daily income, which is even worse than the income of a person of a scheduled caste group (Basant, 2007). Muslims' proportionate participation in a government job in terms of demographic ratio is also the poorest. Even in terms of education, they are the least advantaged group in India. According to the Government of India (2014), while Muslims comprise 14% of the total population, their enrollment in a Government job is 3.45%, and in higher education, 4.4%. If we consider the riots and casualties, Muslims are the most affected groups in India. According to the Minority Commission Report 2013, the average loss of life of Muslims in Hindu-Muslim riots is markedly higher than in communal conflict with other sets of identity groups (Graff & Galonnier, 2013).

History and Sources of Conflict:
Divisive Identity Constructions in Colonial Time

Sources of conflict can be traced back in India to the colonial period when the country was colonized between the 18th and 19th centuries. A similar picture can be found in the case of Myanmar, where the conflict started during the colonial period. Tony Ballantyn (2001) shows that, before colonial rule, communal violence in India or ethnic violence in Myanmar did not exist. So, the origin of the conflict is deeply rooted in how the British ruled these two countries using divide and rule policy and crystalizing identity consciousness. The British tried to heighten communal consciousness and gave credence to many stereotyped notions. They emphasized medieval division in Indian and Burmese society in order to lay the foundation for the unifying and centralizing impact of British rule and prevent any unifying claim from natives (Hasan, 1982). Tony Ballantyn (2001) documented how orientalists in British colonial rule of South Asia tried to conjure up the idea of the original race, namely Aryan vs Arab or Burmans vs

Indians, contributing to differing communal consciousness in both India and Myanmar. Apart from race, the British divided society into religious categories and discriminated based on it.

Before the advent of the British, Muslims were the ruling class, and British colonizers stripped Muslims of their status quo position and empowered the Hindu community (Ahmed, 1981). The Muslim community was marginalized economically and socially, but on the other hand, the Hindus were economically powerful enough to create an imbalance in society. The Hindu community tried to influence the Muslims in various ways by being allies of the ruling class, which was one of the causes of communal conflict. Communal riots that started in colonial times have become a daily occurrence in India today, where the Muslim community is suffering the most victims.

Similarly, in Myanmar, the British divided the country through ethnic categories. They deprived and divested the majority ethnic group of their power and status and replaced it with minority groups. Nevertheless, when the British left Myanmar, they gave power to the majority Burman who had been discriminated against by another competing minority group. After this transition, grievances created in the colonial period and the power gap in the nation produced fertile ground for ethnic conflict.

The Transition of Power and Sustenance of Animosity

India experienced a complex process of divide-and-rule policy and devolution of power. In India, the division was perpetrated based on religion, and the majority of Hindus were empowered. After the departure of the British, the power remained in the hand of Hindus as they were a majority. Basically, as a result of this, there was a terrible conflict in India. Especially when India and Pakistan were partitioned in 1947 based on religious identity, great communal riots took place across India, with more than 100.000 casualties in both cases (Talbot, 1995). The same happened to the Muslims of Myanmar, where minority ethnic groups were empowered against the majority of Burman, and division was accomplished based on ethnic track. However, they handed power to the majority of Burman when they left. As a result, significant riots also took place in the 40s, a decade of transition for both countries. In 1942, a great massacre occurred in Rakhine state, where the Rakhine ethnic group killed 100.000 Rohingya (Wade, 2017).

From the above discussion, it is clear that the British divide-and-rule policy in colonial times initiated and developed antagonistic identity consciousness in both countries; the transition process and concurrent bloody incidences created a permanent mark on the animosity. Although the experiences of other colonial regions in Asia are almost similar, the colonial lesson marks have not yet completely dried up. In both cases, Muslims were adversely affected, but the suffering is more due to a large number of Muslims in India than Rakhine's Muslim population.

Sides and Opponents in the Conflict:
Factors and Procedural Mechanism

In some states, security forces are not primarily involved in the conflicts but should be regarded as intervening parties. Sometimes they are found complicit with the mob, and sometimes they are found blind and other times, they successfully stop the conflict. The primary parties in conflict in India are Hindu and Muslim, two religious communities as secondary parties, much like Myanmar, political parties, religious groups, and authority from both sides' functions. Third parties, domestic and international media, Indian civil society, and intellectuals are active and interested. However, the overall situation of all the provinces of India shows that security forces mostly failed to take a neutral stance at the time of the Riots. Some key findings are frustrating to scrutinize national commission reports done in a different period. Commission reports in different periods identify that Police are biased and prejudiced in handling riots. The Report of the Srikrishna Commission (1998) accuses the Mumbai police of 'built-in bias' against Muslims (Sabrang, nd.). The Report of Srikrishna Commission (1998) described Police as highly communalized and sometimes actively participated in the riots.

The same picture is noticeable in the case of Myanmar, where Rakhine and Rohingya, two religious and ethnic groups, are the primary parties. At the same time, Myanmar security forces also play a primary role in the conflict (HRW, 2013). As secondary parties, Rakhine political parties, Rakhine monks, and local Buddhist authorities, on the one side, and the Rohingya diaspora, on the other, play their roles on their respective sides. As tertiary parties, domestic media, and international media, regional countries like China and India, and international NGOs and UN intuitions are active. In the case of Myanmar, security forces or the army is involved in killing, burning houses and flagrant human rights abuses as part of military regimes' strategy of divide and rule (HRW, 2017). Burmese army forces, locally called *Tatmadaw*, are actively conducting an ethnic cleansing mission in Rakhine state (Zarni & Cowley, 2014). So, putting the two events side by side in the same table, we can clearly understand that the Indian and Myanmar security forces are involved in persecuting minorities.

Politically, Muslims in India and Myanmar are facing similar problems. The role of political parties in India is more central than in Myanmar, as it is a multi-party democratic country. However, the political parties in Rakhine mainly work as a puppet of the regime and are thus highly involved in the riots. However, Political parties in India is central as the army in Myanmar. In several cases, political parties in India are found to conspire, plan and implement communal violence (Wilkinson, 2006, Hasan, 1982). Though all political parties are not complicit in it, the pernicious role of some political parties while the silence of others proves to be vital behind the communal violence in different studies. According to the study of Corbridge *et al*. (2005), right-wing political parties directly inspire communal violence, while secular parties do it indirectly.

Contemporary Conflict Context:
Rise of Religious Nationalism

Among various ingredients that have contributed to creating the current hostile situation for Muslims in India, one significant element is the rise of religious nationalism. The rise of religious nationalism is deeply rooted in the politics of elites in India. How this rise of religious nationalism has left the Muslim group in the most hostile situation must be described. In India's rise of Hindu nationalism based on Hindutva ideology, an exclusivist explanation of Hinduism relates to the political process. The ruling party in India, BJP, came to power playing the card of religious nationalism. If we consider the discourse of Hindutva, and the most active group, RSS, Islam is portrayed as non-Indian religion, and Muslims are deemed aliens and invaders. Surprisingly, they do not portray Christianity as foreign religion as they claimed it did not expand in India through coercion. However, the sword brought Islam to India (Bose, 2009).

The same incident has been repeated in the case of Myanmar's Rohingyas. Among the factors that have contributed to the current context of hostilities, a significant factor is the rise of religious nationalism. In Myanmar, after 1988, the previous military Government stepped down due to protests. A new junta took power which emphasized Buddhist identity rather than Burman identity to diminish ethnic conflict in on hand and attract limited foreign investment. However, this policy and its empowerment of Buddhist monks and eulogizing Buddhism as a national identity gave rise to radical religious nationalism. So, the rise of religious nationalism is intricately related to the state policy of Myanmar. In this Buddhist nationalism, Muslims are portrayed as others and invaders.

The above discussion shows the dire plight of Muslims in both countries with an ocean of disparities. Here, the similarities in the historical process of identification, the hostile role of the state, and the rise of religious nationalism can account for such devastating situations faced by these two communities. In both cases rise of religious nationalism, and its politicization with their hostile narratives showed striking similarities behind the sorrowful plight of these two groups.

Functioning Democracy & Well-Functioning Autocracy:
A Story of Birds of a Same Feather

In India, religious identity is politicized because it is politically helpful to achieve power. The democratic system that remains there, in fact, helps with this politicization. So, the existing political system has assisted and inspired the emergence of Hindu nationalist political parties that can come to power by politicizing religious identity (Bose, 2009).

This politicization of identity through a democratic system in India will be more evident if we look at the relationship between election time and communal violence. It

is shown by Steven Wilkinson (2006) that there is a high electoral incentive to ignite communal violence. Thus, it occurs in the electoral period or when right-wing political parties feel jeopardized. Through communal violence, they polarized the voters and won the election. In their studies, Iyer and Srivastava (2015) show that riots occurring in the year preceding an election increase the vote share of the Bharatiya Janata Party by 5 to 7 percent. However, that does not mean that secular political parties like the Congress party, the leading oppositional political party in the current parliament, are immune to this process. According to Khaleq Hasan (1982), not only BJP make alliances with communal organizations, but instead Congress party also, from time to time, did compromise its secular ideology. Kothari (1988) argues that the Communal face of Indian democracy "is not an aberration but something that is part of the system, a direct outcome of its inherent logic".

The flaw in the Indian democracy becomes more apparent if we consider that this right-wing political party, BJP came to power not the reason that the majority support them; rather, the majority of the voters are divided, and a substantial minority are mobilized and made united based on the politicization of identity (Nandy, 1996). It would be apparent if the current BJP came to power based on 31% of total voters. So, the Indian democracy is ill-functioning and thus deeply flawed at two levels. First, it encourages the politicization of religious identity (Bose, 2009), and second, a vote of a minority of the population is enough to come to power exploiting different identity groups' compliance to their political parties.

While in Myanmar, the politicization of identity is done by the state through its imposed policies, in India it is done through the political process. From the discussion, it is evident that identity politicization has enough space in both systems, and both systems are complicit in conflict, either directly or indirectly. Despite some differences in the political systems of these two countries, that both countries have failed miserably to counter adverse violent situations is puzzling. So, the question is why the Indian political system, which is democratic, and its state ideology, secularism, failed to counter communal violence. Our answer to this question is that both the political process and state ideology are not only failed but also flawed. We can say they are non-functioning and ill-functioning in containing diversity and multiplicity.

**Secular Nationalism in India:
Exclusivist Ideology in Disguise**

Indian democratic failure to contain diversity is intricately related to its secular state ideology, which is exclusivist as the Buddhist ideology in Myanmar though. We stipulate that Indian secular nationalism and its imagined community are exclusivists in nature (Anderson, 1983). To understand that, we must understand the role of religion in Indian society, which differs from that of European society (Nandy, 1996).

Ashish Nandy (1996) shows that the prime mistake that is accomplished in the first place is assuming Indian and European reality as similar. In fact, Unlike in Europe, there was no competing relation between religion and politics in Indian history, and the role of religion is always public in Indian society. So, banning religion in the public sphere and making it an issue of the private realm results in the return of majority religion in the public sphere and the alienation and exclusion of minority religions. As banning religion in the public sphere is incompatible with societal aspiration, the majority's aspiration is reflected in the electoral process, while minority groups' aspiration gets excluded both through the electoral process and through the legal process. However, rather than secular ideology, if the state allowed religion in the public sphere, there might arise a possibility of learning to coexist as it did in the precolonial period. In fact, by restricting religion in the private sphere, India halted the possibility of communicative action between different religious groups, as articulated by Habermas (1984).

Conclusion

The current federal system in India has failed to solve the problem, as within this system, communal violence can easily breed and multiply. In the issue of minority conflict, a permanent solution in the federal system of government has become a dream. So, it is necessary first to establish a consociation system where every religious group will be empowered. Power sharing aims to bring about a religious multi-culturalism instead of secularism. Without proper power sharing, state secularism or mere electoral democracy cannot solve the conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India.

Along with administrative and political reforms, it is also essential to take appropriate steps to establish communal harmony; in this regard, political, social and religious leaders should play a key role. In the case of Myanmar, we can similarly say that installing electoral democracy instead of the current military autocracy might not change the situation unless various ethnic groups were awarded their fair share of power in the political system. Otherwise, electoral democracy will only lead to majoritarianism, as we are currently experiencing in India.

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Indigenous Conflict Management:
Factors Contributing to the Effectiveness
of the Strategies. A Systematic Review

Shimelis TAMIRAT

Kenenisa LEMI

Abstract: There are several possible ways to respond to conflict situations as a managerial intervention to solve it. The current understanding of such conflict management strategies was framed without adequately considering indigenous practices. Therefore, the objective of this systematic review was to explore the contributors and determinants of the effectiveness of indigenous conflict management strategies. The findings indicated that factors such as shared dialogue, empowering indigenous structures, symbolic ritual procedures, flexibility, ease, friendliness, compassion, less costless, timeliness, transparency, inclusiveness, adequate interests representation, power sharing, and diversity recognition contributed positively to its effectiveness. Nonetheless, poor language choice and communication barriers, lack of legal empowerment, corrupt behavior of negotiators, and negative attitudes became hindrances to its value. This review identified that indigenous conflict management strategies have valuable managerial application potential in the field of conflict interventions. However, the review was limited to only positive and negative contributors to indigenous conflict management strategies.

Keywords: Conflict, Conflict management, Effectiveness, Indigenous strategies, Systematic review.

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Introduction

Etymologically, the word conflict originally derived from "***Confligere***" which connotes "*to strike together*" in Latin (Lamle *et al.*, 2019). According to Howell (2014), conflict originally meant to strike at another,

to fight with an enemy, or to do battle with an opposing force. Conflict is often defined as the incompatibility of ideas, beliefs, behaviors, roles, needs, desires, values, and so on among individuals. In most literature, conflict was explained as the process which begins when one party notices that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his (Curcija *et al.*, 2019).

Conflict arises from differences in outlook, opinions, and values about specific issues (Kemp *et al.*, 2011). It is a natural and normal phenomenon in all spheres of our lives and an unavoidable component of human activity (Curcija *et al.*, 2019; Omisore & Abiodun, 2014). The issues themselves can be cultural, social, political, or economic. Conflict can arise in virtually any social setting; they can be at individual, community, national or international levels (Omisore & Abiodun, 2014; Peng, 2017).

If not handled with care; it has so many detrimental impacts on the conflicting parties as well as the society at large. The conflict has a positive relationship with cost, time, and resources, meaning it directly influences these three project constraints and has a negative relationship with quality, workforce productivity, protection of the environment, and safety (Irfan *et al.*, 2019). An organization could be affected in several ways such as decreased employee satisfaction, insubordination, decreased productivity, economic loss, fragmentation, and poor performance (Awan & Saeed, 2014, Sandu, 2015). These are just the tip of the iceberg for the negative effects of conflict on employees, organizations, and society.

However, conflict is not always destructive as constructive conflict can manifest through frustration, debate, and discussion, and can lead to increased understanding among collaborators impact the collaboration between stakeholders, and ultimately secure a positive development outcome (Curcija *et al.*, 2019). For instance, task conflict had a constructive effect on project performance, whereas relationship conflict and process conflict had destructive effects (Wu *et al.*, 2020). The results were determined by the way how we handled the conflicts. Managing conflict is extremely important for the effective functioning of organizations and for the personal, cultural, and social development of employees in the workplace (Lamle *et al.*, 2019).

Conflict management strategies are defined as the behavioral methods used to resolve conflict (Rahmawati *et al.*, 2020). Conflict can be managed in several possible ways and it involves the ongoing process of responding to identified instances of conflict (Curcija *et al.*, 2019; Shen *et al.*, 2019). In any of these ways, we want to attain three aims such as *resolution*, *managing*, and keeping conflict at an optimum level or *transforming* it (Rahmawati *et al.*, 2020).

Numerous forms of conflict strategies have become more pronounced in the last twenty years (Tafere, 2013; Oduma-Aboh *et al.*, 2018; Oladotun & Emmanuel, 2019; Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020; Debisa, 2022). Most researchers advocate that the western

approaches to the management of conflicts as superior (Adkoli & Pawar, 2018) though some conflicts that were resolved using western strategies relapsed (Bello & Olutola, 2016); and the role of customary laws in maintaining peace and order were increased from time to time (Mengesha *et al.*, 2015, Sandu, 2018; Chereji & Sandu, 2018). Therefore, recent research works tried to promote integrative and contextualized homegrown solutions to conflicts (Lundy *et al.*, 2021; Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020; Chereji & Sandu, 2021; Sandu, 2020) and while others engage in hybrid forms of the management of conflict having flavors from both (Kohlhoffer-Mizser, 2019; Pop & Sandu, 2019).

This indicates, the current understanding of conflict management practices and strategies was framed in various approaches and a comprehensive perspective is not emerged yet as many conflict situations were ignored (Alakavuklar *et al.*, 2016; Nwaoma & Omeire, 2014). Similarly, there is growing recognition and appreciation of traditional approaches toward peace and conflict resolution across the world because colonial legacies have failed to prevent, manage, resolve, or transform conflicts in post-colonial states (Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020). If we want to manage conflicts and live in a harmony, the indigenous conflict management strategies have to be adopted for the country as a system of governance such as **Gada** which is '***conflict medicine***' (Negari & Mishra, 2018). Osimen and Aisedion (2019) argued that traditional institutions will certainly continue to shape the African landscape of conflict resolution. That means indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have great untapped potential in maintaining social solidarity in a multiethnic and multicultural society in this vein (Alemie & Mandefro, 2018; Wanyoike *et al.*, 2018). Integrating indigenous strategies is the most preferred style of managing conflicts as measured by indigenous scales in different researched settings (Akhtar & Hassan, 2021).

Despite their significance, indigenous strategies became hardly a priority for respective post-colonial governments and the international community (Appiah-Thompson, 2020; Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020; Yousaf & Poncian, 2018). Few attempts were made to bring evidence of whether these types of conflict management approaches are effective and thus the literature reviews done so far insufficiently addressed the contexts in which the strategies are most helpful (Lundy *et al.*, 2021). Therefore, the current review was concerned only with journal articles that made inquiries from 2010–2022 on indigenous strategies for conflict management and what determines their effectiveness either positively or negatively in their localized contexts as a scope in this review.

Materials and Methods

More recently, there are a lot of empirical pieces of evidence getting published over the last decade in favor of the success of indigenous conflict management practices in diverse cultural and localized contexts across the world (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014; Mohammed *et al.*, 2017; Shen *et al.*, 2019). Some attempts were made to synthesize the literature on

conflict management. Firstly, such reviews have been limited to western types of conflict management practices based on individual responses to conflict situations, such as avoidance, accommodation, competition, compromise, and collaboration. This focus neglects other alternative interventions fitting to environmental contingencies and organizational contextual factors of conflict situations mainly the indigenous strategies (Caputo *et al.*, 2018). Secondly, the reviews done were mainly narrative reviews (John-Eke & Akintokunbo, 2020; Nwosu & Makinde, 2014; Tamunomiebi *et al.*, 2020) though some scholars tried a few systematic reviews in this stream (Caputo *et al.*, 2019). Thirdly, the use of indigenous conflict management in business settings was low, and hence drawing scholarly lessons to present interdisciplinary knowledge (Stepanova *et al.*, 2020) from empirical works was timely agenda in the field cognizant to emerging economies growth and multinational foreign direct investments to see the factors contributing to and challenges against the effectiveness of indigenous conflict management strategies (John-Eke & Akintokunbo, 2020; Tamunomiebi *et al.*, 2020). Therefore, it is valuable to explore and synthesize the lessons from the success and failure histories accrued to indigenous conflict management strategies and practices to address these gaps. In this disposition, framing systematic review questions is required (Shamseer *et al.*, 2015), and the current systematic review is dedicated to answering the following questions:

• How effective indigenous conflict management strategies are in resolving disputes?
• What are those factors (both positive and negative) found to be more critical in managing conflicts in the localized context in which they occur?

Searching for high-quality empirical research evidence could be a daunting task, yet it is an integral part of the evidence-based systematic review process (Hiebl, 2021). Therefore the review followed **PRISMA** (preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis) (Adeyinka-Ojo, 2021). According to the PRISMA, the search terms were developed using Boolean operators based on the research questions and the inclusion/exclusion criteria detailed earlier (Page *et al.*, 2021). Searches were performed on 10 March 2022 from the four targeted databases using the search term "[All: effectiveness of indigenous conflict] AND [All: management] AND [[All: strategies] OR [All: practices] OR [All: tactics]] AND [All: organizational] AND [All: behavior outcomes]". Four research databases having open accesses feature were consulted in obtaining the pertinent information regarding this review; viz., *Taylor & Francis*, *Springer*, *Google Scholar*, and *Emerald Insights*. Some articles were included by snowball sampling from *IJCM* (International Journal Conflict Management) which was included in the Emerald database and Google scholar since using only keyword searches is misleading in some instances (Lecy & Beatty, 2012; Wohlin, 2014). It was also limited to research published later than *2010 to 2022* to consider recent developments in the field of the study.

The inclusion criteria mainly focused on those articles found to be original empirical research that was used for the systematic review. But some of the articles which are

reviewed in the mentioned databases and other sources might be used for substantiating the need for this systematic review in the introduction and cited for backing the review arguments in the remaining parts as needed. Articles in the English language were considered in the search because the researcher could not translate other languages. Moreover, the selection of individual studies followed the PRISMA flow diagram (Page *et al.*, 2021). The screening process generated 37 articles to be included in this systematic review as indicated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. PRISMA Flow Diagram for the Systematic Review

In addition, as systematic reviews were comprehensive reviews of the topic of interest and therefore to improve the quality of the review, 20 empirical articles from the international journal of conflict management (*IJCM*) and another 19 empirical papers were added from *Google scholar* using the snowball sampling to complement search string limitations (Lecy & Beatty, 2012). Therefore, the total number of empirical studies

involved in this systematic review comprises 76 peer-reviewed journal articles. Articles published in reputable journals and the mentioned databases fulfilling these criteria were considered as quality because the conclusions drawn from systematic literature reviews are completely dependent on the quality of the literature selected for the review (Yang *et al.*, 2021). A thematic content analysis was performed for extracting data based on the research questions of the systematic review. Two members of the review team met to discuss and agree on the selection and the evidence grading. In points of a tie on the decision whether to include or exclude the papers, the consensus was arrived at by discussion based on the set criterion.

Results

The 76 full-text articles considered for review were examined to extract the practices of indigenous conflict management across the globe. Firstly, the overall evaluations of indigenous conflict management practices made by the studies involved in the review were sorted out whether they are effective or ineffective in solving conflicts. Secondly, what contributed to their success or failure extracted. The ultimate aim of the review was to draw lessons from the conflict management body of knowledge and how we may make use of them was seen to identify indigenous conflict management interventions that suit the contemporary management paradigm based on empirical findings (Nnah Ugoani, 2020; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009).

Characteristics of the Reviewed Articles

The research works involved in this review were collected from available databases and it contains research works from multiple directions and cultural settings both west and east as well as addressed the north and global south in its coverage. Out of the 76 papers reviewed, the majority of 53 (69.7%) used a qualitative approach, 16 (21.1%) employed a quantitative method, and the remaining 7 (9.2%) did by mixed approach.

Figure 2. Publication trend of reviewed papers

As the trend given in the following graph the number of publications was increasing on the issue indicates that it gains the attention of scholars more recently.

Effectiveness of Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies

The world has diverse conflict management approaches in localized contexts. Among others, the Chinese *Yin-Yang* model (Chin & Liu, 2015); the *Reeda-Gudagambela* of Kambata (Mengesha *et al.*, 2015); the *Gondooro-Guma* of the Oromo (Gumi Boru, 2016); the *Tor-bue* in Nigeria (Kpae, 2018); *Agila* in Nigeria (Oduma-Aboh *et al.*, 2018); the *TSJBCM* traditional Somali approach (Wanyoike *et al.*, 2018); Pakistani *Pashtun-Jirga* (Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020; Yousaf & Poncian, 2018); vendetta and oath in northern Ethiopia (Abraham, 2019); blessing and cursing (Handino & Bekele, 2020); *Wabar* (Hassan, 2020); *Gada* system (Negash, S. D., 2021; Debisa 2022); *Farqasa* pilgrim center in Arsi community of the Oromo (Worku, 2021); *Tolfena-Chaffe* (Mossie, 2020); *Amare* council of elders in Jama (Tesfaye, 2021); *Gepi-Tato* of Sheka people (Bekele & Akako, 2022) were just some of the approaches and traditional ways of managing conflicts in their contexts seen in the papers reviewed.

Besides the approaches indicated in their specific local names, indigenous-led grass-root engagements became the resolutions in industrialized contexts too. The conflicts occurred in pipelines between US and Russia (Tysiachniouk *et al.*, 2021), the Northern Ireland conflict (Croucher, 2011; Fissuh *et al.*, 2012), culturally friendly policing as a remedy to conflict situations in Saskatchewan Canada (Akca & Jewell, 2022), maintaining adequate local representation in Bolivia (Barié, 2020) and Peruvian Amazon basin (Fisher *et al.*, 2020), legal empowerment of local entities (Waldorf, 2019), the use of responsible leadership honoring cultures (Günsoy, 2020), and utilization of *Māori* local leaders in New Zealand (Haar *et al.*, 2019) can be mentioned as strategies unknotted the conflict situations without overlooking the role of localization. Moreover, in some conflict-prone areas religious perspectives and institutions were used to arbitrate conflict situations as evidenced in *Islamic intervention* strategies emphasizing the role of women in conflict interventions in Northern Israeli's Arab communities (Pely, 2011), Syria focused on power-sharing (Groarke, 2016), Indonesia (Surono, 2018), Malaysia *Lahad Datu Sabah* (Malik *et al.*, 2018), Jordan (Caputo, 2018), and India (Croucher *et al.*, 2011; Pless *et al.*, 2022).

In almost all of the papers reviewed in this systematic review, there was an indication of the supremacy of the indigenous method of conflict resolution over modern approaches originating from western cultures. Those studies that explicitly indicated the superiority of indigenous methods of conflict resolution involves the ones of Mengesha, Yesuf, and Gebre (2015), Gumi Boru (2016), Tenaw (2016), Alemie and Mandefro (2018), Kpae (2018), Olowu (2018), Peng (2017), Yousaf and Poncian (2018), Hassan (2020), Mossie (2020) and Tesfaye (2021). But in their study, Okeke-Ogbuafor, Ani, and Gray

(2019) argued that indigenous African conflict management systems were inferior to the western approaches because they were inherently and potentially a source of conflicts; moreover, they bring conflicts by themselves than resolving the conflicts. This argument was refuted by Lundy *et al.* (2021) having opposite findings regarding the effectiveness of indigenous conflict management strategies. Tysiachniouk *et al.* (2021) compared two different cultures in conflict development and resolution and found similarities in approaches as well as results. Kpae (2018) also advocated that reverting to indigenous conflict management was a mandatory move for those who want to have constructive resolutions of conflicts they encounter.

What Makes Indigenous Approaches More Effective?

The scholarly articles identified in this review indicated that the basic aim of conflict resolution was different from that of the modern way of calculating conflict responses by conflicting parties. This was so clear in the empirical findings of Alemie and Mandefro (2018) that indicated indigenous conflict resolution was based on shared dialogue not a punishment to conflicting parties which could bring harmony and solidarity among each other. It starts to constructively deal with the conflict situation to transform it into communal harmony (Olowu, 2018), empower people by their structures, nature, and cultural power (Rodríguez & Inturias, 2018); the symbolic procedures and rituals create its heartedly full acceptance by conflicting entities (Abraham, 2019) which further enhance adaptation to the situations (Mbih, 2020), innovations, creativity and sustainability (Appiah-Thompson, 2020). Therefore, we can say that indigenous conflict management strategies could play a significant role in bringing a cohesive trust-based community (Wanyoike *et al.*, 2018) and leadership (Worku, 2021), restoring justice (Tesfaye, 2021), making peace durable and convert conflicts to constructive situations as seen in the findings of Akano & Bamigbose (2019), Lundy *et al.* (2021), Osimen & Aisedion (2019) and Wanyoike *et al.* (2018).

The reason that made it preferable to the modern approach of conflict resolution, unlike litigation procedures, is inherently drawn from its basic features. For instance, indigenous conflict management practices are suitable to local circumstances (Mengesha *et al.*, 2015), flexible to different arrangements (Alemie & Mandefro, 2018; Mengesha *et al.*, 2015; Tafere, 2013), uniquely adapt and fitting situations of localized contexts (Bello & Olutola, 2016; Lundy *et al.*, 2021), easier, cheaper and less time to adopt and practice (Hassan, 2020; Ibrahim *et al.*, 2019; Kpae, 2018) and it is compassionate and friendlier (Kpae, 2018; Wei *et al.*, 2016). This enhances its transparency and willingness to participate and take part in the process of resolution by parties affected by conflict (Olowu, 2018; Tafere, 2013).

Besides the preferences, its effectiveness also emanates from similar factors related to its transparency and enhanced participation. For instance, adequate representation of

interests or clans (Tafere, 2013), co-management of issues at hand (Teferra & Beyene, 2014), provisions of schemes of power-sharing (Groarke, 2016), bottom-up process ownership (Kimokoti *et al.*, 2014), respecting national ethos (Lewin, 2016), recognition of shared goals (Alemie & Mandefro, 2018), building trust and respect via moral and traditional authority (Ibrahim 2018; Bekele & Akako 2022), involvement and commitment (Kpae, 2018), inclusiveness (Ibrahim *et al.*, 2019), provisions to protect the disadvantaged minorities (Barié, 2020) and indigenous cognizant to diversity and unity (Negash, S. D., 2021; Debisa 2022).

Other socio-cultural tools, like religious acceptability, also enhanced the effectiveness of these indigenous models of conflict resolution (Akano & Bamigbose, 2019; Appiah-Thompson, 2020; Caputo, 2018; Croucher, 2011; Croucher *et al.*, 2011; Fissuh *et al.*, 2012; Hughes & Sasse, 2016; Surono, 2018). This was empirically evidenced by Malik *et al.* (2018) and Surono (2018) in their study that analyzed *the Islamic* model of conflict resolution. According to Caputo (2018), the religious motivation seriously influences which style of conflict management is going to be adopted. Social sanctions are also used as an enforcement tool to shape the behavior of conflicting practices and help in the effectiveness of indigenous conflict management practices (Muluken, 2020). Blessing and cursing (Handino & Bekele, 2020), oath (Abraham, 2019), and other customary laws (Teferra & Beyene, 2014) may be taken as a resort to enforce the decisions made through some studies raised the limitation of enforcing agencies for indigenous institutions.

Factors Inhibiting the Efficacy of the Indigenous Approaches

Factors limiting the value of indigenous conflict management practices were overlooked in most studies. However, the review identified some aspects jeopardizing the effectiveness of indigenous models of conflict management in a few studies involved in the review. For example, poor language choice creates communication barriers (Oladotun & Emmanuel, 2019), lack of legal empowerment (Waldorf, 2019), absence of clear policy direction (Alemie & Mandefro, 2018), corrupt behavior of elders and negative attitudes towards the value of the practice (Handino & Bekele, 2020), etc., were some of the limitations, among others. These problems by themselves originated from the negligence of stakeholders, as indicated in Oduma-Aboh *et al.* (2018) and Olowu (2018). According to Osimen and Aisedion (2019), the indigenous approaches to the management of conflict were not special to be protected from the truncation of colonial masters. Therefore no strong and formal institution was formed as required to see in the modern conflict adjudication system (Bekele & Akako, 2022). In some extreme cases, it confronted with the challenge of limited use in the modern conflict resolution arena due to social, economic, and political pressures (Mengesha *et al.*, 2015; Oduma-Aboh *et al.*, 2018; Olowu, 2018; Tafere, 2013). Due to this neglect and other reasons the challenge of extinction was also the risk for indigenous systems, as indicated in Tafere (2013), and hence with heightened nationalism and extremist religiosity conflicts became leveraged than resolved

in recent years (Hughes & Sasse, 2016). However, in all the cases raised in the articles reviewed, the strength of indigenous conflict management outweighs its weaknesses as compared to the modern approaches (Adewuyi *et al.*, 2021; Negash, Y. M., 2021).

Discussions

1. Implications for policy and practice

As indicated in the review, the results of the indigenous conflict management strategies uniquely fit local circumstances (Bello & Olutola, 2016) through continuous adaptation and resilience (Mbih, 2020) due to their flexible nature (Alemie & Mandefro, 2018; Mengesha *et al.*, 2015; Tafere, 2013). When effectively adopted, it will bring innovation, creativity, and sustainability (Appiah-Thompson, 2020), meaning transforming destructive conflicts into constructive communal harmony (Olowu, 2018) and lasting peace (Yousaf & FurrukhZad, 2020). Moreover, conflict styles and their management affects employee commitment and, hence, performance (Akhtar & Hassan, 2021). But, the question here is how to make use of indigenous strategies for conflict management in the modern workplace.

The indigenous strategies employ cooperative conflict resolution rather than competitive management styles (Wong *et al.*, 2018). Therefore, cultivating a culture of an organization and having employees with a strong emphasis on group interest over self-interest has paramount importance since employees with a strong need to self-interest prefer competitive methods to manage conflicts (Meng *et al.*, 2018). This implies that collective-personality fit is a more important behavior than its dispersion to adopt indigenous methods (Seong & Hong, 2020). Neglecting individual employees and indigenous conflict management may escalate conflict situations due to their subjective evaluation bias toward labor relations (Xiong & Wang, 2018). To this end, the *Confucian model* of self-cultivation for individual-level development brought compassion as evidenced by (Wei *et al.*, 2016). Maintaining deep and non-transactional collaboration pays off in reinforcing this kind of behavior (Fisher *et al.*, 2020).

At the group level, improving the social skills of employees have the utmost importance here. According to Rahim, Civelek, and Liang (2018), situational awareness, situational responses, cognitive empathy, and other social skills are required to effectively solve problems in the contexts they are threatened. Poor communication was identified as one of the sources of indigenous strategies' ineffectiveness (Igbokwe & Amobi, 2020). Therefore, skill development in language choice and conflict communication was the important ingredient in group-level requirements for indigenous strategies which involve a balanced mix of integrated open communication with strategic silence (Guo & Cionea, 2017). Moreover maintaining social norms such as humility, altruism, collectivism, authenticity, and long-term orientations are very important to bring effective

indigenous conflict resolution and cohesive work units (Haar *et al.*, 2019). For instance, the friendly police supervision model adopted in native Canada reduced violence (Akca & Jewell, 2022).

It is difficult to increase effectiveness when managers are taught management theories that contradict their cultures (Adeleye *et al.*, 2020). To put it in another way, consuming useful indigenous management practices by integrating them into modern systems pays off. For indigenous conflict management strategies, considering and understanding the situations holistically is required for institutional-level adoption (Guo & Cionea, 2017). For example, the situation of COVID-19 affected conflicts as well as their management and eroded homegrown practices in Nigeria (Ossai, 2021); neglecting culture and religion couldn't be affordable (Akano & Bamigbose, 2019). The integrative approach to indigenous conflict strategies needs ambidextrous practices and collectivist responses (Ramesh *et al.*, 2017), responsible leadership (Pless *et al.*, 2022) at all dimensions of justice, like organizational, procedural, and interactional (Kemp *et al.*, 2011).

The review team of this systematic review argues that solutions to conflicts be reached through effective cooperation and teamwork. The review indicated that on the majority of the occasions, modern approaches were not effective as well as adequate (Negash, Y. M., 2021). Even though a complete turnaround to the traditional system was proposed by scholars such as Kpae (2018), integrating indigenous with formal structures will be advisable to all concerned bodies to bring the effectiveness of the systems (Tenaw 2018; Anggraini *et al.*, 2019; Lamle *et al.* 2019). To improve the existing condition of extinction, danger preservation activities are needed and the promotion of available methods to be used by community members might be the option (Kimokoti *et al.*, 2014; Osimen & Aisedion, 2019). Lastly, revisiting and giving more emphasis starting from the national constitution is very important not to lose such cultural heritages of having multifaceted values (Oduma-Aboh *et al.*, 2018). However, its implementation didn't get adequate support to the expected level (Gumi Boru, 2016).

2. Implications for further research

Based on his review, Yi (2019) identified the factors affecting conflict management at the organizational and individual levels. He also sorted out the outcome variables of conflict management interventions taken by the leadership of the organization. But here in the reviewed articles, including the recent work of Lundy *et al.* (2021) that the behavioral outcomes of indigenous ways of managing conflicts couldn't be seen at either personal or collective organizational levels. However, the impact of different conflict management methods was primarily manifested in specific organizational behavior and individuals' psychological states of mind (Yi, 2019). This implies that overall organizational performance and productivity is the total of individuals' and groups' performance and hence the analysis should involve multi-level research (Bai *et al.*, 2015; Costa *et al.*, 2013).

The majority of the studies involved in this systematic review are qualitative and exploratory in nature which could be an indication of infancy and the growing level of maturity of the topic that gained recent attention since the literature was dominated by the western culture of conflict management. That means indigenous modalities captured the attention of scholars when triggering events occur and for this, the work of Gebretsadik (2022) can be exemplary when formal structures collapsed and indigenous mechanisms took over to fill the vacancy. Such exploratory studies suffer from statistical generalizability problems and need to be tested with adequate representative samples by researchers in the future.

Cultural differences and values also affect the results (Günsoy, 2020; Saito & Ohbuchi, 2013) though the mechanisms and approaches might have similar ends (Yousaf & Poncian, 2018) as tested in Pakistan, Tanzania, US and Russia (Tysiachniouk *et al.*, 2021). The role of women in conflict resolution was ignored except in the study conducted by Pely (2011) whose findings exposed that the contribution of women to traditional dispute resolution was significant yet sometimes invisible.

Conclusions

Lately, after the decolonial thesis and theories, it became an alternative for practitioners to exploit indigenous conflict management strategies. However, no one has attempted to bring synthesized evidence on whether these types of conflict management approaches are effective, nor have the literature reviews done so far sufficiently addressed the contexts in which the strategies are most helpful to which this systematic review focused. The findings of the review explicitly indicated the superiority of indigenous methods of conflict resolution over modern approaches. Therefore, it could be said that indigenous conflict management strategies play a significant role in bringing cohesive and trust-based lasting relationships. Use of shared dialogue, not punishment; empowerment of people by their structures; the symbolic procedures and rituals; flexibility to different arrangements; besides its ease, less costliness, friendliness, compassionateness and timeliness, transparency, inclusiveness, adequate representation, power sharing, and recognition of diversity in unity are some of the factors that contributed to its effectiveness. However, there are limitations also such as poor language choice, communication barriers, lack of legal empowerment, corrupt behavior of elders, and negative attitudes towards the value of the practice that pose hindrances to its use as well as success. Despite such obstacles, its benefits become prominent in resolving conflicts. Therefore, adopting these preferred strategies in localized contexts would be recommendable in organizations and situations to which it becomes relevant.

Limitations

This systematic review was done using open accessed database sources for searching articles. That means the review was limited to *Emerald insights, Google scholar, Springer*,

and *Taylor and Francis*. The review was also limited to both positive as well as negative contributors to the effectiveness of indigenous conflict management strategies.

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