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Ethiopia: Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism of Shekacho People and Its Role in Promoting Peace and Good Governance

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Admasu Adraro AKAKO

Abstract: This research sought to explore the Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism (ICRM) of Shekacho people in Sheka Zone, South West Ethiopia. The ICRM of Shekacho has organized procedure, structure, and actors who actively participate in the system. The procedures in ICRM of Shekacho people pass through two sequential phases of conflict resolution—intervention and resolution. However, despite this reality, it has no strong or formal relationship with the modern conflict adjudication system. Thus, this research argue for the provision of support from the government and establishing an enabling system for building a working relationship between the indigenous system and the modern adjudication system. Furthermore, higher academic institutions need to play their role by giving awareness-raising training for concerned stakeholders regarding the role of indigenous knowledge in modern governance.

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Keywords: conflict, indigenous conflict resolution, clan leaders, elders, *mikirecho*.

Introduction

Peace is essential not only for the very survival of humans at individual and collective levels but also for achieving human development at large. Therefore, personal and societal wellbeing, and economic development and prosperity are possible only in the

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presence of peace (McCandless & Bangura, 2007). However, though peace is critically required, there are different factors that cause conflict in human life. According to Fisher (1990), Bukari (2013, cited in Masenya, 2021), and Nicholson (1992), conflict is a disagreement between two or more than two parties in their relationship due to their held inconsistent goals or values. Based on the scholars' definition it can be concluded that conflict is a situation that necessarily involves at least two parties running interdependently holding different goals and values.

Therefore, since conflict is natural, what matters is not how to duck conflict but how to resolve it. Here, the concept of conflict resolution comes to the front. In this study, when we say conflict resolution, we are referring to the indigenous one. Thus, in this context, conflict resolution is the mechanism through which conflict is resolved by using widely shared and deeply-rooted social values and norms. To Osei-Hwedie (2012), indigenous conflict resolution is a community process involving the identification of the root cause of the problem and bringing all parties involved to address the underlying issue. Therefore, the process of indigenous conflict resolution ends with the guilty admitting wrongdoing, leading to reconciliation which consequently involve compensation or just forgiveness (Sandu, 2018, Chereji & Sandu, 2018).

Ethiopia is a multicultural state where different ethnic groups had developed their unique ICRM. According to Enyew (2014), Ethiopia is known with having different ethnic groups; as a result, each ethnic group has different conflict resolution mechanisms. Among many, the Oromo (Gada), the Amhara (Yeager-Shimagle), the Gurage (Yejewoka Shengo), and the Wolayata (Deira Cemma) are ICRMs playing significant role not only in reconciliation but also constructing social welfare (Zewude, 2002, cited in Mengesha, Yesuf, & Gebre, 2015). The Shekacho community is not exceptional. ICRMs are parts of a social system that play an important role in maintaining peace and order by conciliating, maintaining, and improving social relationships (Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo, 2008, cited in Endalcachew, Gashaw, & Zelalem, 2015). ICRMs use local actors (elders, chiefs, religious leaders, and clan leaders) and community-based judicial decision-making mechanisms to resolve conflict.

Gebre-Egziabher (2014) pointed that indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms help control and resolve conflicts in Africa, in general, and in Ethiopia, in particular. Southern Ethiopia is known for its ethnic diversity and it is believed to be the home of many multi-lingual and multicultural societies. Shekacho is one among the many ethnic communities living in southwest Ethiopia. The Shekacho community has developed an age-old system of conflict resolution. This system comprises the structure, mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which the people manage their differences and maintain social solidarity. Though such indigenous mechanisms of resolving the conflict have tremendous advantages, practically, Ethiopia, like most countries, has failed to recognize it. In agreement with this idea, Mussa *et al.* (2017) argued that, in Ethiopia, the roles of

elders and clan leaders in conflict resolution have been overlooked by government and non-government organizations. ICRMs are considered as an alternative when mediation by the formal legal systems fails to fit into the practical local situations (Mohammed & Beyene, 2016, cited in Mussa *et al.*, 2017).

Statement of the Problem

Ethiopia is a country in which various ethnic groups live together. Each ethnic group has its way of resolving conflicts. Different communities have distinct traditional settings and relationships, where a traditional mechanism could play a significant role in resolving and preventing violent conflicts. Concerning this idea, Bahru Zewude (2002, cited in Mengesha *et al.*, 2015) stated that throughout Ethiopia, among the Oromo (Gada), the Amhara (Yeager-Shimagle), the Gurage (Yejewoka Shengo), the Wolayata (Deira Cemma), and other linguistic or ethnic groups play a significant role not only in reconciliation but also constructing social welfare.

Unlike the modern conflict resolving system, the indigenous institutions are working to resolve conflict and thereby restore the broken social relationships. Researches have been done by different authors in this regard. The studies explored diverse causes of conflict and mechanisms of conflict resolutions based on the socio-economic and environmental settings of their study societies. For example, the cause of conflict in most of Oromia is a scarce resource (Muchie & Baye, 2015). Different from this, Melese (2008, cited in Awash, 2015) stated that administrative restructuring, abuse of power, and differences in social status are the major sources of conflict among the Wolayita of Southern Ethiopia. ICRMs have an irreplaceable role in resolving conflict. With this, Olsen (2010), strongly argue that conserving traditional practices and values is as important as conserving the natural environment. However, this can only be realized when the cultural and traditional aspects of human society are systematically and scientifically studied and documented.

Shekaco people, like many others, have faced multifaceted conflicts and have simultaneously developed their mechanism of conflict resolution. The ICRM of Shekacho people plays a paramount role in upholding sustainable social welfare. However, as long as researchers' knowledge is concerned, there has been no observable empirical effort to study this cultural endowment of Shekacho people. This has affected not only the development and enrichment of the traditional aspect of Shekacho people but also fails to reveal the history and the attributes of ICRM to other societies. This inspired the researchers to undertake the study on this indigenous cultural practice of the Shekacho people on the following research questions:

1. What are the sources and types of conflict mostly arising in the community of Shekacho people?
2. What are the procedures used and actors involved in ICRM of Shekacho people?

3. What is the nexus between ICRM of Shekacho people and the formal court system?
4. What is the communities trust, and preference to ICRM of Shekacho?
5. What are the challenges that the ICRM of Shekacho People currently facing?
6. What will be the possible role/share of all stakeholders in the preservation of this institution of Shekacho people?

Research Design

As the study aimed at exploring ICRM of Shekacho people of South-West of Ethiopia, the study followed a qualitative descriptive approach. In this regard, the study dominantly employed a qualitative research approach.

Sampling

Purposive sampling was used to select research participants and districts. Three districts, such as Masha, Andracha, and Yeki, were purposely selected. This is because the Shekacho people predominantly live in the Masha and Andracha districts of Sheka Zone, the people also live in some kebeles of Yeki district, namely Kubito and Ermichi. As a result, the researchers strongly believe that these areas are more relevant to the topic that was studied and have abundant information regarding the ICRM of the Shekacho people.

For the selection of research participants, from the three districts, the none-probability sampling technique was preferred to select elders of both sexes who have better knowledge and understanding of the culture and tradition of the people. From the non-probability sampling techniques, a snowballing sampling technique was typically employed. Snowball sampling is often used to find and recruit "hidden populations" that is, groups not easily accessible to researchers through other sampling strategies (Mack, 2005).

Accordingly, 21 elders and clan leaders were selected. Moreover, using the judgmental sampling technique 7 experts and officials from the office of culture and tourism, and justice administration were selected and interviewed. Regarding FGD, three FGD sessions were conducted addressing 10 discussants in each FGD.

Data collection

Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion (FGD). An interview was held with elders and clan leaders, who commonly participate in the conflict resolution process and have experience in the ICRM. In addition, selected formal court judges, police officers, and experts in the culture, tourism, and sport department of the study area were interviewed. About FGD, it was held with elders and clan leaders who were selected based on their lived experience in ICRM and their recognition in the community. Issues regarding sources of conflict in the community,

types of conflict, and structure, actors, and procedures of ICRM were discussed. Issues related with the communities views and knowledge of ICRM of Shekacho people and their preference to be governed by it, were addressed both in semi-structured interviews and FGD themes.

Analysis and Interpretation Technique

Qualitative research encompasses different data collection and analytical approaches to provide a cultural and contextual description and interpretation of social phenomenon (Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019). Though there exist various techniques of analysis, it is not helpful to be overwhelmed with the variety because there is no concrete prescribed way to address the analysis process (Kawulich, 2004). However, as noted by Creswell (2007), data analysis in qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the data for analysis (transcribing), reducing the data into themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes. This is the general process that researchers use, across many books, in qualitative research.

Therefore, in this study, the researchers employed a thematic analysis technique. In agreement with recommendations given by Braun & Clarke (2006) and Vaismoradi & Snelgrove (2019), the researchers followed these steps in thematically analyzing the data. First, getting familiar with the data, which involved reading the transcribed data and getting thoughtful about it. Secondly, generating initial codes, which involved highlighting the item of data that was considered to be potentially interesting across the entire data set. Thirdly, searching for themes, which meant going through initial codes and combined the ones that are similar to form a central theme and sub-theme. At this stage, codes were collected under themes and subthemes based on their relationship. Fourthly, reviewing the themes, which meant that the generated themes were compared and checked against the coded extracts. Fifth, defining, refining, and naming themes; in this case, the researchers defined and named each theme. An in-depth analysis for each theme was given to ensure that the themes are in accord with the overall concept of the data, and more importantly, they are about the research questions. Lastly, producing a final report; an analysis was given for each theme, and a report was written. The report consists of the interpretation of the analysis and discussion part.

Result and Discussion

Types and sources of conflict in the community of the Shekacho people

As researchers learned from literature, conflict may arise within family, between communities, and nations (Gowok, 2008). Thus, there may be a different reason for conflicts arising at all levels. Conflict in Shekacho community also occurs due to different reasons and such conflicts also can be labeled as boundary conflict, conflict in marriage, and interpersonal conflict.

Boundary conflict is the most occurring and common type of conflict among the Shekacho community. Boundary conflict in Shekacho community falls under two categories, clan boundary conflict and interpersonal boundary conflict. Clan boundary conflict is violent if not managed in time, and it is the biggest type of boundary conflict as it involves many families and members of each clan. Clan boundary conflict occurs if a boundary set between two clans is violated. Most of the time, the boundary is said to be violated if members of a particular clan pass a demarcated boundary and use the land for farming crops and planting coffee. Another form of boundary conflict is interpersonal boundary conflict which would occur if one of the neighbors passes the boundary and clear the land for agricultural use, and if a person enter into and uses the forest called *Kobo* which is held by a particular family for honey farming.

Kobo is part of forest land which is held by a person or a particular family. This land, according to the cultural practice of the community, will be gained by inheritance from the parent or relatives. Primarily, the *Kobo* serves for traditional honey farming and it is believed to be one of the great cultural practices that keep the forest of the community from deforestation.



Figure 1: Photo of traditional honey farming in ‘Kobbo’

Source: Photo captured by researchers, 2021

Interpersonal conflict is one of the conflict types in Shekacho community, and it occurs due to various reasons. Boundary dispute, disloyalty, if animal belonging to a person damages the farming of the farm holder, and theft are the most common sources of interpersonal conflict that occur in the community.

Conflict in marriage is a type of conflict that occurs between the couple (husband and wife). If the conflict is violent even it will lead to the break of the marriage.

Procedures Used in the ICRM of Shekacho People

ICRM of Shekacho People has its procedures which conflict resolution process passes through. The ICRM procedures are part of a well-structured social system geared towards reconciliation, maintenance, and improvement of social stability. The study found that, except the case of reconciliation of a marriage conflict, in all types of conflict, the procedures are common. In the reconciliation of a marriage conflict, the women is not forced to choose an elder; this is done to protect the women from pressure. The procedures in ICRM are deeply rooted in the customs and the traditions of Shekacho people. Therefore, conflict resolution in the community passes through two consecutive phases, intervention and resolution.

The intervention phase: any conflict that occurs in the community of the Shekacho people is intervened as soon as the occurrence of conflict is being known. In the community of Shekacho people, the occurrence of conflict is known in two ways. **Firstly**, the occurrence of conflict is known when both or either party in the conflict appeal the case to elders aiming to solve the conflict peacefully. This way of revealing the conflict to elders in the community is known as *wajiho*. Secondly, after the elders get information about the occurrence of conflict, the elders themselves contact the disputants and negotiate them separately to bring the parties into a peaceful resolution of conflict. The rationale behind the intervention in the conflict in the community is to stop the conflict before it becomes broad and destructive and to prevent the potential damage of the conflict. Conflict intervention in the community of Shekacho people includes the following procedures.




Figure 2: Conflict intervention procedures

Source: researchers' compilation, 2021

Revealing the case; the intervention process of conflict resolution in the Shekacho community begins with revealing the case which is known as *kolo*. This is also the process of differentiating the accuser from the defendant or victim from the harmer. In this procedure, the case is unambiguously identified and the victim and harmer are differentiated. This task is carried out by the local elders, known as *Shawe-Geno*, who are well known in the community for their irreplaceable role in resolving conflict and restoring peace.

Calling guarantor which is called *masharec'ego*—after the case is identified and the accuser and accused are differentiated they are expected to call their respective guarantor. The guarantor, known as '*masharo*' takes the responsibility of convincing the person whom he guarantees to peacefully solve the conflict, to prevent the person whom he guarantees from any wrong action that may disturb the peaceful reconciliation and that may trigger further conflict.

Choosing elders, called *Gindegomiho*, is a procedure in which both parties in the conflict choose their respective elders who will be responsible to hear the case and resolve the conflict peacefully. The parties in conflict are also expected to identify and choose reserve elders, known as *kocho*, who carry out the litigation if the main elders are absent due to personal reasons. In Shekacho community, there are two ways of choosing or identifying elders for reconciliation. The **first** is when both parties in the conflict select their elders and one accepts the others. **The second** way is when one chooses for the other and when there is acceptance and confirmation from the other side. There is a possibility that one's choice could be rejected by the other. The selection of elders by the parties continues until one accepts and confirms the selection of the other and both parties come to an agreement.

Resolution Phase: This phase follows after ensuring the deterrence of the conflict from further escalation. At this phase, the two parties present their case to the chosen elders and the process of resolution begins which primarily involves litigation, which is known as *teggo*. This is the proceeding of hearing the argument of disputants turn by turn. The procedure of proceeding litigation is known as *tegge-kebbo* which is held in front of chosen elders who have been identified by the litigants during the intervention. In the litigation process, the elders permit the conflicting parties to present their argument turn by turn in which the first turn is necessarily given for the plaintiff to present his/her complaint. This practice is also true in ICRM of the Afrar people where the elders give the plaintiff the first opportunity to explain his/her case (Gebre-Egziabher, 2014). The argument between the disputants is called *ya'ko*. When *Ya'ko* begins, the victim presents either by claiming the compensation from the harmer or only presents his/her grievance leaving the decision of compensation for elders. If the victim begins *ya'ko* demanding compensation from the harmer, the harmer is expected to respond to the demand of the victim and the compensation varies, for instance, an ox, depending on the demand of the victim. Then, the harmer responds to the victim's demand may be by accepting, rejecting, or requesting for the reduction of the demand. In the *ya'ko*, the process of presenting the demand by the victim and response by the harmer is called *Tife-yechio* or *Kube-yechio*.



Figure 3: Photo depicting disputants' agreement on the pre-determined compensation called *Tife-yechio* or *Kube-yechio*

Source: photo captured by researchers, 2021

After the argument made by the plaintiff, the elders give the chance for the accused to present his/her reaction to the complaint presented by the accuser. The argument between the accuser and the accused continues as long as the permission is given by the elders. The session of resolution may also include providing evidence and witnesses and this depends on the nature of the case. The elders finally come to stop the argument if they believe the two parties have presented and defended exhaustively.



Figure 4: disputants in litigation *tego*

Source: photo captured by researchers, 2021

Then the elders order the two parties to go faraway before they make a decision. Then the elders take time to exhaustively discuss the case and make a decision in the absence of the parties in the conflict. After the decision is made, the parties in the conflict are called back to the session and the decision which has been made is announced by the elders. The decision defines the level of the harm with the corresponding amount of compensation, called **nummo**. Then, the conflicting parties are requested to express their feelings regarding the decision made by the elders and this paves a way for knowing whether the conflicting parties accept or reject the decision. Either party has the right to reject the decision if he/she believes the decision in particular and the litigation process, in general, is unfair and biased. This is called **ginde-shago**. If this so, the litigant has the right to appeal the case to the next step which is at **Gepi-tato** interchangeably **Gepi-niho** (clan leader) level.

On the other hand, if the accuser and the accused agree to accept the decision, further discussion is made on the implementation of the compensation, **nummo**, in which the amount of the compensation and time of execution is decided. For the Shekacho community, the compensation can be in cash or kind. The compensation in kind can range from hen to cow depending on the type and weight of the case and the victim decides to receive or not to receive the compensation. Most of the time, the victim isn't in a position to receive the compensation because the ICRM centers on forgiveness, reconciliation, and addressing the affected relationship based on the value of truth and justice. In the ICRM of Shekacho people, compensation isn't the target. Rather, the indigenous conflict resolution heavily centers on the notion of restoration of peace with the restoration of social solidarity and reconciliation. Therefore, the ICRM of Shekacho people prioritizes ensuring social harmony, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and humanity.

The process of refusing to receive the compensation is called **numme-marō** in Shekacho community. After the issue of compensation is managed and arranged, the conflicting parties confirm their reconciliation, known as **Shoto**, by exchanging greetings from bottom of their heart in front of the elders. Therefore, reconciliation or **Shoto** procedure between the disputants is the practical indication of peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Structure of ICRM of Shekacho People

ICRM of Shekacho people has its structure through which conflicts are resolved. Conflicts that occur in Shekacho community could easily be handled at grass root levels by the communities themselves through an old-aged system of conflict resolution mechanism. This is a system of resolving conflict at the local level through the intervention of local elders who are known as **shawe-geno**. However, it can go beyond the local elders as the structure puts the hierarchy through which the resolution of conflict passes. Therefore, the structure of the ICRM of Shekacho people is hierarchical and is deeply rooted in the cultural value of Shekacho people.



Figure 5: Ceremony of reconciliation *Shoto* at the end of the litigation *tego*

Source: photo captured by researchers, 2021

According to the structure of ICRM of the Shekacho people, resolving conflict begins at the village where the conflict was raised. Here, conflict is managed and resolved initially at the village level by the leading role of local elders. Here the conflict is managed as soon as it occurs so that it doesn't escalate and lead to crisis. The local elders try to intervene as soon as the occurrence of conflict is known. The local elders resolve the conflict by bringing the disputants into a negotiation which aims at resolving the disagreement peacefully. However, either party in the conflict may not be satisfied by the decision made by local elders and can reject the decision. If this is so, as per the structure, the local elders hand over the case to the concerned body that is the next responsible body to handle the case in the resolution. This body is a clan leader who is known as **Gepi-Tato**.

Gepi-Tato in the Shekacho community is the leader of a clan and plays a pivotal role not only in resolving conflict and maintaining peace but also in overall aspects (including administering the resources) of the clan it governs. Therefore, one of the key roles of **Gepi-Tato** is resolving conflict which arises in his administrative area. **Gepi-Tato** gets involved in resolving conflict only if the conflicting parties fail to reconcile during resolution held at village level by local elders and only the local elders hand over the case to him. The clan leader tries to resolve the conflict together with selected local elders and can approve the decision made by local elders or can revise and make a new decision. After the decision is made, there is a possibility of conflicting parties accepting or rejecting the decision made by **Gepi-Tato** (clan leader). In the Shekacho community, conflicting parties usually tend to prefer to accept the decision made by **Gepi-Tato** because, on the one hand, the clan leader is the most honorable and respected person in his administration area and therefore they are governed by his decision, and on the

other hand the community members strongly and undoubtedly believe the decision of **Gepi-Tato** is fair and unbiased. If this is so, conflict resolution is finalized with an arrangement of compensation and a reconciliation ceremony between the conflicting parties. However, there may be a rare case that conflict resolution can go beyond **Gepi-Tato**. If this is so, it is known as **Mikeracho** that takes the responsibility of resolving the conflict from **Gepi-Tato**. **Mikeracho** begins to take part in resolving conflict after the **Gepi-Tato** hands over the case to it.

In the indigenous system of governance of the Shekacho people, **Mikeracho** is a government body that constitute of nine members which include the king, **Tato**, the Prime Minister, **Keterasha**, and seven clan leaders **Gepi-Tatos**. Primarily, the **Mikeracho** (the council) has the role of making discussions and passing decisions on the overall affairs of the Shekacho people.

Concerning conflict resolution, **Mikerecho** members can hold conflict resolution talks with the leadership of **Keterasha** who is the prime leader of **Mikerecho** or the council. After exhaustively discussing the case, the council makes a decision which can be endorsing the decision of **Gepi-Tato** or a new decision by revising the previous one made at **Gepi-Tato** level. After the decision is made, conflicting parties decide to accept or reject the decision made by **Mikerecho** (council). If the decision is accepted by both conflicting parties, conflict resolution is finalized with an arrangement of compensation and a reconciliation ceremony between the conflicting parties. On the other hand, if either party refuses to accept the decision made by this body, the conflict resolution goes beyond **Mikerecho**. It is the King, known as **Tato**, who takes the responsibility of resolving conflict after this stage.

With the coordination of **Keterasha** and leadership of the **Tato**, the case is discussed in detail and a decision is made at **yabo** where the king himself addresses justice and the decision becomes final and binding. This is the highest level of the structure of ICRM of Shekacho people. It is so rare that conflict cases reach this highest level because most conflicts are resolved at lower levels of structure especially at local elders (**Shawe-Geno**) and clan leader (**Gepi-Tato**) levels.

Actors in ICRM of Shekacho People

Different actors take part in resolving conflict through ICRM of Shekacho People. The issue of which and how many actors are involved in resolving conflict depends on the level where the conflict is resolved. Any conflict that arises in the Shekacho Community is resolved at different levels as per the structure displayed in figure 5.

Actors at the local level: in Shekacho Community, conflict is usually resolved by local elders (**shawe-geno**) at the local level where the conflict happened. At this level of resolving conflict, the actors are elders and conflicting parties or the accuser and the




Figure 6: The hierarchical structure of ICRM of Shekacho People

Source: Researchers compilation, 2021

accused. At the local level, it is elders, who are called *Shawe-Geno* or interchangeably *Shawe-Ogo*, who play a key role in resolving conflict and restoring peace. The elders can be identified and selected, depending on the interest of the conflicting parties, from the elders in the community. The local elders are concerned with making morally and socially acceptable decisions to foster good relationships between the parties in the conflict and therefore the whole community.

Actors at *Gepi-Tato* level: conflict is also resolved at *Gepi-Tato* level in the Shekacho community when it is not solved at the local level due to the disagreement to accept the decision made by the elders. The *Gepi-Tato* (the clan leader) with selected elders resolves the conflict at this level. Therefore, the clan leader and the elders are the actors at this level of conflict resolution. However, *Gepi-Tato* is the most significant actor not only at this level of resolving conflict but also in ICRM of Shekacho people in general. In Shekacho community, *Gepi-Tato* refrains from taking any food and drink as soon as he hears the rise of conflict and keeps fasting until he can resolve the conflict and he ensures the restoration of peace. Therefore, the parties in the conflict are expected to expose themselves as soon as possible to obey the *Gepi-Tato* and his act, and then the respective clan leader immediately gets involved in and resolves the conflict. In Shekacho community, it is the *Gepi-Tato* who interrupts in and resolves serious conflicts like the bloody ones.

Actors at *Mikerecho*, interchangeably *Mikere Ogo* level: the members of *Mikerecho* (council) are the actors who involve in resolving conflict at this level. With the leading role of *Keterasha* whose role is like a prime minister in the modern governance, the case that is not resolved at *Gepi-Tato* is resolved at this level. At this level, the case comes to *Mikerecho* by a *Gepi-Tato* who handled the issue prior in his respective administration. However, the chance of reaching a case at this level is rare in ICRM of Shekacho people.

Actors at *Tato* level: at this level, the King, called *Tato*, and members of *Mikerecho* are the actors who take part in resolving conflict. This is the final level and a case of conflict reaches this level if it is not resolved at the lower levels, including *Mikerecho*. *Tato* (the king) takes the leading role in resolving conflict at this level and the decision made at this level is called *mariam-cherato*. The decision made at this level becomes the final and binding one. Like at *Mikerecho* level, the chance of reaching a case at this level is rare.

***Worafo* in the ICRM of Shekacho people**

In Shekacho community, *Worafo* in its literal and general connotation refers to blameless or guiltless and the process is called purification. Accordingly, the term is used to express one's purification or guiltlessness from any wrongdoing. *Worafo* is also used to express one's excellence regarding his/her discipline, industriousness, social acceptance, and good manner.

Worafo plays a very irreplaceable role in resolving conflict in particular and in promoting peace in general in Shekacho community. *Worafo* is predominantly used as a tool for promoting peace in the community because it is *Worafo* that is applied to identify the wrongdoers who destabilize peace and cause trouble in one or another way in the community. Shekacho community, it is *Gepi-Tato* (clan leader) who holds the ceremony of *Worafo*. *Worafo* ceremony takes place with the leadership of *Gepi-Tato* in the presence of elders and the whole members of the village where the problem has occurred. *Gepi-Tato* plays a very decisive role not only in leading and executing *Worafo* but also in resolving conflict, restoring and maintaining the peace of the clan where he governs. Therefore, *Worafo* is a system that *Gepi-Tato* uses to resolve conflicts and maintain peace in the community at large.

There are clear procedures and processes through which the *Worafo* is executed. After the *Gepi-Tato* knew trouble happened, which could be stealing, robbing, beating, burning house, etc., he passes orders through local elders, to all members of the community so that they are gathered for meeting on the problem happened. After the *Gepi-Tato* ensures the gathering of the people, he declares the opening of *Worafo* ceremony by revealing the case to be investigated. Before the investigation begins, the *Gepi-Tato* strongly notices the people to be truthful and to avoid any kind of bias for instance based on family connections, friendship, or intimacy, and merely focus on truth. Truth is the central principle of *Worafo* in particular and indigenous conflict resolution of Shekacho people

in general. Then, each person, turn by turn, stands in front of the *Gepi-Tato* and in front of the people to listen to the critique of the people about his personality that is either he/she is rewarded or denied blameless (*Worafo*). Then, *Gepi-Tato* asks the people to publically and collectively make their critique on the discipline of the person and the ceremony continues until each person passes through this way. Then, this investigation, by default, clearly differentiates those who are rewarded *Worafo* and those who are denied *Worafo*. Then, further investigation, by the *Gepi-Tato*, is made on those who have been denied *Worafo* to find out the person who has been engaged in the act of wrongdoing. Here, the *Gepi-Tato* plays a key role in the investigation and in identifying the wrongdoer because *Gepi-Tato* is so honorable and respectable person in the cultural value of Shekacho people. Then, finally, the suspected persons either admit or deny the action in which he/she was suspected. If he/she refuses and the investigation finds out no troublesome, the *Gepi-Tato* publicly curses the hidden and unseen troublesome to be punished by the power of God and *Worafo* ceremony comes to an end. The curse of *Gepi-Tato* is believed to lead to mysterious death or sickness. The words of *Gepi-Tato* are bitter and those who have caused troubles are often punished.

The Nexus Between ICRM of Shekacho People and the Formal Court System

No single conflict resolution mechanism is a perfect fit for all types of conflict. The types of conflict resolution used differ largely depending on the type, nature, and level of conflict. Accordingly, conflict can be resolved either by the formal court or using an informal (alternative) dispute resolution mechanism. Although the formal court system is the common mechanism of conflict resolution in modern society, indigenous (informal) conflict resolution is an alternative mechanism of resolving conflict in many societies. Therefore, conflict could be resolved either indigenously or in a formal court system in different parts of the world which is also true in Shekacho community. The relationship between these resolution mechanisms of handling conflict could have a significant impact on the overall peace-building process and there may be strong or loose relation between these the ICRM and the formal court system.

The relationship between the ICRM and the formal court system, in one or another way, affects their role in resolving conflict and promoting sustainable peace. The high and high the relationship between them, the more and more they are effective in their function. Thus study reveals that the relationship between the indigenous institution and the formal court system is currently loose in Sheka Zone. The formal court does not have a system that enables it to establish a formal relationship with the indigenous institution. Therefore, the relationship is informal and the court does not formally encourage and support ICRM despite the decisive and bold role of the indigenous institution in resolving conflict and maintaining sustainable peace at large. The ICRM is not capacitated to effectively play its role in resolving conflict and peacebuilding. The formal court system gives no attention to the ICRM of Shekacho people.

However, the formal court sends some cases, based on the type of case and willingness of conflicting parties, to elders (**Shawe-Geno**) and clan leaders (**Gepi-Tato**) to be solved through ICRM because solving conflict this way is more valuable in terms of many things. Many people prefer the indigenous way of resolving conflict as it saves their cost, time, and energy. It is considered the easiest and fastest way to reach an agreement and restore peace. The indigenous mechanism of resolving conflict gives high attention to the justice of the resolution which has a constructive and long-lasting impact on the establishment of harmonious interaction and restoration of sustainable peace in the post-conflict period. Despite the loose relation and weak support from the formal court, the ICRM is still strongly functional and the elders are playing their bold role in maintaining sustainable peace in Shekacho community.

Trust and Preference to ICRM of Shekacho

In the Shekacho community, the ICRM is highly trusted. Regardless of where the disputants came from, their economic background, social class, and differences the institution equally treat all social segments, and the decisions made in the institution are believed to be fair and justifiable. Thus, ICRM of Shekacho people is a trustworthy institution among the community. Due to this reason, individuals who come to appeal their grievance to the elders and clan leaders about a given body hold full trust and reliance on the elders and clan leaders.

Consequently, the Shekacho's communities prefer the ICRM against the formal court system. This is because the communities believe that they know the procedures and adjudication process of ICRM very well and issues can be settled within a shortened period as a result justice in ICRM Shekacho can be provided in time. They also argue that if their cases are seen by elders or clan leaders they can be saved from money and energy loss which can be resulted from a prolonged litigation process in the formal court system. There is a strong belief that ICRM sustainably heals the grievances of the disputants. In the indigenous system, both bodies at the end of the adjudication equally satisfy and heal from their grievances and they show this by shaking hands and hugging each other. Another reason is that compared to the formal court system in the indigenous system honest reconciliation can be reached between the conflicting bodies putting aside their grievance. Whereas, the formal court system emphasizes punishment based on a win-lose approach. In line with this finding Chereji & Wratto (2013), in their comparative study of traditional conflict resolution methods in Liberia and Ghana, argued that traditional institutions emphasize re-conciliation as opposed to Western practices, which place the accent on punishment.

Threats that are Flagging the Institution

The study shows that the following are major factors threatening the continuity of the practice.

- Religious teachings: this is a primary threat to the indigenous institution. Religious teachers consider this indigenous practice especially led by clan leaders as traditional ritual practice and they condemn people not to go to clan leaders for such issues.
- The institution has no support from the government. The government doesn't support the elders and clan leaders who work in settling conflicts. Only the government calls clan leaders and elders when it faces a problem.
- The government doesn't give attention to the institution.

Conclusion

Based on the findings, this study draws the following conclusions on four major themes. Conflict in Shekacho community occurs due to different reasons and such conflicts can be labeled as boundary conflict, conflict in marriage, and interpersonal conflict.

Boundary conflict is the most occurring and common type of conflict among the Shekacho community which falls under two categories these are; clan boundary conflict and interpersonal boundary conflict. Compared to interpersonal boundary conflict clan boundary conflict is violent if not managed in time, and it is the biggest boundary conflict as it involves many families and members of each clan. Interpersonal conflict is one of the conflict types in Shekacho community, and it occurs due to boundary dispute, disloyalty if animal belonging to a person damages the farming of the farm holder and theft are the most common sources of interpersonal conflict that occur in the community.

To resolve such conflicts, the Shekacho community has developed an old-aged system of conflict resolution which has organized procedure, structure, and actors who actively participate in the conflict resolution system. The procedures in ICRM are deeply rooted in the customs and the traditions of Shekacho people. The procedures in ICRM pass through two sequential phases of conflict resolution these are intervention in the conflict phase and resolving the conflict phase. In both phases, there are also procedural sequences that can successfully drive the disputants to the final reconciliation ceremony. Structurally the conflict resolution begins from the elders' level up to the highest level called the king or '*tato*'. At each level, known actors are participating in the process of conflict resolution.

The relationship between the indigenous institution and the formal court system is currently loose in Sheka Zone. The formal court doesn't have a system that enables it to establish a formal relationship with the indigenous institution. Therefore, the relationship is informal and the court does not formally encourage and support ICRM

despite the decisive and bold role of the indigenous institution in resolving conflict and maintaining peace at large.

CRM of Shekacho people is a trustworthy institution among the community. Decisions that are made by the elders and clan leaders are considered to be fair and just. Due to this reason, individuals who come to appeal their grievance to the elders and clan leaders about a given body hold full trust and reliance on the elders and clan leaders.

Religious teachings are the primary threats to the indigenous institution of the Shekacho people. Religious teachers consider the indigenous practice especially led by clan leaders as traditional ritual practice and they condemn people not to go to clan leaders for such issues. Lack of support from the government is also another challenge that is weakening the institution. In general, despite the big role of the indigenous knowledge in maintaining peace and good governance the attention to the institution is very minimal.

Recommendation

Based on the problems pinpointed from the finding, and suggestions given by research participants researchers like to boldly forward the following recommendations. The recommendations given are categorized under stakeholders who are responsible to preserve and ensure the continuity of this knowledge.

1. From the government side, the following actions have to be done:
 - To be able to transfer the knowledge to the next generation; the government has to raise public understanding about ICRM at kebele level, government should give advisory support to elders and clan leaders, build the capacity of clan leaders by finance, and renewing clan leaders compound and preserving it from damage;
 - It is clear that; conflict can be resolved using either a formal court or informal conflict resolution system. Although the formal court system is the common mechanism of conflict resolution in modern society, the indigenous (informal) conflict resolution system is also an alternative mechanism of resolving conflict in many societies including Shekacho people. This is because, as we have learned in experience and literature, there is no single conflict resolution mechanism that is a perfect fit for all types of conflict. Thus, the relationship between formal and informal (indigenous) conflict resolution mechanisms is crucial. The relationship between the ICRM and formal court system, in one or another way, affects their role in resolving conflict and promoting peace. If the formal court has closely worked with ICRM of Shekacho people it would have been easy to maintain sustainable peace. Thus, we recommend the local government take the following activities in ensuring the establishment of an interactive relationship between a formal court and the indigenous conflict resolution system.
 - Discussing with local elders and clan leaders on issues of cooperation on governance.

- Identifying and officially recognizing elders and clan leaders and sting ground for the establishment of a relationship with the formal court system.
 - Letting representatives of elders and clan leaders take experience sharing from other ethnic groups of Ethiopia on issues how to integrate the indigenous system to the formal court system.
 - Communicating with the higher academic institutions for advisory support.
2. From the higher academic institutions side, the following actions have to be done:
- Giving training to elders and clan leaders in collaboration with the local government, giving training to the youth about culture, teaching the youth to differentiate culture, and religious practices. Furthermore, holding symposiums to share and discuss the role of elders, clan leaders, and the indigenous governance system in the modern governance system.

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Islamic Radicalization: A Conceptual Examination

Jonathan MATUSITZ

Abstract: This paper is a conceptual analysis of Islamic radicalization. Islamic radicalization refers to the process of persuading individuals (e.g., often new or potential Muslim recruits) that jihad is the answer to contemporary problems that have undermined the existence or progress of Islam on a global scale. This topic is important because visualizing the issue in this manner enhances our understanding of the Islamic radicalization process. An important conclusion is that such radicalization is efficient because it has been shown to inspire a wide spectrum of individuals to fight the enemies of Islam in Holy War and die for Allah.

Keywords: Caliphate; communication; framing; fundamentalism; internet; Islam; Islamic radicalization; jihad; Social Movement Theory; terrorism.

Introduction

This paper is a conceptual analysis of Islamic radicalization. Islamic radicalization refers to the process of persuading individuals (e.g., often new or potential Muslim recruits) that jihad is the answer to contemporary problems that have undermined

the existence or progress of Islam on a global scale. The three major elements of Islamic radicalization are (1) the teaching of hatred toward the Infidels and foreign invaders (and toward any entity seeking to undermine Islam); (2) the nurturing of feelings that the Apostates (i.e., Muslim “rebels” or “traitors” within the faith) should be disowned or killed because they have associated themselves with the enemies of Islam (i.e., through their policies, actions, or lifestyles); and (3) a desire to rekindle Islamic civilization by establishing a global Caliphate and, thereby, imposing sharia all

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over the world. The Caliphate is an Islamic system of world government; sharia is a body of Islamic law.

This topic is important because present-day jihadism can be framed as a global social movement. Visualizing the issue in this manner enhances our understanding of the Islamic radicalization process. An important conclusion of this conceptual analysis is that such radicalization is efficient because it has been shown to inspire a wide spectrum of individuals to fight the enemies of Islam in Holy War and die for Allah. Particularly emphasized in this paper are the role of Social Movement Theory in Islamic radicalization and the types of people susceptible to it. To this very point, disaffected youths or Muslims coming from contemporary insular communities (i.e., “no-go zones”) are more likely to be radicalized. More importantly, Islamic radicalization is not limited to men. For example, since 2016, ISIS has promoted women as a mouthpiece of jihadist recruitment online. Women can also be used in auxiliary roles, such as supporting their husbands and procreating future jihadist soldiers for the next generation of the Caliphate.

This paper ends with the processes explaining how online Islamic radicalization works. Online radicalization happens after a person immerses him- or herself into extremist literature (including graphic images and videos) for long periods of time. As Neumann (2013) reports, as times goes by, that person’s emotional desensitization tends to decrease as well. Because the internet has the advantage of having a more distributed effect than conventional media, jihadist ideologues can enhance jihadist recruitment and training in unprecedented ways. Three key concept in this section are sedentarism, radical *dawah*, and digitalized *ummah*. When people become sedentary—i.e., becoming physically inactive due to the massive amount of time devoted to reading internet content—they have a higher propensity to self-radicalize to some level. A radical *dawah* is an aggressive method of proselytizing people into militant Islam. The “digitalized *ummah*” is the global community of Muslims on the World Wide Web; they are the main target of Islamic radicalization.

Radicalization: Definitions

Scholarly works on radicalization, limited in numbers, have mostly examined why and how people come to adopt beliefs and behaviors that culminate into terrorist actions, particularly those killing unarmed citizens. Since the late 1960s, the academic literature has looked for answers to these questions by analyzing terrorism at different levels: individual, collective, organizational, networked, mass-movement related, socio-cultural, and international/interregional terrorism (Borum, 2011). Before providing definitions of radicalization, we need to consider certain issues. For instance, there is no commonly-accepted definition of radicalization among governments and within academic circles. Just like “terrorism,” “radicalization” continues to be a contested concept. A predominant problem with the definition of radicalization has to do with “who” is to determine what constitutes radicalization (Schmid, 2013).

Generally speaking, a radical is a person who cherishes “a deep felt desire for sociopolitical changes” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 198). That person may embrace a radical ideology without perpetrating acts of violence (Hamid, 2015). Radicalization *per se* is the process by which an individual promotes a radical ideology. The concept captures the essence of “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). There are multiple conduits to radicalization, which can be individual or group-driven. Some interpret it as the “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008, p. 416). Others call it “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations that justify the use of indiscriminate violence” (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p. 38), or “the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes” (Crosset & Spitaletta, 2010, p. 10). And some researchers look at it as a “pathway” (Horgan, 2008) or “staircase” (Moghaddam, 2005) to terrorism.

In line with these contentions, radicalization is also a process by which people firmly oppose or decrease the status quo, or fight the ideas and movements of the day (Cragin, 2014; Della Porta, 1995). It is both a mental and psychological process in the sense that it stimulates people to undertake violent actions (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2009). Radicalization is a derivative of the mores or milieus from which individuals come. Under these circumstances, radicalization is a product of a general consensus; for example, it could be a consensus against or in favor of changes in society (Kundnani, 2012; Silva, 2008). Lastly, radicalization often increases “extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008, p. 416).

Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism often has religious undertones that reveal unfaltering attachment to irreducible dogmas (Nagata, 2001). Fundamentalism reflects the tendency of particular groups or cultures—mostly, but not exclusively, religious ones—to follow a doctrine of painstaking literalism of holy scriptures (or cherry-picked sections from those scriptures), as well as literalism of principles, tenets, and canons in their everyday lives. While fundamentalism is sometimes presented as “different” from radicalization, the two terms share many similarities. With respect to militant Islam, a significant overlap exists between the religious thinking of Salafists—Islamic fundamentalists who want to impose a pure, traditional version of Islam based on sharia (i.e., Islam law)—and the ultra-violent agenda of jihadist organizations (Alderdice, 2017).

This painstaking literalism of holy scriptures is imbued with an ingrained feeling of preserving ingroup and outgroup boundaries (i.e., Social Identity Theory), leading

radical clerics or jihadist leaders to stress the importance of purity and the desire to revisit traditions—i.e., Salafism or the Golden Age of Islam, which Muslims are accused (by Salafists) to have abandoned (Turner, 2010). Fundamentalism and radicalism are appealing to a significant minority of Muslim youths because they deal in absolutes. They adopt a reductionist worldview; in other words, they transform the reality of a complex world into a black-and-white world (Sterman, 2002).

Rejection of diversity

Diversity of religions and opinions is a hallmark of Western civilization. Rejection of such values is a “fundamental” dogma that becomes deep-seated within a group (Boer, 2005). The result is the group members’ absolute devotion to the group’s beliefs, ideology, or religion—and the possible hatred of other groups’. In this context, radicalization corresponds to the group’s refusal to make any accommodations toward other groups—or even any interactions with them. Eventually, such rejection of diversity leads to a strong desire to subordinate or inferiorize other groups (Gross, 2004). In many contemporary situations, multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are rejected in support of a type of cultural narrowmindedness that advocates a universal rejection of diversity (Smith, 1993).

Those who reject diversity want to see a rift between groups and cultures. For these people, concepts like solidarity, internationalism, and universalism symbolize “dangerous narratives,” “totalization,” or “essentialism,” all of which are fundamentally tyrannical, Eurocentric, and imperialist. Islamists have their own social construction of “Muslim woman,” but they discriminate between Muslim and Western women by constructing a stereotyped “West” that is flawed and immoral. The West is pigeonholed into an immutable, evil entity. In the minds of many Salafists, there is a serious debate about the “Western world” and the dominant “Western culture” (Mojab, 1998). Overall, rejection of diversity implies rejection of the *Other* and resists innovations or adaptation within a culture (i.e., any form of adaptation that could replace aspects of that culture) (Ge, 2001). The corollary is the belief that a universal culture for the entire humankind is either threatening or impossible (Ravitch, 1990).

Islamic Radicalization

The three major elements of Islamic radicalization are (1) the teaching of hatred toward foreign invasion and toward any entity seeking to undermine Islam; (2) the nurturing of feelings that Muslim apostates (i.e., rebels or traitors within the faith) should be disowned or killed because they have associated themselves with the enemies of Islam (i.e., through their policies, actions, or lifestyles); and (3) a desire to rekindle Islamic civilization by establishing a global Caliphate and, thereby, imposing sharia all over the world (Halverson, Goodall, & Corman, 2011). A Caliphate is an Islamic system of world

government. In general, Islamic radicalization champions a worldview that categorically rejects the adoption of new values and principles within Muslim societies. Vis-à-vis the Western-style democracy, Islamic radicalization wants to replace it with religious supremacy—because of its abhorrence of the core precepts of democracy (such as freedom of the press and universal human rights). The process of Islamic radicalization also entails methods whereby jihadist leaders, militant imams (i.e., Muslim religious leaders or clerics), or community organizers attempt to accomplish their Caliphate objectives by adopting laws that would considerably curtail many of the current basic rights that Muslims enjoy in Muslim-majority countries (Borum, 2011).

Although Islamic radicalization mirrors the process of adopting these fanatical ideas, jihadism is the performance of extreme violence based on Islamic radicalization. The ultimate objective is to strong-arm a government and/or population into subjugating themselves into the Caliphate ideology. However, what is seen as a “radical idea” may differ across the social, cultural, religious and political spectrum of the entire *ummah*—i.e., the global Muslim population or the Islamic Nation (Rane, 2016). From a Western standpoint, Islamic radicalization often includes the practice of teaching new recruits to reject fundamental Judeo-Christian values such as equality, voting rights, gender pluralism, civil liberties, divorce between church and state, and peaceful transitions in political leadership. On the other hand, ideas that are popular within radicalized Muslim cultures, even those in Western countries, include the legitimization of ultra-violence (e.g., jihad for the Caliphate), support of sharia as the main legal system in all countries, and unconditional rejection of diversity (Rabasa & Benard, 2015).

Islamic Radicalization through Social Movement Theory

An appropriate theory to further explain the process of Islamic radicalization is Social Movement Theory (SMT). Zald and McCarthy (1987) refer to a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (p. 2). SMT postulates that social movements construct, cultivate, and diffuse meaning by word of mouth, through traditional media, and on online social media. SMT also explains how a movement’s framers communicate messages in manners that echo the wills, passions, ideologies, or beliefs of mass populations—a phenomenon named “cultural resonance” (Berbrier, 1998). Over time, as the masses adopt the movement’s messages, they agree with what the social movement stands for and identify with it—with good or disastrous outcomes (Borum, 2011). Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008) adds that,

movements diagnose problems and attribute responsibility, offer solutions, strategies, and tactics (prognostic framing), and provide motivational frames to convince potential participants to become active. Key to mobilization, according to this perspective, is whether the movement’s version of the “reality”

resonates or can be brought to resonate with the movement's potential constituency. Some scholars have referred to this process as "frame alignment" the emergence of congruence between an individual's and an organization's interests, values, and beliefs (p. 40).

SMT scholars maintain that leaders of social movements work hard to recruit new members; they act as "rational prospectors." They see movements as worthy "operations" because of their collective effervescence. They inflame passions and smooth the progress of conversion to new ideologies. Rational prospectors try different methods of recruitment and "enlist" those who are the most likely to leave everything behind and fight for the cause (Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999).

Social Movements and Present-Day Jihadism

Present-day jihadism can be framed as a global social movement. Visualizing the issue in this manner enhances our understanding of the Islamic radicalization process. First, it provides a context for "mobilization potential"—e.g., the extent to which a movement can use human resources—and for describing how people with the same beliefs or attitudes congregate, join forces, and agree to assume various types of actions and roles. Second, it introduces the concept of "recruitment networks", which explains the processes by which those networks form. Third, it provides the method of "frame alignment" to shed light on the way jihadist leaders manipulate members' beliefs and sentiments in order to get them to comply with the group or movement. Fourth, it emphasizes the necessity to identify other tactics of Islamic radicalization. For example, one can explore the myriad incentives to increase radicalization or the way jihadist organizations impose or remove obstacles to recruitment (Borum, 2011).

The radicalization theory rests on the premise that the success of jihadist persuasion is contingent on effective "framing" creating "cultural resonance" between radical Islamic ideology and the long-established views of mass audiences. Every time a specific aspect of such extreme ideology becomes popular within a mass audience, it is this "alignment" or "cultural resonance" that confirms its appeal (Della Porta & Diani, 2005; Smelser, 2010). Dreaming of global dominance, jihadist movements are expansionist in nature. Jihad framers know how to lay the groundwork for community support—both offline and online—and manage to communicate their message among people who live in areas that could easily be "expanded" into sharia-compliant areas. In response to enemies both outside and within their own ideology, they resort to scary or threatening tactics as a method to reinforce their position and prevent dissention (Halverson, Goodall, & Corman, 2011).

Four Radical Islamic Conversion Categories

The FBI's Counterterrorism Division has classified the procedures of Islamic radicalization into four different categories (cited in Borum, 2011):

- **Jilted Belief:** jilted believers are believers who feel excluded or abandoned. They are motivated converts for whom "internal frustration and dissatisfaction with the current religious faith (has led) the individual to change belief systems" (p. 26).
- **Faith Reinterpretation:** a fundamentally motivated individual has "faith reinterpretation" when he or she "alters his or her religious tradition through introspection and evaluation. This motivation refers specifically to those who are Muslim by birth but then choose to follow a more extremist form of Islam" (p. 26).
- **Protest Conversion:** an outwardly motivated individual experiences "protest conversion" when his or her feeling of perceived deprivation "negatively affects that individual's attitude and beliefs toward those implicated, leading to a change of faith as an answer to the deprivation" (p. 26).
- **Acceptance Seeking:** also a form of outwardly motivated conversion, a person experiencing "acceptance seeking" is determined by the need to "form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting and significant interpersonal relationships" (p. 26).

Who Is Susceptible to Islamic Radicalization?

Although there are several pathways of radicalization with different outcomes (or even conflicting ideological purposes), radicalization can materialize through multiple routes that all have a common denominator. An example of common denominator is the perceived injustice experienced by new recruits, which facilitates their adoption of radical ideas. The now radicalized convert is likely to take actions against the status quo (Khosrokhavar & Todd, 2017). Prior to the radicalization stage, there is a stage called "pre-radicalization," during which people look for more information about the ideology. Websites can influence pre-radicalized individuals by publishing the mission statement and recruitment pages of a terrorist organization (e.g., including articles about religious purity and the wicked enemy). The main stage of the radicalization process is the indoctrination stage, during which people embrace the central ideology and beliefs and are more ready to carry out the goals of the terrorist group. At this stage, the person becomes "jihadized" (Hahn, 2008). During this transformation into jihadization, the internet allows the person to acquire more information on how to be the ideal Soldier of Allah or connect with peers (i.e., actual terrorist organization members) to plan and perpetrate their own attacks (Lieberman & Collins, 2008).

The process of Islamic radicalization would not be successful without its shift towards religious fanaticism and a radical Salafist interpretation of purist dogmas. Sageman's

(2004) study on jihadist backgrounds reveals that 99% of Islamic extremists see themselves as very religious even before joining a jihadist organization and fulfilling terrorist missions. Though committing violence is not necessarily on the minds of all pre-radicalized individuals, those who do actually turn into jihadists often believe that (1) Islam is under constant threat by Western civilization, (2) the Muslim world is divided between true Muslims and the Infidels (and Apostates), and (3) jihad is a necessary method to defend Muslims from the rest of the world (Mullins, 2012).

Islamic Radicalization of Disaffected Youth

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Generation X and Generation Y Muslims have grown up hearing words like “Islam,” “Muslim,” and “jihad” in everyday media and have experienced more scrutiny accordingly. This has pushed a significant minority of them to undertake soul-searching, looking for ways to understand their own Muslim identities in today’s world and to develop a type of defense mechanism in order to prepare themselves for possible hostilities. Customarily, a cohesive family structure within their environment gives them comfort or more answers as to how to handle possible confrontations or antipathy from their non-Muslim peers. Yet, within contemporary insular communities, called “no-go zones” by some critics (see Lebl, 2013; Quraishi, 2005), those youth complain about being disaffected or neglected because they enjoy less support from the dominant society (Liang, 2015).

This has caused some of those youth to delve into the internet for answers, where they eventually “find” mentors (often recruiters or activists) who promise them a better life. Examples of jihadist narratives for a “better life” are the recompenses of *Jannah* through heroic death in battle or the chance of marrying several women (sometimes all at once) after completing the jihadist training successfully (Björgum, 2016). The peculiarity of these online communications is the mentors’ propensity to portray jihad as a necessity to conquer both the Infidels and Apostates. These online recruiters and activists will even resort to employing jihad rap videos (i.e., pop-jihad) and other methods (e.g., online jihadist magazines) with cleverly crafted messages tailored to naïve or disaffected youth (Al-Rawi, 2018).

Gender Considerations

The average jihadist foreign fighter is a man aged 18 to 29, although some exceptions exist outside that age range and outside that gender. Indeed, jihadization is not limited to men. Consider the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS): Since 2016, ISIS has promoted women as a mouthpiece of jihadist recruitment online. Aqsa Mahmood was one of the many females employed to attract foreigners to join ISIS. She decided to leave her quiet, happy adolescent life in Glasgow (Scotland). She exposed her transformation and attraction to jihadism on Tumblr and moved to Syria. From Syria, she used Twitter and Tumblr as a platform to incite others into imitating her radicalism (Aly, Macdonald,

Jarvis, & Chen, 2017). The persuasive narratives to draw male foreign fighters into jihad have also been aimed at female audiences. This was achieved, in part, by magnifying the Western “victimization” of Muslims, by glorifying the new utopian state of the Caliphate, and by extolling the virtues of martyrdom in the cause of Allah. Some women are also dreaming of becoming the wife of a jihadist fighter one day—without worrying about becoming a widow when he dies as a martyr for the cause. As a result, many foreign girls are paired—into marriage—with jihadist males upon their arrival (Aly *et al.*, 2017). A case in point is the recent headline surrounding Hoda Muthana, the Muslim woman who “deeply regretted” to have joined ISIS and wanted to return to her native United States in 2019 (Chulov & McKernan, 2019).

A study by Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford (2018) reveals that 11% of U.S. foreign fighters and people moving into ISIS’s territory are women. The role of individuals who support—but do not combat for—jihadist organizations is something to behold. Of note are female supporters, who more likely than not to assume secondary roles in those organizations. Their roles are found within logistical and financial operations, as well as other simpler, daily operations (e.g., providing safe houses or even cooking for their fellow terrorists). Although ISIS privileges men to fulfill roles that are potentially lethal (i.e., fighters and martyrs), women can be used to nurture their husbands and procreate future jihadist soldiers for the next generation of the Caliphate. Women’s skills at attracting new people through the internet, their dedication to auxiliary and operational roles, and the public’s difficulty to regard them as terrorists, make them a potentially greater threat to U.S. security (Alexander, 2016).

Overall, the growing number of females as both supporters and combatants signals a shift in ISIS’s methods of radicalization and recruitment, notwithstanding the jihadists’ strict views on gender roles in groups. Within the Caliphate ideology, men are the ones who fight, not women, who are expected to stay home and care for as many children as possible (Mironova, 2019). Over the past few years, however, ISIS’s propaganda has laid the foundations for a radical change: in October 2017, the Islamic State’s newspaper openly called on all women of the *ummah* to prepare for battle (Dearden, 2017). By early 2018, ISIS was publicly praising its female combatants in a video that showed a woman carrying an AK-47, the commentary describing “the chaste mujahed woman journeying to her Lord with the garments of purity and faith, seeking revenge for her religion and for the honor of her sisters” (Mironova, 2019, p. A1). An important deduction that one can derive from this section is that the jihadist ideology can inspire a wide spectrum of individuals to fight the enemies of Islam, to establish the global Caliphate, and to unite the brothers and sisters of the *ummah*. More importantly, in terms of age and gender, there is no reliable profile for a typical jihadist foreign fighter. In fact, after more than forty years of research on radicalization, no consistent age-based or gender-based pathway toward terrorist violence has been identified (Aly *et al.*, 2017).

Islamic Radicalization Linked to Poverty?

In like fashion, the link between Islamic radicalization and poverty remains, to some degree, a myth. A high percentage of jihadists are middle-class youths who graduated from college, principally in the STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math). Only minor statistical evidence about poverty-linked Muslim radicalization exists. While poverty and hardship may be, for some, a massive motivator to join extremist organizations that guarantee change, this does not ascertain that poverty *per se* is a leading cause of Islamic radicalization (Baylouni, 2015). The same is true regarding suicide bombers, whereby the role of money—or the lack thereof—is virtually nonexistent (Pape, 2005; Pape & Feldman, 2010).

Islamic Radicalization Linked to Psychological Factors?

If mental depression or illness is associated with poverty, this factor remains to be ascertained as a major factor in jihadism or the support of jihadist ideology (Pape, 2005; Pape & Feldman, 2010). Scientific evidence that ordinary citizens become jihadists out of psychological needs remains scant. In fact, past research reports no psychological aberration or deviation in most cases of jihadist radicalization. As Silke (2008) explains, “despite the indiscriminate and extreme violence of many terrorist attacks, the vast majority of research on terrorists has concluded that the perpetrators are not psychologically abnormal” (p. 104). Sageman’s (2008) study of the backgrounds of jihadist terrorists also confirms the lack of evidence of psychological abnormalities. On the contrary, a common denominator across jihadist motivations is a feeling of social alienation, even among the most educated youths in the West. Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) study revealed that European Muslims have higher rates of joblessness and imprisonment, and are underrepresented in politics.

How Online Islamic Radicalization Works

Since the early 2000s, scholars and practitioners have identified the predominant processes and forces that drive online radicalization and how cyberspace can be easily exploited to propagate fanatical ideas and “solutions”. They warn about the consequences of exposure to terrorist content. One single piece of terrorist propaganda rarely transforms an individual into a killing machine. However, in many situations, online radicalization happens after a person immerses him- or herself into extremist literature (including graphic images and videos) for long periods of time. As times goes by, that person’s emotional desensitization tends to decrease as well (Neumann, 2013).

A recurring explanation for online Islamic radicalization is the following: the internet is so vast that it has the capacity to get people to connect with one another with just a few mouse clicks away—beyond the space-time dimension. As Mitchell (1995) puts it, the internet negates geometry; it can be nowhere and everywhere at once. Salafist

or jihadist websites often have unfiltered control of their blogs or images. Because the internet has the advantage of having a more distributed effect than conventional media, it is not surprising, then, that jihadist ideologues can enhance jihadist recruitment and training in unprecedented ways. At a broader level, the actual names of jihadist sites, internet domains, and online magazines carry symbolism within them, a propagandistic move to sway online readers into identifying with the jihadist ideology even more (Rudner, 2017).

Sedentarists and Self-Starters

Constant exposure to glorified accounts of martyrdom and fatal punishments of enemies—e.g., by listening to testimonies of martyrs' (suicide bombers') wives or watching videos of suicide missions and decapitations—leads to "mortality salience," an obsessive focus on one's own mortality, which cherishes the desire to become martyrs or jihadist soldiers in the near future (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Persuasive online articles and images of destruction in conflict zones—e.g., those depicting the alleged cases of torture, killing, and other "calamities" wreaked by Coalition Forces—can prompt sentiments of moral indignation, which Gabriel Weimann (2012) sees as a stimulus for online Islamic radicalization. All jihadist leaders on the internet support Iraq and Syria rather than the Western-backed régimes of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As expected, internet-driven jihadist training happens in Iraq and Syria (rather than the last two).

Persuasive online articles and images are generally retrieved in the social environment where people use the internet the most: one's home (even one's parents' home) or one's friends' place. This is where self-radicalization peaks—usually over the course of several months to several years (Sageman, 2008). When people become sedentary—i.e., becoming physically inactive due to the massive amount of time devoted to reading internet content (Matusitz & McCormick, 2012)—they have a higher propensity to self-radicalize to some level. In fact, Khan and Butt (2017) have demonstrated that online self-radicalization is frequently the result of sedentarism. In the context of jihadism, a marginal percentage of sedentarists become embedded in what Sutherland and Cressey (1947) describe as "criminogenic environments," a phenomenon whereby deviant or threatening behaviors are interiorized and coopted because of extensive exposure to extremist views.

The newly radicalized online reader enters the jihadist world with a perverted notion of reality in which jihadist ultra-violence is no longer unprincipled or forbidden. Quite the opposite, jihad is "cool" (Gerraerts, 2012). The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2012) in the Netherlands conceded that, because of the internet, online jihadist magazines (such as Al-Qaeda's *Inspire* and ISIS's *Dabiq*) can effortlessly create that perverted notion of reality because the youth are more likely to fall prey to the jihadist mindset than their older peers, even those youth with only a modicum of knowledge of

jihadism. To this point, some of the youth do not even go to the mosque on Fridays—or other worship centers and religious events. Their internet-driven self-radicalization, though, makes them self-starters, amateurs, or free-lancers. In other words, even online readers from distant countries can become self-starters through intense exposure to jihadist content and turn their newly terrorist ambitions into reality (Kirby, 2007).

Radical *Dawah* and Digitalized *Ummah*

For jihadist ideologues, the internet is the ideal conduit for jihadist recruitment because it provides myriad prospects to launch a radical *dawah*. A radical *dawah* is an aggressive method of proselytizing people into militant Islam (Whine, 2001). In this day and age, jihadist proselytization happens through an open call on the internet; propagandists openly ask Muslims to leave their lands, join the *ummah* in holy places or war zones, receive jihadist training, and fight for Allah (Neumann, 2013). Jihad promoters are well aware of the internet's astronomical potential for radicalization and are devoting their time and energy toward online radicalization and recruitment of new operatives. The radical *dawah* cultivates a space for a "digitalized *ummah*," facilitated by the unrelenting propagation of persuasive articles and images in cyberspace (Kaya, 2010).

The "digitalized *ummah*" is the global community of Muslims on the World Wide Web. As potential recruits and jihadist operatives, they can become absorbed into the jihadist counterculture because territorial or civic rules online barely exist and virtual Islamic radicalization challenges the dogmas of established *mullahs* (religious scholars) in traditional Muslim societies (Brophy, 2013). Jihadist recruiters are successfully capitalizing on a virtual diaspora of the *ummah* through countless capabilities that the internet provides—and that also includes smartphones, social media, and apps. The objective remains the same: to promote the radical Islamic doctrine.

Four-Stage Jihadization Process

Jihadization is the process of becoming a jihadist and enlist as a fighter in Holy War (Lahoud, 2010). Today, it works through a "tried and true" method of interaction between jihadists and internet users via social media or similar online platforms. The internet allows jihadist leaders and ideologues to influence the minds of potential recruits and convince them that violent action is necessary (Jones & Wright, 2017). Jihadization also happens through self-radicalization after prolonged exposure to terrorist content. For instance, online jihadist magazines such as Al-Qaeda's *Inspire* and ISIS's *Dabiq* offer captivating articles and images of Islamic fighters who returned from successful missions. This is like a call to arms that a certain number of young Muslims find fascinating.

To illustrate the jihadization process further, Helfstein (2012) crafted a model that follows four stages: *awareness*, *interest*, *acceptance*, and *implementation*. In the model, *awareness* is the stage that is the lengthiest; the more time the online user devotes to

reading jihadist content, the more his or her knowledge base of the jihadist ideology expands. *Interest* is a stage that encompasses “the willingness to alter one’s belief system or social norms to reflect those associated with an ideological doctrine” (Helfstein, 2012, p. 16). When readers become “interested” in the jihadist doctrine, they progressively adopt jihadist ideas into their everyday lives, a stage called *acceptance*. *Acceptance* is the indispensable assimilation of extremist ideas and behaviors into the thought process. At this stage, he or she acknowledges the significance of jihadism to please Allah’s will and fight for the Caliphate. At that moment, the now-radicalized individual can carry out or *implement* the jihad.

Discussion

What this conceptual analysis has demonstrated is that Islamic radicalization is a clear and present danger because, through various strategies and channels such as social media sites and online jihadist magazines, jihadist leaders and ideologues have framed messages that are appealing to a significant minority of Muslims (particularly youths). Islamic radicalization communicates messages in a reductionist worldview, by transforming the reality of a complex world into a black-and-white world. As we have seen, Social Movement Theory explains how techniques such as “frame alignment” and cultural resonance” (between radical Islamic ideology and the long-established views of mass audiences) contribute to the “jihad is cool” phenomenon. Jihad propagandists manipulate members’ beliefs and sentiments in order to get them to comply with the jihadist doctrine. “Jihad is cool” is so attractive that even women have become radicalized and supported the global jihad. This can be achieved by magnifying the Western “victimization” of Muslims, by glorifying the new utopian state of the Caliphate, and by extolling the virtues of martyrdom in the cause of Allah. In fact, in terms of age and gender, there is no reliable profile for a typical jihadist foreign fighter.

In line with this argument, the internet gives jihadist leaders, ideologues, propagandists, and sympathizers immense capabilities for radical *dawah*—for inciting, recruiting, and driving new jihadist fighters all over the world. The internet allows the person to acquire more information on how to be the ideal Soldier of Allah or connect with peers. Some of the disaffected Muslim youth delve into the internet for answers, where they eventually “find” mentors (often recruiters or activists) who promise them a better life. The radical *dawah* cultivates such an environment to create a “digitalized *ummah*”, so that jihadist attitudes and anti-Western sentiments become homogenized and normalized. The consequences can be nefarious: as scholarly and government data have shown, a significant minority of online users become jihadist fighters or leave their lands for jihadist training. Ultimately, they are recruited and transformed into killing machines in order to fulfill Allah’s will and establish the Caliphate.

It is the author's hope that this analysis of the processes of Islamic radicalization has shed light on an ongoing global threat. No matter what strategy or medium, the objective of jihad framers will always remain the same: to promote the radical Islamic doctrine and the establishment of the Caliphate.

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Burundi: A Conflict Intervention Design During the 1990s

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Abstract: Among many various conflict analysis methods, Dennis J. D. Sandole's three pillar model presents a systematic road-map to identify the main issues, causes, and conditions of conflicts, as well as third-party conflict intervention approach. Three pillar model is also well suited to the analysis of complex conflict in Burundi and its intervention process by the third parties during the 1990s. This paper touches on the issues, causes, and conditions of Burundian conflict as Sandole's first and second pillars suggest, but primarily focuses on the intervention aspect in line with the third pillar of the model. In this context, the conflict intervention framework in Burundi is examined based on the regionally launched Arusha peace process, which resulted in a peace agreement. Following that, given the multi-level nature of the conflict in Burundi, it is discussed how an effective conflict intervention can be designed in order to resolve conflicts and ensure positive peace in the country.

Keywords: Burundi, conflict analysis, Sandole's Three Pillar Model, conflict intervention.

Introduction

A conflict intervention relies inextricably on a clear conflict analysis that reveals the causes, conditions, dynamics and actors of the conflicts. Sandole's three-pillar conflict analysis can be applied to any conflicts and their intervention by the third parties. The first pillar in this model examines the conflict elements such as parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict or conflict resolution orientations and environment. The second pillar focuses on conflict causes and conditions at four levels of analysis: individual,

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societal, international and ecological levels. The third pillar is about the conflict intervention and implementation based on the third parties' objectives and approaches. While their objectives could potentially be prevention, management, settlement, resolution or transformation of the conflicts, the approaches draw attention to competition/cooperation, negative/positive peace and Track1/Track2 methods (Sandole, 1998). This paper addresses the analysis levels in Sandole's three-pillar model as well as the root causes, conditions and core elements of the Burundi conflict during the 1990s, and mainly presents an intervention design with the objectives and approaches of the third parties to achieve positive peace in Burundi.

Burundi stands out as one of the leading intervention areas for conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa. Since 1962, when it gained its independence from the colonial rule of Belgium, Burundi has been the scene of many conflicts and military coups. A series of violent outbreaks occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, 1993 and 2015 in Burundi. However, the civil war between the years of 1993 and 2005 was the longest, most costly, most complicated and most dramatic one (Nkurunziza, 2018; Nkurunziza & Ngaruko, 2005). While the Hutus constitute 85 percent of the country's ethnic composition and the Tutsi 14 percent, problems arose in Burundi due to the ethnic appeals that enabled kinship-oriented certain groups among the Tutsi to keep the power, military, economy and resources under control (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; Rubin, 2006). Hutu-Tutsi issue in Burundi was compounded by the assassination of the first democratically elected and the first ethnic Hutu president of the country, Melchior Ndadaye. The political elites were unable to establish institutions and mechanisms in order to put an end to the unprecedented violence in Burundi, which led to the death of more than 300.000 people and displacement of over one billion people (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). This has resulted in a variety of conflict intervention efforts and actions involving third parties.

As well as many studies, the first pillar of Sandole's three-pillar model calls the conflict parties as primary, secondary, and third parties (Sandole, 1998). Among the primary parties directly involved in Burundi conflict were the government, Hutu and Tutsi groups, the armed forces and civilians. Hutu and Tutsi groups in neighboring Rwanda, regional actors and extra-regional or international actors, such as South Africa, the United States (US), France, Belgium and Canada are considered as secondary parties that support the primary actors. Moreover, in order to find a solution to the conflict, the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the individuals as mediators or facilitators were among the third-parties to intervene. The conflict issues are another part of Sandole's first pillar, and the issues on the structure, relationship, interests, and the resources were the key issues in Burundi conflict. Both the Hutu and the Tutsi had the conflict objectives of achieving political and economic dominance over one another

and of defending themselves from any extermination initiatives. The means used to achieve these objectives had an aggressive style like injuring each other, damaging the high-value symbol of each other, armed rebel-attacks and counter-attacks, forced displacement, assassinations and military coups. The underlying orientation of the armed conflict and political life in Burundi was competitive, and this was observed not only in the conflict process but also in any peace effort to deal with the conflicts. In addition, the inefficiency of internal mechanisms in Burundian violent conflict environment empowered the role of third parties such as neighboring countries, regional actors and international organizations (Özçelik, 2017).

After addressing the core elements of Burundian conflict in the context of Sandole's model, it is essential to concentrate on the root causes and conditions behind it. Under Pillar II, Sandole classifies them at four levels: The individual level including biological, physiological, psychological instruments; the societal level with its political, economic and social aspects; the international level and the global/ecological level. These four different levels are also identified with some potential causes and conditions varying from the violations of basic needs to the structural/cultural violence, ethnocentrism, Realpolitik, negative self-fulfilling prophecies and self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes etc. (Sandole, 1998). Regardless of their weight, all levels and most of the causes and conditions in Sandole's theory can be observed in Burundi during the 1990s. On the individual level, unfulfilled "human needs" such as identity, recognition and security (Burton, 1990) became important in the conflict by creating cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964) and frustration between the Hutu and Tutsi. The societal level focused on political, economic and socio-psychological perspectives such as stereotypes, prejudices, and the inter-group biases were appeared among the conflict parties. The international level was mostly related with colonial factors and spill-over effect highlighting the regional and international aspect of the conflict. The scarcity of resources, overproduction of land, overpopulation and environmental degradation have been the ecological level of the tension in Burundi (Sandole, 1998; Özçelik, 2017).

According to the three-pillar analysis, the conditions at different levels of a conflict are also considered in two categories as start-up conditions and as process conditions. Since most conflicts have a dynamic process, it is necessary to come up with solutions that address both conditions at each phase of the conflict, from the starting point to its escalation and resolution (Sandole, 1999). The nature and the starting conditions of violent conflict circle in Burundi seems just as an ethnic problem, but beyond its extremely significant ethnic dimensions, the start-up conditions are fundamentally political. Anyway, although ethnic differences are provoked between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, it should be remembered that both groups speak the same language, share the same culture and live in the same geography (United Nations Peacemaker,

2000; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000). The political circumstances include “divide and rule” colonial policies and post-colonial regimes that polarize politics and economy by using ethnic lines (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005; Piombo, 2010; Ndikumana, 1998). Henceforth, these conditions at individual, societal, international and ecological levels diversify by some socio-economic, institutional and sub/regional factors and transform into triggers of the conflict as a self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling process (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; Curtis, 2013; Sandole, 1998; Özçelik, 2017). Therefore, it can be said that a conflict intervention can only achieve peace in Burundi to the extent that it addresses all the start-up and process conditions at all levels.

Under Pillar III, Sandole eventually maps a model of conflict intervention of third parties in line with their objectives and approaches. The third parties have options from competition or cooperation, negative or positive peace, Track1 or Track2 diplomacy, but these are likely to be used together in certain conflicts (Sandole, 1998). The use of both competitive and cooperative conflict resolution mechanisms in Burundi would have an impact on the capacity for negative or positive peace, and would make the interventions more successful by addressing the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at each level. The endogenous conflict environment in Burundi has been also a critical factor in the duration and intensity of the conflict. Therefore, a conflict intervention in Burundi would also require a long-term collaboration of local, regional and international actors in order to affect the conflict transformation in the country (Özçelik, 2017). This paper mainly focuses on the Pillar III and the third-party intervention in the Burundi conflict during the 1990s.

Conflict Intervention Framework in Burundi and The Arusha Agreement

When a conflict arises, the parties have multiple choices for dealing with the conflict. These options might include unilateral or bilateral acts, as well as third-party interventions in various forms (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996). In the forms of fact-finding, chairmanship or facilitation, third parties might have remarkable roles by revealing the problematic issues between the conflicting parties, by defining the needs, interests, expectations and concerns of the conflict parties, by building ways of communication and dialogue between the parties, by introducing more efficient problem solving and negotiation procedures, or by drafting an agreement acceptable to the conflicting parties (Bercovitch, 1985; Moore, 2014). Third-parties also determine their priorities and objectives in an intervention, such as conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution or conflict transformation (Sandole, 1998). In this sense, it can be said that the intervention framework in Burundi was primarily comprised of conflict resolution and conflict transformation objectives and practices.

The origin of the conflict intervention in Burundi was a regional attempt launched by the neighboring countries mediated by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere in order to escape the negative effects of the conflict on the region, in terms of refugee influx, rebel activities and regional stability (Daley, 2007; Bruderlein & Erhardy, 1997; Reyhler & Langer, 2006). Following Pierre Buyoya military coup in 1996, neighboring countries imposed regionally sanctions on Burundi, and declared Nyerere as a mediator to facilitate and restore peace in the country as well as in the region (Vandeginste, 2009). After Nyerere died in 1999, the former South African President Nelson Mandela took over the mission. There were several negotiations in Burundi during this period, but the Arusha process was the most structured and comprehensive one. The Arusha negotiations -which the international community has tried to find a permanent solution and sustainable peace for the first time to the crisis (Nkurunziza, 2016) have succeeded in putting an end to the violent conflict both by involving a broad variety of participants from political parties to civil society, army, regional and international community, and by culminating in a peace agreement as a climax for the process (Piombo, 2010; Nkurunziza, 2018).

The Arusha Agreement (The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi / Arusha Accords) facilitated by Mandela was signed in 2000 by the government, the National Assembly and Burundian political parties. The cosignatories were the president of Uganda as the chairman of the Great Lakes Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, the president of Kenya as the region's elder statesman, and the president of Tanzania as the host, as well as the Secretary-General of the UN, the Secretary-General of the OAU, the representative of the EU, and the executive director of non-governmental Nyerere Foundation. Five protocols were accepted in the agreement. By analyzing the root causes, perceptions, practices and ideology in Burundi crisis, Protocol I addressed the nature of the conflict, genocide issues, exclusion and their solutions. Protocol II presented democracy and good governance as guarantors of security and justice without any exclusion, as well as specified the transitional period led by legal, judicial and administrative reforms in Burundi. The third Protocol pointed at achieving peace and security by peaceful means in the country, and ending all forms of violence to promote lasting peace, permanent ceasefire and cessation of any type of hostilities. Protocol IV focused on the principles, guidelines and transitional activities for Burundi's reconstruction and socio-economic development. Finally, Protocol V highlighted the importance of the effective implementation of the agreement, building on the road maps established and the lessons learned from previous initiatives (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000).

As an integral part of the agreement, the protocols have generated positive achievements in addressing the start-up and process conditions as well as the root causes and the tragic outcomes of the conflict. The agreement, which opposes any kind of division, exclusion and discrimination, seeks to establish a new political, economic, social and

judicial order in Burundi. In this context, certain arrangements are envisaged regarding the constitution, transitional and constitutional structures, good governance and democratic elections, as well as judicial, administrative and military reforms. The equal distribution of socio-economic opportunities; the prevention and investigation of recurrence of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity; the re-designation of state institutions, as well as defense and security areas based on power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi; the resettlement and reintegration of refugees; the formation of the principles of ceasefire; and the involvement of international community with its moral, diplomatic, technical, material and financial assistance are also discussed in the agreement. It is further planned to set-up an implementation monitoring committee and various commissions, such as truth and reconciliation (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000).

Despite covering numerous issues, it is worth noting that the agreement still has remarkable shortcomings in terms of both its scope and its implementation. One of the major shortcomings in the process is the exclusion of the chief armed Hutu rebel groups (CNDD-FDD and PALIPHEHUTU-FNL) from the negotiations and the agreement (International Crisis Group, 6 August 2002). Since the beginning of the talks, this exclusion has played an important role in slowing down the peace process and preventing a ceasefire from being achieved (Piombo, 2010). Another drawback of the agreement is that it served as a transition time guide and left the implementation details unresolved. The UN Secretary General's Special Representative for the Great Lakes, Berhanu Dinka, was appointed as chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee to oversee adherence to the implementation timetable and functions set forth in the agreement, and to arbitrate outstanding matters between signatories (UN SG/A752—AFR/277, 27 November 2000). Nevertheless, issues such as the leading transition government, ethnic balance in all areas including military, power-sharing in government, and coping with past genocide remained in Burundi (Piombo, 2010).

In addition to a general delay in implementation, there have been charges by Hutu of secret alliances and secret changes made to the agreement between the main Hutu party and the government. Regional leaders involved in conflicts in neighboring countries were accused of derailing process through funding, training and agitating rebel groups (Griggs, 1999). Moreover, the limitations include the lack of concrete mechanisms like an investigation committee, a truth and reconciliation commission, or an international tribunal (Hatungimana, Theron & Popic, 2007, p. 22); the major reservations of the signatories (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 72); signing the cease-fire with external pressure (International Crisis Group, 6 August 2002); the prioritization of ruling elites' interests; and the failure to recognize the importance of strong economic measures for sustainable peace and peacebuilding (Nkurunziza, 2016, p. 224–225). From the problem of exclusion to the agreement's implementation, all of those flaws had a negative effect on conflict resolution and transformation process as a tool for Burundi's conflict intervention.

Conflict Intervention Mapping and Design in Burundi

The Arusha Agreement has already put into place a framework for resolving the conflict and its transformation. However, it has been seen that certain other systems need to be placed for the parties to fulfill the objectives of the accord. The peace agreement had both competitive and cooperative components. The mandate for total restructure of the government, the mandatory integration of the government, particularly the military were illustrative of competitive processes. Cooperative processes must have complemented these competitive processes. The inability to take this approach was one of the reasons that the previous efforts to democratize Burundi failed in the past. Moreover, an effective response would have to operate at all levels of the conflict just as the causes and conditions were identified at different levels. Rather than a negative peace that can be achieved in the prevention or cessation of hostilities at those different levels, the root causes and conditions of the conflict as well as all forms of violence should also be eliminated in the long term by positive peace orientations in Burundi.

In order to affect negative or positive peace in Burundi, an integrated structures of conflict resolution networks which have vertical and horizontal dimensions should be accomplished in the country (Sandole, 1999, p. 161; Lund, 1996). Michael Lund's conflict curve focuses on the intensity of the conflict on the vertical axis and the duration of the conflict on the horizontal axis (Lund, 1996, p. 38). Vertical integration involves systems of conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution and prevention/transformation at local, societal, sub-regional, regional and global levels. A vertical system is also essentially a bottom-up one as described by Lund. Parties of the conflict bear direct responsibility and accountability at the sub-regional and regional levels. In this process, extra-local and extra-regional states as well as the international organizations would provide facilitative, technical, political and military support (Lund, 1996, p. 183). The horizontal axis would ensure that there is lateral coordination of the tasks and objectives between the actors at each level -local, regional and global- to make the most efficient use of available resources by maximizing their effectiveness, and preventing them from working at cross-purposes (Lund, 1996, p. 189; Sandole, 1999, p. 161). The Burundian peace agreement could have been implemented following this system.

There appears to be a need for both Track1 (military support and governmental) and Track2 (non-governmental) components at different stages of the conflict intervention process as well. In consideration of the fact that the negotiated agreement of 19 parties out of the 21 directly interested parties has not been successful in effecting a cease-fire, so it requires some need for the exercise of competitive or realpolitik measures in order to at least bring about a negative peace initially. This is the peacemaking or conflict management stage of intervention (Sandole, 1999, p. 161; Lund, 1996). Accordingly, it would be appropriate for the UN and OAU to send in a sufficient number of armed forces to bring the ongoing violent conflict under control and enforce a cease-fire. This

appeared necessary to break the conflict-as-process vicious cycle of strike and retaliation in which the rebels and the government are engaged. However, nothing short of forceful external intervention of sufficient power but without military objectives could be capable of stopping this quasi-deterministic conflict spiral to allow implementation of the agreement. This armed intervention would have been as somewhere between peacekeeping and a large-scale peace enforcement. Additionally, it was particularly true if some analysts' suspicions were correct that the remaining armed rebel opposition is being sponsored by outside governments, such as Rwanda, Tanzania or the Democratic Republic of Congo, and this is preventing the leaders of the groups from voluntarily agreeing to a cease-fire because of role conflict (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001, p. 112). These competitive measures were critical in attempting to prevent and control the spill-over effect of the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The use or threat of use of coercive forces was also consistent with Lund's observations that different types of intervention are appropriate under different circumstances, depending on what is going on at the time of the intervention (Lund, 1996). Furthermore, in their contingency model of third-party intervention, Fisher and Keashly condoned this approach and claimed that the overall strategy is to intervene at the appropriate time with the appropriate third-party system in order to de-escalate the conflict (Fisher & Keashly, 1991). Similarly, Vasquez has endorsed the idea of peace system that is prepared to prescribe a particular intervention to the specific stages, and combined additional interventions in appropriate sequences to de-escalate the conflict (Vasquez, 1993). After a cease-fire is effectuated, a sufficient number of peacekeeping forces must have then stayed on the ground for a substantial period of time while Burundi undergoes psychological, emotional, economic and democratic reconstruction of civil society. It has never been in place during previous democratic reforms that ended with the military coup d'états such as in 1996, when General Pierre Buyoya overthrew the transitional government leader and reclaimed the presidency that he lost in the last democratic election. This once again shows that negative peace in Burundi is essential but insufficient condition for the ultimate goal of positive peace.

In a positive peace initiative, the parties to the agreement must have sold the solutions presented in the agreement directly to the affected populations, otherwise it may lack legitimacy. This was demonstrated by the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord for Rwanda which purported to resolve the neighboring Rwandan conflict but was followed with the massive genocide of Tutsi in 1993. The agreement was made between political elites and was not inclusive of all conflicting groups in the society. Despite a wide participation, the Burundian Arusha Agreement in 2000 had also this potential, since it was the product of a political elite and did not include critical parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, a coercive solution imposed by political actors has proven that it may fail. In order to avoid a repetition of past peace initiatives' failures both in Rwanda and Burundi, the

implementation process must have involved all relevant parties, including Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals, civil servants, businessmen, and other civil society representatives (Griggs, 1999). The implementation plan must genuinely reflect the political will of all parties to the conflicts. Moreover, transparency and consensus from the bottom-up is essential (Burton, 1997). Through some representatives, establishing a national dialogue environment at the community level as well as conducting a series of village meetings where the agreement is clarified to the public and questions are raised could make this process more effective.

The attachment of certain economic incentives and sanctions as carrots and sticks by the international community including the UN, EU, US, Canada and some regional states as well as regional and sub-regional organizations would be necessary to ensure that the government implements the agreement (Daley, 2007). In the past, this strategy has succeeded in pressuring President Buyoya to make democratic reforms and to restore constitutional order, at least in the short term (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; UN SG S/1996/660, 15 August 1996). The provision of consultative services, the granting of financial assistance and the inclusion in certain trade deals can be conditioned on the government's good faith progress toward the goals of the peace agreement. Furthermore, international governmental organizations and the Western powers that have been involved in Burundi conflict should endeavor to reduce the country's export dependency. Burundi's dependency on the export of coffee and tea to outside countries not only contributed to weak civil society, increased debt, environmental degradation and food shortages in the country, but also made the government more focused and responsive in its relationship with foreign actors instead of citizens (Griggs, 1999). When all these economic issues remained as competitive rather than cooperative, it is often unavoidable to consent to short-lived solutions that can only bring negative peace.

Once a negative peace is restored, then the focus must be on more cooperative processes such as the structural conflict transformation, the national reconstruction, and the reconciliation. These cooperative processes would not only be essential for the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, but also for addressing the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict as well as the deep wounds of the masses of Hutu and Tutsi civilians who have suffered the brunt of the ongoing violent conflict. Heretofore, ethnic strife was dealt with by attempting to impose ethnic unity on the people, for example, passing laws forbidding the formation of political parties based on ethnicity or any other exclusionary factor (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000). Actually, due to the Hutu and Tutsi's diametrically opposed interests, this competitive approach to reconciliation has failed, and the political parties remained split along ethnic lines. Moreover, the chosen trauma for both the Hutu and Tutsi that has been aggravated by the ongoing violence will require the use of creative cooperative processes to heal. Track2 would seem best equipped to fill this need. As the new rule of law is enforced, the leaders, government

officials and representatives from all facets of society should be involved in dialogs, problem-solving workshops, diversity and conflict resolution training programs, and other interactive processes aimed at promoting the inter-cultural and inter-ethnic understanding. This should be an attempt to break the pattern of the past wherein democratization along just majority lines failed because the oppressed minority seeks power by extra-judicial means, such as military or rebel coups.

Regional and sub-regional organizations might have also an important role in collaborative efforts to restore peace. Despite its notable efforts and achievements, the OAU's overall record in maintaining Africa's peace and security was poor. Lack of political will among the members, external interventions, and a lack of capacity, experience and financial resources were among this regional organization's main flaws (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000). However, "the policy of non-interference (OAU Charter, 25 May 1963)" in the internal affairs of member states was the most crucial, and this principle in the Charter hindered its position in resolving intra-state conflicts which have erupted especially in 1990s. The conflict in Burundi confirms that the OAU needs to make a substantial move away from the policy not to intervene in the affairs of its members. The paradigm shift would be experienced with the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and would bring the principle of non-indifference and right to intervene. At the same time, revealing the mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms at regional and sub-regional levels based on the understanding of "African Solutions to African Problems" would shape the peace and security architecture in the continent (Obasanjo, 2015). Particularly, if it was clearly stated when and under what conditions the conflicts would be intervened in OAU period, it would have been possible to prevent the genocidal level of violence in Burundi during the 1990s. So, it should be established the criteria for when interference into the internal affairs of a member state is appropriate and acceptable. In order to architect peace and stability in Africa, the OAU should also redefined itself with a specific mandate and certain standards of conduct as a guide for all members and for all of the acts of the union.

What is more, the sub-regional initiatives in the Great Lakes Region should be strengthened and expanded in scope and purpose. Political boundaries, land shortages, ethnic divisions (Griggs, 1999), social-ethnic cleavages, the fragility of multi-ethnic states, the problems on natural resources, large scale direct violence and mass killings, a high level of structural violence, and impunity were just a few of the prevalent Great Lakes regional challenges, in terms of both conflict sources and consequences. Since the peoples and countries in the region are inextricably interdependent with each other, any lasting peace process in a country must consider the social, economic, and physical linkages in entire region (Sida, 2004). The close proximity, ethnic population overlap, the scarcity of resources, the compelling needs of the masses, and the support of some neighboring countries for rebel groups make them interdependent (Griggs, 1999). In this context,

a Great Lakes sub-regional initiative should identify the common interests on both co-operative and competitive issues like basic needs, defense, security, ecology, economy, humanitarian concerns and stability. Besides, it is critical to determine if they have any other mutual interests, and the organizations should design an agenda for achieving these objectives based on the shared interests. A code of conduct could then be created according to the parameters of whether certain conduct serves or blocks the mutual interests. When it is decided that a member state is acting against the common good, the organization should have a process in place to take disciplinary measures ranging from official reprimands to imposition of sanctions, exclusion from the organization, or actual forceful interventions.

In the interest of maintaining positive peace, long-term efforts should be made to expand public and governmental thinking about the meaning of geographical boundaries. An enhanced understanding of how the boundaries were historically formed and how the regional countries were interdependent with each other will facilitate these efforts. The interdependency and transnational links not only explain the spread of conflicts in the region, but also reveals the importance of developing regional peace policies (Rubin, 2006). Exploration might be made concerning the region heading in the same directions as the trend of European Union. Under this approach, the Great Lakes Region would be designated as an entity composed of nations, tribes, municipalities, villages, ethnic identity groups and other structures. This entity could then monitor, manage and adjust boundaries, and exchange resources more freely to meet the basic physical and identity needs of the varied population in the region. This would have the effect of collectively strengthening all of the regional actors' security and competitive position in the global economy (Lund, 1996). It is also important to recognize the challenges and roadblocks to regional cooperation, such as lack of political commitment and capacity, current regional political and economic asymmetries, ongoing distrust and mutual suspicion among the states in the Great Lakes Region (Westerkamp et al., 2009). In that sense, many peace efforts from conflict prevention to conflict transformation will also depend on overcoming the barriers on the way of regional integration.

Another critical problem in search for peace in Burundi is about the governmental and political issues. As the most significant cause behind the African conflicts, the nature of political power in many African countries is built on certain characteristics, such as a winner-takes-all system, a lack of transparency, a breakdown of the rule of law, human rights violations, and the inability to replace leaders peacefully (UN A/52/871, 13 April 1998). The Burundian government, like the other major players in the region, has a highly centralized power. This has contributed not only to the government's corruption and lack of accountability, but also its engagement in humanitarian abuses and genocide more easily. For example, the past genocide in Burundi was the product of state-directed violence (Griggs, 1999). From this point, a conflict intervention process

should endeavor to dismantle corruption, as well as extensive bureaucratic power and dictatorship throughout the region. The reconstruction of the government must also seek to expand participation in the government and all affairs of the nation at a grass-root level (Burton, 1997). Thus, the intervention design in Burundi should put a greater emphasis on strengthening the local governments and reducing power centralization.

As well as dealing with the governmental issues, creating a reliable internal justice system in Burundi would be a strong supporter of any political efforts and peace initiatives in the long term. An effective intervention design must establish justice and reconciliation mechanisms that have the ability to address past grievances and prevent conflict from resurfacing as a start-up condition. The rationale for justice and reconciliation is the belief that confronting and investigating the past is an inextricable part of the post-conflict peacebuilding, and a key for a more peaceful future (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Approaches to justice are discussed in the literature in two ways: retributive and restorative. The retributive justice seeks to punish the past injustices like war crimes and human rights violations. Legal instruments such as criminal trials in national and international courts and tribunals, as well as reforming the current national justice system, are mostly included in retributive justice (Albin, 2009). In Burundi, a special tribunal should be formed to prosecute all warring factions for unspeakable war crimes and human rights abuses, and to prevent them from committing similar crimes in the future (Human Rights Watch, 2009). As a type of more or less physical compulsion, this legitimate force would serve the integration and adaptation functions of a political system (Almond, 1960). It is also consistent with Sandole and Lund's premise that both competitive and cooperative processes are essential to maintain positive peace, and they can be complementary to each other (Sandole, 1999; Lund, 1996).

The restorative justice approach focuses on repairing and compensating the victims, restoring relationships, and reconciling societies including former adversaries. The most popular restoration methods include truth commissions and truth telling, reparation and compensation, forgiveness and apologies (Albin, 2009). For example, Furlong uses the "triangle of satisfaction" to analyze the success of the peace and believes that psychological measures -like an apology- take place in one of the triangle's corners (Furlong, 2005). A truth and reconciliation commission could also help Burundi in dealing with the atrocities committed during the conflict. The Arusha Agreement states that the parties agree in principle to create such a commission, but the details or a timeline are not specified. Given that both the Hutu and Tutsi have been recognized as victims of genocide at different times, it is critical here to involve external actors like the UN, the OAU, and/or other regional actors in the peace process. This allows all sides a sense of trust and fairness in the integrity of peace process.

Furthermore, the Tutsi political elite dominated the existing judiciary in the country, and it is important to establish a truth commission independent from the government

authority or judiciary. According to David Easton, political life is a boundary-maintaining series of interactions embedded in and surrounded by other social systems. However, the political interaction differs from the others because its primary objective is to authoritatively establish the values for the society (Easton, 1965). The principal inputs in this political system are demands and supports, while the primary outputs are the decisions allocating systems benefits (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The truth and reconciliation commission would serve one of Easton's output functions based on previously established rules and criteria for decision. The manner in which it handled this role would further provide a model for society as an alternative way of conflict management and set standards for acceptable behavior based on cooperative as opposed to competitive process.

The people's belief in imagining a shared future for all by using restorative justice methods is further at the heart of reconciliation, as a necessary condition for positive peace (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Thousands of survivors of the violent conflicts have lost family members and they are permanently wounded emotionally or physically scarred for life. A national dialogue conducted through professionally facilitated town or village meetings would be helpful in eliciting acknowledgement and fostering mutual forgiveness among the masses (Saunders, 1999). Moreover, problem-solving workshops and sustained dialogues would be effective formats for government officials and policy makers to use together. The facilitated community meetings and dialogues can also be used as a mechanism for consensus building and as a feedback mechanism concerning the progress of the restructuring the society.

In moving from negative to positive peace, internal systems need to be put into place that allow for what Talcott Parsons refers to as an "ordered process" of change that maintains equilibrium (Parsons & Shils, 1962). One of the ways that Parsons' posits that order is maintained in systems as they undergo change is through the formulation of common values for all members of society. Parsons further articulates the need for the differentiation of interests among the varied peoples in society in a pluralistic fashion that cuts across historic lines of differentiation between them (Parsons, 1967; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). In some ways, this is what the Burundi government may have been trying to achieve when they mandated that political parties were not to be based on ethnicity. Nevertheless, when the government attempted to enforce this mandate, political parties were the only organized vehicle available to parties seeking change and fulfillment of their needs. Consequently, the people ignored the government's mandate and political parties remained divided along ethnic lines. On the other hand, most political interests tend to be aligned with ethnic identity due to the long-standing structural violence. As the parties gradually reached economic, educational and political parity, it might be possible to develop identities for more pluralistic interests. This is why the intervention program must also include affirmative action

to provide education, employment, economic opportunities and fair representation to the Hutus in the country. Gradual privatization of the country's economic resources could also open up new avenues for economic parity. Moreover, individual projects, self-sufficiency in food production, the growth of small and medium-sized businesses should all be supported in the intervention.

The intervention program for Burundi should not ignore the fact that Tutsi and Hutu share more in common than differences. Indeed, the Arusha Agreement emphasized the common beliefs, identities, substantial history, language and culture of all ethnic groups in Burundi. Therefore, the differences are largely the product of social construction and resulting social perception. To the extent possible, caution must be taken to ensure that the new social and political system developed in Burundi is structured from new images in order to preserve positive peace (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The existing enemy images and stereotypes that shape Tutsi and Hutu conflictual interaction patterns must be systematically counteracted with new information and images about one another (Öğretir & Özçelik, 2008; Özçelik, 2010). Kenneth Boulding discusses how members of a political system form a mass image referred as folk image, and he argues that political leaders' decisions are shaped by the folk image and the conflicting information is screened out (Boulding, 1959; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). As a result, the decision-makers make decisions based on distortions of perception and potential misinterpretation of information. Then, such folk image or knowledge is perpetuated in stereotypes and scapegoating of conflict parties in role defense by leaders (Sandole, 1999). In Burundi, the goal should be to establish a societal-value system centered on a social ideal and vision that promotes constructive behavior and harmonious relations between the Tutsi and Hutu which actually creates cognitive dissonance with respect to destructive behavior based on the old folk knowledge.

Such programs in the Arusha Agreement like imposition of quotas and certain proportional representation in the government or military are necessary and beneficial inasmuch as they address structural violence, foster interaction and expose Hutu and Tutsi to each other. They also counterbalance negative belief systems, promote interdependence and require the parties to collaborate toward mutual goals within the context of the organizations. Nevertheless, these programs are not sufficient alone to sustain positive peace in the long run because of the power of the society's collective memory, chosen trauma and folk knowledge which shape future decisions and actions. In Burundi, each group holds a deep-rooted belief that the other cannot be trusted. No matter how short-term action one's opponent takes, Hutu and Tutsi each believe that one will try to surreptitiously dominate or eliminate the other group. The Tutsi also foster the notion that Hutu are incapable of running the country. As well as ethnically differentiated access to resources and power starting from the pre-colonial period (Griggs, 1999), the imagined distinction between "Tutsi lords" and "Hutu serfs" and

the Tutsi dominance over the Hutu people by colonial practices bolstered that belief (Lemarchand, 1970). When it comes to financial success in agriculture, industry, business and mining, as well as placement in the military and government, there is still a great disparity between the two groups. Moreover, the Hutu are less educated and have few economic options aside from working on Tutsi-run plantations or engaging in illegal cross-border trade in ivory, gold, diamonds, heroin and guns (Griggs, 1999). Structural violence that occurs in various alienated forms in this environment such as failure to meet basic needs (Burton, 1990), rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964), or relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) brings with it the frustration (Sandole, 1998). Therefore, a conflict intervention design in Burundi should deal with the domination, frustration, oppression and the perception of longstanding oppression in society.

A behavioral-scientific approach would also be crucial in Burundi aimed at enhancing international cooperation and preventing conflicts between the two communities by launching a re-education and re-socialization initiative for both policy-makers and the masses. This initiative includes educational programs, cultural exchanges, and training of children, citizens and government officials with new methods (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The combination of programs to facilitate increased actual educational and economic parity between the Hutu and Tutsi and to change their belief systems is necessary to address both the physical and structural violence in the nation. Furthermore, reconditioning and indeed even transformation of the people's psychological attitudes toward each other and toward peaceful methods of conflict resolution can also be achieved through the use of mass media (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The media can help to promote peace in a variety of ways, such as building bridges between peoples, improving governance, increasing true information on conflictual issues, providing early warning, and motivating people to resolve the conflicts (Idris, 2020). Nonetheless, as seen in the Rwandan genocide, it plays a negative role in the fostering of ethnic hatred by facilitating and legitimizing violence (Chalk, 2007). Subsequently, a "hate media" trial was held to prosecute those responsible for this media violence during the tragic period in Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2007; Biju-Duval, 2007). In this respect, a conflict intervention including re-education and re-socialization programs should make active use of the media in peacebuilding, but never underestimate the risk of its turning into a weapon of societal hatred.

Finally, reintegration policies must be seen as a part of the conflict intervention. The Arusha Agreement provides the principles of rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration for all displaced, regrouped and dispersed persons as well as returnees (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000). In 1996, thousands of Hutu civilians in the conflict-ridden provinces of the country were forced to leave their homes and a new category of displaced persons known as "regrouped" emerged in the camps. Along with the forced relocation, the regroupment process has resulted in severe human rights violations

in Burundi, such as extrajudicial executions, property destruction, undue restrictions on freedom of movement, disappearances, vulnerability to attacks and security risk, life-threatening and appalling camp conditions. This also means that the basic human needs related to health, safety, shelter, hygiene and nutrition were not met for those people (Amnesty International, 15 July 1997). It is difficult for people to address the societal rebuilding and reconciliation when their very survival is at stake and basic physical needs are not being met yet. So, the intervention process in Burundi must involve both internal social policies and immediate humanitarian assistance for food, health care, and shelter as well as the physical reconstruction of the villages. Coordination between Hutu and Tutsi in this phase may allow them to recognize a superordinate goal that will lead to a transformation of their relationship.

Conclusion

Given the international community has not been adequately prepared for civil wars in 1990s, and the discipline of conflict resolution has just begun to emerge as a multi-level, cosmopolitan and viable field of study, the Arusha process in Burundi was a remarkable achievement (Leonhardt, 2001). This regionally initiated and internationally supported conflict intervention process has been culminated in a peace agreement which proposes multiple solutions and mechanisms to the country's most dramatic and violent conflict by addressing the underlying causes and conditions. The Arusha Peace Agreement put an end to the atmosphere of strife and violence provoked by using of ethnic issues as a tool of strong political, economic and social dominance, and in the first place succeeded in bringing a state of negative peace to the country. However, the shortcomings of the agreement and the difficulties faced mostly in the implementation phase, reveal the need for multi-level conflict intervention and guide for positive peace in Burundian multi-level conflict. As Sandole's three pillar model classifies, the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at the individual, societal, international, and ecological levels should have been addressed in an effective conflict intervention design in Burundi.

The Arusha Peace Agreement combines competitive and cooperative components, negative and positive peace approaches, as well as Track1 and Track2 methods in order to deal with the violent conflict in Burundi. Stopping the violence and achieving negative peace between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi is undoubtedly a vital step, but achieving positive peace by utilizing such competition, cooperation, Track1 and Track2 tailored to the circumstances, requires much longer-term strategies and preparation. Aside from physical violence, structural violence with its economic, political, social and psychological dimensions at any level must also be addressed in a conflict intervention in the long-term. Unfulfilled human needs such as security, identity and recognition; political, economic and social inequalities; human rights violations, chosen trauma, hate speech, enemy image and frustration are among the underlying causes and conditions

of the conflict in Burundi, and until these issues are resolved, it cannot be accomplished conflict resolution or conflict transformation objectives for positive peace. Overcoming such problems would also strengthen the conflict intervention and peace process in Burundi by preventing not only the occurrence of new conflicts, but also the recurrence of old ones.

Third parties would contribute to the country's peaceful future by supporting the legal reforms and tribunals, as well as establishing justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Burundi. Ensuring the rule of law in the country and developing a functioning justice system are integral parts of positive peace in an intervention process. This involves both punishing past human rights abuses, and healing the deep wounds of the society. Truth and reconciliation commissions, truth-telling, confronting the past, forgiveness and apologies, even if painful, could help society learn from its past experiences, and build a strong future by making the truth available when Burundian people were "ready". Tools such as problem-solving workshops, media, international aid, foreign assistance, economic incentives, as well as rehabilitation, social cohesion and disarmament programs are all among the instruments that can be used at this stage. Moreover, a conflict intervention in Burundi would inevitably be more effective if it appealed to a broad segment of the population, and civil society would have the potential to play a key role in fostering a dialogue environment.

Another important factor in an effective intervention was sub-regional and regional cooperation, which helped to prevent the conflict's spill-over impacts and neighboring countries' support for the conflicting parties. In this sense, Arusha process as a mediation launched by the neighboring countries and regional leaders was a clear example of regional cooperation and Africa's quest for solutions to its own problems. It is not easy to overcome the destructive impact of colonial policies and sowing discord among the people in the region, but a conflict intervention should emphasize the shared values and common interests rather than discrepancies both in the country and in the region. Regional and international organizations, as well as international community should also have contributed to this cooperation. However, despite the significance of any outside assistance or cooperation, the real solution to the conflicts in Burundi lies within the Burundian society itself. Remembering this, every group in Burundi who has lived peacefully together for centuries must work hard in a broad consensus and have a strong will to achieve positive peace by pushing the political elites to put into practice the required legal, economic, political and social structures. In fact, when this point is reached, conflict intervention efforts will be completed their mission in Burundi.

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Libya: Arms Proliferation and Armed Groups. The Libyan Conflict Revisited

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Abstract: The study critically analyses the effects of the Libyan arms proliferation, with a focus on the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the region. It traces the proliferation of arms occasioned by the Civil War in Libya and establishes an empirical link to some of the regional security challenges to the proliferation. Relevant theoretical perspectives, such as the Security Dilemma and the Security Complex Theory, are adopted to explain the resulting effects of the proliferation such as the increased deadly violence of the rebel forces in the region and the neighboring Middle East region. Innovative arms control has been presented as the opportunity for the region to address the security challenges which are quickly evolving into a proliferation of advanced sophisticated weapons, some of them in the rebel-controlled territories. The study concludes that the regional security challenges partly originate from the Libyan arms proliferation which have also worsened security challenges in different parts of the world.

Keywords: Arms proliferation, Security Dilemma, Libya, Regional Security Complex, arms control, Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration.

Introduction

The consequences of arms proliferation are more pronounced in Africa compared to the other regions. More than a half of the countries in the continent have experienced armed conflicts that can be linked directly to arms proliferation albeit at varying degrees. Africa has been a theatre for international great power rivalry either directly or through proxies, armed rebel groups, mercenaries, as well as organized criminal

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gangs. Efforts towards arms control have registered little success with conflicts protracting with devastating effects.

There is no agreed definition of small arms and this study adopts the definition set by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms which considers portability of both weapons as a defining characteristic. Some of the weapons include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and assault rifles, and light machine guns and their ammunition. Small arms are both durable and portable. They are mobile and relatively easy to conceal, making them easy to trade, move, hide or steal. Small arms are light and easy to use even by children (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 1997).

Understanding the Gap

The fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya has witnessed increased armed rivalry and tensions in the neighboring countries and almost all of them have been entangled in one way or another in the Libyan Crisis with no end in sight. A significant number of the neighboring states across three continents in Africa, Middle East and Europe have plunged into direct or proxy conflicts which can be argued to be directly linked to the arms proliferation occasioned by the dismantling of the central holding authority in Libya. Libya, as a country, was believed to possess enormous amount of stockpiles of weaponry and it was in the process of developing biological, chemical and nuclear armaments although with great difficulties as a result of the increased pressure from the international community led by the United States. The main argument of the study is that the crisis facing the neighboring regional states is a result of the dangerous proliferation of arms from the national stores of the fallen Gaddafi regime in Libya. The study critically analyses the consequences of arms proliferation as a result of the Libyan Crisis and provides suggestions for the actors involved to move towards a legitimate arms control regime in a region that has quickly transformed into a proliferation arena for technologically advanced sophisticated arms. The arms control mechanism has the potential of stabilizing the region, first by denying the rebels ammunition for attacking civilians and threatening governments, especially in the Sahel region, and secondly by restoring trust and confidence to the arms suppliers that no actor will be capable of threatening vital interests from Libya.

The study reviews both primary and secondary empirical evidence from published sources such as journal articles, books, relevant government records, records from relevant international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council meetings and resolution on the conflict, with the objective of finding out the effects of the Libyan arms proliferation to the region. The Libyan Crisis is used as a case study to comprehensively review the impacts of arms proliferation and to suggest a legitimate all-encompassing arms control regime that has remained a pipe dream in many re-

gions engulfed in armed conflicts. The qualitative data is utilized to give meaning to observations and events critically analyzed. The outcomes of the study are considered useful to the actors involved in the conflict directly and indirectly, the international organizations that are working towards a solution to the challenges of Libya and, most importantly, the people of Libya and all those who are victims of arms in the wrong hands longing for justice.

The study approaches the issue of arms proliferation through the lens of the Security Dilemma Theory and the Regional Security Complex Theory. According to the Security Dilemma, one party's security concerns, sometimes necessitated by the anarchic international order, prompts an overall diminishing in security of the others, leading them to also increase their security and this unresolvable uncertainty increases arms to unprecedented levels (Roe, 1999). At the intrastate level, the disintegrating state and ethnic hostilities may aggravate the situation, motivating armed groups to exploit each other's relative weakness in an attempt to fill the power vacuum created by the crumbling state (Jeong, 2008). The rival groups are in the same dilemma as states in the international system, characterized by fear, uncertainty and urgent need to increase own security (Hill, 2005). Acquisition of arms is a key factor of the security dilemma and arms control is a solution to it. Arms control potentially reduce the hostility caused by the security dilemma, providing an opportunity for cooperation (Wendt, 1992).

The Regional Security Complex Theory holds that proximity is a source of security concerns and security threats most probably take place within the region. Regional actors interact with the security of the other actors in the region resulting into a security interdependence. The Security Complex Theory links internal conditions in states, relations among states in the region, relations among regions, and relations between regions and globally acting great powers (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 11).

Brief Literature Review

Small arms are responsible for more casualties than any other type of weapon, they aggravate conflicts, destabilize societies and hinder development. Proliferation has been defined as the spread of weapons from one group to another. Variations include vertical proliferation, which involves spread among different actors within a state, and lateral proliferation, where the acquisition involves a spread to other states (Sokolski *et al.*, 2014).

The control of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, is a key element of crisis prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding in the field of conventional arms control. Security is crucial for development and the proliferation of arms hinders economic and social development and plays a major role in the violent escalation of conflicts. For instance, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems, or "Man-Portable Air-Defense

Systems" ("MANPADS"), which are regarded as light weapons, represent a serious threat to both civilian and military aircrafts.

In Africa, some of the regional initiatives towards arms control include the Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (1998), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001) and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004). Others include the peace and security agenda of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU).

According to Bolton et al, (2012), proliferation of arms is facilitated by certain intermediaries based on legal or illegal demands coming from particular lawless or restricted environments. The United Nations, in 2001, aimed to counter proliferation of small arms through the legally binding Protocol on Firearms to the Vienna Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Program of Action (PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2001), as well as the subsequent adoption of the International Tracing Instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons. The Program of Action contains statements and recommendations on various aspects of small arms control laws, production, marking and registration, cooperation on tracing, storage, destruction of surplus arms, awareness-raising among the population, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as international trade and has been the launch-pad for a host of global and regional initiatives to help states implement it and to find the broadest possible consensus on the most important elements (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2001).

Also, a report of the UN panel of Government Experts on Small Arms states, in section 36 that, "mere accumulation of weapons is not sufficient criterion ... to define an accumulation of weapons as destabilizing, since large numbers of weapons that are under the strict control of a responsible state do not necessarily lead to violence. Conversely, a small number of weapons can be destabilizing under certain conditions" (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2000). On nuclear weapons, the General Assembly, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world, declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013.

Arms control, at the national level, aims at creating oversight of weapon possession and use and may include the prevention of possession of certain types of weapons either among the general public or restricted access to individuals who are presumed high-risk amongst the population. At the international level, arms control has developed through legal and political agreements aimed at regulating the production, trade, use, distribu-

tion, handling and disposal of arms. Arms embargoes are illustrations of international attempts to restrict access to arms of certain high-risk actors by separating legitimate from illegitimate holders of the means of violence. Arms control, however, is unlikely to lead to social justice; instead, it contributes to negative peace (Galtung, 1969).

Libya Arms Regime. A Brief Overview

Gaddafi amassed an enormous collection of military hardware during his decades in power, providing training, supplies and arms in Sierra Leone, Janjaweed forces in Darfur and invading neighboring Chad. He also created the Islamic Legion mercenary army to fulfill his vision of a pan-Arabic band across North Africa. Gaddafi purchased arms worth billions of dollars since 1969 fueled by massive oil reserves. From 1970 until 2009, and even with a long-term UN arms embargo in place between 1992 and 2003, Libya spent around \$30bn on weapons, mostly from USSR. Much of the weaponry and ammunition originated from Eastern Europe and Russia. France and Germany earned \$3.2bn and \$1.4bn respectively from arms deals with the Libyan regime (Feinstein, 2011).

On December 19, 2003, Muammar Gaddafi welcomed international inspectors to verify Tripoli's commitment to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), following allegations of owning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Inspectors from the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and international organizations worked to dismantle Libya's chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its long-range ballistic missiles. Normalization of relations with US, which was cut off in 1981, was considered. The US invasion of Iraq, an interdiction of a ship containing nuclear-related components destined for Libya, as well as sanctions and diplomatic efforts, are believed to be among the factors leading to Tripoli's decision.

UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748 of 1992 imposing sanctions on Libya, including an arms embargo and air travel restrictions. In 2004, the EU lifted the arms embargo on Libya, allowing EU countries to export to Libya arms and other military equipment. The reasoning was to improve Libya's capacity to patrol its maritime borders and prevent migration to the EU from North Africa which was a great concern to Southern European states such as Italy. European arms transfers are governed by the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and national export control laws. In 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized an international response to the Libyan civil war. The resolution created a no-fly zone over Libya, strengthened arms embargo and inspection of suspected weapons trafficking ships and planes traveling to the country.

Analyzing the Regional Effects of the Libyan Arms Proliferation

Libya enjoys a geo-strategic location in the African continent with strong Arab ties to the Middle East. The country is separated from Europe and the Middle East only by the Mediterranean Sea. This regional proximity makes it possible for the neighboring states

to experience increased security threats and other related shocks due to the ongoing civil war and the weak administration in the country.

The first report by the UNSC group of experts monitoring Libyan arms embargo, at the start of the uprising in 2011, recognized that Libya was a key source of weapons in the region due government struggles to exert authority as former rebel fighters clench power on the ground. According to the report, “illicit transfers from Libya in violation of the embargo cover more than 12 countries and include heavy and light weapons, including man-portable air defense systems, small arms and related ammunition and explosives and mines” (UNSC, 2013).

The number of countries increased to at least 14 countries on several continents in the following year, according to Rwandan ambassador Eugene Gasana, then chair of the UN Security Council’s Libya Sanctions Committee (UNSC, 2014a). According to his report, non-state armed actors-controlled the majority of stockpiles in Libya and ineffectual border control systems made the country a primary source of illicit weapons, including MANPADs. The proliferation is fueling conflicts in Africa and the Levant by enriching the arsenals of the non-state actors. It also has a dimension on the existing tensions amongst EU member states, especially NATO allies, on the enforcement of the sanctioned regime and the arms embargo.

The transfers of arms to Syria from Misrata and Benghazi in Libya via northern Lebanon has resulted in the loss of many innocent lives and displacement of many. Syria demonstrates that continued availability of arms supply can delay and disrupt post-conflict reconstruction efforts and fuel insecurity and instability over the long-term. Studies have shown that the transfer of weapons is more likely to cause conflicts to escalate because, unlike looted weapons, transferred weapons are more likely to be integrated into rebel fighting doctrines and structures which is the final phase of weapons acquisition (Bourne, 2007). Moore (2012) observes that the international transfer of arms represents a unique form of foreign policy that is not explained by intervention framework alone since not all transfers are interventions.

Armed insurgencies acquire weapons through four main ways. They begin with readily available weapons, then to the previous leftovers, into the primary source of rebel arming which is stealing from government sources as a result of their increased capacity (Jackson, 2010). Lastly, acquisition of weapons from international suppliers, including gray and black-market transfers which have greater effects on the civil war. International supplies escalate the conflict and expand weapons access that would otherwise be unavailable domestically. Rebels can obtain training from state suppliers to better use their weapons or tactics manuals and peer mentoring from similar grouping elsewhere. International sources represent a transition from low-level insurgency to the internationalization of the conflict (Marsh, 2007).

The UN report also identified the trafficking from Libya to Egypt which is a challenge primarily for Egypt's internal security in relation to armed groups in the Sinai. However, some of the material crossed Egypt to further destinations, including the Gaza Strip, which borders Israel. The armed groups in the Gaza Strip are able to purchase new weapons, including more modern assault rifles and anti-tank weapon systems (Nichols, 2013). The weapons are also believed to be stockpiled by Egyptian Salafi groups and in the Sinai Peninsula which is already unstable. This provides a challenge to the magnitude of the security dilemma to Egypt to maintain a military advantage over the Gaza rebels as well as the source country Libya. Egypt seized small, light and heavy weapons systems, ammunition for heavy weapons systems and ammunition for small arms and machine guns. Effective Egyptian response to the arms flows in the Sinai is also hampered by the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty which imposed restrictions on Egypt's deployment of the military in Sinai.

The dangers of not arming are unbearable for the state of Egypt with the reality of more superior weapons in the neighborhood. Egypt, therefore, engages in the endless arms race as a basic option for acquiring the military capabilities required to achieve international goals and gain allies. It is believed to be acting rationally as the causes are external and the arming has no consequences of its own (Glaser, 2000). However, Egypt may also be acting sub-optimally building up arms because the domestic interests have distorted its policy. Arming due to distorted internal circumstances, such as the inherent fear of a coup d'état or a significant disruption from some internal elements and factions, is likely to produce negative consequences.

The arms were also transported through Southern Tunisia, Southern Algeria and Northern Niger to destinations such as Mali. Terrorists, criminals and drug trafficking networks with links to the wider Sahel region have cropped up in the transit areas. In Mali, weapons from Libya helped a rebel coalition topple the democratically elected government in Bamako in May 2012 and allowed a jihadist alliance to gain control over the country's Northeast with the al-Qaeda-linked groups enjoying weapons, fighters and cash from Libya. The Tuareg fighters that had served as mercenaries in Libya remained armed after the fall of Gaddafi (Patrick & Bennett, 2013).

The Libyan conflict has also brought into sharp focus the European Union's (EU's) unity and role in monitoring compliance with the UN sanctions regime in Libya. Proposed naval missions in the Mediterranean, like *Sophia*, are limited since potential arms embargo violators, like the neighboring Egypt, for instance, can access Libya by means of land (Rettman, 2011, 2020; Council of the European Union, 2011). The French were the biggest EU arms suppliers to foreign protagonists in the Libya war. The others, like Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK, granted permits for more than €1bn of arms to UN sanctions violators, such as Egypt and the UAE (UNSC, 2019). France granted permits worth €14.1bn for arms deals with Egypt in 2018,

€9.5bn for the UAE and €295m to Libya. Other EU states did the same under a UN aegis in 2018, including Italy (€4.1m of armored vehicles and explosive devices), Germany (€2.3m of vehicles) and the UK (€0.3m of explosives and electronics) (Council of the European Union, 2019).

The EU and NATO, at large, are engrossed in realpolitik and arms proliferation in a geopolitical conflict involving Turkey and Russia. France arms engagement has been influenced by the desire and capacity to penetrate Africa, to impose set of values, imaginations and practices deemed to be superior (Slater, 2004). The French considers actors in Africa as in need of progress, reform or order. It is constituted by lack of respect, belittling of the differences and intrinsic value of African society. The clash with Turkey on Libya's arms control can be explained by the thinking and believe that non-European or Western states cannot play a lead role in enforcing arms control regimes and in international security at large.

According to a report released by UN experts, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) breached the arms embargo on Libya by providing weapons and ammunition with some reports of direct involvement in the conflict through air strikes (Lederer, 2020; Bakir, 2020). Power struggle and the quest for regional dominance has inspired the two states to actively pursue proliferation of weapons to an end, as deduced from Hobbesian perspectives.

During the 2012–2014 period, weapons of Libyan origin were reportedly trafficked to the Central African Republic, Algeria, Somalia, Chad, Niger and Sudan (UNSC, 2014b). In the Horn of Africa, ammunition from Libya was found in Somalia where al-Shabab militants are still fighting the government. Algeria experienced in 2013 an attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Amenas orchestrated by militants associated with an offshoot of al-Qaeda's North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), known as al-Mulathameen. In Tunisia, refugees from Libya exchanged weapons for money at the beginning of the revolution (Kartas, 2013). Nigeria believes that radical Islamist militants affiliated with Boko Haram have been emboldened by their access to Libyan arms. In Chad, the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), encouraged by arms from Libya, has threatened President Deby's regime despite having agreed to lay down its arms in 2010. The Tuareg-based Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) threatened attacks on oil and uranium operations in the country for a greater share of national energy revenues. In the recent days, there are growing concerns over the advanced weapons which are within the reach of the rebels in the conflict such as the advanced Chinese-made FN-6 man-portable air defense system for shooting MiG-21 jet fighter, anti-tank guided missiles, thermal sights of advanced Russian-made ATGMs for targeting and reconnaissance and US made Javelin ATGMs (Vest, 2019).

Towards a Legitimate Arms Control Regime in the Region

According to Kartas (2013), arms control ensure weapons and ammunition are held for approved purposes by individuals and groups which, in the judgment of relevant authorities, can be trusted not to misuse them. It is a process that involves regulating manufacture, possession, securing and managing of stockpiles, controlling brokering and international transfers, recovery, collection and destruction and most importantly effective marking, tracing and record keeping.

Regional arms control is one of the means to achieve a balance of power among the nervous and suspicious neighboring actors. States adopt and implement arms control agreements under certain conditions, such as the possibility to acquire arms in the future to balance other actors power and overcome threats (Schofield, 2000). For instance, attempts to prevent Turkey from acquiring the S-400 Air Defense System (ADS) were not successful because of the threat posed by similar air defense systems owned by Greece (which Turkey seeks to balance and overcome both militarily and strategically). Both countries are very critical for the success of any regional wide arms control regime resulting from the Libyan Crisis. Security guarantees from the global powers like the UN permanent members have also registered some successes which can be improved upon. For instance, Libya was able to secure its future arms balance of power capabilities against any external nuclear or chemical weapons attack by entering into an agreement with the UK after giving away the Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. The UK agreed to bring to the attention and seek the intervention of the UN Security Council on behalf of Libya in the event of a nuclear attack on Libya.

The bordering states face common threats as a result of proliferation of arms from Libya. Arms control therefore should take the form of these states coming together in an alliance to balance against the external threat they are facing. The African group has been very vocal on the need for their involvement in finding solutions for the Libyan crisis because they suffer the immediate consequences. They called for an enhanced place on the table especially during the Berlin Conference on Libya in 2020 (Wilkins, 2020). Tripoli's African neighbors efforts to seek a wider role in resolving the crisis is an attempt by Africa to balance power with respect to arms-producing states outside the region such as France, Russia and Turkey.

The failures of states to effectively manage the transnational smuggling of weapons and effectively prevent the diversion of arms from government stocks to non-state groups' calls for arms control to address this inefficiency and enhance regulations and border management. Boko Haram in Nigeria has, in several occasions, supplemented its supplies from government reserves through surprise attacks to stockpile locations. This is despite the fact that Nigeria is considered a regional power in the West African region, its effectiveness in sealing the loopholes for proliferation has been called into question. Arms control provides also an opportunity for NATO and to a large extent EU

to salvage image following accusations of aiding the proliferation from the organization's intervention in Libya without a plan to secure the arms of the Gaddafi regime which some NATO members themselves had supplied to the regime. The EU normative power is tainted by its arming of the regime in Libya (Hansen & Marsh, 2015).

The place of DDR in stabilization and reconstruction efforts cannot be overstated. It is central in peace, security and development of communities. DDR has transformed from being a preserve of peacekeeping to include wider peace-building activities, counterinsurgency and stability operations and in tandem with counter-terrorism and anti-crime measures (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). DDR can include negotiating and implementing the terms of peace in a conflict.

Conclusions

The study has traced the effects of the Libyan arms proliferation using the international relations theories of security dilemma and regional security complex. It has reviewed several empirical sources, as well as official organizational documents like the UN reports to understand the full extent of the Libyan arms proliferation. The security impacts to the immediate neighboring states have also been explored in detail, as well endeavors towards arms control in the region. The study concludes that the conflicts and instability in the region is directly linked to the Libyan arms proliferation. Examples include the toppling of a government in Mali, attempts and threats towards government in Chad, smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crimes in the Sahel region. Other effects include the increased severity of conflicts in Syria, Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria and Niger and the Al Qaeda, ISIS and Al Shabaab and affiliates in Sudan, Maghreb and Somalia. However, arms control provides a golden opportunity to the region to tackle the security challenges.

The Libyan arms proliferation will continue to cause security challenges to the region for the longest time since most of the weapons involved are small arms and light weapons with a very long lifespan and with reuse or modification potential. The security threats have evolved and recently resulted in the proliferation of sophisticated weapons towards the region further aggravating the situation. The study recommends the regional state actors to immediately come together in an alliance of peace and establish a regional arms control framework that is anchored in norms and rules to earn the trust of all the actors. Disarmament operations should be coordinated across boundaries to recover, collect and destroy the arms in the wrong hands. The UN should come in to help in the integration of the militants back into the society and subsequent post-conflict rebuilding of Libya because UN led operations will offer greater legitimacy eliminating the mistrust between governments and other groupings in the country.

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