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Middle East:
The Origins of the 'Islamic State' (ISIS)

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Abstract. *This article examines the origins of the 'Islamic State' or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham or Levant (ISIS) in light of the contemporary political and security challenges posed by its diffusion of Islamic radicalism. The Arab Spring in 2011 ignited instability in Syria providing an operational base for the terrorist group to pursue its once abandoned Islamic state idea. Its growth and expansion has hitherto proved to be a threat not only to the Middle East but to international security given its thrust on world domination. It concludes that the United States of America's activities in the Middle East were largely responsible for the rise of the Islamic State.*

Keywords: *Islamic state, Islamic radicalism, international security, Middle East.*

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Introduction

The goal of this article was to examine the origins of the "Islamic State" (IS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Syria) (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in light of the contemporary political and security challenges posed by its diffusion of Islamic radicalism in a drive to establish the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This is important given the fact that the roots of ISIS are under-examined in academic literature although they are tangentially covered in the media. This study augments those studies that have attempted to examine the roots of ISIS such as Gulmohamad (2014). It expands the limited understanding of ISIS's ideology, internal dynamics and war strategy and the state formation theories it embraced that made it difficult for the anti-ISIS forces to defeat it.

The article asserts that ISIS had its roots in the Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian in 2002 which became highly active in the wake of the United States war in Iraq where it developed its ideology, vision and presence. Historically, it has been known by various names from Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin, Islamic State of Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Levant to the present Islamic State. Initially, ISIS failed to realise its objectives when it attempted to connect its demands and aspirations to the popular struggle in Iraq where it intended to establish an emirate. It temporarily abandoned its Islamic state idea, perhaps in light of the American and allies' superior firepower. The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq left a vacuum. Additionally, the Arab Spring in 2011 ignited instability in Syria and thus provided an operational base for ISIS. By 2015, its objectives were partly realised in Iraq and Syria where it conquered large parts, declared a Caliphate and temporarily ruled according to its dictates and radical interpretation of Islamic law-Sharia. This was achieved as a result of several factors which embody the pull out of the United States from Iraq, the group's leadership change that led to the rise to power of Al-Baghdad and the Arab Spring which culminated in the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.

ISIS is a transnational terrorist and Sunni Islamist insurgent group that caused instability and insecurity in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria. It attracted international attention due to its devastating attacks and operations in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Therefore, ISIS reveals the roots of a terrorist organisation whose growth and expansion hitherto proved to be a threat not only to the Middle East but to international security given its thrust on world domination. ISIS is more than a terrorist group because it is a politico-military club that embraces a radical version of Islam as a political idea and seeks to impose that worldview by might on Muslims and non-Muslims in an identical manner. Besides, ISIS's involvement in Syria, it spread instability beyond Syria's borders. The article concludes that the United States of America's activities in the Middle East were largely responsible for the rise of ISIS. To appreciate the origins of ISIS, the article engaged the qualitative methodology guided by the descriptive research design supported by primary and secondary sources in order to incorporate a variety of views. Primary sources used entail listening to leadership statements, speeches, audio and video messages made by or concerning ISIS found on YouTube and other internet sources. Again, secondary sources such as books, journal articles, newspapers and other media reports were consulted.

ISIS's roots

Various theories have been used to explain the formation of ancient and modern states. Although it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the theories that can be used to explain the establishment of ISIS it is vital to allude to these theories. It seems likely that ISIS embraced a significant number of state formation theories notably: conquest,

voluntary, war and media theories. Evidently, there are a number of disputations among scholars concerning the origin of the state and its course of growth. Almost all state development theorists agree that to comprehend state formation one needs to grasp: "interstate relations and the relationship between the state and society … Scholars disagree, however, over whether state formation is primarily a consequence of internal or external affairs" (Hadra, 2015, p. 41). Accordingly, it appears ISIS was influenced by the warfare, conquest, ideology or culture and global media theories among others in its formation and development.

The rise of ISIS can best and convincingly be explained through: the Zarqawi prelude (2002–2006) which was the period of jihadism's initial rise in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2013), the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (2013–2014) and the Islamic State as the outright caliphate (2014) (Bunzel, 2015, p. 1). The Islamic State is also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh, its Arabic acronym (Blanchard, Humud, Katzman, & Weed, 2015; Gerges, 2014; Page, 2015). According to Cockburn (2014), the last "s" of "Isis" comes from the Arabic word "al-Sham", meaning Levant, Syria or occasionally Damascus, depending on the circumstances. It evolved from the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad (JTWJ) founded in 2002. Zarqawi and his group played an important role in fighting the United States after its invasion of Iraq in 2003 and operated as a branch of Al-Qaeda since 2004 carrying out high profile terrorist attacks (Friedland, 2015). Following the killing of Zarqawi by the US and Iraqi intelligence agencies, Abu Ayyoub al-Masri, an Egyptian, came into view as the new leader who advocated for the establishment of an Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Gulmohamad, 2014, p. 1). It was observed that the JTWJ before it became ISIS:

> … filled the security and governmental void created by the disintegration of the Iraqi army and Saddam Hussein's regime, accompanied by the increasing alienation of the Sunni Muslims from the central, Shi'ite-affiliated government in Baghdad sponsored by the United States (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center [ITIC], 2014, p. 2).

In this light, Gerges (2014) notes that the invasion of Iraq by US-led forces and their subsequent occupation of Iraq caused a break in the Iraqi society already fractured and bled by the many years of economic sanctions and war. More so, the destruction of Iraqi institutions by the United States, especially its dismantling of the Baath Party and the military created a vacuum that wrought fierce fighting for power and permitted the infiltration of al-Qaeda among other non-state actors into the delicate body of politics (Gerges, 2014). As a branch of Al-Qaeda, the JTWJ gradually established itself in Iraq during the fighting against the United States and its allies and finally adopted the name the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and became an important force among the anti-American insurgents (ITIC, 2014, p. 2). To this end, while "… ISIS is an extension of the global jihadist movement in its ideology and worldview, its social origins are rooted

in a specific Iraqi context, and, to a lesser extent, in the Syrian war that has raged for almost four years" (Gerges, 2014, p. 339).

Unlike al-Qaeda's central organization which emerged from a pact between ultracon-servative Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism, ISIS came from an unholy union between an Iraq-based al-Qaeda affiliate and the vanquished Iraqi Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein which hitherto has proved a lethal arrangement (Gerges, 2014). However, it was weakened during the US/Iraq anti-terror war campaigns between 2006 and 2007 (Holmquist, 2015, p. 10). Regardless of that, Creamer (2014) asserts that the Iraq war radicalized many vulnerable young people and the Sunni power vacuum created by the US policies and Al-Maliki's policies motivated the extremists to take over large territories. This became realistic following the total withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. This witnessed the re-emergence of ISIS surpassing its previous actions and strength and strongly threat-ening the sovereignty of Iraq and other states in the Middle East (Holmquist, 2015). Accordingly, "ISIS is a symptom of the broken politics of the Middle East and the fraying and de-legitimation of state institutions, as well as the spreading of civil wars in Syria and Iraq" (Gerges, 2014, p. 339).

Delineating the formation of ISIS, Mehta (2016) notes that:

> The birth of ISIS/Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups came into being be-cause of:
> • Vacuum created by withdrawal of US forces from Iraq-Instead US planted militias in Iraq like SAS who were caught red handed while making bombs.
> • Massive aid ($3 billion in two years) given by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to former army officers of Saddam Hussein. These officers ruled Iraq for 35 years and were ready for action to follow Saudi and Qatari military agenda.
> • Support of Muslim brotherhood.
> • Supporting of Kurdistan forces led by Nechirvan Barzani (Nechirvan).
> • A compliant media with depictions of hate, violence and terror creating fear (Mehta, 2016, p. 3).

**The rise and fall of Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad
and the creation of al-Qaeda in Iraq**

Al-Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, in Zarqa, northeast of Amman, Jordan. He was from the Bani Hassani tribe. He had no education as he dropped out of school when he was at secondary school (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Al-Zarqawi was neither a great warrior nor a scholar but a thug and man of the street. He was involved in: alcohol use, the sale of drugs, fights and had tattoos which made him unsuitable as a leader of a radical religious group. However, his excessive ideas and the forcefulness of his character impelled him into this role (Warrick, 2015). His first experience with

Salafism as a doctrine started when his mother sent him to do religious courses at the Al-Husayn Ben Ali Mosque in Amman. The doctrine calls for a return to theological purity and Prophet Muhammad's traditions. To Salafists, Western style modernity and democracy is irreconcilable with Islam. It is the one which largely polluted Arab civilisation. Consequently, this view influenced Zarqawi and the groups that succeeded the ones he led (Weiss & Hassan, 2015).

Al-Zarqawi got experience as a Jihadi in Afghanistan when he fought against the Soviet Union invasion but did not do much as he joined when the war was at its end. This prompted him to return to his home country, Jordan where he was sentenced for 15 years in Jordanian prison on terrorism charges. However, he did not serve the sentence because he was pardoned in 1999 after King Abdullah II came to power (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). According to Weiss and Hassan (2015), prison was Al-Zarqawi's university. It turned him into a more focused, brutal and decisive individual. It was during his time in prison that Al-Zarqawi reconnected with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a jihad theorist whom he had met in Afghanistan during the early 1990s. Al-Maqdisi's fundamentalist views of Islamic theology and jurisprudence also influenced Al-Zarqawi (Holmquist, 2015). Al-Maqdisi's teachings adopted by Zarqawi include the doctrine of *al-Wala' w-al-Bara,* which is loosely, translated "Loyalty and Disavowal". The doctrine asserts that Muslims ought to have an absolute loyalty towards, and love of, God and the Sharia, his law. Again, it means that Muslims be obliged to detach themselves and renounce everything that oppose the Sharia, especially democracy (Holmquist, 2015).

While JTWJ is viewed in other circles as an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Gulmohamad, 2014), Al-Zarqawi's group was initially focused on effecting regime change in Jordan (which led to Zarqawi's imprisonment) (Friedland, 2015). The rest of the world was to be conquered after regime change in Jordan but the goal was changed over time (Zelin, 2014). Although Al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden (the founders of both ISIS and al-Qaeda respectively) came of age during the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, their socio-economic backgrounds were different. Whereas Osama bin Laden and his closest associates were from the middle class and had university education, Zarqawi and his closest compatriots were from poor and less educated backgrounds (Friedland, 2015; Zelin, 2014). This prompted differences and friction between the two leaders' organisations witnessed today which were sowed as soon as the two met in 1999 (Zelin, 2014). It was during Al-Zarqawi's second tour in Afghanistan that he ran a training camp for jihadists from the Levant. He trained amnesty beneficiaries released from a Jordanian prison together with him. He was critically assisted by the military commander of al-Qaeda, an Egyptian by the name Saif al-Adel to overcome the many challenges he faced in settling in Afghanistan. Additionally, Osama bin Laden gave him a small amount of seed money (USD 200, 000) which continued to the time of the 9/11atacks (Weiss & Hassan, 2015; Zelin, 2014).

However, Al-Zaqawi is viewed as having had a different and infrequently overlapping agenda with al-Qaeda. Although Zarqawi's public speaking was the same with that of Bin Laden, his targets were rather different. From the onset, Zarqawi directed his wickedness at colleague Muslims, principally Iraq's mainstream Shiite population. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda considered the Shiites as heretics but seldom targeted them for killing (Ghosh, 2014). Attempts by Osama bin Laden to fully co-opt him by requesting a religious oath (*baya*) saw Zarqawi repeatedly rebuffing it (Zelin, 2014). He fled in 2002 going to a Kurdish-dominated area in Iraq held by Ansar-al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked group (Holmquist, 2015). The United States' Colin Powell made Zarqawi known when he wrongly publicised at the United Nations in 2003 that Zarqawi was the link between al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein in an attempt to make a case for invasion (Warrick, 2015). Inadvertently, this made Zarqawi famous.

Zarqawi travelled a lot before the US invasion of Iraq going to and from various places that include Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and the Sunni Triangle in Iraq in an effort to gain new jihadist contacts. He only became famous half a year following the invasion of Iraq by the US because of his brutal suicide bombing campaigns and personal beheadings directed at Shiite religious persons and Sunni civilians among many (Zelin, 2014; Hadra, 2015). This earned him the title "sheikh of the slaughterers" (Warrick, 2015; Weiss & Hassan, 2015). It was these successes that motivated many foreign fighters to want to join him leading the group to need more resources to pursue and expand its operations (Zelin, 2014). Zarqawi's group's goals at that juncture was to drive the US forces out of Iraq, remove from power the Iraqi government and consequently purge the country of all Shia Muslims and create a pure Muslim state.

According to Altschular (2015), Zarqawi dismissed Americans as the most cowardly of creatures, who were supposed to be forced to leave the country as a matter of urgency. Again, he viewed the Shiites in Iraq as the "insurmountable obstacle", that needed primary attention as he saw them as "the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom" (Altschular, 2015). He also viewed the Shia in Iraq as the "the chief threat to Sunni power in Iraq and the wider region" (Hadra, 2015). In October 2004 he decided to proclaim the oath of allegiance (*bay'a*) to Osama bin Laden. Afterwards, JTWJ then fighting the United States invaders in Iraq renamed itself *Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, or commonly known in the West as *al-Qaeda in Iraq,* AQI) (Holmquist, 2015). Clearly, al-Qaeda's official endorsement and financial support made Zarqawi's promises to destabilize Iraq and arouse Sunnis to annihilate Shiite apostates to be realised. Zarqawi and his group looked forward to "take advantage of the resulting chaos to cast itself as the defender of the Sunni community and to usher in the establishment of an Islamic state" (Lister, 2014).

The proclamation of *baya* to Osama bin Laden by Zarqawi was a marriage of convenience which sowed seeds for future conflicts evident in the conflict that has emerged between the two late leaders' groups today (Zelin, 2014). However, it was strategic for Zarqawi because it gave him access to benefits that included but were not limited to: "... private donors, recruitment, logistics and facilitation networks" (Tucker, 2014). As an al-Qaeda network, AQI controlled many important informal networks that range from the flow of resources and foreign fighters to gaining loyalty from individual fighters which eventually became critical for the continuation of the jihadist movement and this was apparent since 2010 (Zelin, 2014). In this regard, the Syrian case is a good example that attests the importance of the relationships and contacts obtained during the Iraq fighting. Like AQI and before, the organization infrequently attacked "... U.S. army installations, Iraqi authorities, the population and also targeted and assassinated Western citizens" (Blumenau, 2014). It raised its funds through various methods that ranged from robbing banks, taxing the victims of their terrorist activities, stealing trucks, abductions and ransoms among others which the group continue to use.

The fall of AQI and the creation of the Islamic State

The Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) also known as Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin (MSM) was founded in 2006 by Al-Zarqawi as a calculated manoeuvre to move away from al-Qaeda. It came into being against the backdrop of the suffering from legitimacy crisis by AQI due to the foreign composition of its fighters that fought against the United States and lacked a real touch with the problems in the struggle (Holmquist, 2015). In this light, the MSC was established to unify the jihadist groups fighting in Iraq and to give AQI an Iraqi identity. About eight factions of Jihadist groups constituted MSC including AQI. As a result, AQI (under MSC as ISIS in the making) exploited the grievances of Sunnis particularly their disempowerment that was brought by the ascendancy to power of the Shia. This led Iraq Sunnis to protest their marginalisation and discrimination. However, their objections were not heard in both Baghdad and Washington creating an opportunity for ISIS to intervene instrumentalizing their grievances (Gerges, 2014). According to Patel (2015), those who were opposed to the United States occupation included:

> ... Baath Party loyalists hoping to return to power, as well as what were often informally described by occupation officials as POIs, or "pissed-off Iraqis": former public sector employees and soldiers who had lost their jobs, families who felt disrespected by counterinsurgent activities, and Iraqi nationalists motivated to resist foreign occupation. Islamist and nationalist insurgents often engaged in pragmatic alliances of convenience ... (p. 2).

Apparently, these groups of people formed a more than willing and ready recruitment base for ISIS's predecessors as they were motivated by the need to reverse their marginalisation and discrimination and ultimately regain political power, respect and dignity.

The death of Al-Zarqawi in June 2006 at the hands of the United States and Iraq intelligence agencies led to the emergence of an Egyptian, Abu Ayyoub al-Masri as the new leader of AQI. This also marked the change of the group's direction and goals. He is the one who advocated for the cause of an Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Gulmohamad, 2014). The change of the group's name in October 2006 to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) heralded the beginning of the group's focus on conquering Iraqi territory in an effort to create a sharia-based state (Friedland, 2015; Zelin, 2014). However, ISI efforts in this regard during this period were abortive. This is because tribal militias supported by the United States managed to defeat ISI with the help of the local population who turned against ISI due to its brutal methods of enforcing sharia (Zelin, 2014). Resultantly, ISIS emerged as a combination of the original AQI, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq and the Jund al-Sahhaba (Soldiers of Prophet's Companions). Unfortunately, Sahwat al-Anbar which played a critical role in defeating the ISI (between 2006 and 2007) was not integrated into the Iraqi military which instead targeted them as a potential threat to Shiite majority rule. This made many of them to join ISI when it re-emerged in 2010 (Zelin, 2014). Evidently, ISI efforts to build an Islamic state had brighter fortunes in Iraq and Syria since 2011.

In the same vein, Patel (2015) summed up ISIS's origins when he noted that:

> ISIS developed out of a string of predecessor insurgent organizations that operated in Iraq between 2003 and 2013, most notably "al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers," commonly known as AQI. Although Iraqis over time increasingly filled the cadres of AQI, the organization's leadership and early fighters were largely non-Iraqi Arabs, including its most well-known leaders, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006) and the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri (d. 2010), as well as the leaders of the wider al-Qaeda network (p. 2).

Related to the above citation, Zelin (2014, p. 1) has offered a history of ISIS's names as: Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad between 1999 and 2004; Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, or AQI between 2004 and 2006; Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin (MSM) (or Mujahedin Shura Council (MSC) in 2006; Islamic State of Iraq between 2006 and 2013; and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham from 2013 to the present (2014). However, at the end of June 2014 ISIS rebranded itself the Islamic State following its proclamation of a Caliphate in the areas it conquered in Iraq and Syria (Weiss & Hassan, 2015).

In 2010, Baquba in Iraq was established as ISIS's headquarters by the emir Abu-Baker al-Baghdadi. His real name is not clear as others say he is also known as Abu Dua and his real name was Hamed Dawood Mohammed Khalil al-Zawi (Gulmohamad, 2014; Page, 2015). On the other hand, Cockburn (2014) notes that Baghdadi's real name was Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai. However, what is clear is that Al-Baghdadi is of Iraqi origin and was announced as the outfit's new leader following the killing of Al-Masri by the United States and Iraqi forces in 2010. According to Warrick (2015), Al-Baghdadi was

part of the Zarqawi network at the beginning of the organisation's operations in Iraq. He was not a typical warrior insurgent nor was he known for bravery on the battlefield. Instead he was an Islamic scholar and had his carrier inclined to be spent as a college professor teaching Islamic law had the Iraq invasion not occurred. This is because he spent most of his time studying the Quran, the Hadith and the sayings of the prophets and understanding each detail and legal nuance. The establishment of al-Qaida in Iraq headed by Zarqawi came along with the need for religious scholars who could give him cover, bless his undertakings and guarantee his followers that killing people made them good Muslims. Indeed, Al-Baghdadi specialised in this but resultantly rose through the ranks for several years until 2010 when he assumed the leadership of the organisation when other leaders of the Islamic State were killed (Warrick, 2015).

In addition, Cockburn (2014) points out that while there are disputes over his career depending on the sources (whether ISIS itself or US and Iraqi intelligence), generally the representation is reasonably clear. Al-Baghdadi was born in Samarra, a Sunni-dominated city north of Baghdad, in 1971 and is learned. He holds degrees (including a doctorate) in Islamic Studies, together with poetry, history and genealogy, from the Islamic University of Baghdad. Contrary to Warrick's (2015) view of Baghdadi as merely a scholar, Cockburn (2014) asserts that he may have been an Islamic militant under Saddam as a preacher in Diyala province, to the north east of Baghdad, where, after the US invasion of 2003, he had his own armed group. Insurgent movements have a strong motive for giving out misleading information about their command structure and leadership, but it appears al-Baghdadi spent five years as prisoner of the Americans.

The above citation is appealing in light of Baghdad's ability to revive the ISI. He took over the leadership of the organization when it was at its weakest point. However, he went on to transform it into "... a classic-styled terrorist group built on an underground organisation" (Holmquist, 2015, p. 16). This is because by 2014 the group had amassed over 30 000 fighters for the Sunni army. Besides numbers, Al-Baghdad recruited experienced former Hussein military officers, especially those from the Republican Guards and these converted ISIS into a professional fighting force (Gerges, 2014, p. 339). Additionally, Patel (2015) observes that the military successes of ISIS have been propelled by the non-dilution of its ideological commitments strengthened by the full incorporation of former Baathists into its organizational structure. This has led some observers to plausibly refer ISIS as "... a hybrid of terrorists and an army" (Patel, 2015, p. 3). This confirms Hove and Chenzi's (2017, p. 68) observation that indoctrination is the backbone of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism.

In April 2013, Al-Baghdad renamed the group the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) (Gulmohamad 2014) prompting its intervention and expansion into the Syrian civil war. This was the case because the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad had been weakened by the attacks of the US and its Western allies who backed the "Free Syrian Army"

(Hove & Mutanda, 2015). According to Warrick (2015), the Arab Spring was a wonderful opportunity for the re-emergence of ISIS (or ISI as it was known). This is because they thought that Muslims around the world were to rally and overthrow corrupt regimes thereby enabling them to rise to power but this did not happen. Instead of calling for Islamic governments the peaceful demonstrations in Arab countries called for democracy and economic liberty among other reforms and demands (Hove & Ndawana, 2017).

The mishandling of the peaceful demonstrations by Assad in Syria influenced the jihadists to seize the opportunity in the same way they did in Iraq during the US invasion of Iraq (Warrick, 2015). Moreover, Cockburn (2014) notes that ISIS's swift rise since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took its reigns was due to the uprising of the Sunni in Syria in 2011. This prompted the Iraqi Sunni to also protest about their political and economic marginalisation from the time when Saddam Hussein was ousted and killed. The peaceful demonstrations since the end of 2012 witnessed few concessions from Iraq's Shia-dominated government. The government was convinced that the protesters did not need reform but a revolution aimed at returning their community to power. This led to the alienation of between five to six million Iraqi Sunnis and these were responsive towards armed action by ISIS (Cockburn, 2014). Additionally, Assad exacerbated the situation, "... by sending Alawi death squads into Sunni villages to murder and rape, or by releasing violent Salafists from prison in 2011 at the same time he was targeting secular, peaceful activists for detention and assassination" (Yassif-Kassab, 2015). More so, blame goes to the Iranian-backed Shia jihadist militias of Lebanese and Iraqi origin who fought on the side of Assad (Yassif-Kassab, 2015).

Furthermore, in an audio message in early April 2014 Baghdadi included a terrorist organization and al-Qaeda affiliate operating in Syria by the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) as part of ISIS (Gulmohamad, 2014, p. 2). However, the leader of JN, Abu Muhammad al-Julani denied the merging of his group with ISIS. Instead, he made known his allegiance to Osama bin Laden's successor and leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Gulmohamad, 2014, p. 2). Nevertheless, another version argues that Al-Baghdad sent Abu Mohammad al-Golani, a Syrian to create JN in Syria in a drive to realize the Syrian part of the long desired Islamic State (Cockburn, 2014; Holmquist, 2015). The confusion was further aggravated by the fact that Zawahiri was also involved in the plans to establish JN (Zelin, 2014, p. 5). However, Tucker (2014) contends that JN "... is an organically grown extremist organization within Syria that derived from old cadres of AQI, but has since re-emerged in Syria's 2011 uprisings to become al-Qaeda's preferred affiliate within the region" (p. 2). This is because as in Iraq, Sunni resentment in Syria unfolded in the context of the domination of the Bashar al-Assad regime by the Alawite sect (Gerges, 2014).

Increasing ISIS's influence outside Iraq's borders in rebelliousness of the al-Qaeda's Central Leadership (AQC) appears to be the agenda of Al-Baghdad (Gulmohamad,

2014). As a result, following months of disagreements and rows between ISIS and AQC Al-Zawahiri proclaimed the dissociation of AQC from ISIS (Gulmohamad, 2014). To this end, Weiss and Hassan (2015) assert that ISIS is actually the latest front in a bloody culmination of a long-running dispute within the ranks of international jihadism. Problems are centred on how to wage the holy war and who to target from Shia, Alawites, and other minority sects and ethnicities, Americans to their "Zionist-crusader" allies. This illustrates the emergence of radical and extremist autonomous groups from and within the al-Qaeda.

Furthermore, the relationship between ISIS and al-Qaeda from the onset of ISI since 2006 remains hazy as Al-Baghdad has maintained that his group "is not and has never been an offshoot of Al-Qaeda" (Blanchard *et al.*, 2015, p. 2). It is an independent entity as the ISIS leadership before him gave the al-Qaeda leadership deference as opposed to allegiance Zelin (2014) shares the same sentiments where he argues that al-Qaeda and ISIS had distinct backgrounds, leadership styles and aims. However, these have been confused to be one because of the marriage of convenience the two groups entered into in 2004. Among other things, Zarqawi had a criminal past and extreme view of *takfir* (heresy accusation of another Muslim justifying his killing) that led to distrust and friction between him and Osama bin Laden when they first met in 1999 in Afghanistan (Zelin, 2014). According to Crooke (2014), ISIS's extreme and radical interpretation of Islam has also brought divisions in Saud Arabia where it is believed to share a lot and appealed to many (both youths and the elite) who subscribe to strict Salafist ideology (Wahabbism). They embrace ISIS as constituting "Sunni fire" fighting "Iranian Shiite fire" but what they do not see is that ISIS is also a threat to them too. In addition, ISIS and JN (now pro-al-Qaeda) are believed to differ in their methodology with the latter favouring a gradualist approach and willing to work with other groups and establish an Islamic state at last, whereas the former is inclined to a more direct approach where territory seized is immediately declared an Islamic state and sharia imposed (Friedland, 2015). This took place in Raqqa in Syria between late 2013 and early 2014 where ISIS seized control of the area after defeating all the factions there and from then on served as its power base (Friedland, 2015).

Moreover, ISIS also managed to capture huge territory in Iraq taking Anbar province's Fallujah and Ramadi areas and Mosul, the country's second largest city in the north in 2014 (Friedland, 2015). In fact, it was at the mosque in Mosul that Baghdadi first appeared and declared himself Caliph and called for the intensification of jihad to serve Allah.

Overall, one can primarily and plausibly shoulder the emergence of ISIS and its consequent horrendous operations on the United States. Warrick (2015) points out that ISIS was a creation of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Similarly, Ogur (2014) notes that ISIS's predecessors emerged as a result of the US invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the US in

2004 released the current leader of ISIS, Al-Baghdad from Camp Bucca and in 2013 most ISIS militants escaped from the US-controlled Abu Graihb Prison. Furthermore, it was the CIA who trained Syrian opposition fighters in Jordan that have now joined the ranks of ISIS in greater numbers following their defection from the erroneously considered moderate Syrian rebel groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Again, a number of weapons from the United States ended up in the hands of ISIS (Ogur, 2014). As observed by Ayad Jamal Al-Din (2014), weakening the Syrian regime by arming and aiding the FSA by the US has been futile because it all benefits ISIS both in Syria and Iraq as it is actually the one causing problems in the two countries.

In line with the re-emergence of ISIS soon after the total pull-out of US forces by Barak Obama in 2011, ISIS's rise is also attributed to Obama as opposed to Bush. This is because Bush managed to keep radical Islamist groups under control in Iraq (Merry, 2014). Since the beginning of US forces' pull-out in 2009 ISIS regrouped and rethought its strategies and by late 2009 terror attacks targeted at overthrowing the Iraqi government had already begun. Added to this, was Obama's failure to decisively intervene in Syria to prevent it from being turned into an ISIS haven (Merry, 2014). However, it is important to note that Bush has his fair (if not the biggest) share of blame to the rise of radical Islamists and fundamentalists including ISIS. This is in light of the way he handled the 9/11 attacks which he did in a way that inflamed anti-American fervour and stirred sectarian violence in many countries when he invaded Iraq in 2003. Indeed, in light of the emergence of ISIS and the destruction it has caused, "... the Bush decision to invade Iraq ... ranks among the greatest foreign-policy fiascos in the nation's history" (Merry, 2014).

Essentially, it was Bush who made the provocative statement following the 9/11 attacks that:

> I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world ... Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them...Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated ...We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists (Bush, 2001).

Furthermore, Creamer (2014) underscores the laying of conditions for the rise of ISIS by Bush when he noted that Bush's "de-Bathification program" eliminated all vestiges of Sunni power in Iraqi society and set the stage for the Sunni insurrection against American occupation and the new Shiite-led government. Bush disbanded the entire Sunni-dominated Iraqi Army and bureaucracy. He didn't change it. He didn't make it

more inclusive of Shiites and Kurds. He just disbanded it. It is no accident that two of the top commanders of today's ISIL are former commanders in the Saddam-era Iraqi military.

It is imperative to realise that Iraq was invaded in 2003 for economic (oil), security (weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein supported terrorists) and political reasons (to depose Saddam Hussein a dictator) (Bassil, 2012; Lieberfeld, 2005). Similarly, Pillar (2008) asserts that, "Iraq's oil resources are part of what makes it an important and influential state in the Middle East, and thus one where it was hoped that change would serve as a catalyst for change elsewhere in the region". The Bush administration anticipated that deposing Saddam Hussein would lead to the removal of all regimes in the entire Middle East antagonistic to the US and its wellbeing in the region, or compel them into cooperation, or to be overthrown by their citizens in an effort to emulate the liberation of the Iraq people by the US (Gause III, 2009). After the removal of Saddam Hussein the regime change agenda of the US failed and Iraq declined into a failed state (Hove, 2017).

Besides, the US, Turkey also played a significant role, particularly in opening (by not enforcing restrictive measures on migrant movement) its 550 mile-land border with Syria to free passage of would-be ISIS fighters (Dorsey, 2014). Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia among other countries have been accused of providing controversial ISIS affiliates in Syria with arms among other forms of assistance under the pretext that they would fight Assad (Dorsey, 2014). Ironically, Assad himself (including his allies Iran and Russia) also contributed to the rise of ISIS because he supported it when it was still AQI targeting US troops in Iraq. Moreover, he facilitated the flow of foreign fighters and logistics into Iraq, particularly from Saudi and North Africa who today have become the largest of ISIS's fighting contingents. The same support structures and logistical links and networks originally established with Syrian assistance are now utilised against it. Most of the ISIS fighters were arrested and jailed in Syria on terrorism charges but were controversially released in a series of amnesties (Dorsey, 2014).

Contrary to the view that shoulder the rise of Daesh on Syria and Iran, the leader of Hezbollah has maintained that it is sheer nonsense to believe that the countries that are fighting hard to defeat ISIS created it. ISIS was a creation of the United States' CIA and its Middle East allies' intelligence through establishing al-Qaeda to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Middle East Observer, 2015). However, in 2014 fear had already been provoked in many of these countries as it increasingly became clear that they were soon to become targets of battle-hardened Sunni fighters, especially following the creation of a Caliphate by ISIS in northern Iraq and Syria (Cockburn, 2014). This is because the outfit has made its agenda very clear that it wants to return to the pre-First World War status of the Muslim world in the Middle East and other parts of the globe. In the following section I focus on ISIS ideology and agenda.

ISIS ideology and agenda: the roots

ISIS has been viewed by others as not an ordinary *jihad* group influenced and controlled by al-Qaeda. Its disobeying of the AQC and al-Zawahiri many times reinforces the fact that ISIS has its own conception and standpoint (Gulmohamad, 2014). Simms (2014) notes that ISIS whilst frequently thought as an 'al-Qaeda' group, the accurate understanding of the group can only be made by pointing out that its previous leaders maintained a significant degree of autonomy despite their swearing of loyalty to al-Qaeda. In addition, Friedland (2015) argues that AQI while still subordinate to AQC managed to establish its own network of supporters and fighters during the course of the Iraq insurgency allowing it in practice to be autonomous and be able to develop an ultraviolent brand of jihad of its own making. Resultantly, it pledges loyalty to Al-Baghdadi, its leader and not Al-Zawahiri. In this regard, Friedland (2015) believes that this was caused by generational differences between Osama Bin Laden aligned jihadists who fought in Afghanistan and Al-Zarqawi's compatriots whom he fought alongside in Iraq including the current leader Al-Baghdad. This is reflected in ISIS's song of faith (*nasheed*) translated as:

> We have closed ranks and pledge *bay'ah* to Baghdadi,
> For our emir in our Iraq and ash-Sham (Gulmohamad, 2014, p. 2).

To this end, ISIS is believed to be a Salafist-jihadi organization where Salafism is perceived as an extremist politico-religious movement within Islam that seeks to restore the golden era of the dawn of Islam (ITIC, 2014, p. 2).

Others have argued that ISIS is more of an idea and approach as opposed to an organization. Besides being the most radical of the extremist organizations, ISIS's faith is based on seeking punishment for regimes and rulers opposed to and resisting its ideology (Gulmohamad, 2014). The most extreme interpretation of Islamic religious law (sharia) is the basis of governing the supranational Islamic Caliphate envisaged to come into being in Islam's golden era modeled after the first Caliphs that emerged following Muhammad's death (ITIC, 2014). In this regard, the Salafist ideology holds that a jihad has to be waged against both internal and external foes and it is the personal duty of every Muslim. In fact, in his first appearance statement, Al Baghdadi proclaimed that Ramadan is a month to wage Jihad, a month when the Prophet made armies to fight enemies of God, the month where he would wage Jihad on polytheists! He also urged people to take advantage of this month and obey Allah. Allah has blessed and created us to single him out in monotheism, and to establish his religion. Allah said, "I have not created the human and the jinn except to worship". Allah has ordered us to fight his enemies and wage jihad for him to establish his religion. Allah said, "I have ordered you to fight (for Islam) even though you do not like it", He said, "and fight them so there is no discord and this is for all people to adopt in their life for Allah".

This is even the case with al-Qaeda and other global jihad organizations that sprang up motivated by Salafist jihadism (ITIC, 2014). However, some differences exist and these are caused by the fact that Salafi philosophy espoused by ISIS does not accommodate theological diversity (Holmquist, 2015). While other jihad organizations like al-Qaeda view the West, especially the United States and Israel as their primary target and enemy of the Muslims, ISIS views the West as a secondary target and its real and acute enemies are actually the infidel and apostate regimes in the Muslim world (Gerges, 2014). This made the deepening of the rift between JN and ISIS due to the fact that the latter's entire council leadership (8-13 members) consisted of Iraqi nationals and all are former military officers in Saddam's regime (Gulmohamad, 2014). Consequently, the official separation between ISIS and al-Qaeda marked the beginning of fierce hostilities between the groups that have seen many battles and infighting in Syria and Iraq between ISIS and JN (Gulmohamad, 2014). This prolonged the survival of Assad in Syria (Holmquist, 2015, p. 18). Again, instead of focusing on defeating Assad ISIS focused on establishing its Islamic State (Friedland, 2015).

While ISIS has its roots in Iraq, it has affiliations in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan (Blanchard *et al.*, 2015). ISIS in Lebanon was established in 2014 led by Abu Sayyaf al-Ansary who proclaimed allegiance to the ISIS leadership. Tripoli in northern Lebanon is believed to be the fertile ground for its extreme ideology where the group arose (Gulmohamad, 2014). The Shura Council of Islamic Youth based in the eastern city of Derna in Libya officially declared their allegiance to Al-Baghdad and ISIS in June 2014 (The Maghrebi Note, 2015). In February 2015 ISIS executed 21 Egyptian Christian citizens (Hove, 2017). In addition, groups in Yemen, Egypt and Algeria have already proclaimed their allegiance to Al-Baghdad both in good and bad times (The Maghrebi Note 2015). Boko Haram in Nigeria did the same in March 2015 (Friedland, 2015). Consequently, the contagious effect of terrorist groups and their ability to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Islamic region in the midst of the worst civil wars in modern history is illustrated by the operations of ISIS. This is in line with the agenda (short, medium and long-term goals) of ISIS's establishment of a Caliphate out of the debris of nation states established in the Middle East following the First World War.

The 2014 and 2015 disintegration of Iraq and Syria due to ISIS's operations has been viewed as part of the upheaval favourably conditioning the creation of the envisioned Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East (ITIC, 2014). The planned Islamic Caliphate intends to encompass the whole of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, other countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, the Caucasus and Spain and the Balkans among other parts of Europe that were once under Muslim rule (ITIC, 2014). In fact, Al-Baghdad self-proclaimed himself as *Caliph Ibrahim II* taking it from *Caliph Ibrahim I* who ruled the Ottoman Empire between 1640-1648 and whom he seem to

be of the same lineage with (Tucker, 2014). Apparently, this reveals how serious and enormous the threat ISIS poses to the region and international peace and security.

Obviously, ISIS's grand goal is nothing short of world domination of Islam (Eckman, 2014). This is even supported by its famous official slogan: *baqiya wa tatamaddad ('remaining and expanding')* (Al-Tamini, 2015). Additionally, Baghdadi glorified the ISIS fighters after ISIS's invasion of Ramadi in May 2015 vowing that Allah wished and the prince of the believers reported yesterday, and before yesterday the conquest of al-Anbar city is the start of the conquest of Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala, and destroying the idols and shrines on the heads of its owners by the help of Allah the Almighty. This conquest marks the start of bigger conquests. I congratulate the caliph of the Muslims, the believers' prince, Abu Bakr-al Baghdad al-Hussany al-Quraishy and congratulate Muslims living in the Caliphate and the Islamic State on freeing the land of Ramadi with Allah's permission, the most high, we are going to Baghdadi, the repulsive Najf and filthy Karbala.

However, the caliphate idea of Baghdadi has been rejected by other Islamic leaders saying it lacks broad support across Islam. Those inclined to al-Qaeda have insisted that a caliphate needs broad consensus on behalf of all Muslims and scholars as opposed to a mere proclamation by an individual following military victory. Additionally, and sharing the same sentiments with al-Qaeda on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence, Baghdadi's caliphate claims have been refuted by about 126 distinguished scholars and clerics who contended that a caliph without a general consensus is a *fitna* (strife or sedition in Arabic) (Eckman, 2014; Wood, 2014).

The Islamic State constitutes a hybrid threat and this is attested by its transnational aspirations, a combination of tactics, structured formations, and the use of terror and criminal activities (Jasper & Moreland, 2014). To this end, to those opposed to ISIS the decisive intervention of the world's superpowers such as Russia in Syria fighting ISIS although viewed with mixed feelings is necessary in order to curb its menace before it further slips out of control (Dyer, 2015). This is because earlier efforts by the United States to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS both in Iraq and Syria had proved to be long and unsuccessful. Among other things this was due to divided attention and efforts with some directed at ousting the Syrian leader, Assad instead of simply focusing on defeating ISIS (Blanchard *et al.*, 2015). Resultantly, both ISIS and Assad have hitherto survived the US's ill-informed and divided strategies to simultaneously deal with both. While the 2015 ISIS gains were later on reversed, it had demonstrated its capacity to destabilise many countries globally (Byman, 2017). This makes its potential to continue posing threats to international peace and security not far from over.

Conclusion

This article traced the origins of ISIS and asserts that it has its roots in the Jordanian Zarqawi's TJWJ. It has been known by various names that include Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, or simply as al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI, Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin, and the Islamic State of Iraq before it rebranded itself to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and lastly the Islamic State since 2014. Although it is debateable the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 laid the groundwork for the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Iraq and the Middle East. The intervention inflamed anti-American fervour and stirred sectarian violence in many countries. This is because ISIS's predecessors emerged and got legitimacy as a result of the US invasion of Iraq. Although the US managed to aid the al-Maliki government to weaken AQI between 2006 and 2007 the decision by Obama to fully withdraw the US military from Iraq in 2011 assisted the re-emergence of ISIS in full force. Additionally, the CIA's ill-conceived training of Syrian opposition fighters in Jordan helped the growth of ISIS's ranks and weaponry base as these have joined it in greater numbers. Consequently, the US and its allies in the region that include Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia among others also played a significant role in propping up ISIS by providing controversial ISIS affiliates in Syria with arms among other assistance under the pretext that they would fight Assad.

Assad himself and Iran also shoulder a share of blame as ISIS's predecessors, especially AQI received aid and assistance from the two countries when it was still fighting the US in Iraq. Consequently, ISIS managed to realise some of its goals by establishing its Islamic state in parts of Iraq and Syria. It also spread its tentacles to Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan thus it was on its course towards world domination. However, its ambitions were thwarted by the decisive intervention of Russia which began in late September 2015 with the objective of stopping the ISIS menace. More so, ISIS's 2015 attack on France and Belgium, downing of Russia's air-liner over Egypt (Hove & Chenzi, 2017, p. 72) and the beheading of a Chinese national intensified offensives against the terrorist organisation in a drive to bring it to an end. Allow me to urge the US and its allies to rally behind the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in a drive to hasten the down fall of ISIS. It is tactical and strategic for the US and its allies to render their military assistance to Assad than to the FSA, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Quarter some of whose efforts, weaponry and forces find their way to ISIS.

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Rwanda:
In the Aftermath of Genocide against Tutsis. Survivor and non-victim position to the subordinate identity and "rwandeity"promotion policy.

Clémentine KANAZAYIRE

Abstract. *Following the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, the Rwandan government implemented a policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identities, which resembled the common in-group identity model (CIIM) known in social psychology. The present interview study examined how participants live being a member of the survivor or non-victim group and being a Rwandan. It also investigated the different perspectives of survivors and non-victims in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups. Consistent with socio-emotional needs-based model (NBM) (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), the results show that most non-victims support the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identity because the national identity permits them to escape this negative moral image conferred by the subordinate identity. For survivors, their subordinate identity is related to the history of victimization. Half of them were supportive of this policy but they had to ensure that the commemoration period is maintained. The two oldest survivors preferred political identities which consider the ethnic group and national identity at the same time. Other reasons advanced of supporting single recategorization policy are related to the official translated version of the history, diverse government policies, empathy towards to the members of the perpetrator group and not representing the prototype of the group.*

Keywords: *Rwanda, genocide, subordinate identity, super-ordinate identity, single recategorisation policy and needs-based model of intergroup reconciliation.*

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Introduction

Rwanda is situated in the Great Lakes region of central-south Africa. It had about 12 million habitants that can be grouped into three social classes (the Hutus, the Tutsis

and the Twa). All Rwandan classes speak the same local language (Kinyarwanda), have the same culture and have lived side by side for many centuries. These social classes have developed on the basis of power and socioeconomic conditions. The powerful and wealthier in cattle class were regarded as the Tutsi (Newbury, 1988, p. 11). However wealthy Hutus could become honorary Tutsis after acquisition of cattle.

During colonial period (1884–1962), the German and Belgian colonizers ruled with the local Tutsi chiefs who were considered by colonials as superior group (Prunier, 1995). In 1933, during Belgian rule, identity cards were introduced Belgian colonizers with social class for each person (Clark, 2010). From that day these social class became the ethnic group and the mobility between classes was prohibited.

In 1959, the Tutsi monarchy was removed from power by the Hutu group led by Gregory Kayibanda and installed a government that discriminated Tutsi in many ways (Kiwuwa, 2012). In 1973, General Habyarimana claimed power by coup d'état and continued to implement pro-Hutu policies. In April 1994, Hutu extremists started the genocide against Tutsi after the crash of airplane that carried President Habyarimana, and extended quickly to cover the whole country. The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), an armed wing of Rwanda Patriotic Front, led by current president Paul Kagame, ended the genocide and gained the control of the country.

When it was established on July 19, 1994, the current Rwandan government was confronted with the management of the cohabitation of genocide victims and perpetrators as well as rebuilding a country following its social, political and economic destruction (Presidency of the Republic, 1995). About one million Tutsi and Hutu opposed to genocidal ideology had just been killed by Hutus extremists and Interahamwe militia. The coexistence between genocide survivors, perpetrators and their respective family members was inevitable, there was no other possibility. To promote this cohabitation, various rehabilitation policies were adopted, the pillar of which was and remains reconciliation (Presidency of the Republic, 1995). The Rwandese government has promoted national identity as a tool of reconciliation and response to the identity problems of a society destroyed by the interethnic division. The policy for the promotion of Rwandese nationality has been implemented at the expense of the ethnic group identities, by discouraging ethnic identification (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Kanazayire, Licata, Melotte, Dusingizemungu, & Azzi, 2014). In that line, the mention of ethnicity in identity cards has been removed and at the political level, parties based on previous group membership (or any other demographic criterion) were also prohibited by law (Mukashema & Mullet, 2015).

The initiative for the promotion of Rwandese nationality at the detriment of ethnic group are considered by the Rwandan political leaders as shrewd given the illegitimacy of ethnic identity constructed by Belgian colonizers (Moss, 2014) and the excesses associated with ethnicity, which led to one of the worst genocides in human history

(Shyaka, 2003, p. 191). In terms of social psychology, this policy is consistent with the Common Ingroup Identity Model. The results of a quantitative study in non representative sample conducted by Kanazayire, Licata, Mélotte, Dusingizemungu & Azzi, (2014) showed that levels of national identification were at comparable levels among both survivors of the genocide and non-victims, and national identification was associated with more reconciliatory attitudes in both groups. However, this strategy seemed to be more effective among non-victims than among survivors.

Unfortunately, this study did not measure differences in social identifications between ethnic groups, given the inability to directly measure the participants' ethnic identification. Consequently, the authors were not able to confirm if the common in-group identity model is better than dual identity model. The purpose of this study is to examine the manner in which survivors and non-victims live with their subordinate identity and their attitudes to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of ethnic group identity.

The Common In-Group Identity Model

The Common In-group Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993) is proposed as a strategy to improve the relations between groups in conflict. The CIIM (Dovidio, Neir, Ward, Banker & Rust, 2001; Gaertner, Man, Murell & Dovidio, 1989), like the social decategorisation model (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Dovidio, Gaetner, Isen, Rust & Guerra, 1998; Miller, Brewer & Edwards, 1985) and dual identity model (Crisp & Hewstone 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hornsey & Hogg 2000b), is based on the theory of social identity (Tajfel &Turner, 1986), and on self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to this model, intergroup relations improve if individuals identify with a supra-ordinate common group, such as nationality, rather than if they identify with different subordinate groups, such as ethnic groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, Gaertner *et al.*, 1993).

Even for groups in conflict, identification at the inclusive level reduces prejudice, contributes to the development of positive attitudes towards the exogroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), reduces intergroup antipathy (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993), favours intergroup contact (Gómez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner & Cuadrado, 2008) and promotes forgiveness between these groups (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Indeed, the effect of identification at the inclusive level on pro-social behavior has been demonstrated in both laboratory studies with minimal groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, & Matoka, 1997) and in the natural context with the different racial groups in American schools (Dovidio, Gaertner, John, Halabi, Saguy, Pearson & Riek, 2008), in multi-ethnic schools ((Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio & Anastasio, 1994), (Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997), in social justice (Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996), in the recomposed families (Banker & Gaertner, 1998) and post-genocide situations (Wohl

& Branscombe, 2005; Cehajic, Brown & Castano, 2008; Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi & Branscombe, 2011; Noor, Brown & Prentice, (2008; Shnabel, Halabi & Noor, 2013; Kanazayire *et al.*, 2014).

Nevertheless, some researchers have demonstrated that the model of common group identity does not always apply equally to all groups and all social contexts. The model of identification at the inclusive level does not take into account the fact that some groups may identify more than others at the supra-ordinate level. Several studies (Binder, Zagefka, Brown, Funke, Kessler, Mummendey & Leyens, 2009; Dixon, Tropp, Dürrheim & Tredoux, 2010) found that members of the disadvantaged minority group preferred interventions aimed at reducing intergroup bias compared to those of majority-favored groups. Majority group members prefer policies that promote inclusive identification (Verkuyten, 2006), while members of the minority group prefer policies that promote dual identity because it takes into account social and ethnic distinctions (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007, Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

In addition, the model of identification at the inclusive level does not take into account victim and perpetrator status. According to the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), at the end of a conflict, the perpetrators face a threat concerning their moral image (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002; Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) and fear of being rejected by their moral community (Tavuchis, 1991; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio & Carmi, 2009; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). On the other hand, victims suffer a threat to their identity as a powerful actor (Foster & Rusbult, 1999; Nadler, 2002; Scobie & Scobie, 1998) and are likely to have a high degree of self-esteem (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The victims and perpetrators will thus be motivated to identify at the super-ordinate level if this inclusive identity permits them to restore the agency and positive moral image, respectively.

However, it should be remembered that identification with the superordinate group poses a threat to subordinate identity in individuals strongly identified with their in-group (Crisp, Stone & Hall, 2006). Compatibility between the two identities is only observed in individuals who are weakly identified with their in-group (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997) and in disadvantaged minority groups (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

Members of the perpetrator group might experience collective guilt and feel responsibility for atrocities they personally did not commit (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Those who identify themselves strongly with their in-group may adopt different attitudes towards threats related to their moral image. To distinguish themselves from other members of the in-group who have committed negative actions, some members of the perpetrator group can value their personal identity (Branscombe,

Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993). Other members of the perpetrator group may also use a strategy of distinguishing faulty members responsible for negative actions from other in-group members in order to protect the overall value of the identity of the in-group (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). Alternatively, minimizing or discarding the extent to which the in-group as a whole is responsible for the mischief, group members do not need to distance themselves from their in-group identity.

In addition, members of both groups (victim and perpetrator) may experience threats of exclusion or rejection from members of their ingroup because they are not the prototype of the group. In other words, they do not embody the stereotypes attributed to the whole group, nor

the group's most abstract ideal (Turner *et al.*, 1987). In general, those excluded from the group are people who are far from the norm. They may differ from others on the basis of age, ethnicity, skin colour, religion, etc. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The manner in which these people deal with the identity threat of exclusion from the ingroup will depend on their level of identification. Those who identify strongly with the ingroup will make efforts to be accepted (Noel, Wann & Branscombe, 1995; Iyer, Jetten & Tsivriko, 2008) and decide to follow the standards in order to get closer to a central group position (Noel *et al.*, 1995). In some cases, like exclusion based on ethnicity or race, this strategy can't work. We believe that in a similar situation the identification with a super-ordinate group can also constitute a good strategy for facing the negative moral image of the in-group and the exclusion linked to not representing the prototype of the in-group.

In the present study we investigates the way the members of genocide survivor and non-victim groups live with their subordinate and super-ordinate identity and the threats related to these identities. It examines also their positioning regarding the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups.

The present study examines the way the members of survivor and non-victim groups identify themselves with their subordinate identity and the threats related to this identity. It also investigates the positions of survivors and non-victims in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identities and interest ourselves in the motivation that underlies them.

Method

Participants

The study was conducted in 2011 at the Kibungo Institute of Agriculture, Technology and Education (INATEK) in the eastern province of Rwanda. The participants were students of the Faculty of Psychological Sciences and Education, 3rd and 4th year of license, of Rwandan origin. The sample consisted of 20 participants, selected from the

300 participants who had previously participated in a quantitative study on identity. Of the 20, 10 were genocide survivors and 10 non-victims (member of perpetrator group). The interview lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. Participants' ages ranged from 22 years to 51 years at the time of the survey. The mean age is 31 years with the standard deviation of 8.08.

Table 1: Demographic characteristic of participants

Participants	Status	Sex	Age at interview
N° 1	Survivor	Female	22 years
N° 2	Survivor	Male	23 years
N° 3	Survivor	Male	25 years
N° 4	Survivor	Male	24 years
N° 5	Survivor	Female	51 years
N° 6	Survivor	Female	48 years
N° 7	Survivor	Male	31 years
N° 8	Survivor	Female	31 years
N°9	Non-victim	Female	30 years
N° 10	Non-victim	Male	25 years
N° 11	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 12	Survivor	Male	28 years
N° 13	Non-victim	Female	26 years
N° 14	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 15	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 16	Survivor	Male	24 years
N° 17	Non-victim	Female	26 years
N° 18	Non-victim	Female	27 years
N° 19	Non-victim	Male	28 years
N° 20	Non-victim	Male	43 Years

Procedure

Following the collection of data for the quantitative study, we returned to the Institute of Agriculture, Technology and Education of Kibungo (INATEK) to inform the Dean of the Faculty of Psychology and educational sciences that we needed participants for a qualitative study. The Dean agreed to give us access to the students and asked the teachers to facilitate the recruitment. Explanations of the study were provided to the students during to clarify that the persons eligible for participation were those who lived in Rwanda during the genocide and who participated in the first study. Many of those who were willing to participate remained at the end of the class, signed up on a sheet of paper and they identified themselves as mentioned their status (survivor/non-survivor). Only 20 participants were selected, the first 10 genocide survivors and the first 10 non-victims (member of perpetrator group who were not persecuted during genocide against Tutsi) on the list. Participants signed a free and informed consent

form. Five of participated in the interview on the same day and the others made an appointment to be interviewed at a later time.

Materials

The aim of this study is to investigate how participants experience being a member of the survivor or non-victim group and their perspectives in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda. Some interviews were conducted at INATEK and others at the Kigali Health Institute. The interviews lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to explore the following research questions: How the participants experience being a member of survivor group or non-victim group and a Rwanda at the same time? How the participants respond to the "Single Recategorization Policy" which promotes national identity to the detriment the ethnic identity group? Do they think that single recategorisation policy can constitute a solution to the threat related to subordinate identity the face? Interviews were recorded and probes were added if answer were not clear enough.

Analysis Method

Since our aim was to identify different attitudes in relation to national identity, subordinate identities and policy that promote national identity to the detriment of ethnic group identity, we carried out a thematic analysis (Braun and Clark, 2006). This analysis implies an identification of the responses taking into account the particular aspects mentioned. After a discussion with colleagues on the categories identified in the interviews, the main themes and the sub-themes were differentiated. The schemas below, provides a detailed analysis of the categories, themes and sub-themes that guided us in the presentation of the results.

Results

Different types of positioning in relation to subordinate identities

Different types of positioning in relation to non-victim identity

During the interviews, we realized that the non-victim identity was directly understood as the Hutu identity. When talking about non-victims or people who were not persecuted but were in Rwanda, the non-victims responded directly by saying "*I understand you want to talk about the Hutus*". The non victim group was related to ethnic identity. Four positions were observed in relation to how non-victims live with this identity directly associated with the non-victim identity.

Guilt of the group without distancing from the in-group
One out of ten non-victims felt collective guilt but did not mention anything that would imply that she is no longer attached to her group. "*I think every Hutu lives with guilt and shame. (...). As a member of the Hutu group, I still live with this guilt*" (Int.18). However, individuals who feel collective guilt may adopt strategies that allow them to escape guilt and collective shame, as illustrated by the following themes.

Distance to the in-group
Six out of ten non-victim participants revealed that they were not proud to belong to a perpetrator group. They felt shame and guilt about belonging to this group and they wanted to change it. This is reflected in Int.17: "*I am neither proud nor content to belong to the Hutu group. If it were possible for me, I would leave this group and look for another group of which I would be proud. I feel sorry for the fact that I belong to the hang man[the genocide perpetrator group]*". Another participant agreed in the same sense that she would like to belong to another positively valued group: "*... I am not happy to*

be a member of the group whose members have committed genocide. (...). I always want it to change. I want to wake up one day and be told that my family is no longer a member of the genocide perpetrator group" (Int.9).

These two participants have a negative image of themselves as members of the victim group. They are ashamed and disliked to belong to a guilty group and, if mobility was possible, they would have left the Hutu group to escape the negative identity.

Distance to the two groups

A non-victim often strongly expressed threats related to mixed identity. These threats arise from the fact that the participant is not a prototypical member of any group. *"I am identified as Hutu. In Rwanda, we are in the patriarchal regime where the person takes the ethnicity of his father. I identified myself with both groups before the genocide. My mother was a Tutsi and my father was Hutu. (...). After the genocide, I sought to identify myself with my mother's family. I no longer wanted to identify myself with a group that had committed genocide. (...) I thought I had a choice. I felt that I was not accepted by my mother's family. I was sometimes labelled a child of Interahamwe or even Interahamwe. When it began to weigh heavily, I turned to my father's family. But here too, I did not feel accepted; there I was labeled a cockroach or a snake. (...). In terms of ethnicity, I can say that I belong nowhere, neither to the Hutu group nor to the Tutsi group. Neither of them accepts me"* (Int.10). This excerpt shows that participant 10 is rejected by members of both groups and cannot do anything to adopt prototypical postures. He eventually disidentified from both two groups.

Individualization of guilt

It is important to note that two out of ten non-victims strongly identify with the non-victim group and did not place guilt on the group's back. For them, the guilt is personal and should not be attributed to all members of the group. Although these two non-victims adopted the same strategy, one felt the collective shame of belonging to the non-victimized group while the other felt neither collective guilt nor collective shame. Those who feel shame opt for a strategy of distinguishing the wrongdoers from the innocent to protect the value of the group (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). It is expressed in the following way: *"In reality, I am like the other members of the group of executioners. Nevertheless, I was not together with them [the genocide perpetrators] in the crimes they committed. I think that those who committed the genocide must accept and confess in order to remove our shame. They must accept without delay what they have done so that the other members of our group can feel at ease. For even without committing genocide, as a member of the executioner group, we walk and we always live with this shame"*(Int.11).

Participant 11's comments must be understood in the social context at the time of the survey. These are statements made in 2011, when the Gacaca courts were coming to an end. These jurisdictions were closed in December 2012. The hope of escaping collective

shame for this participant may be based on the fact that after the close of the Gacaca jurisdictions, the distinction between guilty and innocent members of the non-victim group would be clearly established.

Unlike participant 11, who mentions the fact that she walks and lives with shame, participant 19 showed that this was not the case for him. He has chosen a strategy of using personal identity to distinguish himself from other members of the group who have committed negative actions (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). "*I feel like a member of the Hutu group, some of whom have committed genocide. But I do not feel ashamed or guilty of belonging to this group, for to me the crime is personal. (...) Me, I'm not part of this basket that includes the perpetrators. (...), I deal only with what concerns me*".

We have just seen how individuals identify with their non-victimized group and how they experienced certain threats related to non-victim identity. In the next section, we will discuss how survivors experienced their subordinate identity.

Different types of positioning in relation to survivor identity

The survivor status was not directly related to ethnic identity, as was the case for members of the non-victim group. The victim identity does not refer to Tutsis. Moreover, three positions were observed in relation to how survivors live with the identity.

Highlighting their victimization story
Seven out of ten survivors showed that how survivors live with their survivor identity is related to their victimization stories. They talked about their vulnerability and suffering related to genocide. Two of these six survivors went so far as to demand compensation for what they had experienced. *"As a survivor, I feel like someone who has suffered. I would like to see even the other people recognize that the survivors have suffered a lot. Let them have grief. (...) I even think that as survivors, they need to be compensated for all that they have suffered and lost"* (Int.5). In the next section, we will talk about some survivors who have been able to overcome this vulnerability and have become self-reliant.

Evolution ranging from vulnerability to self-reliance
Two out of ten survivors revealed that an evolution appears in the way survivors experience their in-group identity and in the way they lived right after the genocide. Both participants acknowledged that government programs have played a role in this evolution: *"It was a time when we were vulnerable, imprisoned by our grief. We were hostages of our grief. But thanks to the Association of Genocide Widows (AVEGA) and the various government programs that strengthen us, we are no longer in this situation. We were able to move forward positively in life and take charge of us. (...). In general the survivors have gone beyond being hostages of grief, they are now looking to the future"* (Int.6).

Participant 8 agrees with this and believes that the survivors have become autonomous and thanks to the Funds of Assistance to the survivors of the Genocide (FARG). "*I see myself as someone who is self-reliant. Before, I thought I was more vulnerable, but now it is no longer the case. I was able to study due to the Fund of Assistance to the survivors of the Genocide and I work as a nurse. I take charge and try to help survivors who are still vulnerable*".

These remarks highlight a certain recognition of the survivors towards the Rwandan government. This self-reliance and reconstruction mentioned by the two participants can be understood in the positive sense. Both participants have a positive image of themselves. Let us also add that the hope for the future mentioned by participant 6 is in line with the new orientation advocated by the National Commission of the Fight against the Genocide (CNLG) from 2009, with the new launch of the logo of hope (The flame of hope). From 2009, the CNLG has encouraged people not to forget the past but to commit themselves and to invest for their future. This motivates the survivors to mention in their testimonies their achievements in order to create optimism for the future among other survivors. The concern for the future is also evident in another participant who believed that, unlike before and during the genocide, he currently has dignity and worth.

Current power status in comparison with the period before the genocide

Although having travelled through traumatic events as a survivor, participant n°12 thinks he is a valuable person. *"As a victim, I am someone who has value unlike before and during the genocide. I have to live and no one has the right to refuse me to live. I know that I must not misbehavior and harm myself by abusing drugs or alcohol. I am someone who must struggle to live, because I think there is a reason why I survived".*

This participant believes that he was able to restore a status of power that he had neither before nor during the genocide. It shows how it fits into both regimes. He refers to the fact that he had no value and no dignity during ex-President Habyarimana's regime compared to now.

The results of the interview revealed that seven out of ten survivors highlighted the history of victimization. Two other survivors had gone beyond the stage of seeing themselves as victims and vulnerable survivors and saw themselves as people who can take care of themselves. This way of perceiving oneself positively is found in another survivor who mentions that he has value as survivor of the genocide.

The results not only informed us about positioning in relation to the in-group identity, but also confirmed that the non-victim identity gave a negative image to most non-victims. On the other hand, for survivors, survivor status was not directly related to ethnic identity, as was the case for members of the non-victim group. Therefore, in

response to the question of how they perceive themselves as members of the group and whether they are proud to belong to their in-group, most victims insisted on their suffering and the history of victimization during the genocide. Few survivors spoke positively or valorized the status they have after genocide.

Different types of positioning in relation to national identity

The different positions of the participants in relation to the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups can be grouped into three categories.

Support for the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic groups

It emerged from the interview that eight non-victims and three survivors supported the policy of promoting identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic group identities. All those who supported this policy believed that it is a solution to the shame and guilt felt by non-victims. While these participants supported this policy, the reasons for their adherence differed according to the group. Indeed, non-victims questioned the basis of ethnic differences in order to justify this policy of categorization at the super-ordinate level.

Challenging ethnic groups
Participant No. 9 supports the promotion of national identity because the elements on which the Hutu are differentiated from Tutsis are unfounded. *"I support this policy, because we are all the same, the Hutus and the Tutsis. We speak the same language, inhabit the same territory, have the same culture. There are not even any physical differences that were mentioned, that the Tutsis are slender with a long nose, that the Hutus are short with a stocky nose. When I try to see especially in my generation, I see no difference. For me, it is the fact of identifying oneself as Rwandans and not as Hutu and Tutsi that will make disappear the interethnic conflict"*. Participant No. 9 raised arguments corresponding to those in the official version of the policy, that the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis is only artificial (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015).

Mobilization of mixed marriages
Mixed marriage was mobilized to support the policy promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities. "*For me, Rwandan nationality is a solution. In addition to being Rwandan, we are brothers and sisters. As a member of the Hutu group, we have members of our families in the other group who have been killed. There were marriages between the Hutus and the Tutsis. That is to say, in reality, we have the same blood, we even have kinships in the other group*" (Int.17). The latter mentions that mixed marriage justifies Hutus and Tutsis as brothers. We will find in the next section a participant who revealed that she was the victim of this mixed marriage and that the national identity is a solution for her.

National Identity: a solution for threats related to mixed identity

For participant No. 10, the program of identification with the Rwandan nation is a solution because it allowed her to have a group to belong to, and to meet her basic need of belonging, since she was excluded by the two groups*: "My mother was a Tutsi and my father was Hutu. I am proud to be a Rwandan. I identify myself as Rwandan because at least with the Rwandan nationality, I am sure that I am Rwandan and no one contests it like, like my family members do it with my ethnic identity. I am for the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic groups".* We have just seen the different reasons put forward by the non-victims who support the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups. In the next section, we will discuss the survivors who took the same position.

The reference to the colonial period

Participant N°3 refers to the colonial period in support of the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities. *"The ethnic groups merely separated and opposed Rwandans who were initially the same. Let us remain Rwandan as was the case before colonization, this will save us many problems"*. It appears that this surviving participant supports this policy in order to promote the unity of the Rwandans. He also uses the pre-colonial period described in the official version as a harmonious period (Bilali, 2014) to show that this unity existed before the introduction of ethnic groups.

Compassion for Innocent Hutu Youth

Participant No. 2 argues that this policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic group identities can be a solution for innocent Hutu youth: *"When I try to look at my colleagues, there are really those who suffer because they belong to the Hutu group. The latter carry a burden of things they have not done, because of the members of their families".* This compassion for the suffering and burdens of innocent Hutu youth is important in the process of reconciliation. It shows that survivors can take a step, abandon competition for victim status and recognize that members of the out-group may suffer, even if it is not for the same reasons as the in-group. It should be mentioned that this compassion was revealed by a survivor who was 6 years old during the genocide.

Confidence in Government

Another survivor supported this policy for the sole reason that he has confidence in his government*. "I am proud to be Rwandan. I support the policy of identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic groups. I have confidence in Rwandan government and I am sure the government will do its best to make this program a success"* (Int.7). These two survivors support this policy without any conditions. On the other hand, other survivors also supported this policy but by protecting their victim status.

**Supporting the promotion of national identity while responding
to the need for positive differentiation**

Supporting the promotion of national identity while protecting victim identity
Eight out of 20 participants (7 survivors and 1 non-victim) supported the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities by proposing different conditions that would allow them to gain a positive identity. Five survivors wanted the commemoration period to continue, two wanted ethnic identities to be maintained, and one non-victim hoped that there would be a clear distinction between non-culpable victims and innocent non-victims.

The period of commemoration is a period that recognizes the victimization of survivors. We believe that insisting on the period of commemoration allows survivors to protect their victim status, allowing them to respond to their needs for positive differentiation.

Promotion of dual identity model
Some survivors (2 out of 10) identified strongly with the nation identity but also claimed recognition of their ethnic identity, which may be forgotten in favor of the Rwandan identity. "*I am proud to be Rwandan despite the genocide of the Tutsis. Only, what worries me is that for me, we must not forget the ethnic groups. We were victims of these ethnic groups. Our people were killed because they were Tutsis. But removing ethnicities for me amounts (means) to denying my survivor status. (...). For me, one must keep ethnicities and perpetual teachings about the ethnic groups. One must show that one ethnic group has been the victim and another one perpetrated the genocide*" (Int.5).

Participant No. 6 agrees in the same sense: *"The fact that there is no ethnicity on identity cards and that is good because we have been victims of this for a long time. This time, there is no one who lacks scholarships or job because of his ethnicity. But even if we advocate the Rwandan identity and suppress the ethnic groups, I cannot forget who I am. I lost my children, I became a widow, all because of my ethnicity, I cannot forget my ethnicity. I am proud to be a Rwandan, and I support the program of highlighting the Rwandan identity. Nevertheless, I would also like the ethnic group to be kept, because suppressing ethnic groups can serve as an alibi for Holocaust deniers".*

Both participants suggested that ethnic identities should be protected and maintained because they were victims of their ethnicity. People of the older generation seemed to care more about ethnicities than younger generations. These people who supported ethnic identity were middle-aged people. They know the whole history of ethnic groups and have experienced this directly. It is not easy for them to detach themselves from these ethnic groups. Young people were just concerned about their identity as a victim, while the older ones want to protect both the ethnic identity and the identity of the victim. Only one non-victim mentioned a condition that would promote the success of

this policy of categorization at the super-ordinate level while allowing innocent non-victims to protect their positive social identity.

Separating Hutus perpetrators from Hutus non-perpetrators
Participant N ° 11 was not against the promotion of national identity, but she thought that this promotion would not be a solution for the moral image of her group as long as it is possible to generalize the attribution of responsibility of the Genocide to non-victims *"I am proud to be a Rwandan and I have nothing against this policy of promoting identification with the Rwandan nation. But for me, what would be a solution to my shame would be to make a clear distinction between the Hutus who were involved in the genocide and the innocent Hutu"*. We have just seen that certain victim participants support the policy of identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of the ethnic identity but evoked the necessary conditions for the success of this policy. As we have seen below, this participant mentioned that *"I think that those who committed the genocide must accept and confess without delay in order to remove the shame".* For another non-victim, although she recognizes that the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic identities may be a solution for some members of his group but for him, whether this policy takes ethnicities into account or not, it doesn't make any difference.

A neutral position in relation to the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities

Participant N° 19, non-victim, is neither disturbed by the maintenance of ethnic groups nor by their suppression. *"(…) But for me, I do not care whether we advocate the Rwandan identity or keep the ethnic groups. I do not even see why we would try to get rid of the ethnic groups, anyway, we know our ethnic groups. It may help some members of my group who are ashamed and guilty about their belonging. For me, the ethnic groups should not disturb me, if no one uses them to harm others and deprive people of their rights"* (Int.19).

This participant takes a neutral stance but insists that once the ethnic groups are maintained, care must be taken that they are not used to discriminate against some. This caveat reminds us that ethnic groups have been manipulated by the leaders of two former political regimes and corresponds to the version officially conveyed by the current Rwandan government (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015).

All the participants of the two groups expressed their pride in being Rwandan; they like to belong to the Rwandan group and they cannot bear if a person speaks ill or something bad of the Rwandans. Seventeen out of twenty (9 non-victim and 8 survivors) supported the policy that promotes identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic identities. However, while eight non-victims supported this policy and were ready to identify with the Rwandan nation without any conditions, only three survivors were

in the same situation. A single non-victim required conditions to support this policy, while five of the survivors made the same request. A single non-victim had a neutral position in relation to the promotion of the Rwandan identity to the detriment of the ethnic identities, while two survivors were against it because they considered that this policy does not take into account the ethnic groups. In short, non-victims suffered from their negative moral image and national identity can be a solution for these threats. On the other hand, while all survivors supported the promotion of national identity, some of them required conditions that allow them to retain the identity of a victim for their positive differentiation, while others, belonging to the former (old) Generation, propose to take into account both national identity and ethnic identity.

Discussion

During the interviews, we realized that the non-victim identity was directly understood as the Hutu identity. When talking about non-victims or people who were not persecuted but were in Rwanda, the non-victims responded directly by saying "*I understand you want to talk about the Hutus*". Regarding the survivors, the results revealed that the term survivor did not refer to the Tutsi identity for them but rather to the status of victim. This may be due to the fact that there are other repatriated Tutsis, victims of the 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1990 massacres that were not in Rwanda during the genocide. Another explanation could be also that some survivors were moderate Hutu.

Overall, most findings of this study are coherent with the need based model of the intergroup reconciliation approach (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). This model postulates that the victims and perpetrators have different threats related to their social identity after the conflict. The victims face threats related to their agency loosed during the conflict and for the perpetrators, their threats are related to a moral subgroup image tarnished by their group's perpetration of violence. The victims and the perpetrators are motivated to remove these threats and to restore agency and the positive moral image, respectively.

In that line, our results show that most non-victims (member of perpetrator group) suffer from the negative moral image in relation to their identity of non-victim, which is directly associated with the ethnic Hutu identity. The way in which most survivors experience their identity as survivors is linked to their history of victimization rather than their ethnic identity, and the suffering experienced during the genocide and the resulting vulnerability. Some of them mention their evolution from vulnerability to self-esteem and from the devalued status that they had before and during the genocide towards the current valued status. This evolution is due to the assistance from the Funds for Assistance to Genocide Survivors.

Concerning positioning their attitudes related to the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities, the results show that all participants liked and

were proud to be Rwandese and supported the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities. Some motivations that underlie positioning of members of different groups were in line with the need based model of intergroup reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

The majority of non-victim and some survivors participants supported the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups as a solution for the negative moral image and guilt conferred by the non-victim identity, while most of survivors also support it with some conditions. Half of the survivors were proud to be Rwandan and were in favour of the policy that promotes national identity, but only on condition of maintaining the period of commemoration, maintaining policies that recognize their victimization.

We believe that insisting on the period of commemoration which recognizes the victimization of survivors permits survivors to maintain their victim status and allowing them to satisfy their needs for positive differentiation. It should also be pointed out that, according to an official of the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG), there have been many changes and evolution in the politics of commemoration that may be of concern to the survivors. A further study needs to be carried out to explore the reasons behind for the choice of maintaining the commemoration for some survivors.

The survivors mentioned above wanted to maintain their victim status trough the commemoration period. On the other hand, middle-aged survivors, like the widows of the genocide, supported this policy but suggested also recognition of their identity as victim as well as the Tutsi identity. For these people, minimizing or ignoring the Tutsi identity meant denying their victim status because they saw them as intricately linked. They were persecuted and members of their families were killed because they were Tutsi. These middle-aged survivors recommended a model of dual identity that recognize and respect subgroup identities, while promoting a strong identification with the inclusive group at the same time (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001).It should be remembered also that compatibility between subordinate and superordinate identity is observed among the members of disadvantaged groups (Dovidio, Gaertner&Saguy, 2007; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

Survivors of the older generation cared more about ethnicities than younger generations. They knew the whole history of ethnic groups and had experienced this directly. It was not easy for them to detach themselves from these ethnic groups. Young people were just concerned about their identity as a victim, while the older ones wanted to protect both the ethnic identity and the identity of the victim. This difference has been observed also in a study conducted in Lebanon by Licata and colleagues (Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi, & Branscombe, 2012). The results of this study showed that identification

with Lebanon had a positive effect on intergroup attitudes of young Christian Maronite participants toward Muslims after the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), whereas identification with their religious group had the opposite effect.

Other reasons which were not in accordance with Need Based Model were also given by some participants. Two survivors, for whom national identity posed no threat, fully supported the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic identity. One argued that he supports this policy because he has confidence in his government. For the other, his reason was his compassion for the suffering of innocent young Hutus, linked to their ethnic identity. Indeed, this study has shown that it is possible for a victim to sympathize with the suffering of a member of the perpetrator group who has not been involved in the perpetration of the atrocities. Unlike victimization as a barrier to reconciliation (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008, Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998, Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003), compassion for the suffering of out-groupmembers can promote reconciliation and reducing competition in victimization (Noor *et al.*, 2008).

We think that this kind of compassion for the genocide survivors who empathized with the suffering of younger members of perpetrator group who were not implicated in genocide are not common in post genocide context, and can play a big role in reconciliation. According to the need based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), this empathy or compassion can be considered and perceived as a manner of acceptance by the victim (e.g., forgiveness, understanding of perpetrator's perspective), which can remove the negative moral image among members of perpetrator group and increase willingness to reconcile.

Staub (2003, 2005) has developed a new concept "altruism born of suffering" to explain how individuals victims of physical and sexual abuse, persecution, violence rather than become vengeful, hostile against other can dedicated themselves in helping others. Staub (2003) argue that that in the case of collective violence, caused with human agency and intention like in genocide, an important manifestation of altruism born of suffering can have a signification implication in preventing a large-scale cycles of revenge. However, Vollhardt (2009) precise that even if altruism born of suffering has a positive impact on important on the interpersonal and societal level, collective helping and helping of out-group members is less common. Subsequent studies on the pro-social behavior toward their perpetrators, after experiencing a collectively suffering caused with human intention like genocide and its influence in the reconciliation process must be carried out.

Indeed, some participants support this policy because the ethnic groups are artificial. The Hutus and the Tutsis are the same and the physical differences between them do not exist. One of the survivors mentioned that he was in agreement with the promotion of national identity, that people should identify themselves as Rwandans and not as Hutus and Tutsi, as was the case during the pre-colonial period. These different points of view correspond exactly to the official version according to which the distinction

between Hutus and Tutsis is only artificial (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015) and which regards the pre-colonial period as a period of harmonious relationships during which unity reigned (Bilali, 2014). The myth of Gihanga, which serves as a basis for the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities, is included in the courses given in the Ingando solidarity camps (reeducation camps for former guerilla soldiers, prisoners (Straus & Waldorf, 2011), students (Ndushabandi, 2013).

The results also indicate that non-victims with mixed identities may feel a threat to their prototypicality as group members. For this kind of non-victim, national identity can be a solution to escape these different threats. Members of both groups (survivor and non-victim) may experience threats of exclusion or rejection from members of their in-group because they are not the prototype of the group. In other words, they do not embody the stereotypes attributed to the whole group, nor the group's most abstract ideal (Turner *et al.*, 1987). In general, those excluded from the group are people who are far from the norm. They may differ from others on the basis of age, ethnicity, skin colour, religion, etc. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

We can also add that two non-victims identified with the Rwandan nation, but for them, promoting national identity at the detriment of ethnic group identity was not the solution for threats to group identity. They advocated for other solutions; one of them proposed the distinction between the perpetrator and the members of Hutu group who are innocent after Gacaca court. Another one choose to privilege personal identity to the detriment of social identity, since the social identity gave them a negative moral image while they were innocent (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). We believe that the use of the narrative history of non-victim Heroic Helpers called « indakemwa » can be a solution for those non-victims suffer from homogenization.

Conclusion

Our study has shown that members of victim and perpetrator groups have different needs after violent intergroup conflicts. Globally, our results suggest that the policies of strengthening national identification at the detriment of ethnic group identity, endorsed by the Rwandese government after the 1994 genocide, is fully supported by the most of non-victim participants. This policy is a solution for the negative moral image faced by non-victims. For the survivors, they support this policy but have to be ensured that other policies that recognize their victimization such as commemoration will be maintained.

However, the results of this study also show that some programs or policies put in place by the Rwandan government in post-genocide management play an important role in the process of identification, intergroup perception and the determination of inter-group attitudes. These programs are the Gacaca Courts and the Funds for Assistance to Genocide Survivors. The end of the Gacaca jurisdictions would allow, according to some non-victims, a clear distinction between innocent and perpetrating non-victims.

Thus, this distinction would eliminate the shame and collective guilt of non-victims. In addition, our study has shown that some intra-categorial differences, such as age or mixed identity, play an important role in positioning in relation to subordinate and super-ordinate identity. Future studies should place more emphasis on this.

A small number of participants suggested a dual identity model, but one of them expressed a concern about the use of these ethnic identities. This model has been suggested to be better than the common in-group identity model, which doesn't consider the ethnic distinction (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007, Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006; Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008). However, each model must take in account the historical social context (Kanazayire *et al.*, 2014) and post conflict transitional processes. In Rwanda post genocide context, due to the excesses associated with ethnicity, and security need it is not yet appropriate to use dual identity process. The fear that identities can be mobilized for violence is persistent, as mentioned by one non-victim participant and Moss & Vollhardt (2015). As long as the policies which recognize the victimization of the survivors of genocide against Tutsi are maintained, the policies of strengthening national identification, whilst also minimizing ethnic identities, endorsed by the Rwandese government after the 1994 genocide, might be the one efficient in promoting intergroup reconciliation.

Limitations and Future Research

We can't pretend to generalize the findings given a size of our sample but this study allows us to understand the deeper the resultants from our quantitative research tilled Does identification with Rwanda increase reconciliation sentiment between genocide survivors and non-victims? The mediating role of perceived intergroup similarity and self-esteem during commemoration against Tutsis.

The findings from the present study suggest several future research directions; same research could be done with a larger sample which can consider intra-categorial difference.

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Tanzania:
Small Arms Proliferation
in East Africa and National Security

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Abstract.

This article examines the effects of the prolifera-tion of small arms on Tanzania's national security. Engaging the security dilemma theory, regional security complex theory and ideas about state weakness, the paper argues that the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania negatively shape the so-cial, economic and political milieu with profound consequences for the stability and security of the country and region both in the short and long-term. While Tanzania continues to be relatively stable, it suffers from the proliferation of small arms. This may erode its long observed image as the anchor of East African stability if not urgently addressed. The paper concludes that Tanzania has both strengths or successes and weaknesses in its efforts to mitigate the small arms challenge in which the former need to be strengthened to avert the country's image of peace and stability in East Africa from becoming an illusion.

Keywords: *national security, small arms, East Africa, Tanzania, state weakness, peace and sta-bility.*

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War generated global optimism regarding global peace and security because of the shift from super-power-initiated proxy wars in developing countries towards the seemingly viable project of social and economic growth. These hopes were shattered by the outbreak of many civil wars during the post-Cold War era (Kingazi, 2006, p. 3; Solomon, 1996, p. 1). The post-Cold War era compounded the proliferation of small arms[1] because many of the weapons were sold at very cheap prices by the major military powers in the world as they reduced their Cold War stockpiles and/or modernised their armed forces (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 6). Instead of realising sustainable security and development, dangerous civil wars, crimes, terrorist activities and gross human rights violations have been witnessed at a disturbing rate. In many of the brutal conflicts (including Angola in the early 1990s, Central African Republic, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia in the late 1990s, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya 2011 to the present, Mozambique in the 1980s, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone in the early 2000s, Somalia and Sri Lanka just to mention but just a few) and crimes, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are used and their sources vary but many are sourced from the industrialised world, particularly the United States of America (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 3).

The proliferation of SALW is a global problem. Over 875 million small arms are in circulation worldwide with many of them illegally in the hands of non-state actors and civilians (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 1). About 100 million small arms are in circulation in Africa causing huge problems for the continent and its people (Ngboawaji, 2011, p. 1). It is considered to be the hardest hit in the world (AWEPA, 2006, p. 7). The proliferation of small arms causes immediate security challenges to many facets of humanity including at the individual, society and state levels. The link between security and development especially in the post-Cold War era has been well observed (Chandler, 2007; Hillier, 2007; Ngboawaji, 2011). Among other things, the proliferation of small arms prevents

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1 Small arms and light weapons are defined as a sub-category of conventional weapons that are easy to carry, use and inexpensive. They include pistols, rifles (the most common being the AK 47 assault rifle and its associated models), mortars, man-portable air defence systems and rocket-propelled grenades. The weapons can either be carried by one person or a group of people. Small arms, according to the United Nations (UN) include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. They can be carried and used by one person. On the other hand, the UN defines light weapons as including heavy machine guns, portable antitank and antiaircraft guns, portable launchers of antitank and antiaircraft missiles, hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre. They can be carried and used by two to three people either on the back of an animal or a truck. For details, see Ayuba & Okafor, 2015, p. 77. In this study, small arms and light weapons are simply referred to as small arms in reference to and acknowledgement of the UN definition since the small arms are the ones prevalent in the country with negligible cases of light weapons.

the realisation of sustainable security and development. This is because "small arms fuel civil wars, organised criminal violence, and terrorist activities" undermining development assistance to fragile states and if unchecked threatening to destabilize whole regions (Ngboawaji, 2011, p. 1; Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 1). The availability of small arms also weakens the ability and capacity of the state by nurturing a culture of impunity and criminality as easy access to weapons make difficult central government efforts to establish and maintain public order, rule of law, supply relief, pursue development goals and deliver essential social services (Patrick, 2006).

The link between the proliferation of small arms and the outbreak of violent conflicts, particularly in Africa in the post-Cold war era, has been established (Ayuba & Okafor, 2015; Patrick, 2006). The national and regional security implications due to small arms proliferation are evident in Libya. The rampant flow of weapons in that country has negatively affected its neighbours and destabilising the whole Middle East and North African region (Hove, 2017; Hove & Ndawana, 2017; Zambakari, 2016). The large scale intra-state conflicts in East Africa have fed the ready availability of small arms to pastoral communities in the region. The prevalence of small arms protracted these groups' conflicts and complicated and rendered irrelevant the old methods of peaceful conflict resolution (Bevan, 2008, p. 2). This negates the view that easy access to small arms actually increases security at the personal level thereby reducing crimes at the interpersonal level (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 9). While the causes of violence and armed conflict are complex and many, the presence of arms spur, intensify and prolong armed violence in many cases in Africa and controlling them will also go a long way in limiting such violence (Hillier, 2007, p. 4). Against this background, this study discusses the implications of the proliferation of small arms on national security in Tanzania.

National security threats to the Republic of Tanzania include small arms proliferation. It is one among many other threats including refugees, religious and political fundamentalism, terrorism, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and poaching (Kingazi, 2006, pp. 11-18). The broadened concept of national security is used in this article. It includes military, political, economic, societal, environmental, individual and informational security. This can be universalised under the term human security where security entails a public good and is the foundation of human well-being (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 1994, p. 23). It denotes a shift from the traditional belief whereby national security was largely viewed as the ability of a country to defend itself from external aggression, that is, an attribute of the state meaning absence of military conflict - military security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 1). This is so because a secure state does not automatically make secure people (Hove, Ngwerume & Muchemwa, 2013, p. 3). In fact, the end of the Cold War ushered in the "consideration of non-state actors such as individuals, society and the global systems as alternative objectives (referents) of security" (Mogire, 2003, p. 5). Linked to this, Riedel (2010: 99) asserts that security is simultaneously a state, process, need and value.

In light of the above, sustainable national security and development in Tanzania cannot be realised without putting a stop to the proliferation of small arms which is likely to threaten the security of individuals, society and the state with high possibilities of destabilising the whole region through spill over effects. We demonstrate that while Tanzania continues to be relatively stable, it suffers from the proliferation of SALW. This may erode its long observed image as the anchor of East African stability if not urgently addressed. Tanzania has both strengths or successes and weaknesses in its efforts to mitigate the SALW challenge. Consequently, unravelling the impact of small arms on Tanzanian citizens, society and the state is vital to sensitise and guarantee the preparedness of the Tanzanian security sector as it will be equipped with the knowledge and how to deal with the menace of the proliferation of small arms. This is because the proliferation of small arms poses serious national security threats to countries as well as destabilising whole regions and disturbing international relations, peace and security. Overall, this study augments the literature on arms control, disarmament, security and development.

The article proceeds as follows: Section two discusses the methodology used while section three provides the conceptual framework guiding the study. Section four discusses the findings of the study revealing the causes and scale of the problem of small arms proliferation, and the magnitude of their consequences. Section five presents a discussion contributing to a profound understanding of the serious negative implications on national security of the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania and at the regional level through spill over effects. Section six presents the conclusion and way forward.

Methodology

This is a qualitative study of SALW in Tanzania. It used a combination of primary and secondary sources. The research engaged direct semi-structured interviews in Dar es Salaam to gather data wherein one of the researchers (Ghuliku, a Tanzanian) was the main research instrument. Research guide questions were used just as a guide as opposed to a prescriptive device. This permitted the carrying out of conversations with key informants and understanding what is happening from their viewpoint. Interviews were conducted between January and February 2016 with three key informants from relevant security sector departments namely, home affairs (with Charles Ulaya, Head of Department, Assistant Commissioner of Police, the Department of Arms Management and Control, Police Headquarters, and Haji Y. Janabi, Director of Policy and Planning-Ministry of Home Affairs) and border management (with Moses Ismael Malisa, Border Management and Control Division of the Tanzania Immigration Service Department). These individuals were selected via purposive (judgmental) sampling because they appear to have expertise of the implications of the proliferation of small arms on the national security of Tanzania. Key informants are engaged, "as a result of their personal skills, or position within a society, are able to provide more information and a deeper

insight into what is going on around them" (Marshall, 1996, p. 92). Besides, the informants in this study also fulfilled all the five identified features of an ideal key informant namely, role in community, knowledge, willingness, communicability and impartiality (Marshall, 1996, p. 92). Consequently, the authors felt that the chosen individuals provide valid and reliable information in the context of the SALW trade. The purpose of the interviews were to identify the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania and bring to the fore details of the security challenges imposed on the people (individually), society and ultimately the state.

Additionally, documentary analysis was used in this study. The authors made use of reading and analysing relevant literature on the topic under study (including newspaper articles, peer-reviewed works and books) in order to establish the gaps, giving the background and comparison of what other published works on the topic and related topics say (Yin, 1994, p. 85). Documentary analysis also permitted us to gather data beyond Tanzania, the geographical area of study. The information gathered through documentary analysis was crucial because it provided important insights for the generation of interview questions without unnecessarily replicating what is already known, corroborating and augmenting the data gathered from interviews. More so, documentary analysis served to verify the exact spellings of names and titles of places and organisations among others (Yin, 1994, p. 85). The collected data was thematically analysed and presented.

This study's use of three key informants means a very small sample and comprises a major limitation in its findings. This is because the small sample could not represent all the views and experiences of the Tanzanians with regards to SALW. However, this study's conclusions reflect what the key informants observe and know about how SALW have threatened national security in the country. This is because a qualitative case study approach permits the exploration of a phenomenon in its context using different sources of data (Baxter & Jack, 2008, pp. 544-559; Yin, 1994, p. 94). Consequently, the case study approach in this case immensely benefited from the use of more than a single source of evidence. It ensured that the findings of the study were based on the convergence of data from various sources, thereby enhancing the credibility and validity of its findings as articulated by Yin (1994: 93). Thus the weaknesses inherent in the small sample made of the key informants were minimised (to the extent possible) by the use of documentary analysis. This implies that for future research, scholars may need to at least widen the base of their informants to avoid similar weaknesses which may be gleaned from this study.

Conceptual Framework

The authors argue that the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania negatively affects the social, economic and political milieu with profound consequences for the stability and security of the country and region both in the short and long-term. We draw on the

security dilemma theory to articulate how small arms and their proliferation threaten peace and security through their destabilising and conflict inducing consequences including reciprocated fear and hostility between groups within states or outside states. Security dilemma denotes a process in which a concern of one's security prompts an overall waning in security of the other. The need to be ready for the worst-case scenario emanates from the "unresolvable uncertainty" which shows a sense of uncertainty on the part of the actors about the present and future intentions of who might harm them, including both friends and enemies (Booth & Wheeler, 2013, p. 138). As a result, the threat posed by one's security leads others to also increase their security. The need to keep the same level of security empowers one to keep pace with their rival's by increasing their arms to the level of their rivals (Roe, 1999, p. 186). This mutually reinforcing process has been well observed between states and their rivals. However, this can also happen in intrastate conflicts where the disintegrating state and ethnic hostilities may aggravate the situation motivating groups to exploit other groups' relative weakness to fill the vacuum created by the state (Jeong, 2008, pp. 138-139). To this end, any weapon has both defensive and offensive capabilities and can be used for any of the purposes. Clearly, small arms can be intended for diverse purposes besides direct violence and the unintended signals and consequences they provoke.

The security dilemma concept has been successfully applied in intrastate conflict situations. Posen (1993) applied the operation of security dilemma in the post-Cold War era intrastate conflicts. He asserts that the way anarchy promotes security dilemma dynamics in the international arena is the same way it is relevant to intrastate conflicts. An "emerging anarchy" grows within the state putting sub-state factions in the same dilemma as states in the international system and are subjected to similar fear and uncertainty of other groups and ought to secure their own security. Hill (2004, p. 14) further argues that the anarchical intrastate milieu can probably be even more delicate than in the international one because individuals are more susceptible in relation to states. This points to the fact that even the influx of small arms at a small scale may incite dramatic results with a potential of leading to the outbreak of a civil war among other insecurities. Given that arms are a key factor in the security dilemma, arms control efforts are therefore seen as a preventive factor if not a promising solution to the security dilemma (Croft, 1996, p. 14). Again, security dilemma theorists describe another beneficial factor of the security dilemma. This comes in the form of the effects of the arms control system in reducing the mutual hostility caused by the security dilemma and generating alternatives for cooperation as opposed to competition in the anarchic milieu (Wendt, 2008, pp. 105-106). This makes the security dilemma theory useful to explain the implications on national security of the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania.

On the other hand, the regional security complex theory (first developed by Barry Buzan) highlight the existence of regional sub-systems as objects of security analysis and presents a methical framework for dealing with such systems. Defining secu-

rity complex, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) note that it is "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (p. 11). The theory was originally propounded primarily focusing on the state as the key unit of analysis plus the military and political sectors. It has now been broadened to be applied on various units of analysis beyond the state including on non-traditional sectors such as environmental and societal sectors among others. It offsets the underplaying of the importance of the regional level by power theorists in understanding international security situations (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 16-17).

The regional security complex concept deals with how security is grouped in geographically fashioned regions. It holds the notion that security concerns usually travel well over short distances as opposed to long ones and security threats are thus most probably to take place in the region due to proximity. Each regional actor interacts with the security of the other actors in the region thereby affecting the region's security. Regional security becomes an interesting area of study due to the fact that there is habitually strong security interdependence within a region as opposed to between regions thereby defining a region (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 11). Furthermore,

> security complex theory also links studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the region, relations among regions, and relations between regions and globally acting great powers ... as well as predictions about, possibilities for stability and change (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 11).

Here regions become mini-systems where all other international relations theories including but not limited to balance of power, interdependence and alliance systems can be applied. As such, Tanzania's security or insecurity is linked with the East African region's security or insecurity. As a result, the insecurity brought by the proliferation of small arms in the East African region on Tanzania's national security by way of spill over effects coming from those countries in conflict is feeding into the insecurity of Tanzania. Tanzania will also be the source of insecurity in the region if the proliferation of small arms in the country is not addressed.

The paper also draws on the general ideas of weak states in which it reveals that Tanzania possesses not only weaknesses in its efforts to control the flow of weapons, but there are also strengths or successes. The characteristics of weak states include that they are incapable of guaranteeing security, obtaining legitimacy and providing basic services to their citizens (Hove & Ndawana, 2017, p. 18). They are also typified by:

> Weak institutions, bad governance, legitimacy crisis, divided community, neo-patrimonalism, corruption and varieties of personalistic and clientalistic politics ... considered to be dangerous for their own people and the international community due to their proneness to conflict, instability, terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and dangerous diseases (Ababu, 2013, p. 3).

While some of these generalisations relatively apply in Tanzania, others do not. This makes it important to explain what makes Tanzania, a weak state, continue to be different, that is, being more stable and its reputation somehow still suggesting that.

The Role of Small Arms in Threatening National Security in Tanzania
The Causes and Scale of the Problem of Small Arms Proliferation

The long and porous borders of Tanzania have contributed to the proliferation of small arms. Tanzania, while hailed for political stability since its independence, free of civil wars, coups and violence which are a typical feature of the post-independence history of many African countries (Grossman-Vermaas, Huber & Kapitanskaya, 2010, p. 16), is bordered by eight African countries (Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique Rwanda, Zambia and Uganda) and has a coastline over 1 400 kilometres long (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2005, p. iii). This makes it difficult for the country to ensure border security and illegal small arms easily find their way into the country (Janabi, personal communication, 5 February 2016). For instance, the Kagera region was made unsafe in 1994 when Rwandan refugees numbering more than a million largely comprising the Interahamwe militias fled to this part of Tanzania with their arms which they intended to attack and destabilise Rwanda from (Shyaka, 2006, p. 14). In this regard, the porous, far-stretched, isolated and least monitored borders of Tanzania with its neighbours with conflicts or in immediate post-conflict situations expose it to small arms trafficking (Gichane, 2015, p. 54).

Although Tanzania has proved different, as discussed below, because it did not witness widespread violence of the magnitude experienced in some of its neighbours it was all the same affected. The refugee crisis from Rwanda led Tanzania to face:

> Environmental degradation, rapid depletion of water resources, water pollution, the difficulty of digging pit latrines in the rocky soil around the camps and therefore the overflow problem, diverting road construction equipment to camp construction, extra wear and tear on the poorly developed regional road system, criminals in the camps, and marauding among local residents in the vicinity of the camps, fears that the violence of the Rwandan situation would spread beyond the camps and lead to more violence among Tanzanian neighbors, increased prices in basic goods and food security threats in the border villages, for example, in the Ngara District there are three refugees for every Tanzanian (Smith, 1995, p. 55).

The regions sharing common borders with civil war and conflict-ridden countries are the ones also experiencing rampant illegal trade in small arms. These include Kagera, Kigoma, Rukwa and Katavi. The illegal possessors of the firearms find their way to large cities and towns such as Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and Mbeya with ease (Rugonzibwa, 2014). As a result, "Tanzania's long and porous borders makes it difficult

to prevent the passage of destabilizing influences that are prevalent in the region such as drugs, small arms, and people" (Kessler, 2006, p. 3). Similarly, in light of human security concerns, it has been noted that many violent cases witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa due to small arms are as a result of the prevalence of "weak states", large number of rebel movements and the increase in brutal incidents among civilians due to poverty and violent struggle for inadequate resources (AWEPA, 2006, p. 7). However, as discussed below Tanzania so far seems to negate the generalizations regarding the link between state weakness and conflict.

Further evidence of the prevalence of small arms proliferation because of the porosity of Tanzania's borders was found. According to Jacob (2014), "Kigoma region and the neighbouring Kenya are reportedly said to be the major gate ways for illegal fire arms and bullets entering the lake zone of Mara". Again, the boundary between Mozambique and Tanzania is a case in point where Pams Foundation, a Tanzanian-based conservation organisation has been patrolling the Rovuma River arresting people caught with SALW. In a single patrol they usually get 10 firearms. The firearms are being used by poachers on wildlife. In its August 2013 report, the organisation recorded seizure of 473 firearms, and 1 138 rounds of ammunition over a period of 12 months (Doshi, 2013). An anti-poaching campaign in Tundura, Ruvuma region launched by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism special joint task force in July 2012 "impounded 297 firearms, 370 rounds of ammunition and 150 shell castings. The type of firearms seized included 47 submachine guns, 225 homemade guns (gobole), 23 rifles, two SARs, one SMG, and one Egyptian G3" and seized government trophies valued at Sh618.4million (Athumani, 2012). Border guards (on both the Tanzanian and Mozambican border side) have been accused of complicity in the smuggling operations in both firearms and ivory (Doshi, 2013). This indicates that it is not only the porosity of borders enabling the proliferation of small arms but corrupt tendencies as well.

The laxity of security at the border and port areas also contributes in the proliferation of small arms. It has been noted that Tanzania's security forces - Tanzania Police Force, Tanzania People's Defence Force, and Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service—are regarded as

> ... generally too weak, under-resourced, and poorly coordinated to ensure the security of the country's borders...Not only is the region characterized by highly porous land and sea borders, it is also beset by largely dysfunctional structures of law and enforcement, endemic organized criminal activity (involving everything from drugs and people smuggling to weapons trafficking) and relative proximity to known Islamist logistical hubs such as Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (LeSage, 2014, p. 5).

The 2009 alleged smuggling of 15 rocket-propelled grenades heading for Dar es Salaam from Zanzibar via a dhow was a tip of the ice bag demonstrating the porosity

of Tanzania's borders and substandard port security both in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam (Grossman-Vermaas *et al.*, 2010, p. 28). As Moses Ismael Malisa puts it in an interview, the nature of the country's borders encourages the proliferation of SALW through cross border smuggling. He remarked:

> Due to the fact that our borders are porous, vast and unmanned, this situation has exposed the country to the many security threats including proliferation of small arms. Porosity of the border has greatly encouraged traffickers of small arms to use illegal entry points to smuggle small arms into Tanzania. Cross border smuggling of goods along border areas is among the push factors which have encouraged proliferation of small arms. For instance, in the Indian Ocean on Tanzanian territory waters, there are 45 illegal ports, which are being used by smugglers to penetrate contraband and smuggled goods including illegal immigrants who come with small arms to Tanzania. About 85 illegal entry points in the Northern part of Tanzania have been identified by the Tanzania Immigration Services Department. These illegal entry points are being used by smugglers in the smuggling of goods into Tanzania as well as illegal immigrants from the Horn of Africa (Malisa, personal communication, 8 February 2016).

In light of the above sentiments, the fact that long and porous borders of Tanzania are contributing to the proliferation of SALW need not be overemphasised.

East Africa is home to violent conflicts and the emerging of new ones remains high with destabilising effects on relatively peaceful neighbours including Tanzania. The "... most insecure countries in the world, Somalia, and it borders other various conflict-torn states, most notably Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo" and "... Kenya experienced internal conflicts in 2008 with the root causes of the violence remaining unaddressed. Border regions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain volatile, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda is still active" (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2009, p. 6). Consequently, "... these wars and conflict, refugee camps are prevalent throughout the region, and the spread of fear and violence by militias, gangs and armed pastoralists ..." (UNODC, 2009, p. 6) have made difficult the implementation of regulatory measures dealing with SALW.[2] According to Janabi (2016),

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2   The international regional legal frameworks dealing with the sale and transfer of SALW include UN Program of Action (UN PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001) and the Arms Trade Treaty (2014). The regional framework comprises the African Union Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000) while the sub-regional framework includes the Nairobi Declaration on the illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (2000), the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and

the international, regional, sub-regional and national legal instruments dealing with the proliferation of SALW are not respected in the face of conflicts. He remarked that:

> These instruments are effective in controlling the spread of small arms but the implementation of the same is somehow difficult especially in conflict areas. When an armed conflict breaks out in a country, law and order also disrupts, so it becomes difficult to control the spread of small arms in that area. And due to our porous borders, these arms get carried by refugees to the other countries. Also, not all countries around us have signed and ratified those protocols, so it also becomes easier for SALW to flow from one country which has less strict laws to the other through illegal means (Janabi, 2016).

This is because both governments and rebel groups continue to arm militias and gangs as a way of guaranteeing their survival. In fact, countries at war do not exhibit any political will to implement the laws culminating in the changing of hands of weapons even by government arming its militia or vigilante groups (Ulaya, personal communication, 28 January 2016). The resultant violence and refugee crisis lead to instability to previously stable parts of the country and other countries due to the availability of weapons that are brought by refugees.

The scale of the problem of SALW in Tanzania is huge judging by the numbers of the weapons that continue to be seized and destroyed by the government since the early 2000s. About 2,772 guns were surrendered and destroyed in 2008 (Alpers & Wilson, 2016). In 2010, 1,500 illicit arms were confiscated by police in Mwanza region during raids on criminals (The Citizen, 9 August 2010). Moreover, a total of 4,000 illicit firearms were also destroyed in 2010 by the police. These were confiscated across the country from "Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora, Rukwa, Mbeya, Ruvuma and Mwanza while other weapons were from the Tabora wildlife department" (Sezzy, 2010). In 2012, a short-lived campaign witnessed police impounding 304 unlawfully owned firearms (Daily News, 6 December 2012). In 2013, 3,100 unlawful SALW were destroyed (Bucyensenge, 2013). Additionally, about 439 illicit firearms were recovered from citizens in an effort that lasted a month, from 5 December 2012 to 5 January 2013, collecting unlicensed arms without consequences to their owners (Sabahi/Guardian, 8 January 2013). Tanzania's Criminal Investigation Department pointed out that illegal arms possession increased from 469 in 2011 to 550 in 2012 (Emanuel & Ndimbwa, 2013, p. 522). According to Reisman, Mkutu, Lyimo and Moshi with support from the Tanzanian Police Force (2013,

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the Horn of Africa (2004) and The Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials 2001. Tanzania is a state-party to all these mentioned legal frameworks. The domestic legal framework comprise constitutional provisions which include the Armaments Control Act (No. 2/ 1991), the Arms and Ammunition Act (Act No. 2 of 1991 and No. 19 of 2007) and the recently enacted Firearms and Ammunition Control Act 2015.

p. 36), between 2002 and 2013, government led disarmament operations collected and destroyed 24,187 firearms. In 2014, about seven guns largely submachine guns and not less than 420 bullets were seized by the police in the Mara region in an operation aimed at curbing the illegal influx of firearms (Jacob, 2014). While other estimates of how many more illegal SALW were imported without being detected in the midst of government concerted efforts to destroy them are difficult to come by, the persistence of the high figures of those destroyed are roughly indicative of their continued presence and widespread, albeit, obviously with a slight decline.

Tanzania has been a victim of her neighbours worsened by her geographical location that puts Tanzania between the Southern, Eastern and central African states prone to political and civil instability. At one point, Tanzania hosted about 600,000 refugees largely from Burundi and the DRC (Kessler, 2006, p. 3). Moreover, the Tanzanian region of Kigoma had the highest number of firearms in circulation as a result of the spill over effects of the decades long destabilisation caused by conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. Apart from being affected by a refugee crisis, the spill over effects also came in the form of the establishment of rebel groups training in Tanzania to launch attacks back home (Jefferson & Urquhart, 2002). Tanzania's unstable neighbours, particularly Somalia, Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda have spill over effects of their conflicts not only in the form of refugees numbering over 800,000 in the country but these also came with arms which they sold cheaply in order to get spending money (Maze & Rhee, 2008, p. 27; Kingazi, 2006, p. 13). Importantly, the weapons that were brought by refugees got a market because the people in Tanzania bought the guns. They bought the weapons probably due to their perceived insecurity or inadequate security from the government at the individual and community level. As a result, it can be argued that the individuals and their communities armed themselves in a security dilemma context. More so, the relevance of the regional security complex theory is exposed where conditions of instability prevailing in one country in a region are felt by other countries in the neighbourhood.

Tanzania is also a relevant example demonstrating that the SALW qualities such as cheapness and ready accessibility and portability and easy concealment also account for their proliferation. For instance, there are numerous cases of the exchange of guns for maize and livestock in many regions in Tanzania including in parts of Arusha such as Sale, Loliondo and Ngorongoro populated by pastoralists (The Arusha Times, 2 April 2016). Again, at one point a submachine gun was illegally able to be purchased in Tanzania at a cost of 200 United States dollars (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). In April 2014, four suspects were caught in Musoma Municipality with a submachine gun and dozens of bullets hid in a box loaded with bananas (Jacob, 2014).

The above discussion reveals that a combination of socio-economic and political factors explains the proliferation of SALW in Tanzania. The uncontrolled border checkpoints

are simply enablers but the underlying causes of the proliferation of SALW are on the demand side of SALW within the country or from which the arms come from. Indeed, arms flow into Tanzania from the north-western borders of the country is worsened by rebels from neighbouring countries in conflict who sell them cheaply to the community or exchange them for food. The next subsection discusses the magnitude of the consequences of the proliferation of SALW on the country's national security.

The Magnitude of the Consequences of Small Arms on Security in Tanzania

While no exact data is available regarding the extent to which SALW are available in Tanzania, we argue that the country has in recent years showed negative trends due to excessive amounts of small arms in civilian hands. These have increased the levels of violence and insecurity in the local communities.

The destruction programmes were an effort to avoid the returning of the surplus illegal firearms onto the secondary arms market. Increased arms flow into Tanzania from the north-western borders of the country was exacerbated by rebels from neighbouring countries in conflict who shelter themselves in the country and engaging in the proliferation of SALW in East Africa (Janabi, 2016). As a result, an increase in armed crime has been witnessed across the country – cattle rustling and interethnic conflict in rural communities and armed crime in urban areas (Maze & Rhee, 2008, p. 27). Owning a gun has become fashionable for the Tanzanian youths and many of the handguns they own are intended for wrong reasons (Tambwe, 2013). Indeed, there are weaknesses in the destruction campaigns. These include that they do not address concerns contributing to the demand for arms, including but not limited to livelihood and continued existence needs, dearth of official security provision, and the money-making drive factors in small arms possession, in which owning a weapon signifies fast money. Additionally, while on the one hand arms are removed from communities, they are simultaneously being given out with inadequate regulations in other places, such as private security companies, whose guns have sometimes been found in use for criminal purposes (Reisman *et al.*, 2013, p. 36). Clearly, this culminates in small arms proliferation contributing to individual, community and national insecurity. Even the region is liable to face security problems due to SALW proliferation in Tanzania although for now it appears the situation is still under control.

The conflicts between farmers and herders over land and water in Tanzania while existent for many years have over time turned deadly due to the availability of small arms. One of the deadly clashes between farmers and herders is the Kilosa killings that occurred on 8 December 2000 in Rudewa Mbuyuni village between farmers and herders. It culminated in the death of 38 villagers (the worst and deadly clash so far) and the wounding of many. It occurred against the environment of the destruction of the crops of farmers by the herders of livestock which occurred over the years without

compensation that led to conflict between the two communities which in turn armed themselves for self-defence (Benjaminsen, Maganga & Abdallah, 2009, pp. 434-435). Additionally, eight people were killed, several houses torched and livestock stolen in 2008 following the reigniting of the conflict. In January 2014, 10 people were also killed by the Maasai pastoralists in Kitito district. The conflict was over the disputed Embroi Murtangosi forest reserve where the people who are settled in the forest had their houses torched in an attempt to evict them (Makoye, 2014). It escalated because guns and other traditional weapons have become full-time companions of farmers and livestock herders for self-defence in the face of conflict between each other. The lack of quick police intervention to solve the conflicts between them makes the conflicts more fatal (Ulaya, 2016).

Inter-tribal conflicts which previously were addressed through traditional weapons when they go out of hand have also become increasingly fatal due to the availability of weapons. For instance, in Ngorongoro District, especially in Loliondo and Salle tribal killings erupted fuelled by the proliferation of small arms in civilian hands. This culminated in the death of seven people as violence and banditry escalated in the area in 2011 (Ubwani, 2011). In 2013, two people including a former Mwanza Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Regional Chairman, Clement Mabina were killed due to a land conflict. The conflict could have been solved peacefully had it not been for mob justice and the prevalence of small arms that were misused. Anger rather than wisdom and patience became the deciding factor during conflicts due to the presence of guns pushing people to mete out improper and short-lived solutions (Tanzania Daily News, 18 December 2013).

Furthermore, banditry and cattle rustling have been witnessed in the border regions of Tanzania and Rwanda and have become more violent. Cows and goats are stolen in Tanzania for sale in Rwanda and some bandits cross into Rwanda to commit robberies and go back to Tanzania (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). A good example of the banditry groups involved in such activities is the Kinyange group. The group was formed and led by Kinyange a refugee and a former fighter from Rwanda (Ulaya, 2016). His criminal gang terrorised people both in Tanzania and Rwanda stealing goods and destroying property and taking even people's lives. The group was dismantled in 2004 due to cooperation and information sharing efforts between Rwanda and Tanzanian forces after causing significant harm and damage (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). In line with the security dilemma and the regional security complex theories, we glean that national security and even regional security is threatened by the armed groups, individuals and communities and can render a country ungovernable and region unstable by taking the law into their own hands.

Moreover, poachers and cattle rustlers have become more violent over time. According to Emanuel and Ndimbwa (2013, p. 523), between 2004 and 2007 cattle rustling was the leading crime committed with firearms with a total of 5,080 cases to 5,153, apart

from murder which also rose from 2,926 to 3,583 and armed robbery which slightly declined from 1,175 to 1,080, respectively. Operation "Kimbunga" (whirlwind) in 2013 which targeted illegal immigrants and bandits vandalising the border regions of Kagera, Kigoma and Geita netted 47 guns, impounded 600 rounds of ammunition and 3,400 cattle. The cattle came from neighbouring countries to Tanzania for grazing with the herders being armed with guns for protection and only left them when they were over-whelmed by the operation. As a result, the operation flushed out about 7,800 foreigners (Daily News, 20 September 2013). In Serengeti and Tarime Districts in the Mara region, guns are not only used to cause insecurity to people and their property but include that of wild animals particularly elephants found in the Serengeti National Park and the neighbouring Ikorongo and Grumeti game reserves that are wildlife-rich (Jacob, 2014). The huge scale of poaching in Tanzania was exposed by Hellwig-Botte (2014: 1) who noted that the census of October 2013 shows that there was a plummet in the elephant population in Selous ecosystem from "109,000 in 1976 to 13,084 today". Poachers had killed about 67 percent of the entire population in the previous four years because in 2006 it was 70,000 (Hellwig-Botte, 2014, p. 1). Additionally, Kideghesho (2016) has observed that the ongoing high rate of the killing of elephants in Tanzania is related "to increased criminality, corruption, the proliferation of firearms, the failure of the judicial system and a perception that Tanzania is a sanctuary for criminals" (p. 369). Clearly, the scale of the proliferation and misuse of SALW in Tanzania is huge.

Terrorist attacks in Tanzania have also increased over the past few years indicating a negative trend in the country's stability. Although not solely the cause, SALW prolif-eration is linked to terrorism. Between 2013 and 2014, there were several blasts in Arusha, Mwanza, and Stone Town, Zanzibar. Most of these blasts have been used in areas with huge population concentrations and culminated in death, injury and de-struction of property. About 41 bombs were recovered during this period (Kyalo, n.d., p. 16). In February 2016, police in Arusha halted and killed three alleged terrorists, seized ammunition and materials used for producing explosives and army regalia. The link with terrorists emerged when the deceased were found with two flags with Arabic inscriptions similar to those used by terrorist groups. The death of the three suspects occurred in exchange of fire with the police, according to the Arusha regional police (Business Monitor International [BMI], 2016, p. 9). In April 2016, explosives, military regalia, masks, bomb detonators plus a black flag used by al-Shabaab fighters based in Somalia were seized by police in the Morogoro region. The seizure culminated in the arrest of 10 people in association with the weapons. In 2015, terrorism warnings had been issued in Dar es Salaam and the northern tourist town of Arusha. These had led to improved security measures in regions understood to be terrorist targets (BMI, 2016, p. 9). According to Business Monitor International (2016: 10), al Shabaab, Boko Haram and unidentified Tanzanian citizens inspired by al Shabaab are the major groups in the country. They largely target Western interests, tourist resorts and government

buildings. However, the terrorist threat level continues to be moderate to low. Despite that, this underscores the fact that the increase in terrorist attacks in Tanzania and the region in general is partly linked to the proliferation of small arms.

Tanzania has over the years witnessed an increase in organized crime. It is among other ills brought by the proliferation of small arms and include car hijacking and other armed robberies and serious crimes in Tanzania. For instance, in Dar es Salaam there were daylight armed robberies at the Co-operative and Rural Development Bank in 2004, with 3.1-billion shillings stolen; at Stanbic in 2004 with 2.5-billion shillings stolen, and at Citibank in 2002, with 2.2-billion shillings stolen. Other robberies occurred at the Postal Bank Arusha, National Bank of Commerce Kibo Branch Moshi, Exim Bank Mtwara, and the National Microfinance Bank Igunga Branch Tabora (Macha, 2006, p. 27). Between 2010 and 2014, firearms linked with crimes were reportedly rising (Kyalo, n.d., p. 13). In December 2012, a bank clerk of Artan Company of Dar es Salaam was shot on his way to a bank to deposit Sh150 million by three robbers. He later died in hospital while a bystander was shot and died on the spot when he tried to rescue the bank teller from the robbers through throwing stones at them (Daily News, 20 December 2012). These notable losses in the spate of bank robberies involving small arms undoubtedly hindered sustainable economic development as they become disincentives to new investments. This deepens poverty (which is already high) due to lack of or reduced interest in bank deposits, higher interest rates on borrowed loans forcing borrowers to default on their payments (Macha, 2006, p. 27). The economic security and personal security dimensions of human security were endangered as a result of SALW which in turn threaten the national security of Tanzania. In both the short and long run, national security is threatened by these activities because they retard economic growth, cause serious insecurities at the individual, group and society levels. On the other hand, they prompt the affected individuals or groups' desire to provide for their own security and such a process fuels arms races.

Adding to the above point, people's standards of living have been affected as the few with resources resorted to hiring private security companies to guard their compounds. The resultant engagement of security personnel by individuals and organisations has been bemoaned by Macha (2006) noting that:

> Today, heavily armed policemen patrolling streets and armed guards in schools, public buildings, commercial complexes, and private premises are common-place in Dar es Salaam. Such a proliferation "has often led to the acceptance of weapons as a normal part of life ... These developments have created numerous anxieties, induced by perceived threats to personal security and consequent domestic arms races. The formation of paramilitary, civilian defence and armed vigilante groups can be seen as both symptoms and causal factors in processes of societal militarization and weapons proliferation" (p. 27).

In line with the security dilemma theory an increased presence of armed individuals somehow force other members of the community to arm themselves for protection since they cannot trust each other. This unwittingly leads to an arms race at both the individual and community level. This argument dovetails with Cross, de Caris and Urquhart's (2003) observation that "domestically Tanzania has a significant firearms problem. Violent firearms-related crimes are numerous and impact heavily on people's perceptions of security, leading to law-abiding citizens feeling the need to arm themselves for protection" (p. 8). This explains the security dilemma caused by the proliferation of small arms prompting the need to control them.

Furthermore, crime rate in Tanzania increased over the past years. Organised crime levels are on the increase due to the growing number of weapons in private hands (Kipobota, 2010, pp. 153-154). Despite having a moderate homicide rate, Dar es Salaam has a high rate of community violence largely as a result of lynching and vigilantism (Outwater, Mgaya, Msemo, Helgesson, & Abraham, 2015). According to SGA Security (2015), about 16 guns and 53 rounds of ammunition were recovered by police following the arrest of five bandits who had raided Sitakishari Police station in Ukonga in Dar es Salaam. During the raid, the gunmen had shot seven people to death and injured four who included policemen. Similar incidents have been on the rise at Ushirombo in Geita Region, Rufiji in Coast Region and Kawe in Dar es Salaam and were intended to reduce police efforts to protect people and their property (SGA Security, 2015). More so, a more than an hour shoot-out between police and armed robbers in Bukoba District that led to the death of the four robbers was also another incident. The robbers had invaded Chenjubu village and took away several items including cash from villagers at gunpoint (Ulaya, 2016).

Again, violence has become the often resorted to means of society in addressing conflicts with state and corporate interests. For instance, in Mererani, the TanzaniteOne Company which mines Tanzanite has tightened its security and was allowed by the Tanzanian state to use force. This did not go well with the residents of Mererani and small scale miners who were opposed to the dominance of a foreign owned private company securing profits from mining at their expense (Helliesen, 2012). In addition, in 2013 there were protests against the unequal distribution of benefits from mining concerns, especially in the southern part of Tanzania, in Mtwara where violence erupted (LeSage, 2014, p. 5). The protests which took place at mining sites such as the North Mara gold mine in March 2013 and spontaneous riots that ensued following the pronouncement of new extraction licensing repeatedly halted mining progress. This did not only threaten the mining industry and future mining investments but risked destabilising the whole country (Cooper & Stevens, 2013). To this end, Cooper and Stevens (2013) observed that Tanzania's long observed image as the anchor of East African stability is fast becoming an illusion due to among other things adverse invest-

ment laws and growing religious conflict. These are exacerbated by the proliferation of SALW which easily turn the conflicts into fully-fledged violence. Tanzania needs to prevent some of its regions from falling victim to small arms like the Niger Delta region where small arms have been used to settle conflicts generated by the unequal distribution of proceeds from natural resources leading to perpetual loss of life, violence and instability characterising life in that part of Nigeria (Garuba, 2007).

Although not similar to the levels of election violence that have been witnessed in Kenya, Tanzania over the years has also seen some incidents of political violence since the beginning of multi-partyism in 1995. Among other incidents include during the August 2005 presidential campaign when CCM's presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete's house was attacked by a mob of unclear party membership (Kessler, 2006, pp. 6-7). In Zanzibar violent elections have been witnessed several times although these have not been sustained (Kessler, 2006, pp. 6-7). The most violent elections were those held in 2000 and 2005 where the opposition party, Chama Cha Wananchi (CFU or the Civic United Front) violently demonstrated against allegations of vote-rigging by the CCM (LeSage, 2014, p. 4). Indeed, CCM attempts at undermining its challengers culminated in a dangerous rise in political violence. In 2013, the CCM was accused of relying on state-sponsored repression after throwing a hand grenade against Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress) rally in Arusha killing four people (LeSage, 2014, p. 4). This demonstrates the evolving problem of small arms and their effects on individual security and by implication national security in the country.

The proliferation of small arms has also engendered a situation of general insecurity among Tanzanians. For example, more than 31% of people in Dar es Salaam do not feel safe in their areas after sunset (Macha, 2006, p. 27). In January 2010, 14 people were left dead in a mass shooting. In response, the police arrested nine suspects and recovered a sub-machine gun with 68 bullets and a short gun with five bullets dumped in a nearby bush. However, they had not established whether the recovered guns were the ones used in the killings (Katulanda, 2010). Moreover, in March 2010, a gang armed with a machine gun invaded a wedding party at night where they killed five people and left six including two children injured in Kimusi village, 40 kilometres outside Tarime Township (Mayunga, 2010). This clearly indicates that Tanzanian communities (both rural and urban) are now living in fear because guns have become a permanent danger in their lives.

Overall, we refute the conclusion reached by Jefferson and Urquhart (2002) during the turn of the 21st century that Tanzania is relatively a safe country. This is so because the foregoing discussion maintains that the country's image of peace and stability is likely to become an illusion if the SALW problem is not permanently addressed. Our evidence largely proves that the situation in Tanzania is worsening. A number of changes have taken place since these two scholars' study including an increase in the lack of confi-

dence in the police among other public institutions. Many people in the country are of the opinion that most police officers are corrupt and once the suspect is in the hands of the police justice will not take its course as the offender could be released on the complainant's back. This has led to mob violence due to "... lack of confidence in the police force, far locations of some police stations, citizens' ignorance of the due legal process of handling a suspect criminal and public anger against petty crimes" (Kipobota, 2010, p. 17). Unsurprisingly, it is the public's lack of confidence in the law enforcement agencies' ability to ensure security and justice that motivates many to resort to the need to own a gun as a form of self-protection (Janabi, 2016).

In 2009, Transparency International ranked Tanzania's judiciary number four in East Africa's most corrupt public institutions while the Immigration department was ranked 6th (Kipobota, 2010, p. 175). The variables used to determine the ranking of corruption in the country are not specific to small arms. However, they generally point to the level of corruption in the country at the time, particularly given the centrality of law enforcement agencies in enforcing arms stocks management, security and border security. The African Development Bank (2011: 4-5) noted that "incidents of grand corruption scandals, weak sanctions, deficient accounting standards and ineffective internal/external audit; all underscore the need for greater oversight and accountability in government, strengthening legal and judicial reforms and revamping the country's fiduciary environment". However, as highlighted below the corruption levels in the country have slightly improved. In consonance with the security dilemma theory this somehow explains the prevalence of firearms and a proclivity by individuals (both in rural and urban areas) to own a gun for self-defence among other undisclosed reasons. However, the dismantling of the Kinyange gang in 2004 among other successes, especially the disarmament efforts shows that Tanzania has been successful in some areas. As such, although contemporary trends are negative, Tanzania still suffers less internal violence than her neighbours. Consequently, we have demonstrated that in the midst of growing weaknesses there are successes.

Discussion

For any state to confidently embark on development, peace and security are prerequisites. It is critical to point out that the presence of small arms undoubtedly promotes crime. This generates a number of repercussions including but not limited to: threatening human security, hampering development, obstructing investment and corrupting state institutions. Good examples in Africa where the pervasiveness of small arms have increasingly caused security problems to the state and region are numerous and include but extend beyond: Libya (during the Arab Spring), Mali in 2012, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Sudan (Ayuba & Okafor, 2015; Hove, 2017; Ngboawaji, 2011; Nna, Pabon & Nkoro, 2012; Oluwadare, 2014; Thurston, 2013; Wezeman, 2011).

Many of these case studies demonstrate that small arms proliferation is at the core of the outbreak of many violent conflicts in Africa. The associated repercussions include: violence, deaths (both of civilians and combatants), crime, rise of terrorist groups, incessant political instability and civil wars, cattle rustling, poverty, illiteracy, poor infrastructure and social services all with a bearing on national security in both the traditional and contemporary approaches (Chelule, 2014; Cilliers, Hughes & Moyer, 2011, p. 75; Emanuel & Ndimbwa, 2013; LeSage, 2010, pp. 2-4; Souare, 2010).

Further, violence perpetrated by, between and against organized groups has been equated to the more traditional armed conflict in both scale and intensity (Cilliers *et al.*, 2011, p. 75). Besides, affecting the whole continent in various ways, small arms have been singled out as one primary obstacle to West Africa's peace and security (Malam, 2014; Souare, 2010). Ogu (n.d.: 1) asserts that the implications of small arms on national security and its cross-border impact in Africa have increased the likelihood of numerous other security threats and damaged the ability of governments to fulfil their legitimate security mandate. Clearly, this demonstrates that small arms proliferation has profound security implications on national security. Social and human capital is eroded due to high levels of crime and death rates and business is driven away (UNODC, 2009, p. 9). This is because investors both local and foreign perceive crime as a sign of instability and a disincentive to investment. The tourism sector, for instance, is a major contributor to economic growth and is highly disrupted in the face of crime concerns brought by the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania (Janabi, 2016). In this regard, the re-emergence of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants targeting local Christian leaders, foreign tourists, bars and restaurants beginning in 2012 is a wakeup call for the Tanzanian government officials to support the country's security forces to nip in the bud or pre-empt this security threat (LeSage, 2014, p. 1). As Kideghesho (2016) notes, "besides tarnishing the image of the country, elephant poaching has undesirable effects on the ecological, economic and security aspects" (p. 369). Again, the areas of Kigoma, Kagera and Morogoro where firearms were prevalent were affected by economic decline demonstrating a correlation between a perceived sense of lack of safety and the worsening economic situation (Jefferson & Urquhart, 2002). This has largely continued.

The ability of the state to promote development in education and health, among other development sectors of the country is hampered by the challenges brought by the proliferation of small arms. Consequently, the farsighted words of the former United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech on 16 April 1953 bemoaning how the arms trade precipitates human rights abuses and underdevelopment are still relevant in Tanzania as well as the world at large to date. He said:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone.

> It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children… This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron (Shah, 2013).

In light of the above quotation, individuals in Dar es Salaam among other urban places in Tanzania have suffered huge losses due to armed robberies. Loss of property and at times life has been witnessed.

However, Tanzania has hitherto demonstrated to be a unique weak state. This is because "the World Bank governance index for 2015 rates Tanzania low to moderate in account-ability, low in governance, low in rule of law, low to moderate in regulatory capability, low in political stability and absence of violence, and low in control of corruption" (Cordesman & Jones, 2016). On the contrary, of late, the country has a somewhat more favourable corruption rating compared to some of its neighbours where out of 168 it ranked 117 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015). More so, between 1996 and 2010, Tanzania's legitimacy and state capacity scores have been favourable each with an overall average score of -0.37 and -0.45 (Ababu, 2013, p. 15). In 2013, the country was in the very high warning category ranking 81. 1 out of 120 countries on the Failed States Index. However, the breakdown of the scores by indicator was as follows: demographic pressures–8.6, refugees and internally displaced persons–6.8, group grievance–6.0, brain drain and human flight–6.4, uneven economic development–6.4, poverty and economic decline–6.8, state legitimacy–6.2, public services–8.8, human rights and rule of law–6.2, Security apparatus–5.5, factionalised elites–5.7, and external intervention–7.7 (The Fund For Peace, 2013, p. 38). The country fell neither in the best performers category nor worst performers category. Again, the 2016 Global Peace Index ranked Tanzania's state of peace high at 58 out of 163 countries and scoring 1.899 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016, p. 11). Nevertheless, Tanzania's inclusion in the top 10 list of unhappy countries in 2016 and 2017 where in the latter it was ranked the third unhappiest country in the world represents a negative trend (Helliwell, Huang & Wang, 2017, pp. 22-23). Notwithstanding these standings in state weakness, Tanzania continues as a relatively stable country.

Our mention of the weaknesses of African states contributing to the outbreak of violence seem to obscure the fact that the presence of armed Interahamwe cadres from Rwanda did not cause the Rwandan civil war to spread to Tanzania, as it did in the then Zaire (now DRC). There are diverse explanations for Tanzania's uniqueness. Among other things, the lack of involvement of Tanzania in the Rwandan conflict in a similar manner as Uganda or the DRC did coupled with other factors has been cited. Tanzania largely limited itself to helping refugees without being involved in the Rwandan affairs (Smith, 1995, pp. 54-55). In the DRC, the Rwandan civil war caused violence because of a combination of factors such as similarities in ethnicity which led Laurant Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi to launch a war to put an end to Hutu insurgents from the Democratic

Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). He blamed the Congolese government for sponsoring the FDLR. The forces which constituted the FDLR had vowed "publicly before the new government gained power, and before refugee camps and a government in exile were set up in Zaire, that they would use the camps as a staging ground for future attacks" (Smith, 1995, p. 56). The abundance of natural resources in the DRC which are not equitably exploited for the benefit of the locals also exacerbated the situation (World Without Genocide, 2013).

Additionally, unlike in DRC, Tanzania did not allow refugees to come with heavy weapons although former military persons and militia men were living in the refugee camps (Smith, 1995, p. 56). The DRC government allowed and facilitated further receiving of arms shipments by the ex-Interahamwe soldiers and the sheltering of its senior officers under the DRC commanders (Doctors Without Borders, n.d.). In 2015, there were revelations about how the FDLR apart from being provided with arms, military support and intelligence by the Congolese army it is also assisted to profiteer from eastern Congo's massive natural resources, particularly charcoal (Mungai, 2015). In this regard, the lack of the major factors that generate conflicts in the region and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa explains why the Rwandan conflict did not extend to Tanzania. These include but are not limited to: "local elites political manipulation, competition over scarce resource, culture of cattle rustling, and state policies that exacerbate regional inequality and marginalization" (Ababu, 2013, p. 15).

In addition, it appears ethnicity causes conflict when it is made the basis for exclusion, both real and imagined, as in Kenya among other cases which is not the case in Tanzania (Cocodia, 2008; Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). Tanzania's over 120 ethnic groups have never at any given time been the basis for political divisions and there is a much stronger national identity (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 9). This has been attributed to the country's post-independence state and nation building path where its first president, Julias K. Nyerere established educational and linguistic policies intended to foster a Tanzanian identity. Again, the equitable distribution of resources from central government in Tanzania coupled with the creation of elected district and village councils with wide legitimacy across ethnic divides closed the incentives for competition over political and economic rewards (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 9). High and less variable economic growth has been witnessed in Tanzania and this is linked to low occurrences of popular unrest. To this end, the case of Tanzania is a good example to show that "ethnic and religious diversity do not necessarily make a society more prone to conflict" because although it is "one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries, [it] has been peaceful for decades" (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 8).

Overall, the state's role under the broadened concept of national security including human security to create the enabling environment for its citizens to live secured lives full of self-realisation, self-development and self-actualisation (Jinadu, 2000, p. 3) might

become an illusion in Tanzania if the SALW challenge is not fully addressed. The failure of the state to provide its citizens with the enabling security environment compels its citizens to arm themselves thus generating a market for SALW. Small arms proliferation undoubtedly poses a threat to national security because they prevent the accomplishment of the three basic human instincts important to national security from the human security perspective. These encompass self-realisation, self-development and self-actualisation. This is because it is the general insecurity in the broad understanding of security felt by citizens that create the fertile ground for small arms proliferation. In other words, the proliferation of small arms should not be simply seen as a threat to national security but should also be viewed as a symptom of individual, groups and communities' need for security caused by the failure of the state to provide that security. Generally, in search of security individuals, communities and groups compete to acquire arms to provide for their own security. Such a reaction is driven by the state's failure to fulfil its obligations to provide for both state and human security.

Conclusion and the Road to Sustainable National Security

Guided by the security dilemma and the regional security complex theories as well as ideas of state weakness, this paper has argued that although Tanzania is not unstable politically it has been affected by the proliferation of SALW. These come largely from her unstable neighbouring countries ravaged by sustained political instability and armed conflicts. Among other things, the situation has been worsened by the country's long and porous borders. The proliferation of SALW in Tanzania affects the pastoral societies, border area communities and urban societies. Therefore, small arms have profound implications on Tanzania's national security because development in the health, education and economic sectors of the country has been impeded. The rise in cases of political violence and resurgence of terrorist activities in recent years coupled with the proliferation of small arms if unchecked will destabilise the entire country and become a real challenge to Tanzania's national security. Tanzania is not yet totally overwhelmed by the SALW problem but the prevailing situation in the country points to the urgent need to tackle the problem because prevention is better than cure. An introduction of a more reliable and effective security sector institution by the Tanzanian government for both urban and rural areas as well as at border and port areas will reduce SALW proliferation. It is imperative for the government of Tanzania to enhance the operation of its security sector by sending its members for training into other countries with a good record of curbing the proliferation of SALW.

The authors maintain that Tanzania's long observed peace and stability image might become an illusion as a result of the proliferation of SALW. Its citizens are increasingly resorting to the use of weapons as the first solution to solve their conflicts (both interpersonal and inter-community problems). The widespread availability of SALW and the public's lack of confidence in the police force fuel their circulation and mis-

use. The authors fully acknowledged that while Tanzania has a functional police and other security sector institutions, these institutions are facing a number of challenges such as lack of capacity, and resources required to ensure effectiveness. The prevailing lack of trust between civilians and the authorities responsible for providing security within local communities is worsening the problem of the proliferation and misuse of SALW. Dialogue between civilians and local authorities and security details needs to be encouraged and hastened as a precursor to sustainable solution via disarmament including addressing other fundamental root causes of SALW movement. The demand for weapons will still remain unless the attitudes of civilians towards the police force and other security forces and the justice system are comprehensively modified. To change this reliance on weapons into nonviolent conflict resolution skills the country requires long-term government and other stakeholders (security forces, private companies, nongovernmental organisations, local authorities and civilian groups) driven strategies and commitment. The participation of the police, armed forces, and other security sector elements will ultimately lead the way to the development of new policies and practices that all the stakeholders are prepared to observe. Engagement is crucial because groups as well as individuals will always find ways to address their own fears and find common solutions to ameliorate their security rather than the dangerous current reliance on firearms.

Moreover, the holistic implementation of international, regional, sub-regional and national legal instruments and measures meant to prevent the proliferation of SALW will go a long way in curbing the proliferation of SALW in Tanzania and its consequences on national and regional security. It is thus imperative for Tanzania to develop a multi-pronged strategy to build up capable, resourced, and effective efforts to curb the proliferation and resultant misuse of SALW. Overall, we maintain that the efforts by the government are largely likely to contribute immensely in easing the movement and misuse of SALW in Tanzania if they are earnestly bolstered and continued. This is evident in the dismantling of the Kinyange gang in 2004 and the continued seizure and destruction of illicit weapons which demonstrate that Tanzania has been clearly successful in some areas. While the trends are negative, Tanzania still faces less internal violence compared to her neighbours.

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Philippines:
A Review of the Traditional Conflict Resolution Practices Among Indigenous Cultural Communities

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Abstract. *This paper reviews the previous studies related to traditional conflict resolution practices of different indigenous cultural communities in the Philippines. Arranged according to tribes from three major island groups of the Philippines (i.e., Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao), it includes discussion on the system of conflict resolution among tribes, traditional means of conflict resolution among indigenous peoples, and forms and nature of punishments employed.*

Keywords: *traditional, conflict resolution, indigenous, elders, mediation, negotiation.*

Luzon, Northern Philippines

The Democratic Progress Institute (2012) revealed that the most preferred and popular form of settling disputes among the cultural communities in the Philippines is mediation. This is because of the small number of cultural communities, in turn making it the most effective and fastest way of addressing disputes (Rio, 2016). According to the renowned anthropologist Felipe Landa Jocano (1968), the people who are chosen as mediators or arbiters are those who are regarded by the community with utmost respect and credibility. This situation is general for most of the traditional practices around the globe, from the traditional Gypsies in Eastern Europe (Sandu, 2018) to the elders from Africa or the Chechens in the Caucasus

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region. Their effectiveness is realized when they are able to address the disputes in their early stages, thereby preventing their escalation to a more violent phase (Jocano, 1968). Durante (2005) added that "they functioned to examine the evidence, evaluate testimonies, render judgment and define the penalty for the offense to preserve or restore community relationships".

In the book *Creating the Third Force: Indigenous Processes of Peacemaking*, one of the chapters which was contributed by Barnes and Magdalena (2016) was dedicated on exploring the traditional peacemaking processes among indigenous populations in the Northern and Southern Philippines. The *Kalinga* people of the Cordillera region in Luzon, they wrote, "originated the *Bodong*, a political institution that facilitates the resolution of intervillage or inter-regional conflicts". In English, the term translates into "a 'peace pact' which in practice defines the behavior of two neighboring village populations while members of each are in the territory of the other". Again, this is very resembling with other parts of the world. For example, the Gyspsies all around the world use the word *Kris* for the Gypsy court and *krisinitor* for the judge. In their language this means "making peace" and "the one who makes the pace" (Sandu, 2018). The peace pact holders, which are the host villages, are responsible for making sure that the boundaries are properly policed so that no one is killed or seriously injured within their territory (p. 210).

Another group is the *Ifugao*, which means "people of the hills". Barnes and Magdalena (2016) observed that the *Ifugaos* employ different means of conflict resolution depending on the nature of the conflict. Generally, this group has an institution of a "go-between" named the *monkalun* to carry out negotiations. This mediator is "selected for his prestige, high 'face', and wisdom as perceived by the community" (p. 211). In particular, one cause of conflict among the *Ifugaos* is the *muyong*, "an untilled slope covered mainly with timber, fruit trees, climbing rattan, bamboo, palms, and other natural vegetation" (Serrano and Cadaweng, as cited by Barnes and Magdalena, 2016). These small-forested areas play a critical role in the sustenance of the people. It stores the rainfall while slowly releasing it throughout the year to irrigate the rice terraces. It also provides 171 fuel wood species, 112 wood species used in construction, 70 species that provide food, and 10 varieties of rattan. Given these benefits, they have developed a system of punishment for anyone who will try to destroy it. If a person is caught stealing from the *muyong*, s/he must go before the tribal elders to be severely reprimanded. They are required to compensate the owner of the *muyong* for the loss. If there is a second offense, the owner can demand restitution through a third party negotiator (possibly a *monkalun*). A third offense indicates that the perpetrator may lack appropriate respect for the owners and elders, and so the issue could end in violence (Barnes and Magdalena, 2016, p. 212).

Another form of conflict resolution among the *Ifugaos* is an ordeal called *haddaccan* (derived from the word *ihadac*, which means "to rectify a mistake" or to "put right a

wrongdoing") used to settle boundary conflicts which are usually considered as more serious issues. These conflicts involve two different individuals claiming the same *uma* (fallow swidden land) while that land is naturally regenerating. The two parties, working through a mediator, would typically decide whether the *I bultong* or *I uggub* is used. *I bultong* involves a wrestling match between the two contending parties. Each party may either choose to wrestle himself or to select one of his relatives to fight, with a rule that the opposing wrestlers must be evenly matched. In *I uggub,* the combatants throw *runo* (reeds) fronds and eggs at one another. After the performance of either ordeal, a peacemaking rite called *hidit* is conducted to thank and assure the gods that both parties will peacefully abide by it (Serrano and Cadaweng, as cited by Barnes & Magdalena, 2016, p. 213).

The *Tinggians* are another indigenous group in the Cordillera Region of Luzon. The all-male *lalakay* (the word *lakay* is an Ilokano term for "old male") council of elders settles misbehavior and misdemeanors in the *Tinggian* society. Wrongdoers are fined or ordered to provide food for the elders settling the case. If for some reason an offender cannot be located, the community resorts to *sapata* that tries an offender *in absentia* via an elder who is an authority on the practice of *bagawas*. The *bagawas* is a ritual done at sunrise in which the elder conducting the *sapata* prays that something tragic such as a bloated stomach or swollen feet will befall the violator (Barnes & Magdalena, 2016, p. 214).

According to Aro, as cited by Banaag (2015), the traditional way of conflict resolution in Benguet which is still practiced today is called the *Tongtongan*. A council of elders which were chosen based on their knowledge and wisdom, led by its oldest member, mediates the process. It starts on finding out the root cause of the dispute, then negotiating a settlement followed by the elders giving their advice. When a decision is reached, the offender is punished by butchering pig, dog, chicken, or whatever the winning party demands. The weight of the penalty increases depending on the intensity of the crime. In rare occasions, disputes are resolved through a "toss coin" (pp. 13-14).

In their study concerning indigenous governance practices in the Philippines, Buendia, Brillantes, Mendoza, Guiam, and Sambeli (2006) created an inventory of the justice and conflict system of some indigenous groups. In Northern Luzon, the *Ivatans* penalized whoever stirred up trouble in the community. Grave crimes such as homicide, witchcraft, and murder by poison were punishable by death while less serious crimes like robbery, theft, and adultery were reprimanded by fine. The *Ivatans* consider burying alive as their severest punishment (Hornedo, as cited by Buendia *et al.*, 2006).

Visayas, Central Philippines

In his study entitled "Indigenous Dispute Settlement: Learning from the *Panay Bukidnon* Tribe," Professor Irving Domingo L. Rio (2016) discovered that vengeance is the underlying principle of the justice system of the *Panay-Bukidnon* culture in the Visayan

region. For most members of the tribe, the penalty of incarceration cannot compensate for the loss of a family member. The bereaved family considers vengeance as a shared community obligation rather than a personal pursuit. Failure to avenge can create an impression of the crime committed as just and predisposes a family to abuse by other members of the community. Retaliation that results to death of members of the other tribe or family provides a counterbalance for the loss (Rio, 2016, p. 76). Specifically, this custom is called the *Kantang*. *Kantang* is the practice of leaving the dead unburied and placing the dead body, without the coffin, on a bamboo bed outside the aggrieved family's house. The decomposing body is left in the open until there is a *durog* or partner dead body from the assailant or anyone from the assailant's family or clan. As such, *Kantang* aims to dramatize the extent of grief that family members have as a result of the murder (Rio, 2016, p.78).

Mindanao, Southern Philippines

A study conducted by Pailig Development Foundation, Inc. (2007) on *rido* in Mindanao reveal that the most common prevailing measure, especially with *Maranaos*, to bring a *rido* to an end is an initiated or forced wedding in order to ensure a strong and lasting good relationship between two rivaling families. Traditional tribal leaders such as a *Sultan*, *Datu*, or council of elders (as part of the *barangay* government), would be responsible in the first instance for the settlement of disputes in their area of jurisdiction. However, if a *rido* cannot be nipped in the bud through the early intervention of the traditional leaders, the traditional procedure of conflict resolution will be applied.

Sumaguina (2000) conducted a similar study entitled "Autonomous Authority of *Maranao* Indigenous Institutions on Conflict Resolution". In his findings, Sumaguina stressed that conflicts which are committed by *Maranaos* who are related to each other by blood are customarily settled through the *Maranao* kinship system of *kokoman-a-kambetabata'a*[1] (kinship system of social justice). However, *Maranao* conflicts which are classified as of "higher intensity and gravity" are submitted to a sophisticated and strategic mediator or team of arbitrators for a peaceful method of settlement.

"The resolution of conflicts," according to Sumaguina (2000) "is not easy, it is not merely ritualistic; it is difficult and its process is very dynamic. Its dynamism lies in the *Maranao* system of mediation". In fact, Sumaguina (2000) found out that the mediation process is very crucial; it likely determines the success or failure of the peaceful management of *Maranao* conflicts. The more strategic the chosen mediator or team of mediators, the easier the *Maranao* conflict is to be put under control (Sumaguina, 2000).

Moreover, Sumaguina (2000) mentioned that there are two kinds of *Maranao* conflicts which are easier for the *Maranaos* to resolve by peaceful means. The first kind is called

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1 *Kokoman* means justice, while *kambetabata'a* implies relationship by blood.

rido-o-totonganaya or conflict arising between *Maranaos* who belong to one and the same kinship group. In this kind of conflict, the *Maranaos* just resolve it through the system of *kokoman-a-kambetabata'a.* This system has an advantage over the due process of law or any other *Maranao* indigenous methods of dispute settlement. This is on the grounds that such a system is more efficient, more economical, a faster method of dispute settlement to the element of kinship or blood ties. The conflicting parties to the dispute tend to be easily reconciled to keep their blood ties from being broken. Because of kinship consideration, the punishments or damages to be imposed are very minimal.

The second kind *Maranao* conflict of lesser gravity and intensity is the *rido-o-sesala-kawa-a-tao a damakamaolika.*[2] In this kind of *Maranao* conflict, an informally organized traditional court or committee in the community where the conflict arose may intervene to put the dispute under control for the sake of peace and order in the community (Sumaguina, 2000).

Furthermore, Sumaguina (2000) found out that when a conflict occurs in the community, the relatives of the disputants would close ranks to provide some moral, financial, physical or human support to their relatives who are involved in the conflict or dispute. It was found out also that when a conflict finally breaks out into factional violence through revenge and counter-revenge, the legal and the traditional authorities tend to become helpless to take authoritative actions. Even the law enforcers would not dare to exercise their governmental authority to control the warring factions who are usually heavily armed and strongly supported on both sides by their respective kinsmen (Sumaguina, 2000).

The Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines or PCRDSP (1980: 67) revealed that in the act of maintaining peace and order in the community, *pangalawat*[3] is practiced among the *Bukidnons*[4] and *Manobos.*[5]

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2   It refers to conflicts between *Maranaos* who are not related to each other by blood, but it does not inflict moral, physical and material damages.

3   *Pangalawat* is one of the economic and ethical anchors of Bukidnon and Manuvu society. Anyone in need of any object or item can go to any person who has it and request for it. The person in possession of the said item or object requested is then under obligation to relinquish the item. If one needed a pig, for example, all that is needed is to have a rope to tie it, go to someone who has a pig and the owner is ethically bound to give it up. On such an occasion, however, the recipient of the pig or some other item is under obligation to invite the owner to pay a visit within a month or two so that a reciprocal favor can be given.

4   *Bukidnon* comes from two words, *"bukid"* (mountain) and *"non"* (people), thus, "mountain people." They are located in northern Bukidnon Province, western Agusan, and southern Misamis Oriental. Their language is called *"binukid."*

5   *Manobo* or *"Manuvu"* or *"Minuvu"* literally means "person or people." They belong to the original stock of proto-Philippine or proto- Austronesian people who came from South China Sea, earlier than the Ifugao and other terrace-building people of northern Luzon.

The consequence of the *pangalawat*, however, is on the architectural form of the houses. It was noted that the house of a certain Datu Namnam was originally so open that even his family room is completely accessible to any intruder. As a result of acculturation, only it was when he built a new house did he become aware of privacy: he carefully enclosed his new family room and even provided a system of locks outside and inside his doorway-a most unusual act because normally, every bit of property was available to everyone to borrow or use.

A similar study was conducted by Humpa (2002) entitled, "The System of Conflict Resolution of the *Thimuays*[6] in the Three Barangays of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur". In this study, the researcher found out that no common steps are followed by the *Thimuays* in resolving conflicts. By calling the conflicting parties, the *Thimuays* assume jurisdiction in the resolution of complaints. Yet, there are no formalities required in filing the complaint. However, it was found also that the decisions of the *Thimuays* about those conflicts were final.

Among the *Aetas*[7] living at the foot of Mt. Pinatubo, trouble between families may arise due to the failure of the husband's family to pay the *bandi*[8]. Another cause of conflict was elopement with someone to whom one is not engaged. Also, that divorce is rare but can be arranged through mutual consent. Grounds for divorce may be laziness, cruelty, unfaithfulness and the like. The issue is decided by a council from both the kin groups. The guilty spouse loses custody of the children. Both parties are free to remarry after divorce. If the woman is the guilty party, she must return the *bandi*.

Moreover, the society of Agusan Provinces in Caraga region is said to be a warrior society in which revenge was considered a religious act. Therefore, customary law is based on the right of revenge, usually committed as a ritual act. Revenge by killing is allowed for the following crimes: adultery, fornication, rape and homicide. If one cannot avenge himself on the culprit, he has the right to declare as vendetta on a culprit's relative. All other crimes are settled by an imposition of fines. Customary law upholds respect to a person's property. For crimes like theft or nonpayment of debts, testimony and arbitration are combined with a trial by ordeal. Examples are the plunging of the suspect's hands into boiling water, diving in water or placing one's hand under a candle. Innocence is proven if one of the suspects passed the ordeal unscathed (CCP, 1994).

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6 *Thimuays* (or heads) composed the tribal leaders in a *Subanen* tribe.

7 They were also known as *"baluga,"* especially those of the Pampanga side of Mt. Pinatubo. They are part of bands residing in mountainous, forested areas of the archipelago from Luzon to Mindanao.

8 A bride-price given by the groom to the family of the woman, which can be bows, bolo, cloth, homemade shotguns, and money.

Miller (1905, as cited by CCP) revealed that in the past, divorce was unknown in *Batak*[9] society, and not even adultery could dissolve a marriage. In lieu of divorce, adultery is punishable by public whipping. Nevertheless, should the husband consent, his wife could go to the offending man upon payment by the latter of a certain amount of fines. Or, both men can live with the woman, with the second husband acting as no more as servant for the first husband, who will exercise all authority and has the right not to work. At present, the practice is that if a man wants to divorce his wife, he calls for a *surigiden*[10] to hear the case. Before this body, he lays downs the reasons why he seeks a divorce. If the body rules in his favor and he is granted the divorce, he is required to pay the woman a certain amount of money in exchange for the separation. On the other hand, when a woman takes a second husband, the latter supports not only the woman but also her first husband, and all his children by her. Aside from deciding cases involving relations between men and women, the *surigiden* is also expected to be present at all ritual activities usually observed for the curing of illness. In these rituals, there is a *babaylan*[11] (shaman or healer) who presides.

Among the *Bukidnons*, a hierarchy of datuship, with the chief *datu* holding the symbol of authority, the *giling*[12]*,* remains the paramount anchor of social organization as well as the keeper of traditional values which are still essentially intact. *Bukidnon* is the name given to the people inhabiting the inland parts of Misamis Oriental, Western Agusan and Northern Bukidnon in Mindanao. The *Higaunon* tribe is one of the many tribes that can be found in Bukidnon. Northern Mindanao is a medley of cultural encounters. To the settlers from the Visayas who are attracted by the rich resources of Mindanao, it is a new frontier. For the indigenous society, each encounter is a test of will as well as their capacity to adapt. Historically, the hill peoples of Bukidnon, together with the *Manobos* and *Subanons*, have been pushed into the interior parts of the region by the more advanced and aggressive cultural groups. First of these groups are the Muslim raiders, and then by the Christians who settled the lowlands, coming from the Visayas during the Spanish period up to the American regime, with the greatest number of them coming in during the Commonwealth government. As has been noted, the setting is a natural one for conflict. Spanish colonization failed to bring about a synthesis of cultures in the region (PCRDSP,1980). Culturally and linguistically, the *Bukidnons* are

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9   The word *Batak* means "mountain people." Because of their physical characteristics, they are classified as Philippine Aetas. They live mainly in small settlements near Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

10 A council of male arbitrators composed of all resident adult males in a large local group of *Batak* society.

11 Shaman, healer or priest. It is believed that he establishes the relationship between Deities and men.

12 It is a black scepter possessed by the *datu*, symbolizing the position of "the highest *datu* of Bukidnon."

related to the *Manobos*. Among the *Bukidnons*, the term *"manobo"* carries a pejorative note because it means "people without law." Indeed, it is the strict observance of traditional laws (or *batassan*) and the land which shaped their culture.

Therefore, the *lumads* have their own way of conflict resolution among the problems arising within the tribe. In most cases, conflicts involve relationships between husband and wife in the tribe. Common crimes such as stealing and murder are also seen as roots of conflict. This system of conflict resolution among the *lumads* is an obvious manifestation of their traditional culture that they have preserved through the years. Apparently, their system of conflict resolution is approved and respected by the members of the tribe.

Based on the data above, it can be inferred that indigenous cultural communities were governed by their own traditional political system. Contrary to what the early colonizers claimed, the indigenous people have their own system that governs the relationship of the members of the tribe. It can be noted also that they were able to preserve and pass the tradition to their sons and daughters. More so, the researches imply that this political system conforms to their cultures and traditions. Also, paganism is but a noticeable feature among many indigenous cultural communities; it is manifested in their ways of living.

In his book *Elements of Filipino Philosophy*, Mercado (1993) held that the concept of retribution comes under various names. One aspect comes under that of debt and its payment. Payment is not only in terms of financial debt but also of moral debt. This is implied in the expression *'magbayad ka sa imong pag-insulto kanako'* (You'll pay for insulting me). In *Tagalog*, *pagbabayad* is expiation for a fault and *pagbabayad-puri* is expiation or atonement. To kill someone is to borrow life: *humiram ng buhay* in *Tagalog* or *utang sa hari* (literary 'debt to the king') in *Visayan*. *'Bayad' sa utang* in *Visayan* means daughter.[13] Another form of retribution is *gaba/busong/lunod* (curse).[14]

Mercado (1993) continued that Filipinos are also realistic. *Gaba* alone is not sufficient, because some men will continue to do evil. Hence, rural Filipinos use sorcery as a form of sanction. In his study of Cebuano sorcery, Lieban (as cited by Mercado) concluded that legitimate social sanctions are inadequate to prevent serious social discords such as land disputes, courtship and marital cases. Among the *Thimuays* of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, penalties and sanctions are also imposed. These penalties include collection of damages, death penalty, public contempt, and supernatural sanctions. Such penalties

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13 The explanation is this: a man who impregnates woman other than his wife has to pay for his adulteries by allowing his daughter/s in turn to be impregnated by others.

14 *Gaba* is quite similar to the doctrine of karma in Hinduism and Buddhism. It is also similar to biblical doctrine of reaping what one sows (Mercado, 1993).

are seen as effective means in maintaining the peace and order of the *Subanen* tribe. In settling conflicts, the *Thimuays* of Lapuyan employ oral laws. Moreover, Humpa (2002) stressed that oral traditions and laws of the *Subanen* are passed from generation to generation. In settling these conflicts, however, cases are either solved or remain unsolved (Humpa, 2002).

Moreover, a study by PCRDSP (1980) about the *Bagobos*[15] reveals that there were not so many thefts among the *Bagobos.* It was reported that they had a most efficacious way of ferreting out thieves by means of the *bongat.*[16] This consists of two small containers made from the joints of a bamboo tree. They contain some mysterious powder which was used to discover thieves in this manner: if one had been robbed and wished to find out who did it, he took an egg and make a hole in it. Then a pinch of powder from the *bongat* is put into the egg which was then put into the fire. It is believed that wherever the thief is, he would be compelled to disclose his guilt because of the sharp pains all over his body. He could even be put to death simply by breaking the egg but, since the one performing the *bongat* may not want the thief killed, he could just wait for the thief to confess. Afterwards, as a remedy for the pains caused by the *bongat*, the guilty one is bathed in water mixed with the other powder from the *bongat.*

Furthermore, it is a general principle that, among the *Manobos,* it is considered obligatory to seek redress for all wrongs done. The *tawagan* system permits a *Manobo* to kill or seize anything, provided that he has tried all other means to settle the dispute amicably. Minor offenses such as stealing, slandering, failure to pay debts, deception that causes damage to another person, and disrespect towards another property are punishable. However, when the credibility of the suspect is doubted, it is verified by means of a ritual. This is called *to-tugo.*[17] There are ordeals made to determine the innocence or guilt of a person. The first is the hot water ordeal, where an anklet or an earring is put into boiling water, and the suspects are ordered to submerge their hands to get the item. He who his hands is scalded, is considered as the guilty one. Then there is the diving ordeal, where the suspects are made to stay under water. The one who comes out of the water first is considered the culprit. The third is the candle ordeal where the candles of the same size are given to the suspects. These are lit at the same time and kept away from the wind. The suspects stand holding the candles. The one whose candle is put off first is considered the guilty one.

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15 They belong to proto-Malayan race. The *Bagobos* were the first ethnic group in Mindanao encountered by the Spaniards at the end of the 19th century.

16 It is a practice of divination involving mysterious powders inserted into a chicken egg. This was believed to cause so much pain in thieves, that they would be compelled to confess.

17 This is done by burning of the wax, a ceremony that maybe used on witnesses and on those who are required to tell the truth. The accused is made to appear in a public assembly. He is confronted with witnesses, and, if they testify against him, he admits to the guilt.

A study by Pailig Development Foundation, Inc. (2007) on *rido* in Mindanao reveals that the amount of compensation is more or less negotiable but to a certain degree determined through the traditional procedure of conflict settlement. The application of punitive laws would, from a traditional point of view, make the situation worse. The imprisonment of a wrongdoer would not be perceived as a punishment since he would be "better off" than the victim's family; still alive with 'regular meals' and without having paid any kind of compensation. For traditional communities this would be an obvious win-lose situation.

A study conducted by Moner (2015) regarding the inter-ethnic conflict between the *Higaonons* and *Maranaos* showed that in resolving their conflict which is rooted on land, petty crimes, wife-grabbing, and politics; customary laws were relied upon. Both groups have their own set of customary law, which is the *Batasan Adansil* and the *Taritib ago Ijma*, respectively. When settling disputes, either one is used over the other or both can be used depending on the parties involved and the discretion of the mediator- arbiter (pp. 61-62). If the *Batasan Adansil* is to be used, then both or either of the conflicting parties must be a *Higaonon*. Compensations were stipulated based on the nature of the case. If it is a major case, which includes deaths or serious injuries, the offender is required to give a blood money called *Bangon* to the aggrieved party, which is consist of four sacks of rice, one carabao, and P 50, 000. On the other hand, the *Taritib ago Ijma* requires that both the conflicting parties are *Maranaos*. This law specifies that in all cases, the perpetrator should provide a blood money to the aggrieved party comprising four sacks of rice, one carabao, and P 100,000 (Moner, 2015, pp. 63-66).

Among the *Tedurays* (or *Tirurays*) located in Upi and South Upi in Mindanao, conflict and peacemaking are anchored on *tiyawan* (social relationship) and local arbiters called *kefeduwan. Tiyawan* is responsible for handling personal encounters which resulted in death and marriage. The *kefeduwans*, some of which are women, settle disputes peace- fully with the intercession of village leaders, both of which have considerable expertise of the *adat* or customary law (Schlegel, as cited by Barnes & Magdalena, 2016).

In a study entitled "Indigenous Administration of Justice and its impact on the Protection of Children: The *Tagabawa-Bagobo* and *Subanen* Experience," Save the Children (2006) drew on the conflict resolution of both indigenous groups in Mindanao with a high- light on the latter. Among the *Subanens* in Barangay Bag-ong Matalang, Lakewood Municipality, Zamboanga del Sur, a leader named as *Timuay* (from the word *timu* which means "to gather") and a council of elders is responsible for the administration of justice. They possess a good memory of their unwritten customary laws called *Batad Banwa Subanen* which covers disputes regarding land and property, marriage and ex- tramarital relationship, and crimes against life, to name a few. During the process of resolving conflicts, through the intercession of the *Timuay*, the one who is at fault offers the aggrieved party a *daga* (a ceremony where both parties offer animal sacrifices as a

symbol of their willingness to be reconciled) and pays the necessary penalty to soothe bad feelings and restore good relations (Save the Children UK, 2006).

Buendia *et al.* (2006), quoting Maceda (1975), noted that among the *Mamanua* found in Northeast Mindanao, a headman presided over problems in the judicial system and rendered punishments. It was reported that ostracism was the most common punishment. Furthermore, unlike other ethnic groups, the *Mamanua* women had crucial role in their society. Because they were helpful in easing the anger of the headman, the community's problems were oftentimes referred to them first.

Limikid (2002) aptly stated that for the *Mansaka*, an intervention of a *matikadong* in conflicts was necessary in order to prevent the existence of a tribal war. When settling disputes, an unusual festive celebration with food was often prepared during an assembly. This was followed by an investigation of the case, consultation with the leaders and enforcement of penalties.

The *Manobos* celebrate the culture of retaliatory killing as a form of punishment. When a murder is done, an immediate response called *pangayaw* was made. It is a pattern of vengeance wherein a warrior leader (*bagani*) from the offended party retaliates by killing the perpetrator (Montillo-Burton, Matuan, Poingan, & Alovera, as cited by Barnes and Magdalena, 2016).

Save the Children UK (2006) elucidated that among the *Subanens*, a corresponding punishment is made for each crime. Once a perpetrator is found guilty of rape, s/he is ordered to offer as a fine an amount that is almost impossible for him to produce such as a carabao. For theft, if the accused denies the allegation, he would be asked to get a needle placed at the bottom of a pot of boiling water. If he succeeds in getting the needle, this would prove his innocence and the accuser would be punished. If a man refuses to acknowledge responsibility for the pregnancy of a woman, he would be subjected to a test by challenging him to hack the midsection of the pregnant woman's body. If the woman is lying, she would be too scared to go through the procedure. However, this approach is only employed when the *Timuays* are not able to settle the argument after having exhausted all efforts through mediation. In cases of crimes committed against property, fines are based on the value of the property stolen or destroyed (p. 34).

Among the *Isama* of Mindanao, death was the punishment rendered for those who committed grave acts like murder and homicide. Less serious acts like theft and robbery were punishable by cutting off the fingers or hands of the culprit. The number of fingers to be cut depended on the gravity of the offense as judged by *Ruma Bitiara* (Buendia *et al.*, 2006, p. 34).

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