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Contents

Bangladesh:
The Effect of Political, Economic & Social Imparity and the Rise of Islamic Militancy

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Abstract. *Bangladesh, third largest Muslim populated country in the world, recently faced a frightful and dreadful militant attack. The militant movement in the country is the deadliest but not the very first. As a liberal Muslim country in the world, the augmentation of Islamic radical movement is not desired. But the inequality and the increasedracism that spreads into the veins of every part of the society are the main reason behind the movement. Political instability, economic discrimination and absence of the rule of law are key factors behind the militancy and radical movement in the country. The article will analyze the key factors behind the Islamic Militant movements in Bangladesh with social, economic, current law and order situation, political unrest along with social injustice and inequality to name just a few. The way to fight against Islamic Militancy must be by Islam, not by permuting it. The social justice and economic impartiality has to be ensured to win the war against terrorism and also political stability has to be kept for a long time.*

Keywords: *Militants, Islamist, Imparity, IS, Rule of Law.*

"And spend in the way of Allah and do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction [by refraining]. And do good; indeed, Allah loves the doers of good" (Al Quran, 2:195).

Introduction

The present Muslim world is facing the most pestilent and odious militant attacks in recent times. Though the whole world is facing these terrorist activities, the Muslim world receive the detraction as the terrorists operate these actions under the name

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of Islam. This problem is not only for the non-Muslims or only Muslims, but for all. The terrorist violence spreads across the whole world and the sanguinary situation effected all religious peoples and places. The law enforcement agencies in the most affected countries have failed to challenge this problem. Though they have taken some steps to stop the terrorist tide, the response is not sufficient enough.

Most of the terrorist organizations operate their militant activities in the name of Islam; they are often called as 'Islamic Terrorists' or 'Islamic Militants'. Though the Muslim community in the world has denied the allegation, they also termed them as terrorists as a whole. There are so many terrorist organizations that operate their militancy in the world in the name of Islam as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL), etc.

Bangladesh has attracted the attention of the international media for heightened militant activities in 2015, particularly after a series of killings of bloggers by a local militant group allegedly associated with Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and after murders of foreign nationals, responsibility of which was claimed by the Islamic State (Riaz, 2016).

Bangladesh, third largest Muslim populated country in the world, is also facing the militant activities. Bangladesh is renowned as a liberal Muslim country and persons of other religions live here with peace and tranquility for a very long time. After the British colonial regime, the country had gone through a period as Pakistani Provincial State, the country liberalized from Pakistan in 1971. With a high percentage of Muslim population, most of them being Sunni, the imparity is not religious but political and economic with social contraposition.

This imparity is one of the reasons behind the present militant activities in Bangladesh. This discrimination is not only economic but also social and political. And it grows in time. In every aspect of life, the population has faced the discrimination and the result is ghastly. This article will analyze how the continuous and boundless discrimination effects the society and, as an outcome of this situation, the militant movement, or radicalism, propagated. It has been arguably observed that religious fundamentalism and violence have very deep relation among them. Many scholars opined that extremist violence and intolerance are inherent to fundamentalism. They argue that when competing with other religious movements and secular institutions in order to protect and sharpen religious identity, fundamentalist movements tend to commit violent and intolerant acts (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003). Sarwar Alam observed that this is especially the case in third world countries like Bangladesh, where post-colonial secular political institutions and modern technology (particularly the electronic media) are believed to challenge conventional morality, which encourages some people to reaffirm religious ideals (Alam, 2008). Often, religion is the most visible and evocative vehicle of protest, not only of political protest, but also of morality, dignity, and group identity (Lawrence, 1989).

According to Mark Juergensmeyer (2000), religion has the ability to give moral sanction to violence, and because violence is the most potent force that a non-legal entity can possess, religion can be a potent political tool. Juergensmeyer also stated that, religious violence can empower people who have not had power before. He furthers the statement that, in developing countries, violent fundamentalist movement soften have nationalist and anti-imperialist motives in addition to their religious ones, which was also stated by Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003).

But the social, economic and political crisis in Bangladesh is more responsible for the violence and extremism occurs here. The political unrest, economic imparity and social injustice are the key factors behind the militancy and unrest in Bangladesh. This will be the main concern of the article with empirical research and secondary data.

Sources of the Rise of Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh

The history of militancy actually starts after the independence of Bangladesh. The leftist insurgency makes the whole country vulnerable and it unrested the political situation of Bangladesh. As a result, there were assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and several coups had occurred. Several leftist parties were banned due to their militant activities and increasing the violence, crime, killing, extortion, etc. During the martial law regime from 1975 to 1990, the leftist movement gone underground and they were vanished from the political scene. But, they had minnow level of presence in the southwest part of the country.

Sarwar Alam (2007) also stated in his book *For domestic use only: the perception of power and powerlessness among rural Muslim women in a Bangladesh village* that Islam is not a monolithic tradition in Bangladesh. In historical terms, it contains four overlapping traditions: (i) a Sufi-influenced accommodationist and tolerant tradition of coexistence of different faiths that influence one another on a religious-cultural basis, (ii) a scripturally literalist and socially active Islamic tradition derived from the influence of revivalist reform movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, (iii) a modern Islamist tradition mostly derived from radical and militant Islamist political parties and organizations and (iv) a secularized and modernist tradition of Islam derived from the European education system introduced by the British colonial rulers (Alam, 2007).

But the Islamic militancy in Bangladesh was injected later. Though there has been a noteworthy upsurge in militant activities in Bangladesh in recent years, mainly from 2015. Both AQIS and the IS have claimed their presence in the country. Killing of atheist bloggers, also the publisher of one of the atheist blogger's book, foreigners, attacks on Shi'a community, killing of religious preachers is claimed by IS through their magazine named Dabiq and also by the SITE intelligence group.

According to Ali Riaz, a University Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, USA, the Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh,

based on their transformations, tactics and objectives can be divided into five generations (Riaz, 2016).

The first generation of militants was the product of the Afghan War (1979-1992). Though geologically Bangladesh is located thousands of miles away from Afghanistan, the linking was established in 1984 when a group of volunteers travelled to Afghanistan to fight against Russia. An estimated 3,000 volunteers joined the war in several batches in the following four years, of which 24 died on the battlefield. Also a group of 'ulama' visited the country and reportedly met Usama bin Laden (Manik, 2005). Between 1988 and 1992, Shafiqur Rahman, a returnee of the Afghan war, established contacts with a Pakistani Islamist organization called Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Bangladesh chapter began its clandestine operations (Riaz, 2016).

The second generation of militants was born after 1996, when the group moved its bases to the northern and northwestern parts of the country and adopted the name "Qital fi Sabilililah" (Fighting in the way of Allah) (Riaz, 2016). The expansion of the organization came after contacts had been made with Shaikh Abdur Rahman, son of a deceased Ahle Hadith leader, and Asadullah Ghalib, leader of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB, Ahle Hadith Movement Bangladesh). They joined forces in 1998 and established the Jaamatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) (Saikia & Stepanova, 2009).

As the JMB and HuJIB were gradually transforming, a new organization with international connections and a global agenda appeared on the scene – the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). The Bangladesh chapter of the HT was founded in 2001 by a university professor who had studied in the United Kingdom as a Commonwealth scholar. This can be categorized as the third generation of militants. The new generation is characterized by its technical skills (being students of universities) and well versed in global political events. The profiles of arrested activists in the past years indicate that they are largely from middle class backgrounds and more urban-based than any other Islamist groups, including the mainstream Islamist parties (Riaz, 2016).

After the arrests and execution of the JMB leaders in 2006-2007 by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party led government, a new group named the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) has been established at that time and they can be described as the fourth generation of militant groups. Originally, the group used the 'Ansar al Mujahideen English Forum' (AAMEF), an Al Qaeda affiliated website, and later moved to another website, 'bab-ul-islam.net', launched in Pakistan. The group uses Bengali, Urdu, Arabic and English for the dissemination of its message (Rashid, 2014). The group reflects a young generation of jihadist in Bangladesh, which uses cyberspace extensively in propagating the jihadist ideology and training manuals to guide terror attacks (TRAC, 2016). The ABT was thrust into the limelight in March 2013 after arrests of five university students in connection with the killing of blogger and activist Rajib Haider. Haider, a self-proclaimed atheist, was hacked to death in February.

With the announcement of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, in September 2014, that the organization was establishing a branch in South Asia, AQIS came into being (The Guardian, 2014). In February 2015, Zawahiri called upon the people of Bangladesh to 'launch a massive public uprising (intifada) in defense of Islam against the enemies of Islam' (Bdnews24, 2015). Members and followers of the AQIS and the IS can be described as the fifth generation of militants in Bangladesh. The defining feature of the new generation is that they are inspired by, and connected to, the transnational terrorist groups, intend to pursue their objective of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh and participate in the global militant Islamist movements (Riaz, 2016).

Social & Economic Structure along with Political Crisis in Bangladesh

Social structure is a term roughly applied to any recurrent form of social comportment or to order interrelationships between different elements of a society. Social structure comprises different affiliation, religious, economic, political and other institutions, as well as of norms, ethics, values and social roles of the members of a society.

The social structure in pre-British Bengal was different from that in other parts of India, not merely because Bengal was ruled by rulers of non-Bengal origins. Many forces contributed to the development of Bengal's distinctive social institutions, the most important among which is the Bengali village and kinship (Banglapedia, 2016). The practice of Zamindari had a direct negative impact on the social structure in Bangladesh. It formed the lord-servant system in this land. Zamindars were only tax-collectors, but they treated peoples as vassal. Though, later on, the system of Zamindari was abolished.

The British rule brought certain deviations in the social structure of Bengal by bringing new laws and rules. After the abolition of Zamindari system and tenants got their absolute right and title over the land, it changes the mind setup in the population. Thought, the upper class or richer class of the country acquired the economic and political strength. After the liberation war in 1971, the middle class society played the main role in leadership and economic structure.

Since liberation, Bangladeshi society has undergone massive changes in terms of the emergence of capitalism in the agrarian economy, rural-urban migration and the growth of the informal sector. The rural and urban social structure received differential developments. Rural society is left with a vast mass of proletariat, including the peasantry, artisans and working classes. The different social groups developed in the rural areas are capitalist farmers, rich peasants, middle peasants, marginal peasants and the landless (Banglapedia, 2016).

Traditional norms, ethics, values and morality still play a vital role in the social structure of Bangladesh. Religious values also played an important role as the largest percentage of the population are Muslim. The urban social structure is very different from the rural social structure. The change in the both urban and rural society is eye-catching.

Communication system, internet, and over-urbanization are responsible for various crimes and offenses.

With the improvisation of technology, the values, ethics and morality has been degraded in the society. The gelling and bonding into the family and society was the elegance in Bengal society. But the bonding in the family and society got detached and urban family life is self-centered.

The education system has also played an important role in the changing of social structure in Bangladesh. The primary religious education was the lucrative as it develops the base of morality. But at the present education system the primary religious education has melted and the education system cannot produce the education of morality, ethics and values.

The class system is not practiced in the social structure in Bangladesh but it is visible more than daylight. The racism components are present in the society. Though the Zamindari system has been abolished and after independence in 1971, the middle class family flooded into the economic and political system, but the racism has been grown up into the veins of the society.

But after the liberation, the differences between the classes have grown up radically. Riches become richer and poor become poorer. The middle class has become invisible as they mixed up with higher class and lower class.

The changes in the social structure have shaken the mental structure of the society. Pride, arrogance, impudence, irritable, piggish, and fractious and other negative features have observed in the society. The rapid social change causes the society vulnerable and no steps have been taken to tackle this problem. And more or less this social structural change has become one of the key components in the uprising of militancy.

Bangladesh has recently been upgraded from a low income country (LIC) to lower-middle income country (LMIC) as per the World Bank's classification (Raihan, 2016). But this classification is merely calculated from an average income status. But in reality the discrimination in economic level is very high. The income growth is rapidly increasing to only a group of people and they play the important role in the economy. Or in another word, the economy of Bangladesh is restricted to a handful people.

According to the Human Development Report (HDI) 2010, Bangladesh is one of the countries that made the greatest progress in recent decades, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). Bangladesh's HDI has increased by 81 per cent in the past 30 years. Even with such impressive relative gains, Bangladesh remains a country in need of continued and coherent development assistance (INTERACTIONS, 2016).

The dominant number of the population of Bangladesh lives in rural areas. According to World Bank, about 80% of the total population lives in rural areas. And in these areas

the lack of enjoying rights likes education, health clinics, adequate transportation, etc., are common. There are also a significant number of people living under the poverty line in urban areas, although the people in the urban areas enjoy a better standard of living in comparison to rural areas with electricity, gas and water supply. Even in the major cities, however, "a significant proportion of Bangladeshis live in squalor in dwellings that fall apart during the monsoon season and have no regular electricity. These Bangladeshis have limited access to health care and to clean drinking water" (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2016).

Economic discrimination is discrimination based on economic factors. These factors can include job accessibility, incomes, the expenses and/or availability of goods and services and the amount of capital investment funding available to minorities in business. This can include discrimination against workers, consumers and minority-owned businesses.

Economic discrimination can be explained by GINI Index published by the World Bank. GINI Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. According to the World Bank, the value of GINI has only developed from 25.9 in 1983 to 32.0 in 2010. The progress is not expected after 1990. Though in recent years, the national income rises, but it doesn't cover the whole scenario of the socioeconomic condition in Bangladesh. The GNI per capita in Bangladesh is 900$ in 2013 according to the World Bank and the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line is 31.5% of the population.

Bangladesh has 25 million extremely poor people, or nearly 60 lakh families, according to Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2010. The poverty rate in Bangladesh has dropped between 23.34 and 26.51 percent of the total population by 2015. This is a dismal figure when compared to other developed economies. Even though the poverty rate in Bangladesh has been decreasing, it is doing so at a slow rate of less than 2% per year (Mustafa, 2000).

From the income distribution data between poorest and richest according to the World Bank, it shows that 1% of the population of the country currently receives 13% of the national income. In other words, if an average person from the lowest 10% of the population earns Tk 6000, an average person from the richest 1% earns Tk 195,000. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the problem of mounting income inequality becomes even more severe when we analyze the wealth growth into justification.

According to the Bangladesh Labor Force Survey, 2010, in Bangladesh, total employed populations are 54.1 million and among them the female employed populations are only 16.2 million and the female employed population in rural areas is 12.6 million and in urban areas 3.6 million.

The gap between the rich and poor is increasing with the number of unemployed population and it is a very alarming situation for the government. Because the discrimination

is creating some serious problems like poverty, unemployment, crime, drugs and so other problems with domestic violence, extortion, etc. And all of these problems are helpful to create a situation for operating militant activities. The militant groups will continue to make use of this situation in favor of them.

The economy of Bangladesh is more hampered by political violence. The national economy has been continuously disturbed by political activities like strike, blockade etc. In the absence of exercise of democracy, politics itself is ferocious and the police department is used as a political power. Violence is coming from politics more than from any other causes.

After independence, Bangladesh has faced several political crises. It begins with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (President at that time) with his family in 1975. After that, several coups had followed and the martial law regime had just begun. After that, General Ziaur Rahman (President at that time) was assassinated in 1981 and the new martial law regime was established by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. That military regime was overthrown by the civil movement led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Bangladesh Awami League in alliance with other political parties in 1990.

In 1991, the country elected Begum Khaleda Zia as new Prime Minister and democracy established and it continued till now. Though, there are several political crises in the meantime. In 2007, there was a military backed government in the form of Caretaker Government rule the country. The political clashes between Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party were the main reason behind the political crises and destruction and violence in the country. Since 1999, the attacks by Islamist militants have been increasing. They have targeted opposition politicians, scholars, journalists, members of the judiciary, religious minorities, and members of the Islamic Ahmadiyya sect (Ganguly, 2006). Between March 6, 1999 and January 27, 2005, militant Islamists killed at least 156 people in Bangladesh (Ali, 2006).

But, at present there is political nothingness existent. 10th national parliament election of Bangladesh was held on5 January, 2014 boycotted by 20 Party alliance led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Bangladesh Awami League was elected and formed the government. Before the elections, 154 candidates out of 300 won an uncontested majority to pass. The election was most violent in the history of Bangladesh.

After that uncontested election, the present ruling party Bangladesh Awami League wiped out the opposition by criminal cases, violence, torturing and also with killing. The Bangladesh Police and RAB (elite law enforcement agency) were accused of several political killings. The healthy political environment is totally absent and there are no activities from the opposition party because the present opposition party, Bangladesh Jatiya Party is also part of the government.

There is no actual opposition party and it is noted that in democratic system a strong opposition party is needed to keep the political equilibrium. But the equilibrium is not

present and it is golden opportunity for the militant groups run their activities. Without an actual opposition party, the present ruling party behaves like an autocratic form and it is ideal ground for any militant groups to cultivate their principles and inject them to the deprived population.

Taking place in different poles by two major parties is most expensive and awful part of the history of politics of independent Bangladesh. The most disturbing feature of the Bangladeshi polity, however, is the state of the two principal political parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). They do have some ideological differences (Ganguly, 2006). In some context, it is realized to me that, there is another particular entity which does not want the unity of these two parties. There were many of chances came to get unity among the political parties like natural calamities, natural security etc. But some undisclosed reasons, that never been happened and the people of Bangladesh suffered most from it.

The political crises only raise the disunity among the people of Bangladesh. The divide and rule policy is strongly applied in the political system of Bangladesh. Two of the main political parties, Bangladesh Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party, keep themselves in the opposite pole. At present, the vacuum created in the politics in Bangladesh must be filled with other components and the possibility of this refill could be the extremist. Every component of creating the environment of revolution ground is present. But if the road to revolution is blocked and the vacuum in the politics is still present, then the whole political condition will surely welcome the extremist to take the vacuum place.

Imparity is Present Everywhere

Apart from social, economic and political discrimination there are several imparity components present in Bangladesh. This imparity can have described as racism, though it is quite different from other racist countries where the race was decided on a color or caste. But in Bangladesh color racism is not that much existing though that is also present in minnow level. Wealth, political, social class, job sector and in some context, religious imparity are seen in Bangladesh.

The most discrimination has been seen in the job sector in Bangladesh. Gender discrimination with quota system is one of the reasons behind unemployment. Even graduate students have to apply for menial jobs because of no vacancy due to discrimination. Also, lobbying and money dealings are responsible for keeping a huge educated population unemployed and the rising turmoil can be fulminated at any time with grievance and agitation. Liberation war's children and grandchildren quota of 30% in education and job sector is another reason of imparity and it also increases perturbation among the educated unemployed population.

Social class discrimination can be noticed in the higher class of the society. In many areas in the country the people from lower class have to face discrimination. Though there is no caste system in Bangladesh, but the social class system is also responsible for discrimination in life.

Political discrimination is like the members and activities of the ruling party takes immoral benefit and the opposite minded peoples are deprived of equitable rights. Corruption is also one of the results of political autocracy.

The whole country is divided into two groups. Not only political activists, the supporters and professionals are so divided into political groups. The national unity in national issues like national security, destructive calamity, environmental issues etc. is not present. The nation-wise disunity is spreading like mephitis. This disunity is the result of discrimination and imparity in every aspect of life.

The country has three types of education system: Bengali medium (for normally middle class and lower middle class people), English medium (for higher class people) and Madrasa medium (for normally lower class people). So our education system has the seed of imparity and a child can learn the discrimination from his early stage of life. This discriminatory education system is the one of the main reasons behind all kinds of imparity and discrimination.

The militant activists just take the opportunity of disunity and they use it to spread violence and also propagandize their principles and ideology. And yet there is no sign of unity to be happening.

Is the Present Law and Order System in Bangladesh enough to Deal with Islamic Militants?

The Bangladesh Constitution ensures the protection of the right to life and personal liberty in accordance with the law. Article 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh declares that,

> "To enjoy the protection of law, and to be treated in accordance with law, is the absolute right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Bangladesh, and in particular, no action unfavorable to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law".

According to Article 35(5) of the Constitution of Bangladesh and Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,

> "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".

But, in practice, the government of Bangladesh seemingly fails not ensure the right to life or to comply with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Constitution of Bangladesh.

In 2009, Bangladesh enacted for the first time, specific legislation designed to combat terrorism: the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009. To bring this anti-terror legislation in line with the UN's Action Plan on Counter Terrorism Strategy and other resolutions, it has been amended twice subsequently. In the latest such amendment, the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2013, provisions were made for the courts to accept videos, still photographs and audio clips used in social media as evidence. The amended law also provides for capital punishment and stiff financial penalties for terrorism and subversive activities, depending upon the gravity of the crimes. The broad language of the legislation provides several mechanisms by which Bangladesh can implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178, which requires nations to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat. In 2010, the government formulated a strong anti-militancy National Education Policy, which highlights the need for reforming the Madrassa curriculum. The government also introduced anti-extremism chapters in academic text books. Additionally, the Ministry of Education has been organizing awareness programs against terrorism in different schools and colleges. In 2011, the government formulated a "National Counter Terrorism Strategy". In August of the same year, Bangladesh acceded to the Palermo Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes (Centre for Research and Information, 2015).

To fight against the militants there must be a national unity against it along with a strong law and order maintenance must be needed. But with the corruption and disgraceful behavior towards the civilians the police force is no longer recognized as *'citizen's friend'*. They are hated by most of the population and this is the situation that can be used by militants in their favor.

During the *Gulshan Attack,* a local police station chief, Mohammed Salahuddin, was killed in the gunfight along with one other officer, confirmed Ashraful Karim (Hammadi, Scammell, & Yuhas, 2016) with another 30 police officers has been injured. Naturally, these two police officers killed by militants and them along with their families should get the condolences from the countrymen. But the scenario is different than it is expected. After the death of Mohammed Salahuddin, chief of Banani Police Station, the reaction in the social networks is totally opposite. People get happy and they even celebrate the death of the mentioned police officer. It is the worried sign that must be dealt with caution and care.

To fight against terrorism and militants there are no alternative other than the law enforcement agencies. But the infield law enforcement agencies Bangladesh Police and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), both are accused of various crimes and corruption. Crossfire, killing mission, contact killing, extortion etc. are common allegation against them.

Extra judicial killing in Bangladeshis is becoming like the breakfast of the rich people or like the lunch of that poor person who eats for a time in a day. Every day in the getting up or in the fast reading of daily newspapers, we watch the issue or occurrence was occurred in any place in Bangladesh that is killed by Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) or police of terror which is known to us as extra judicial killing. The security forces are continuing to arbitrarily arrest people, often torturing and then killing them in custody (Banglanews24, 2016).

Extrajudicial killing is an arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life and simply a murder. Bangladesh has earned notoriety in carrying out extrajudicial killings. The rights to life and personal liberty are under threat in Bangladesh, despite the fact that they are guaranteed by the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Article 32 says: "no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, save in accordance with law". According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966 and ratified by Bangladesh in 2000, "every human being has the inherent right to life". The Covenant also says: 'this right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life". Different terminologies have been used by the law enforcement agencies to distract from extrajudicial killings; such as, deaths during 'cross-fire', 'encounter ', 'gunfight' etc. (ODHIKAR, 2016).

Rule of law has to establish to fight against terrorism. Extra-judicial killing must be stopped. There are extra-judicial killings in the name of crossfire, encounter gunfight etc. though the government and law enforcement agencies do not have responsibility or accountability for these crimes. Political wipe out with law enforcement agencies by using the extra-judicial killing also has a bad impact on citizens and political parties. Every political party in Bangladesh uses the law enforcement agencies as their vanguard and to protect the power. It is a bad practice with law enforcement agencies and it increases the corruption, willfulness among the force. And as political parties use the law enforcement agencies as their vanguard, sometimes they felt helpless to gain control over them.

Another alarming situation for the government is the absence of justice. Both social and judicial justice system has been erupted due to discrimination, corruption, muscle power, nepotism, misuse of political power, etc. Due to social injustice the unity between the people is not present. If in a society, the social justice is absent, then, the judicial justice system has to step forward and strongly enforce justice through the society and country. But the judicial system in Bangladesh is not fully independent and that is the reason it is used as political proceeding.

Steps to Take Down Militants

It is high time to take some measurements to fight against militants. Government, political parties, citizen and all law enforcement agencies have to play their roles to minimize the threat of militants. Political vacuum must be filled with proper political activities and the environment to practice healthy political activities must be ensured by the Government. It can be argued that the suicide terrorism, or just the act of terrorism, is a willful choice displaying collective rationality; it is a reasonably informed choice among available alternatives (Crenshaw, 1998). Government has the responsibility to address about this among the nation by communication or any other means. Juergensmeyer observes that, violent action and terrorism inspired by, among others, the intimacy with which the humiliation is experienced and the degree to which it is regarded as a threat to honor and respectability (Juergensmeyer, 2000). The aids which have come to these militant organizations must be stopped by any way, but the Government has to be also sensible towards the innocent publics. There are so many complaints against law enforcement agencies by mass population regarding harassment, extortion, giving threat etc. It has to be kept in mind that government cannot win against the militancy if the mass population does not give full support of them. So, in this regard, the Government and law enforcement agencies have to be careful.

It has been argued that a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community (Qutb, n.d.). However, it can be argued that the feeling of humiliation as Muslims, among others, is the basic foundation of the militant fundamentalist organizations (Alam, 2008). It is likely that this feeling ultimately generates frustrations and helplessness, which in turn motivates them to adopt terrorism as a political strategy (Crenshaw, 1998,). In this regards, the proper guidelines and opportunity to work can be effective among the population who are backward and frustrated. *Imams* (Islamic priests) and *Alems* (Islamic scholars) can be more effective than any other body regarding the guidelines from the view of Islam.

Allah (SWT) says, "...And do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful" (Al Quran, 4: 29). So, who kill themselves and others cannot enter into *Jannat* (Heaven). So it will be also addressed to the peoples who are off the rails. It has to keep in mind that, to fight against Islamic militancy you have to use Islam against it. Which can be more effective than the proper and solid education of Islam in the war against Militancy? Allah (SWT) also says that, "Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And our messengers had certainly come to them with clear proofs. Then indeed many of them, [even] after that, throughout the land, were transgressors" (Al Quran, 5:32).

Social injustice and imparity with any type of discrimination must be banished and social justice with judicial justice has to restore. Economic discrimination must be dissolved and some proper steps have to take to create employment. Any type of injustice in employment sector has to abolish. The quota system has to alter in a reasonable figure. If a country has 56% quota system in education and job sector and only 44% of the total system evaluated only by talent, it will affect so negatively because the less talented people get jobs and education advantage than the more talented people.

The idea of Islamic Socialism (Islamic Socialism will describe later in another study) can be applied here. The religious educational must be obligatory for a certain level and full education system of the country must be altered and re-evaluated. The discriminatory education system cannot bring the unity and justice in the country. The proper education system has to imply to mix all classes of people in a same level.

The judicial system has to take initiative to establish the rule of law. Any type of discrimination must be liquefied and it can only possible by the strong judicial system. Stand against corruption, nepotism, political crimes, etc., should be united and as a nation whole.

Relative deprivation is a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them (Gurr, 1970). The perception of dishonor or the deprivation of honor can be addressed by the theory of humiliation. According to Evelin Lindner, Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honor [sic.] or dignity. ... Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground (Lindner, 2001). He also stated that, Torture, humiliation, and loving empathy can link up with terrorism (Lindner, 2006). Love and affection can be another way to fight against the militancy. Lindner observes that feelings of humiliation are among the strongest emotions available to human beings. She argues, "Feelings of humiliation come about when deprivation is perceived as an illegitimate imposition of lowering or degradation" (Lindner, 2006, p. 171).

Political unity is now more necessary than ever. Every political party has to unite and stand against militant activities. And for this the present ruling party has to take the initiative. Political dialogue, opportunities to participate in the election, stand against political crimes and violence, etc. should be taken measures to create the environment of healthy politics.

Law enforcement agencies have to restructure themselves from top to bottom. The corrupted and criminal members of such agencies have to turn before the court and justice.

Extra-judicial killings and other crimes has to be stopped and the accountability in the agencies must be restored. Proper investigation against militancy without any influence must be assured. To repair the relation between people and citizen, government should take some steps. The connectivity with citizens has to increase and harassment and vexation towards the citizen has to stop completely. Agencies have to be friendly with people to regain the title as a friend.

In another word, the country needs to fight against the militancy as a unit and it can only happen when social injustice, discrimination and imparity can be abolished from the society. Every citizen has to help each other to fight against terrorism and militancy and government has to ensure the environment of politics.

Conclusion

To fight against militants is not an easy task. Many united and more technical countries have failed to tackle them. So a country like Bangladesh with present political uncertainty, economic imbalance and social imparity will be more difficult to fight against terrorism and militancy. But it can be possible to fight against militancy with a united citizen and proper law enforcement agencies.

Top fighting against terrorism and militancy, every person has to be united and get behind each other to help them to fight against militancy and extremism. Islamic scholars have a real task now, to motivate the community and teach them the proper education of Islam against terrorism. Governments also treat the Islamic scholars not their enemy, but as a friend.

Government can take measures steps to fight the terrorism, but it has to keep in their mind, those only imposing strong laws and with strong agencies with modernized weapon cannot guarantee the win against militants. More technical and modernized country has failed to fight against terrorism. So, at least, government, citizen, agencies, departments of government overall every one of the country has to be united against terrorism and government has to ensure the ground of unity.

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Boko Haram and the Islamic State:
A Tale of Two Terrors

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Abstract. *This research analyzes the similarities and differences between The Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram in order to enrich the growing debate on the threat they pose to international security. Using the relative deprivation theory, the research argues that both groups are similar in their use of radical Islamic ideology to mobilize political, economic and socially aggrieved communities towards violence via hybrid warfare against status quo forces deemed unjust. However, they differ in their strategic goal, organizational structure, membership, financing and capabilities. These differences stem from the different strategic outlook of the two groups, with Boko Haram more focused on change in Nigeria and its immediate environs while IS has an ambitious global agenda of an Islamic Caliphate. Understanding these similarities and differences are necessary to effectively combat the security threats they both pose.*

Keywords: *Boko Haram, Islamic State, Terrorism, Hybrid Warfare, Relative Deprivation.*

Introduction

Ever since the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York by Al-Qaeda, multiple Islamic terrorist organizations have emerged in different theatres of the world, all motivated by radical Islamic ideology that seek to challenge the Westphalia state model and replace it with an Islamic theocracy based on Sharia Law. Although the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is not new, the shear intensity and scope of their activities and reach continue to confound international and domestic policy makers. For example, a 2014 report by the Institute for Economics and Peace, ranked Boko Haram the "most deadly terrorist group in the world" based on the number of people killed, followed by IS. There is a raging debate among scholars and analysts as to whether Boko Haram can be classified as an international terrorist

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organization and a global threat as the Islamic State (IS). These competing views are represented by Karmon (2014) who cites Boko Haram's 2011 car bombing of the UN headquarters in Nigeria and kidnapping of Western hostages as proof of Boko Haram's international threat. On the other hand, Oftedal (2013) dismisses Boko Haram's international threat by arguing that the group only poses a threat to Nigeria and its neighbors based on the geography of the attacks and its emphasis on domestic grievances. However, a third perspective represented by Pham (2016) has emerged. He argues that unlike IS, Boko Haram is an evolving international threat that demands international attention nevertheless. Pham points out that although IS has proclaimed Boko Haram as the "Islamic Sate West Africa Province" (ISWAP), the relationship has not moved beyond the rhetoric and cyber declaration of mutual moral support to operational support. Although this research concurs with the latter perspective based on the differences between the two as defined by the local focus of Boko Haram vis-a-vis IS's global Caliphate project, it is necessary to understand the similarities and differences among the two terrorist groups in order to effectively deal with the threats that they pose, whether local or international. Herein lies the contribution of this research.

In policy terms, Boko Haram has not attracted the same intense great power interest as IS. This is mainly because the western great powers, led by the United States, view Boko Haram more as a Nigerian/West African problem in view of the fact that Boko Haram does not have a broad international reach in terms of its targets, recruitment and the capabilities for international terrorism. According to a Stratfor 2014 report, "The West has offered no real response to Boko Haram, preferring instead to support its African allies indirectly through intelligence sharing and logistical assistance. The United States and Europe consider Boko Haram a local Nigerian issue that does not threaten U.S. or European national security, and so they will continue to be somewhat ambivalent" (Stratfor, 2014). This research seeks to enrich the aforementioned debate and generate more insights about the two terrorist groups for deeper theoretical understandings of Islamic terrorism and for better policy guidance in dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism. Thus, using the comparative method, this research seeks to answer the following question: What are the differences and similarities between IS and Boko Haram as terrorist organizations? The research argues that although both share similar domestic grievances that drive the aggrieved towards them and employ similar terror tactics, they differ in many ways such as their strategic goal, organizational, membership, financing and capabilities. These difference stem from the different strategic outlook of the two groups with Boko Haram more focused on change in Nigeria and its immediate environ while IS has a greater global agenda of an Islamic Caliphate**.** The paper is organized as follows: theoretical framework, literature review, similarities, differences and conclusion.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

There is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism among scholars, states, international organizations and even among the terrorist themselves (Tuman, 2003). This is because issues of terrorism are emotionally charged and highly political owing to the fact that one man's hero can be another's terrorist. However, because ISIS and Boko Haram use terrorism for political gains, as in seeking to establish Islamic rule in place of the status quo, this research defines terrorism as "the use or the threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change" (Tuman, 2003). There are different types of terrorism but for the sake of this research, which focuses on two terror groups that claim *their raison d'être* on a religious ideology, it is anchored in the definition of religious terrorism as follows:

> "A type of political violence motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned and commanded terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts committed in the name of the faith will be forgiven by the otherworldly power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence, one's religious faith legitimizes violence as long as such violence is an expression of the will of one's deity" (Martin, 2015, p. 130).

Several untested explanations abound on the causes of terrorism but this research in grounded in Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory to explain the circumstances that leads to the emergence of groups such as IS and Boko Haram because of its emphasis on group violence. Gurr used relative deprivation to explain the political violence that arises when people feel that they have been denied a benefit or right that they deserve or are entitled to. This feeling of denial is further compounded when they compare their circumstances with others around them and realize that others are better-off than them. According to Gurr (1970), "the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity" (p. 24) as "men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations" (p. 58).

Methodology

This research utilizes the comparative case method to examine two of the most prominent Islamic terrorist organizations in contemporary times, in an attempt to discover patterns, similarities and contrasts in their aims, organizational, operational structure and *modus operandi*. Such a task can only be achieved via a qualitative method which enables the collection and analysis of information from a small pool of cases (Burnham, Lutz, Grant, & Layton-Henry 2008). Collier (1993) posits that "this focus on a small number of cases is adopted because there are relatively few instances of the phenomenon under consideration that exhibit the attributes of interest to the analysis" (p. 105). As a result of the obvious difficulties in gaining access to the leadership and

members of the two terrorist organizations and time constraints, the study relies on primary information in the public domain, gained from government agencies and media pronouncements by the terrorists, archival sources and existing secondary sources in an attempt to discover new insights about the brand of Islamic terrorism espoused by these two terror cases. Lijphart (1971) has observed that "given inevitable scarcity of time, energy and financial resources, the intensive analysis of a few cases may be more promising than the superficial statistical analysis of many cases" (p. 685).

Literature Review: Origin of Boko Haram and IS

Although the world has come to know Boko Haram as the dreaded terrorist organization, the group prefers to be called by its Arabic name *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad*, which means 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad' (Onuoha, 2012) and finds their labeling as "Boko Haram" which loosely translates in Hausa as "Western Education is a sin" to be pejorative (Boyle, 2009). The goal of the group is the overthrow of the Nigerian state and the implementation of Sharia across the entire country in order to cleanse Nigeria from what they consider to be its affliction with western education and social vices. The ideological philosophy of the Boko Haram is rooted in the practice of strict Islamic orthodoxy which, in their interpretation, prohibits Western education and working in the civil service (Boyle, 2009). The group draws its ideological baring from their interpretation of a Quranic verse which says that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (BBC, 2016).

Islamic State (IS)

The Islamic State, as the group prefers to be called, has undergone several name changes since its formation in April 2013 as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is sometimes referred in the media as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) but, nevertheless, the group refers to itself as the Islamic State (IS) in the aftermath of the Caliphate declaration in June 2014. Thus, the name "Islamic State" (IS) is used in this research for the sake of consistency. According to a BBC report, the group was originally formed in April 2013 and emerged out of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (BBC, 2014). The Al Qaeda-IS link is further corroborated by a November 2014 video released by IS which "acknowledged Abu Musa'b al Zarqawi, the brutal head of al Qaeda in Iraq from roughly 2003 until his killing in 2006, as a more immediate progenitor, followed sequentially by two other guerrilla leaders before Baghdadi, the caliph" (Wood, 2015). Ideologically, it is a militant Salafist jihadist group that follows a very fundamentalist Wahhabi doctrine of Islam (Al-Ibrahim, 2014). In June 2014, the group started referring to itself as the Islamic State (IS) after declaring all territory under its control as a Caliphate for all Muslims worldwide. The group's leader, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, declared himself the Caliph (Roggio, 2014). In pursuance of its Caliphatehood, The Islamic State

(IS) has adopted a territorial expansionist goal where the group seizes territory, consolidates it and expands. This is epitomized by the group's motto which is "Remaining and Expanding" (Joscelyn, 2015).

Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram Link?

Pham (2016) has observed an increasing scenario of Boko Haram and ISIS collaboration, not only symbolism and ideology, but in insurgency doctrine as well. This conclusion is informed by a number of collaborative declarations and actions. First, is the 2015 pledge of alliance of Boko Haram to IS and subsequent rebranding as the 'Islamic State of West Province' (ISWAP). This has been followed up by an increased pace in virtual exchanges from Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau as well as the group incorporating IS's black jihadist banner and *de facto* anthem, "My Umma, Dawn has Arrived" in its video releases. In a mutual nod to each other, the two groups have credited each other for certain actions they have undertaken. For example, IS's publication, Dabiq, cited Boko Haram's kidnap of the Chibok school girls as a precedent for its enslavement and sexual abuse of Yazidi women. In addition, Boko Haram has also taken a cue from IS sectarian strife playbook by also attacking Nigeria's small Shia minority group. Furthermore, both groups have now abandoned their hit and run guerrilla tactics by now seizing and holding onto land (Pham, 2016).

Similarities: Grievances Galore

Based on the theory of relative deprivation, it is no coincidence that political violence has emerged among highly indignant northerners in Nigeria who are the most impoverished in the country and Sunni's in Iraq who feel marginalized by the Shiite led government. In the two communities, the most organized groups tend to be the radical Islamic ideologues who tap into the groundswell of disenfranchisement by offering them a radical solution. As Forest (2012) has observed, "the likelihood of ideological resonance is greater when members of a community are desperate for justice, social agency, human dignity, a sense of belonging, or positive identity when surrounded by a variety of depressingly negative environmental conditions" (p. 10).

Political Grievances

The unequal distribution of power at the local, national or international levels breeds resentment and fuels a perception of "us versus them" among the disenchanted community which can be capitalized upon by terrorist groups who thrive on such grievances (Forest, 2012). Nigeria and Iraq, the birth place of Boko Haram and IS, are archetypal cases of political grievances being exploited by violent groups. In the case of the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria, they have experienced the erosion of their political clout with the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate which used to be dominant in West Africa and

their subsequent domination by colonialism, military regimes and the current secular democratic dispensation (Forest, 2012). It is, therefore, not surprising that the Boko Haram insurgency peeked during the presidency of a Christian president, Goodluck Jonathan, who was roundly rejected by the entire northern Nigeria during his 2011 re-election (Forest, 2012).

This situation is compounded by a high rate of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment which has diminished the capabilities of the people of the north relative to their southern counterparts, a sentiment that Boko Haram has tapped into. Gurr (1970) describes such a situation whereby value expectations remain the same in the midst of declining capabilities as "decremental deprivation". The same situation has happened in Iraq whereby the Sunni Iraqis, who once dominated political and economic power in Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein, suddenly find themselves on the margins of power with the Shiites using their numerical advantage to win elections in a zero sum game of politics. However, the Iraqi case falls under Gurr's classification of "progressive deprivation" because Iraqi Sunni did not anticipate such a precipitous fall from political power as their capabilities to hold on was greatly diminished in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. This feeling of political dispossession among Iraqi Sunnis explains the appeal of IS among a segment of the latter.

Economic Grievances

In both Nigeria and Iraq, while oil remains the largest foreign exchange earner and contributor to the GDP, decades of wanton corruption, economic mismanagement and misplaced priorities has denied millions the economic benefits of the oil revenues leading to a sea of discontent and hopelessness. The World Bank (2013) has warned that "Despite its abundant oil resources, Iraq lacks the capacities to use the revenues from oil for the maximum benefit of its population". Indeed, Iraq has a checkered history in terms of the management of its oil revenues with Saddam dabbling in two costly wars with Iran, invading Kuwait and embarking on a clandestine Weapons of Mass Destruction program with its attendant costly international consequences. Currently, Cordesman (2014) laments the economic discrimination against Sunnis by the ruling Shite elites which fuels the instability in Iraq.

Having elites from the same community in power does not translate into fair distribution of wealth and the placation of the communities that produces these elites. Citing the case of Nigeria, Onuoha (2012) argues that although political leadership has been dominated by Nigeria's northern elites since independence, they failed to address the disproportionately high levels of poverty in northern Nigeria. Isaacs (2003) believes such high levels of poverty has alienated many young Northerners who have become skeptical about a system that has brought them little benefit but rather served the interests of the ruling elites.

Social Grievances

Societies where people feel discriminated against in the allocation of public goods such as social services or jobs are bound to have many aggrieved people especially if the discrimination is viewed as targeted. Thus, communities that feel targeted are more likely to be enticed by extremist groups such as IS and Boko Haram who promise justice and restoration of rights. For example, there is an overwhelming perception among northerners in Nigeria that "the wealthy elite throughout the country tend to be Christian, while the most impoverished communities in the country are found among the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and other northern groups-all of them primarily Muslim" (Forest, 2012, p. 56). Such disparities fuels into Boko Haram narrative for the need to seek justice via violent jihad.

One of the worse policies that had dire consequences on the security of Iraq was the U.S. backed "De-Baathification policy" which sought to purge mostly Sunnis deemed to be loyal to Saddam Hussein from the army and public sector/civil service. Many of these people felt targeted and could not accept the preferential treatment that their Shiite counterparts were receiving and thus ended up as IS recruits out of grief. Furthermore, in Iraq many Sunnis from within which IS recruits "are locked out of key jobs at universities and in government, their leaders barred from cabinet meetings or even marked as fugitives" (Associated Press, 2012).

The absence of basic social amenities and the unequal distribution and access to basic social services generates grievances in affected communities that could be exploited by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and IS. Agbiboa (2013) has observed that although the primary goal of Boko Haram is the takeover of the Nigerian state and the imposition of Sharia law, the high levels of poverty and youthful unemployment cannot be disregarded (Isa, 2010).

Tactical Similarities: Hybrid Warriors

The Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram are both engaged in an asymmetric warfare defined as "the use of random/unpredictable violence by a weak group (i.e., one with a smaller force) against a stronger power (i.e., military, government, or even society in general) to gain advantage. Asymmetrical warfare is fought between grossly unequal sides. The less powerful force does not attack the more powerful force under the conventional rules of war because it cannot win by following these tactics" (Matusitz, 2013, p. 5). Under this type of warfare, the weaker sides such as IS and Boko Haram, employ "hybrid" tactics that includes both conventional and unconventional tactics against a much formidable enemy such as the U.S led international coalition and the Nigeria government respectively. These tactics are erringly similar and are discussed below.

Attack on Security Installations

A major part of the *modus operandi* of IS and Boko Haram is attacking military installations such as military barracks, police stations, recruitment centers and check points, prisons, etc. Such attacks are usually carried out stealthily and in spectacular fashion to inflict the most damage and casualty in order to garner as much as public attention as possible. Security installations are high value targets for terrorist organizations because of their centrality in legitimizing state authority. Thus, a blow against them not only demoralizes security agents of the state, it sends a message to the general public that if government cannot protect its forces, it surely cannot protect defenseless citizens. Furthermore, terrorist groups such as IS and Boko Haram attack security installations in order to seize weapons and also to free their members that may be held there. According to Look and Haruna (2015), Boko Haram not only successfully attacked the border town of Baga in north eastern Nigeria, which happened to be the headquarters of the four-country anti-terrorism joint task force, they hoisted their black flag over the town in a symbolic blow to the government. Similarly, after a 2014 seizure of the third largest military base in Western Iraq, the IS seized the contents of the base and the training camp, including tanks, heavy weapons, munitions and stores, as well as spare parts and different military supplies (Mamoun, 2014).

Territorial Conquest and Control

Both IS and Boko Haram share the tactics of capturing and holding on to territories with the latter evolving towards this strategy after drawing inspiration from the former's territorial conquest strategy. Buttressing this point, Pham (2016) has observed that both groups shed their previous hit-and-run guerilla tactics in favor of seizing and holding increasingly large chunks of territory. According to Byman (2014), at the height of ISIS's prowess in 2014, it controlled territory larger than Israel which included oil fields, electricity generating infrastructure, small manufacturing zones and weapons depots, some of which contained arms supplied by the U.S. Such territorial control provided a base for IS to train, recruit and served as an operational launching pad (Byman, 2014). Similarly, Pham (2016) has observed that by also capturing and holding onto territory, Boko Haram was able to set up a number of bases in the territory where hundreds of its recruits received ideological instruction, weapons and other training. This cadre subsequently raised the tactical sophistication and operational tempo of Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria, elevating the group to the level of full-fledged insurgency (Pham, 2016).

Suicide Terrorism

Suicide terrorism is deemed the most horrifying and violent terrorist tactic used in today's world. Although suicide bombing account for a minority of all terrorist operations, it accounts for the majority of terrorism-related causalities and the rate of these

attacks is increasing rapidly worldwide (Atran, 2006). Both IS and Boko Haram employ the tactic of suicide bombing as part of their terror repertoire because of what Pape (cited in Friedman, 2016) has dubbed the "strategic logic of suicide terrorism". Pape has established a link between fierce territorial battles and suicide terrorism by arguing that suicide terrorism is a reactive strategy by terrorist groups in a territorial fight against a competing entity in an attempt to establish a monopoly of force and political authority over a prized territory.

Furthermore, Pape argues that suicide terrorism is particularly effective in achieving two goals. First is to "to coerce the target government to pull back its military forces and suicide attacks kill more people – it's the lung cancer of terrorism – than non-suicide attacks by a factor of ten" (cited in Friedman, 2016, p. 5). Second, in the regions within which the terrorists operate, "suicide attacks are excellent against security targets to hold territory...Suicide attacks are a way to level that tactical advantage" (cited in Friedman, 2016, p. 6). Buttressing this point further, Pape posits that this explains why during a May 2015 battle for the Iraqi city of Ramada, IS employed an array of strategies that involved complex suicide bombings in tandem with other non-suicide attacks all in attempt to seize and hold territory against competing forces (Friedman, 2016).

In Nigeria, Boko Haram has undertaken a new trend in terror, which is the feminization of terrorism, in which the group has used young girls as vanguards of terror. Females are being used for such operation due to the lack of suspicion they arouse in populous areas, such as local markets or schools which they can easily blend in. Moreover, Boko Haram has exploited the conservative characteristic of the Muslim society in the north to their advantage, because the Islamic religion prohibits men from frisking women. Thus, the group occasionally uses women in hijab to convey and hide explosives for suicide missions (Onuoha, 2012).

Kidnappings, Beheadings and Ransom Demand

Weak actors such as IS and Boko Haram, aware of their severe military disadvantages against powerful state armies and international military coalitions, are increasingly resorting to unconventional tactics such as hostage taking and kidnapping as a way of revenge. In addition, kidnapping and hostage taking is becoming one of the most common money-making and attention pulling weapons in the modern terrorist arsenal (Yun, 2007).

Furthermore, by displaying the graphic murder of their victims via the Internet and online videos, the terrorists are able to mount an international media spectacle for strategic effect. The killing of noncombatants can strike fear into the general public and weaken the resolve of the supporters of war on terrorism. Terrorist beheadings are deliberately painful and heinous to achieve dramatic results. When hostages are taken, the nationality of the victims dictates their fate, whereby hostages are divided

into two categories: those worth demanding ransoms for and entering into negotiations for and those who will be executed or videotaped for terrorizing effect (Jones, 2005).

Pham (2016) has observed that Boko Haram does not limit its kidnapping for ransom to only "higher profile foreign nationals, but hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians whose families have had to offer modest payments, with most on the order of $10,000-$20,000".

Similarly, IS has been able to command millions of dollars in ransom by relying on its fearsome reputation of barbarity. For example, in February 2016, ISIS released 230 Assyrian Christians kidnapped in Syria it had held for over a year after Assyrian businessmen and the Assyrian Church paid $25-30 million in ransom money (Associated Press, 2016).

Sexual Violence Against Women

Both IS and Boko Haram use sexual violence against women and anti-women's rules as part of their *modus operandi*. The World Health Organization defines sexual violence as "any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work" (Jewkes, Sen, & Garcia-Moreno, 2002). These terrorist organizations have gone to the extent of using Islamic theology to justify their violence against women. IS has particularly gained notoriety for its institutionalization of sexual violence against Yazidi women whom they claim as non-believers, fall under the spoils of war under Sharia law classifications (Newsweek, 2014).

Boko Haram has adopted an ultra-Salafi ideology that view women as subordinate to men and perceive Christian women, in particular as infidels. In 2012, Boko Haram distributed videos and booklets and delivered sermons in northern Nigeria, calling for the denial of girls from modern education and threatened to kidnap infidel girls as slaves. As a result, the group undertook several kidnapping operations on girl schools in which the hostage's toll ranged from as little as two girls to as many as 200 girls in each attack. These kidnapped women in Boko Haram camps are being subjected to sexual violence, forced into marriages, killing, maimed, converting to Islam or even recruiting into the group (Maiangwa & Agbiboa, 2014).

Attack on Western/Secular Symbols

IS and Boko Haram share an ideological antipathy towards westernization and western culture, which they view as having a corrupting impact on Muslim societies because of its attendant moral decadence. This ideological motivation has led to a systematic campaign against symbols and targets they perceive to be representing western culture or civilization. For example, in 2015, IS ordered school closures in three provinces pend-

ing a review of the school curriculum to conform with Islamic teachings, a move which affected about 670,000 Syrian school children (Huffington Post, 2015). Boko Haram fares worst in this regard by deliberately targeting schools and burning them down. According to a Human Rights Watch Report (2016) titled *They Set the Classrooms on Fire*, "between 2009 and 2015, attacks in northeastern Nigeria destroyed more than 910 schools and forced at least 1,500 to close. By early 2016, an estimated 952,029 school-age children had fled the violence". In addition, motivated by a fundamentalist Islamic interpretation of combating "Shirk", which loosely translates as idolatry, both IS and Boko Haram have attacked symbols such as tombs, shrines, churches, monuments, etc. The most egregious example of such attacks is IS's destruction of the UNESCO Heritage site of Palmyra Temple in Syria.

Extra Judicial Enforcements and Killings

After territorial capture comes governance and both IS and Boko Haram administer territories under their control via extreme brutality. They enforce their extreme interpretation of Sharia via extra judicial killings for the most mundane "offenses". Pham (2016) points out that just as it's IS counterpart, wherever it seizes control, Boko Haram raises its black jihadist flag on public buildings and brutalizes anyone who fails to conform to their strict interpretation of Sharia Law. For example, in Yobe State, people caught smoking cigarettes were summarily executed. In Borno State, the spokesman for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri told journalists that the insurgents were beheading men who refused to convert to Islam and forcing their widows to covert and marry militants (Pham, 2016).

Stoking of Sectarian Conflict

IS has perfected the strategy of stoking sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria by positioning itself as the guardians of oppressed Sunnis living under Iranian-back Shiite dominated countries such as Iraq and Syria**.** Indeed, ISIS sees the struggles in both countries as parts of a larger grand struggle against apostate-dominated regimes (Shiite in Iraq, Alawite in Syria) backed by Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah (Byman, 2014). IS stokes sectarian conflict by attacking Shiite religious sites and places of worship, populated Shiite public spaces such as markets, schools and military camps. The intention behind such acts is to provoke unpopular retaliatory actions from the opposite side and thereby offer IS the opportunity to rally the Sunni faithful into a preexisting narrative of fighting the murderous "apostates and infidels".

Boko Haram draws inspiration from IS by stoking sectarian conflict in Nigeria by targeting the country's small Shiite minority (Pham, 2016). Unlike Iraq, where the fault lines of religious strive lies between Shiites and Sunnis, in Nigeria, it lies between the predominately Muslim North and Christian South of the country. Hence, for Boko Haram,

Christians living in their midst are their source of sectarian ire and they have gone after them with vengeance with a series of targeted bombings of their places of worship. Available data indicates that in August 2014 alone, Boko Haram destroyed more than 178 churches (Open Doors, 2014). In a statement lamenting the vicious attacks on Nigerian Christians, the General Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Reverend Musa Asaka, posited that the statistics released by international agencies shows that more Christians were killed in Nigeria in 2012 alone for their faith, than the rest of the world combined" (Fatunmole & Ajayi, 2013).

Elimination of Moderates

There is no tolerance for moderates in IS and Boko Haram's world view, even within their Sunni community. The two groups reserves some of the harshest retribution against people perceived as moderates or people who question their ideology and *modus operandi*. According to Byman (2014), IS also targets Sunni Muslims, if the group believes that they are insufficiently zealous or have collaborated with the United States or its allies, including the current Iraqi government. In addition, to serve as a deterrent for moderates, IS sometimes crucifies fellow Muslims and publicly hangs their bodies as a warning. Such barbarity even shocked the conscience of Al Qaeda's leader, Ayman Zawahiri, who one time issued a formal condemnation (Byman, 2014). A report by the United States Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has also documented similar intra-faith reprisals by Boko Haram by pointing out that "Clerics or senior Islamic figures critical of Boko Haram were attacked in 23 separate incidents, killing at least 60 people" (Christian Today, 2013).

Multi-Media Strategy

The Islam State has become a global phenomenon in the realm of terrorist media production and propaganda. Although the structure and competitiveness of the media industry have influenced media attention to the Islamic State, the organization has been successful in attributing equal emphasis on media projection along with military efforts. IS have utilized several social media sites, such as YouTube, Instagram and Facebook. However, Twitter is considered to be the largest source of propaganda input by the organization. The main appeal of Twitter is the difficulty for governmental authorities to permanently eliminate their messages and accounts. Hence, Twitter is widely used by many terrorist groups as the official media outlet of their organization (Green, 2015).

Another media tool is the Dabq, which is a standardized magazine, published by the organization, that contains current events, informative articles and photo reports about matters related to IS. In addition, the group uses pamphlets, which are hard-copy propaganda that have been handed to Muslims in London to encourage them to move to areas under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Another important and big part

of the IS's propaganda campaign is the use of propaganda videos that spread through social media sites such as YouTube and Twitter. These videos range from an hour long documentaries to short videos showing the execution of captives (Greene, 2015).

Although Boko Haram does not have the media sophistication of IS, recently, there is evidence that the group is following in the footstep of IS and even receiving technical assistance to reboot its media operations. A BBC (2015) report cited the launching of Boko Haram's twitter feed and the level of its sophistication as evidence of IS collaboration. The report also indicated that "the increased sophistication and organization of the propaganda that followed the launch of the Twitter account bore signs of the influence of IS, which has honed its social media exploitation over the past year ...and the use of multiple languages and well-presented subtitles – using English, Arabic, French and Hausa – suggested the group may have had outside help from IS media operatives" (BBC, 2015).

Differences Between IS and Boko Haram
Strategic Difference

While both IS and Boko Haram share the strategic goal of introducing Islamic rule in their various spheres of influence, they differ in scope and ambition. For Boko Haram, their strategic goal is the introduction of Islamic governance in the whole of Nigeria in place of the current secular and democratic system. IS has a much more expansive goal of establishing a global Caliphate for all Muslims beyond the boundaries of their home base of Iraq. This Caliphate will be akin to the 6th century during the time of Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors. IS envisions Iraq as the nerve center of this Caliphate where the leader, in the form of a Khalifa, will preside over the "Ummah". McFate (2015) believes that "IS is framing its strategy across three geographic rings: the Interior Ring in the Levant, the Near Abroad in the wider Middle East and North Africa, and the Far Abroad in Europe, Asia, and the United States. IS's strategic framework corresponds to a campaign with three overarching goals: to defend inside Iraq and Syria; to expand operations regionally, and to disrupt and recruit on a global scale" (p. 3). The strategic differences between the two groups have shaped their organizational, membership and financial drive as well as their capabilities which are further discussed below.

Organizational Structure

According to Matusitz (2013), terrorist organizations have varied organizational structures that may include an identifiable high command, a horizontal structure with unidentifiable leadership with vague roles or a cell structure with loosely affiliated members encouraged to be lone rangers. The same applies to IS and Boko Haram. Indeed, evidence abounds that IS, with its global ambitions, has taken a cue from Al Qaeda's hierarchical organizational structure which is aimed at ensuring more discipline in a

multinational terrorist organization. A Rand Corporation study argues that IS has taken a cue from Al Qaeda organizational structure which is vertically integrated with a hierarchical management structure and functional bureau. This structure is replicated at the local levels with substantial level of autonomy in the execution of the group's strategic goals. However, each local jurisdiction is required to send periodic reports about its operational, financial, logistical and personnel status to the group's overall hierarchy (Johnston, Shapiro, Shatz, Bahney, Jung, Ryan, & Wallace, 2016).

In contrast, Boko Haram, with its narrow focus on change in Nigeria and primordial membership, has a more decentralized and layered organizational structure. Thus, it draws membership primarily from sympathetic Islamists from northeastern Nigeria, northern state institutions and government and military establishments. At the apex of this decentralized organization is Abubakar Shekau who wields final decision making powers with the support of the groups highest decision making body known as the Shura Council. The council is made up of 30 members and overseas the various decentralized cells. There are also specialized operationalized departments below the Shura Council responsible for carry out various tactical operations that ranges from suicide bombings, kidnappings, intelligence gathering, recruitment and bomb making. Boko Haram also has departments that focus on medical needs of its members and their families, as well a public affairs department responsible for propaganda. The organizational fluidity of Boko Haram ensures a high level of operational security outside the Shura Council. Typically, different cells are unaware of the activities of the other (Stratfor, 2014).

Membership: Recruitment: International Recruitment versus Local Recruitment

While Boko Haram is predominantly a pan-ethnic regional organization in terms of membership, IS is an international terrorist organization with membership from different nationalities. Boko Haram's membership is primarily drawn from the Kanuri and Hausa Fulani ethnic groups which constitute four and 29 percent of Nigeria's population respectively and spills into neighboring states such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Forest, 2012). On the other hand, IS has a far more diverse international membership base. According to Barrett (2014), IS has identified 25 countries whose citizens or residents have joined the group. Citizens or a resident from as much as 57 countries are reported to have joined IS per estimates. Furthermore, in Syria and Iraq, IS's success in recruiting can be traced back to its effective virtual propaganda machinery. The declaration of Caliphate and the early military victories made the organization seem more legitimate and stronger and this has boosted recruitment and made it more effective. IS has a significant global presence in the social media arena that is sustained by their manpower in which the organization's well educated and trained foreign fighters with the requisite technical and linguistic skills have made their success clearly evident (Gates & Podder, 2015). Unlike IS, Boko Haram's membership is made up of poorly

educated and unskilled foot soldiers who lack the linguistic and technical dexterity of IS's membership.

Financing: Transnational Financing versus local/regional financing

Comparatively, IS has more financial resources than Boko Haram that enables it to finance its transnational terror activities. This is largely because IS has better sources of funding than Boko Haram because of the relatively better socio-economic circumstances of its "Ummah" in Iraq, the MENA region and internationally. The relative richer environment within which IS operates from enables it to raise money from a much more diverse source. In addition, the environment within which IS emerged provides a better source of financial extraction and fundraising than Boko Haram's wretched circumstances.

Levitt (2014) has observed that IS's finances depend on oil smuggling, criminal enterprise, deep pockets of major donors and kidnap-for-ransom payments and many more. IS is considered as the world's best-funded terrorist organization, in which at the height of its ascendency, the organization had a daily income of around $3millions from oil smuggling. By this standard, IS's income was more than many small nations, including Marshall Islands and Tonga. This income was vital for the existence of the group, since it helped the group maintain and supply equipment, expand their propaganda campaign, pay salaries for fighters and manage civilian infrastructure and administration. Prior to the international coalition against IS, the group controlled about 350 oil wells in Iraq and 60% of the Syrian oil fields (Levitt, 2014).

However, an emerging financial profile of Boko Haram indicates that, unlike its counterpart, which has successfully raised millions to finance its terror campaigns by appropriating valuable oil assets in both Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram has been forced to depend on less lavish sources, such as wealthy sympathizers from its insular community, bank robbery and dividends from their partnership with some Al Qaeda affiliates. This is because although Nigeria is an oil producing country as Iraq, the country, unlike Iraq, is too big and its oil resources are located far away from Boko Haram strongholds to be easily appropriated. Thus, Boko Haram has resorted to raising money from powerful and wealthy individuals some of which even held political power – such as a former Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Isa Yuguda, a former Bauchi State Governor who was alleged to be paying Boko Haram members monthly stipends (Agbiboa, 2013).

Differences in Capabilities

As a result of the vast financial disparity between IS and Boko Haram, there are bound to be military/terror capabilities disparities between the two, with the more financially endowed IS having a superior capability than its West African counterpart. For example, initially, IS as a guerrilla army, proved itself as a skilled battlefield scavenger. Prior to 2012, the group had zero to little heavy weaponry. However, after continuous battles

and areas captured, IS emerged successful in amassing an arsenal that its rivals in Iraqi Shia and Kurdish forces have failed to match, until receiving extensive aid from Iranian, European and US stockpiles. Tactically, the summer of 2014 represents a major turning point for IS as the group was able to capture significant weaponry from several Iraqi divisions, along with spoils from the Syrian military base at Al-Tabqa. The capture contained significant amount of American and Russian made heavy weaponry, such as man-portable anti-aircraft missiles and guided anti-tank, Humvees, artillery and Russian T-55s and T-72s tanks and several American Abrams M1A1s tanks (Fromson & Simon, 2015).

These IS's gains have led the Kurdish forces and Shia Iraqi to be outgunned, in a time where IS was distributing these spoils along the spacious territories it controls. IS has organized parades in the street of its territories in Iraq to show off the weapons they have took from the Iraqi army and such tactics may sow fears among the group's rivals along with driving recruits to the group. IS has achieved its local superiority through its hybrid style in warfare, in which the sophisticated weapons that the group claimed, played a significant role in the evolution of the group's offensive operations, mobility and the element of surprise (Fromson & Simon, 2015).

On the other hand, Boko Haram's repertoire ranges from traditional bombs, such as hand grenades and small arms, to Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices, Molotov cocktails and simple Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The security situation in Nigeria is worsened by the overflow of bombings that claim lives and destroy properties. As Boko Haram's arsenal gets more sophisticated, and it's attack capabilities evolves rapidly, stopping the group gets even harder and harder. The group's competent internal bomb making suggests that it is either stealing explosives from mining companies or has somehow been able to buy these explosive using front companies. At the very least, however, the group's limited arsenal suggest that the threat Boko Haram poses is only regional in nature, in which recent attacks indicate that development in deploying its IEDs and suicide operatives need to be done in order for the groups to evolve in its operations. More so, Boko Haram has yet to demonstrate an ability to work outside its traditional operational areas. Until Boko Haram master those skills and jumps into more unconventional and untraditional weaponry, the group will remain regional, albeit deadly threat (Okpaga, Chijioke, & Eme, 2012).

Conclusions

This research concludes, that although Boko Haram and IS share similar ideological foundations which enables them to exploit their respective environmental grievances towards violence and employ similar hybrid warfare tactics, they are significantly different in many ways. These differences are fomented by the provisional focus of Boko Haram versus IS's global Caliphate agenda. The differences are as follows: First, strategically, IS has a more ambitious pan-Islamic agenda of establishing a global Islamic

Caliphate while Boko Haram has the singular goal of establishing Islamic rule in Nigeria. Second, IS's hierarchical organizational structure is aimed at instilling discipline in a multinational force pursuing a transnational objective while Boko Haram's decentralized organizational structure is aimed at achieving a localized objective. Third, in terms of membership, while IS has a multinational membership base, Boko Haram has a limited pan-ethnic membership base. Fourth, IS has an extensive and diverse source of fundraising within and beyond the Middle East whereas Boko Haram is limited to its pan-ethnic circuit with occasional support from AQIM. Fifth, Boko has relatively modest military capabilities which has significantly limited its areas of operation whereas IS has the military capabilities of a state that enables it to project power globally. Thus, in order to confront the security challenges these groups present, governments and the international community must be wary of these similarities and difference in order to avoid monolithic policies that are bound to fail.

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Nigeria:
Living in the Shadow of Islamist Violence:
Assessment of Citizens' Response
to the Boko Haram Insurgency

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Abstract. *The* Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad *(People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), popularly called* Boko Haram*, which literally means '*Western Education is Sin*' was established in 2002 with the objective of restoring Islamic legal system (*Sharia*) in Northern Nigeria. It, therefore, started as a fundamental Islamic sect intended to supplant government structures that allegedly politicised, corrupted and bastardised proper implementation of* Sharia *in the North. In place of those structures, it will install an Islamic theocratic regime, in which* Sharia *law would be applied to the fullest. The sect carried out series of attacks on government facilities, security forces and later churches. In 2009, massive clampdown on the group by federal forces led to the death of one of its founders, Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram regrouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2011 and embarked on a revenge mission for Yusuf's murder, leading to suicide bomb attacks on police, military and civilian targets. Although the Boko Haram violence occurs mostly in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, bringing the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja (the seat of the Federal Government of Nigeria) within its orbit raises the profile of the terror group. Attack on the FCT would also taunt the state over the vulnerability of the capital city as it also projects the state as incapable of fulfilling its primary responsibility of security of the lives and property of residents. The sect's violence on the FCT and its environs thus successfully imposed a climate of fear over the city and on the residents. In order to assess how residents of the FCT and its environs responded and are responding to the Boko Haram violence, this study adopts an eclectic blend of both survey and descriptive*

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research methodologies. The study found out that the responses of residents of FCT to Boko Haram violence is spatio-temporal relating to space (area) or time. Areas (city centre or satellite towns) where residents lived or worked played a role in contributing to feeling of vulnerability and the fear of the sect was heightened among residents after the high-profile attack of the UN House Abuja in August 2011. However, with the inauguration mid 2015 of a new government headed by a Northern Muslim, the fear of potential Boko Haram attacks in the FCT and its environs has significantly abated.

Keywords: *Boko Haram, Islamist, Violence, Suicide Bomb Attacks, Federal Capital Territory, Residents.*

Introduction

The sophistication, precision and strategic attacks by the *Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), otherwise widely known as the *Boko Haram* sect, since 2011, when the sect brought its vicious attention on Abuja - Nigeria's seat of power, did indeed raise concerns over the scepter of Islamists violence in Nigeria which began since 2009. Boko Haram's attack in Abuja first occurred on December 31, 2010 at a market in the Mogadishu Army Barracks where soldiers and civilians often gather for leisure (Vanguard, 2010). Strategic as the attack was, occurring at a walking distance to Aso Rock Villa, the seat of the Nigerian government, it symbolically exposes the vulnerability of both the state and sent shock waves not only among the Abuja residents but also across the length and breadth of the country. Military barracks usually are considered safe and secure in Nigeria. Since that initial attack, 11 other attacks have been executed by the sect in Abuja and the satellite towns in which scores of security operatives and civilians have lost their lives. These include the attack on the Police Force headquarters in June 2011, the United Nations House, later in August, the Christmas Day 2011 attack on St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Suleja (a satellite town of Abuja located 40 km from the city center), the April and May 2014 attacks at bus stations in Nyanya (another Abuja suburb), the attack on a shopping mall in the heart of the city in June 2014 and the October 2015 simultaneous attacks on Nyanya and Kuje, also an Abuja suburb. In Nyanya, the target was a police station while a market and a police station were targeted in Kuje.

Since 2009, when the Boko Haram sect formally declared a war on Nigeria, its violence was concentrated on other parts of northern Nigeria, particularly the North-East. Although the sect's violence in Nigeria, especially in the North-East part of the country, preceded the year 2009, however, not until 2011 did the Nigerian authorities became confronted with the reality of a vicious home-grown terrorism mounted by an Islamist sect. But it was the attack on the Police Force headquarters that exposed how daring the sect had become. In particular, quite spectacular were the audacity of attacking the convoy of the country's Police Chief, Hafiz Ringim, the symbol of the country's internal security, who only a few days back had boosted how he would wipe out the sect in a

matter of days. Executing the attack in the Police Czar's fortress was quite impudent. The Nigerian state has taken a lot of measures to contain the sect and its virulent violence including the use of extensive roadblocks and security patrols. Countering terrorism indeed is a doubled-edged strategy aimed at neutralising planned terrorist attacks and mitigate the effects. While the State take measures to contain the terror, the citizenry is on the edge. The frequency of terror attacks of the Boko Haram and its geographical spread has prompted security agencies to intensify joint counter-terrorism operations. While the successful execution of the attack probably helped boost Boko Haram's standing among global jihadi movement, it also exposed the vulnerability of Abuja, the seat of power in Nigeria, and subsequently imposed a climate of fear on residents; it casts doubts on the ability of the state to protect the citizenry.

For a city like the FCT, whose teeming population experiences rush periods (in the mornings and evenings), adoption of the suicide mode of attack by the Islamists heightened the anxiety and made the situation even more scary and traumatic. Bombs could explode anytime from the next fellow either in the morning rush hours, when people are anxious to get to their places of works/businesses, or in the evenings, when they are returning to their homes. It could also happen in many of the recreational facilities that dot the city. The FCT residents, like other Nigerians, began to raise the question of how they could protect themselves against a perpetrator who uses his/her life as a weapon. Before the Police headquarters attack, the only instance of suicide bombing involving a Nigerian, was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's, (a.k.a, Underwear bomber), who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwestern Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. Despite being from a prominent family, many Nigerians blamed his action on the fact of his having spent most of his life abroad, thus dismissing suicide bombing as alien to Nigerian culture. The Police headquarters attack thus shattered that myth in Nigeria and the sense of security within the FCT. The attack on the UN House, which followed the same mode as the attack on the Police headquarters, further reinforced the fact that suicide as a modus operandi for the sect's operations as come to stay. The random nature of suicide bombing also worsened the climate of fear and insecurity. The climate of fear was further heightened by the brazenness of the attack on *ThisDay* newspaper, Abuja office, where the sect not only successfully executed yet another suicide bombing, but also took time to video the operation which was later posted on You Tube social media platform. In 2014, there were 31 suicide attacks by the group in Nigeria, with an average of nearly 15 deaths per attack according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report of the Institute for Economics and Peace, (IEP, 2015, p. 22).

Expectedly, the Nigerian state has adopted several strategies in order to secure the FCT and residents alike. Checkpoints manned by soldiers were introduced at the city's entry points and in several parts of the FCT. Roads close to major government buildings such as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

(NNPC), Federal Secretariat, Defense Headquarters and a host of other security forma-tions were also either condoned off or partially closed. Concrete barricades were also mounted around potential targets which include shopping malls, churches, government buildings and others. Patrons were subjected to screening, using bomb detectors and manual searches before accessing public places. But the closure of several lanes on city streets and the military checkpoints posed their own challenges. They contributed to massive traffic build-ups, especially at rush hours, even on intra-city road networks. But the Nyanya-Maraba-Masaka axis, leading into the FCT from eastern flank, where three bomb blasts occurred, including one that claimed 100 lives, bore much of the brunt of the traffic snarl. The number of checkpoints on the road inflicted untold hardship on commuters and other road users, with many spending as much as four hours to get into the city from a distance of about 12 kilometers. Many residents reported having to leave home as early as 5am in order to get on time to their jobs in the city. The check-points, nevertheless, did not allay residents' fear; bombs could yet detonate in traffic hold-ups and result in mass casualties.

State authorities also embarked on sensitization of citizens, urging them to report sus-picious persons or objects to security agencies, whose help lines were widely circulated. The Nigerian Police, in particular in 2015, published *A Guide to Personal Security* and had copies distributed to citizens for enlightenment on general security matters. The booklet detailed actions to take to enhance security at home, workplaces and what to do in instances of encountering suspicious packages and explosive devices. Simulation drills were also conducted by security agencies to enhance coordination and improve response readiness and capability among relevant agencies in times of terror attacks in public places in the FCT. In early 2016, two of such simulation drills were coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) on prompt response to terror attacks in public places in Abuja. One was conducted at Garki Mall on February 1, 2016 and the other at the International Conference Centre (ICC) on February 2, 2016. Sufficient awareness was raised among the public before the conduct of the simulation exercises to avoid panic among the already traumatized residents. Such simulation exercises have been replicated in several parts of the country, at airports, markets, etc.

Not surprisingly, the atmosphere of insecurity affected businesses, night clubs, recre-ation parks and malls which hitherto experienced high influx of patrons. Those places began to record low patronage as folks stayed away for fear of terror attacks. Indeed, the stop-and- search policy introduced at access points to these businesses took the fun out of recreation.

This study, therefore, focuses on the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and its environs. For the purpose of this study, Nyanya, which is part of Nassarawa State, and Suleja, which is part of Niger State, would be included as environs of the FCT. The two satellite towns are contiguous to the FCT. The indiscriminate manner of the Boko Haram attacks

has shown that Abuja and its environs, such as Kuje, Nyanya or Suleja, remain targets. Young and old, women and children, rich and poor, military and civilians, have come within the orbit of the sect's bloody campaign. The manner of well-planned and executed attacks in the FCT instilled fear into the residents, who realized that even if the city was not experiencing attacks as intensely as Maiduguri, the epicenter of the sect's violence, each of the attacks in the FCT was planned to inflict the maximum casualty. Despite the government's assurances, the attacks obviously continued. In December 2015, the Federal Government claimed it has "technically defeated" Boko Haram militants. However, the Islamist sect has continued to successfully execute deadly attacks and even more audaciously, though no such attacks have been reported in the FCT.

This study intends, therefore, to analyze the trends and patterns of behavioral and psychological responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram violence since the first attack on Abuja, in 2011. The study limits itself to the period (2011) when the first Boko Haram attack was executed in Abuja to the time (2015) when it was declared technically defeated. Accordingly, we shall sample the opinion of 200 FCT residents who were randomly selected, to empirically determine their responses patterns to Boko Haram violence. For the purpose of this study, the environs of the FCT include Abuja city center and the satellite towns of Nyanya, Suleja and Kuje.

In embarking on the study, we are conscious of the fact that the attacks by the Boko Haram Islamists in Abuja and its environs have imposed fear and acute sense of insecurity on the psyche of residents. The viciousness of the attacks in the FCT created a siege-like atmosphere, where residents are acutely aware that they are perennially in danger. Residents deliberately stayed away from places which seemed prone to terrorist attacks and where maximum impact could be achieved in the event of terror attacks, resulting in adverse effects on socio-economic life. This study, therefore, intends to crystallize how the residents have responded to both the fear and actual attacks of Boko Haram Islamists over the years. It analyses the pattern of reactions and responses of FCT residents to Boko Haram violence and how these propelled the government's actions. The research derives its impetus from the fact that it will contribute to the extant body of literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism and their implications on national security. The findings, therefore, will serve as an indicator of how much Boko Haram has succeeded in instilling fears in the residents, bearing in mind that invoking fear is the overall goal of all terrorism.

With the focus on how the FCT residents have responded to the Boko Haram violence since 2011, the study thus aims to achieve the following objectives, namely: (i) to explain why FCT is a target for Boko Haram, (ii) ascertain the extent to which security measures in the FCT have allayed the fear of the Islamists in the minds of residents, (iii) determine if the caliber or quality of the population of the FCT exerted any pressure on the State to up its responses to the Boko haram violence, (iv) analyze the response patterns of

FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism, (v) to determine if the responses of the residents contributed to the forestalling of Boko Haram violence in the FCT since June 2014 and (vi) to establish an empirical correlation between responses of residents and their public activities.

Boko Haram: A Background

Different accounts have attempted to provide an insight into the early history of the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria- specifically striving to provide information into the group's early formative period, including the actual date it was founded (Okereke, 2011; Adibe, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). The ambiguity beclouding the information on the origin of the group may not however be unconnected with the fact that not until it began its transformation into a violent group, the emergence of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria followed the pattern of the prevalent Alamajiri system in northern Nigeria. In that part of the country, Islamic scholars are usually prone to establishing Islamic education centers that target mainly street children who are taught the Islamic holy text, the Koran. Also called Moshalashi, these Islamic centers also serve as the purpose of doctrinal centers where the mallams feed their impressionable victims who are usually between the ages of three and 17 with their personal understanding and versions of Islam. Thus Boko Haram sprang up as a loose religious group formed around the teaching and preaching of the Islamic religion in that part of Nigeria. Although the credit for the formation of the group has generally been ascribed to Mohammed Yusuf, looking at it from the perspective of an entirely home-grown terror group, mention is often made also of a certain Abubakar Lawan who established the group first as Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization (SMYO) at the University of Maiduguri. At that preliminary stage, the SMYO operated merely as a Muslim evangelical group. Lawan would however later leave for the University of Medina for further studies, thus making way for the ascendency of Yusuf to the leadership of the group. The period 2002-2003 have been speculated as the one when the Boko Haram was formed as a loose religious organization. Some accounts, however, put the date as the mid-90's, when the group's messages were said to have begun to spread publicly. This later account, however, brings into focus the international dimension of the origin of Boko Haram. The mid-90's coincided with the period when the Al-Qaeda founder, Osama bin Laden, made the famous statement to the effect that Nigeria had become ripe for a jihad. Invariably, this aspect, therefore, links the founding of the group to one Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri, who was a student of Islamic Studies at the University of Khartoum, Sudan, between 1992 and 1996. According to this narrative, while at the university of Khartoum, Ali had come under the influence of bin Laden who gave him $3 million to organize al-Qaeda cells in Nigeria. Ali was also said to have had military training in Afghanistan which was facilitated by Osama bin Laden (International Crises Group, 2014).

The common denominator in all the narratives about Boko Haram at its formative periods, and all through the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, cast the group as non-violent. Yusuf was projected as someone imbued strongly with the conviction that a theocratic state within Nigeria, which was the ultimate aim of the group, was achievable without resort to violence. It was also said that Yusuf's approach, which they dismissed as been too soft, did not go down well with his two deputies, Abubakar Shekau and Aminu Tashen-Illim, both who were apostles of violent route to the installation of Sharia governance in Nigeria (International Crises Group, 2014). The violence with which the group became notorious with is thus alleged on the splinter group which was based in Yobe – Yusuf's home state, but whose allegiance laid with the two deputies. Such narrative created the doubt whether or not the sect's current level of radicalization is a function of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the State or the accession to its leadership of the taciturn psychopath, Abubakar Shekua, a Kanuri native, who boasts that "I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill – the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams" (Alozieuwa, 2012, p. 2).

Prior to Yusuf's death in 2009, an event that is widely believed to have provoked the group to violence, certain incidents had occurred to betray the violence propensity of the Boko Haram sect. In late December 2003, about 200 members of Boko Haram had launched an attack on police stations and public buildings in the towns of Kanammaand Geidam in Yobe State. In early January 2004, Boko Haram also clashed with a local vigilante group while attempting to attack a police station outside Domba town, in Borno State, near the Chad border. Bags containing AK-47 riffles were recovered from sect members in that encounter. In September 2004, Boko Haram also launched an attack on police stations in Gwoza and Bama communities in Borno State, and, thereafter, took refuge in the Mandara Mountain along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. In October 2004, the group also attacked a convoy of 60 policemen in an ambush near Kala-Balge, on the Nigerian boarder with Chad. Those operations, whose purposes were to gain weapons, mostly AK-47 riffles preparatory to armed struggle (Olaposi, 2014), not only remove the veil over the non-violent pretentiousness of the group, they also occurred under Yusuf's leadership. And even if the violence perpetrated in Yobe within the aforementioned periods was executed by the faction led by Yusuf's deputies, it may be safe to speculate that those perpetrated in Borno were directly under Yusuf's supervision. Ibn Taymiyyah, from whom Yusuf drew his Salafist inspiration, was a fourteenth century Islamic scholar, theologian and logician who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East (Sergie & Johnson, 2015). In July 2009, Yusuf threatened reprisal attacks on Nigeria's security forces and issued ultimatum to the State preparatory to a campaign of vengeance against the security forces who had clashed with his members the previous month over crash helmet legislation violation. Some members of the group were lost to the stand-off. Towards the end of July, following a crackdown on the group at Yusuf's

base at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri, large cache of arms was also found and a militant training ground discovered. Boko Haram responded with an uprising. Yusuf and some of his followers lost their lives eventually in the process. What is more? Many of Yusuf's members were part of the ECOMOG group, a political militia that was used by politicians in the state to struggle for political power. Alozieuwa (2015) has treated the culture of political militia in great details and therefore needs not be repeated all over again. But suffice it to state that Yusuf's ECOMOG brandished cutlasses, cudgels, knives and sticks and used same to terrorise residents of Maiduguri, ahead of and after the 1999 and 2003 elections.

It is also important to situate the militancy of the Boko Haram against the backdrop of the Sharia fever which swept across the 12 Northern between 2002 and 2003. In 1999, Mallah Kachallah rode to power with the support of the ECOMOG group on a deal to implement the Sharia legal code in the state. However, with the improper implementation of the Sharia in the state by Kachallah and disagreements between the later and his political godfather Ali Modu Sheriff, who allegedly was funding the ECOMOG group, Yusuf became disillusioned, particularly over the half-hearted implementation of the Sharia. With the advantage of the huge youth electoral bloc provided by the ECOMOG group, Yusuf backed Ali Modu Sheriff to upstage Kachallah and emerge Governor in exchange for stricter implementation of Sharia. Sheriff and Yusuf fell out after the latter reneged on his promise (International Crises Group 2014:12), leading to the removal from office of the Boko Haram members in Sheriff's government who were senior government officials including the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Ustaz Buji Foi. Yusuf's disillusionment worsened. Subsequently Yusuf's group constituted itself into a nuisance in the state and Sheriff's attempt to rein in the group through the crash helmet legislation was resisted by the group. The stage was formally set for confrontation with the State.

In a sense, therefore, Boko Haram could be said to have started out as a fundamentalist Islamic sect intended to supplant government structures, which in its view, politicized, corrupted and bastardized proper implementation of *Sharia* in the North. In the place of such a corrupted system, it would install an Islamic regime where *Sharia* law will be applied to the fullest. The initial demands, following Shekau's emergence, included punishment for the security agents in whose hands Yusuf died and revenge for the arrest and detention of families of Boko Haram members. However, in many of the statements credited to him later on, Shekau never stressed the demand for the strict observance of Sharia in the states in the Northern region. Neither has the Boko Haram also neither asked for economic compensation from the Federal Government over those deaths, nor demanded for special social welfare package.

The Boko Haram sect, which eventually extended its reach into Cameroon, Niger Republic, and Chad, was a product of Islamic fundamentalism before forming alliance with global terror groups. While the group today has evolved into a terrorist organiza-

tion, it however started out as a religious group with *Salafi* millenarian beliefs, which assisted its evolution into Islamic militancy. Perhaps the manner of its evolution informed the seeming reluctance initially by the Nigerian government to designate it a terrorist organization. It was a religious group which canvassed for the full implementation of Sharia law, winning the sympathies of most Northern Muslims. The extra-judicial murder of Mohammed Yusuf and unleashing of federal troops against the sect in 2009 also pitched some sections of the populace against the government, which eventually made attempt at pacification by the arraignment of the policemen who allegedly carried out the execution. This support and the fact that then President Goodluck Jonathan government did not enjoy the support of the majority of Northerners, informed the prevarication over its designation as a terrorist organization, even when it already met the criteria for such listing. The rules of engagement which would allow for maximum military force could further fracture an already frosty relationship with some elements in the North. After much pressure, the Nigerian government eventually designated Boko Haram and its splinter group, Ansaru, as terrorist organizations in June 2013; the US followed in November. Despite being an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram later pledged allegiance to ISIS, which also started out as an al-Qaeda affiliate. The Global Terrorism Index report of the Institute for Economics and Peace cited Boko Haram and ISIS as responsible for 51 percent of deaths attributed to terrorists groups in 2014 (IEP, 2015). Boko Haram has however overtaken all terror groups to emerge the deadliest in the world with 7,512 fatalities in 2014, up from 6,644 fatalities in 2013 (IEP, 2015).

The Research Methodology

According to Ogolo (1996), methodology describes the procedure to be followed in realising the goals and objectives of a research. For the purpose of this study, we shall rely on both primary and secondary data sources. These data will be subjected to content analysis, triangulated and interpretatively analysed. For our purpose, which is to examine how residents of the Federal Capital Territory have reacted to Boko Haram violence, the quantitative research methodology is used in this study. It involved the use of measurable data to formulate facts and uncover patterns in research. Our data collection method is, therefore, the descriptive survey. In this regard, the main instrument used to measure the relationship between the variables of response and Boko Haram violence is the questionnaire designed with the Likerts model. 200 questionnaires were distributed in all four locations and analysed quantitatively using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel. Face-to-face-interview is also used for the purposes of data collection. It is however important to note that a major fall-out of the Boko Haram violence in the FCT and indeed in Nigeria generally is that people became suspicious of issues that have to do with security. Some potential respondents were, therefore, unwilling to fill out questionnaires, whereas some agreed after much persuasion. Many were skeptical despite assurances that the information would be held

in the strictest confidence and is for academic purposes only. The study also made use of secondary sources of data.

Research Design

In this section, we present a comprehensive analytical breakdown of the methods used in conducting the study. The study design was based on descriptive survey. Questionnaires respondents were randomly selected in the FCT. Data was collected quantitatively (through a survey) by the use of questionnaires, while four residents were also interviewed. These were complemented with qualitative data collected from published books, journals and reports on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria since 2009. Collected data were analysed quantitatively using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and qualitatively using descriptive and content analysis.

Study Population And Sampling Technique

Study population is the total number of people within the area the researcher intends to study, while sample population is derived from entire population. The FCT has an estimated four million residents living and working in both the central districts and the satellite communities up from 778,567 according to Nigeria's 2006 Census figures. For the purpose of this study, respondents to the questionnaires, and interviewees were randomly selected to reflect the two major demography compositions of the FCT, mentioned above.

Methods Of Data Collection

The main instrument of data collection for this study is the questionnaire which has been designed to quantitatively assess how residents of the Federal Capital Territory have reacted to Boko Haram violence over the years. The questionnaire was used to collect data from the field. The questionnaire was divided into two parts, the first part extracted demographic data, while the second part contained questions which were derived from the research objectives as stated earlier. Specifically, some of the items sought to determine if the public information and security alerts circulated by the government establishment and the statutory security agencies significantly influenced how the FCT residents responded to the Boko Haram violence. The responses were ranked, on a scale of 1 to 4, in line with the Likerts model. Attempt was made to reach the one hundred and twenty (120) respondents across FCT.

Procedure For Data Analysis And Model Specification

Empirical data collected and those retrieved from archival sources (secondary data) were analysed through the use of qualitative data analysis methods. Hence, data were subjected to interpretative analysis and triangulated in order to verify their accura-

cy. Data generated through questionnaires (primary data) were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), from which the descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages, tables and charts) were derived. The qualitative data generated literature review was subjected to content and interpretative analysis.

Justification Of Methods

The methods for this study is justified by the reason of the fact that in the process of carrying out this research work, care was taken to ensure that the various rights and freedom of individual respondents were adequately respected and protected. No respondent was placed under duress, fear or favour of any sort; informed consent of individual respondents; secrecy and confidentiality of respondents, and the integrity of individual respondents were all respected. All these were emphasised in order to ensure truthful, reliable and quality information.

Hypotheses Formulation

For the purpose of this study also, we shall formulate our hypothesis around two variables, namely the dependent and independent variables. For our purpose, the dependent and independent variables are 'Response' and 'Boko Haram Violence' respectively. Thus our hypotheses are follows:

H_1: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighbouring communities have made residents fearful.

H_0: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighbouring communities have not made residents fearful.

The findings of this study will serve as the basis to validly reject or accept H_1 and H_0.

The Conceptual Discourse

Terrorism, according to the US Department of Homeland Security is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience," (US Department of Homeland Security, 2002). Bruce Hoffman (2006) defines it as: "...violence-or equally important, the threat of violence-use and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim" (p. 3). These definitions and several others reflect the similarities of 'violence' as tool deployed by terrorists and with the 'aim or intention' to induce fear. In other words, the objective of terrorism is to induce fear and this study focuses on how residents of the FCT have reacted to the threat of terrorist group, Boko Haram. Hoffman argues that the US Department of Homeland Security has the most encompassing definition for terrorism, as it highlights the threat as much as the actual violence and focuses on the target of society and government. Beyond the actual violent

acts, the far-reaching effect of terrorism is the psychological aftermath of creating an atmosphere permeated by fear and insecurity, where citizens live in fear of the unknown - a response pattern which this study examines on residents of the FCT. Due to this psychological aftermath, its violent nature and the misery its bloody actions entail, the word terrorism stirs strong emotions (Lindberg, 2010). Goldstein (2005) describes terrorism as a shadowy world of faceless enemies and irregular tactics marked by extreme brutality. Nigeria's Boko Haram has employed different tactics in its violent campaign on the populace, ranging from detonation of bombs, suicide bombings, random shootings, landmines, kidnappings, beheading on videos, etc.

However, the terrorist is fundamentally a rational actor and a "violent intellectual" ready and committed to using force in pursuit of his particular political goals (Hoffman, 2006). He thinks out his objective and then carefully plans how best to achieve it (Whittaker, 2007). In the taxonomy of violence, terrorism stands out as a policy tool of coercive intimidation whose ultimate aim is to change "the system" through violent acts (Hoffman, 2006, p. 37). An important objective for those terrorists who carry out the coercion strategy is to influence the public, not so much through articulate appeal as through intimidation and fear (Whittaker, 2007). Therefore, violence applied to achieve a political goal is in essence the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes terrorism from crime and other forms of violence (Hoffman, 2006).

Since the definition issue remains controversial, terrorism experts such as Laqueur (2004) and Hoffman (2006) find it useful to list certain distinctions as a path to definition. In addition to its ineluctable political dimension and deliberate violence, there are some cardinal criteria for describing the ontology of contemporary terrorism. Lindberg (2010) identifies and discusses some of these criteria:

(i).   It is about power: Terrorists want power; terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate it where there is very little, (Hoffman, 2006).

(ii). It is systematic: The terrorist enterprise is a planned, calculated and indeed systematic act (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism is a method, rather than a set of adversaries or the causes they pursue (Pillar, 2003). It is choreographed with an audience in mind - a concept epitomised in the celebrated statement by terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, "Terrorism is theatre" (cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 32).

(iii). It is designed to have the ripple effect of fear: Terrorism seeks to go beyond the immediate target victims; it seeks to have far-reaching psychological repercussions (Hoffman, 2006). The purpose of a terrorist attack is to instill fear on a wider scale in order to coerce others into giving in to their demands. The essence of terrorist operations is its indiscriminate attacks against civilians, with the intent of creating havoc and instilling fear and insecurity in society (Laqueur, 2004).

(iv). It is rational: The terrorist strives to act optimally in order to achieve his goal in a clear demonstration of an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced after

considerable reflection and debate, weighing costs and benefits before undertaking the murderous journey, (Cordesman, 2001; Lindberg, 2010).

Boko Haram, as a phenomenon, fits the identified attributes, as the sect uses terrorism for the propagation of its ideas and pursuit of its objectives. Crenshaw (1983) notes that terrorist groups usually have direct, physical connections with other terrorists groups in other countries, which extend to travel arrangements, funding and collaboration in executing attacks. Boko Haram was initially linked to Al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Considering the pronouncements of the leaders of the group and targets of attacks, it can be said that though Boko Haram terrorism is majorly an internal security challenge, yet intelligence reports have indicated that its operations have been aided by the global jihadi movement. While its primary targets initially were the police, military and religious facilities and their operators, the August 26, 2011 attack on the UN House in Abuja indicated that Boko Haram has global jihadi ambition. Elements of Boko Haram have been found out to have received training from foreign militant groups, including North Africa-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The link with ISIS was also solidified by a video released on March 7, 2015, by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau when he formally swore an oath of allegiance to the ISIS. In his pledge, Shekau publicly accepted the authority of ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and vowed to support him in times of "difficulty and prosperity". Shekau further called upon "Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Caliph and support him". On March 12, 2015, ISIS spokesman, Mohammed al-Adani 'graciously' accepted Shekau's oath of allegiance in an audiotape recording. This marked the formalisation of a relationship between two of the deadliest Islamist extremist organisations currently in operation. According to the IEP's Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2015, Boko Haram and ISIS together accounted for 51 percent of all deaths attributed to Islamist extremism in 2014. The report, which is a comprehensive study of the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 162 countries, also lists the sect as the deadliest Islamist group in the world. It notes that Nigeria is the third terrorism most impacted country after Iraq and Afghanistan (IEP, 2015).

The Theoretical Framework: Psycho-Social Theory of Terrorism

Terrorism, as Luis de la Corte (2007, 2014) has rightly noted, is a difficult topic. Its explanation may indeed be biased by political assumptions and social prejudices. However, every research process certainly needs to be substantially aided by the use of appropriate theories, concepts and constraints to elucidate and classify relationships among phenomena. As John Gaddis (1991) rightly observes, finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain, generally requires a map of some sort. That map, in this endeavor, is correspondingly an appropriate theoretical framework. That is, a network of reasoning that embodies theories, concepts and assumptions about some observed events or phenomena and the explanations as to how these events and phenomena

are related to each other (Asika, 1991). Theory, as Brown (1975) has therefore noted, helps to determine consciousness. Appropriate theoretical framework will thus help in not only providing direction and focus to the study, but also provide the condition whereby specific hypotheses about causes and effects can be deduced and tested by their refutability. Nigerian scholar Aja-Akpuru (2007) has also noted, as every scientist knows that every theory is a guide and tool for the inter-operation and prediction of events, and outcomes. Yet no theory perfectly captures reality. Little wonder, Thomas Kuhn (1962) stresses that intellectual scientific advance consists of the displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new paradigm, which does account for those facts in a satisfactory manner. Even then, Kuhn asserts that to be accepted as a paradigm, although a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it needs not, and in fact never does explain all the facts with which it can be confronted. Whereas several theories attempt to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria, for our purpose, this study is premised on the psycho-social theory for explaining terrorism in relation to the political and ideological intentions of Boko Haram. Terrorism, in the first instance, is a matter of individual motivations, perceptions and deliberate choice to join a terrorist group, participate in acts of terrorism, and continue to engage in terrorist activity (Crenshaw, 1990b). It is therefore necessary to determine when and under what circumstances extremist groups choose to deploy terrorism.

De la Corte (2007), in applying the psycho-social theory to explain terrorism, presents its seven assumptions, as listed below:

(i). Terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome, but as a method of social and political influence. For terrorists, it is about a social sphere of influence, where people attempt to influence the behavior or beliefs of other people. It is therefore a communicative tool, as spreading fear through violence has a communicative dimension. Terrorist violence is considered a means to direct people's attention to certain problems or publicize political or religious demands. The assumption is closely linked to the tactical utility of terrorism which provides explanations for why extremist groups find terrorism useful (Skjolberg & Lia, 2007) after attempts to make impact through non-violent struggle. Why would Boko Haram deploy terrorism? As stated in the introduction to this study, one of the founders, Mohammed Yusuf, had chosen the path of preaching and working with the state government to see to a creation on a theocratic state, governed by the ideals of Sharia law, even though the method was considered idealist. The sect later under a new leadership adopted the tool of violent terrorism, effectively drawing attention to its existence and cause. As Crenshaw (1990a) puts it, the decision to deploy terrorism stems from the 'useful agenda setting function' of terrorist acts. Modern mass media facilitates the spread of dramatic violence and tragedies, helping to amplify the psychological effects of

terrorism. It could also be for vengeance, with extremists and states engaging in a cycle of attacks, and counter attacks, each to avenge their victims (Waldman, 2001).

(ii). Attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interactions, of like-minded persons. Joining a terrorist group could be influenced by a social political environment shared by family and friends; a person who was raised in an atmosphere of radical ideas and values has the potential to join an extremist organization, which propagates same values and ideas. Joining a terrorist organization could however also be a result of making contact and establishing relationship with others who share similar extremist political or religious ideas. It could however be unintentional, as some get recruited into terrorist organizations without realizing they would be deployed in carrying out acts of terrorism (Onuoha, personal communication, April 11, 2016[1]). In buttressing the assumption of social interaction, Sageman (2004) posits that personal paths, interactions and choices may lead young Muslims to become radical jihadists. In a research he conducted with 168 subjects, Sageman discovered that the act of joining a jihadist group could be unintentional, resulting from friendship with another person who is a radical jihadist. The research presented that 68 percent of the 168 said friendship was the main factor influencing joining extremists groups, while 14 percent said it was influenced by familial bonds.

(iii). Terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with other social movements: terrorist campaigns are the result of a long radicalization process of religious or political movements and, therefore, find that identification as part of a much larger community will help them fulfill their goals. This creates a social cohesion among them, promoting positive relationships and intra-group cooperation. As Tajfel predicts in his social identity theory, terrorists lose a sense of self, committing themselves to put the interests of the organization ahead of theirs, which could encourage willingness to suicide terrorism (cited in De la Corte, 2007, p. 2). They see the world as 'us versus them', as their bipolar worldview makes them develop negative prejudices towards people who are not part of their 'community' (Taylor & Louis, 2003). In striving to be part of a global jihad network of terrorists, extremist groups copy modes of violence (e.g. recording live beheadings) and plan their attacks in a manner to impress their allies, an aspect backed by the contagion theory of terrorism (Skjolberg & Lia 2007).

(iv). Terrorism is only possible when terrorists have access to certain resources (materials, people and symbols).The possibility of any protest movement's emergence depends not just on the social situation, but also on the capability to mobilize resources to execute its campaign (McCarthy & Zaid, 1973). Terrorist campaigns therefore require materials (money, technology), people (militants, collaborators,

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1 Interview at the National Defense College, Abuja: April 11, 2016.

etc.) and symbols (clearly linked ideologies that motivate terrorist acts) (Waldman, 1997, cited in De la Corte, 2007, p. 3). A significant amount of time is spent in mobilizing these resources which may lead the terrorists to engage in armed robbery, kidnappings, extortion and other illegal acts (Ozdamar, 2008). They also design unique methods for recruitment strategies (Onuoha, personal communication, April 11, 2016) and for radicalization training programs (De la Corte, 2007).

(v). The decision to sustain a terrorist campaign is always legitimized by an extreme ideology. Ideology, in this context, is a system of extremist beliefs and values that are shared by a terrorist organization and its allies. Terrorist organizations are always backed by an extremist ideology which provides justification for their violent actions. It is however necessary to point out that the ideology of an extremist group could also be embraced by others who are not involved in terrorist activities and do not support their violent acts.

(vi). Every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals, but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect. This assumption is closely linked to the rational choice theory which posits that individuals always make logical decisions; that a rational actor, in this case, the terrorist, only chooses actions which he believes would best serve his purpose and satisfy his preferences. In other words, an action taken by a terrorist is the most effective according to the real situation he operates in. Regular citizens do not consider terrorists to be rational because their choice of action and level of violence exhibited do not seem justifiable, particularly since it is carried out against civilians. Scholars, however, emphasize that terrorists are rational, which is why they change strategies to adapt to changing situations and to react to their 'enemies', i.e the state, and citizens (Victoroff, 2005).

(vii). The activities of terrorists partly reflect the internal features of their organization. The chances of terrorists acting in a rational way are not only affected by their mental attributes, but by the characteristics of their organizations. Blanco, Caballero and De La Corte (2004) identify two kinds of terrorist organizations' attributes that influence their actions: organizational structure and group dynamics.

The structure of any organization is equivalent to the formal pattern of social relations established based on roles and norms. There are two main structures to terrorist organizations: a hierarchical structure, such as the Italian Red Brigade, and a less hierarchical, flexible or decentralized structure (De la Corte, 2007). The hierarchical structure involves stronger leadership, which exhibits stricter control on followers, ensuring adherence to organizational rules and operational guidelines. According to Zanini and Edwards (2001), contemporary terrorist groups have adopted the decentralized, flexible and less hierarchical structures, which adapt better to trans-national terrorism campaigns. The newer groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have become the most active and they rely more on shared values and co-ordination mechanism to accomplish their goals, much more than hierarchical fiat. These less hierarchical groups are harder to

disband or dismantle, as neutralization of some cells, or networks do not necessarily have much impact on the entire group (De la Corte, 2007).

The group dynamics attribute is related to decision making process. As experimental studies have shown, human groups polarize attitudes and decisions much more than individuals. Group polarization, therefore, encourages highly risky behavior and action (Myers, 1978). Terrorist cells exhibit conditions that facilitate group polarization, such as deliberately reducing contact with persons who do not share similar extremist ideologies. Other group dynamics which facilitate terrorist activities include the norms and roles to which they adjust their behavior, the influence exerted by the leaders, and the material benefits and psychological rewards associated with terrorist militancy.

In adopting the psychosocial theory to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon, certain attributes are applicable: violence and fear. Brought on by Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria, the activities and violence of Boko Haram can however best be understood within the context of the global jihadi movement (Onuoha, 2011; Sergie & Johnson, 2015). The terrorism attribute of Boko Haram is, therefore, the outcome of its direct and indirect alliance with the global jihadi movement.

If the question is raised as to the main motive of Boko Haram, it will be safe to assert that the sect's real motive is to "purify" the Islamic religion and ensure that Islamic tenets and morals values are not swept away by the globalising wind of western civilisation and culture. While Boko Haram's attacks on police formations could be properly framed as the retaliatory or revengeful actions (for the death of Yusuf in police custody in 2009), the bombings of the UN House in Abuja, security facilities, churches and kidnapping could not be categorised as such, but rather an attempt to indicate that Boko Haram has a global link, and invariably boost its status within the global jihadi movement.

Data Analysis and Discussion

For emphasis, the aim of this study is to examine how the FCT residents have responded to the Boko Haram violence since 2011. Specifically, the study aims at explaining the reasons why the FCT is a target for Boko Haram, ascertain the extent to which security measures in the FCT allayed the fear of Boko Haram in the minds of residents, analyze the response patterns of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and determine if the responses of the residents contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015. This section covers the presentation – analysis and interpretation of data, which was extracted from the reports of respondents from Abuja, Suleja, Nyanya and Kuje environs. The results of the statistical analysis are presented in this section following the order of research questions and hypothesis posited in the preceding section of the paper.

Also, four respondents from each of the locations under study were interviewed, after a random selection. The interview questions were summarized from the questionnaire,

to present a clearer picture of the opinion of the randomly – selected respondents on the subject matter.

Overview of Data Collection

Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the distribution of the samples used for this study organised according to locations, gender, age, level of education and marital status. Table 1 shows the distribution of Cohort samples according to location, age and gender. A total of 200 people responded to the questionnaire administered. Of this number, 135 (67.5%) are males, while 65 (32.5%) are females. The questionnaire was administered to residents within four locations in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) namely: Nyanya, Abuja, Suleja and Kuje, areas. From the Table, the highest numbers of responses were from male respondents in Abuja and Kuje residential areas with a total of 34 (17.0%). A further breakdown of the responses shows that the highest numbers of respondents were from the age bracket of 33 and 42, numbering 84 (42%). The least number were from those within the age range of 63 and above, numbering only 7 (3.5%). The youths amongst them were only 8 or 4% in number.

Table 1: Distribution of Cohort Samples According to Location, Age and Gender

Location			Age						Total
			13-22 Yrs	23-32 Yrs	33-42 Yrs	43-52 Yrs	53-62 Yrs	63 and Above	
Nyanya:	Gender	Female	1	4	7	1		2	15
		Male	0	6	12	17		0	35
	Total		1	10	19	18		2	50
Abuja:	Gender	Female	1	0	12	3	1		17
		Male	1	6	15	10	1		33
	Total		2	6	27	13	2		50
Suleja:	Gender	Female	1	3	10	1		1	16
		Male	1	5	11	16		1	34
	Total		2	8	21	17		2	50
Kuje:	Gender	Female	1	6	3	5	1	1	17
		Male	2	2	14	11	2	2	33
	Total		3	8	17	16	3	3	50

Table 2 depicts the distribution of samples according to level of educational attainment and marital status, moderated by gender. The highest numbers of responses were from respondents with post graduate diploma. Table 2 shows that a total of 56 (28%) re-spondents are males with HND/First Degree qualification. This is followed by 34 (20%) other males with Post Graduate Diploma. The least numbers of respondents are those with primary school certificate who are 4 in number. The highest numbers of females with HND/First Degree are 26 (13%). Majority of the respondents were married people. Of this number, 65 (32.5%) of them are females while other 132 representing 66% are males. Three (3) respondents representing 1.5% did not indicate their status.

Table 2: Distribution of Samples According to Level of Education, Marital Status and Gender

Gender			None	Married	Separated/ Divorced	Others	Total
			Marital Status				Total
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	1	0	0	1
		Secondary	2	3	1	0	6
		NCE/OND	3	3	0	1	7
		HND/First Degree	4	19	1	2	26
		Post Graduate	3	16	0	6	25
	Total		12	42	2	9	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	1	1	0	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	1	1	1	1	4
		Secondary	9	7	3	0	19
		NCE/OND	0	9	1	3	13
		HND/First Degree	11	39	3	3	56
		Post Graduate	3	24	3	7	37
	Total		24	81	12	15	132

As in Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 depicts the distribution of samples according to level of education, location and gender. Responses were received from four locations. Male respondents had the highest number with 135 or 67.5%. Also, people in this male group had the highest level of educational qualification of HND/First Degree and their number is 57. The female group had lower number comprising 56 respondents and 26 of them had HND/First Degree. Those with Post Graduate Diploma were 25 in number. Male respondents living in Nyanya area were highest in number with 35 or 17.5%, while female respondents living in Abuja and Kuje had the highest number of 17 or 8.5%.

Table 3: Distribution of Samples According to Level of Education, Location and Gender

| Gender			Nyanya	Abuja	Suleja	Kuje	Total
			Location				Total
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	1	1
		Secondary	2	1	1	2	6
		NCE/OND	3	0	2	2	7
		HND/First Degree	7	7	5	7	26
		Post Graduate	3	9	8	5	25
	Total		15	17	16	17	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	2	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	1	1	1	1	4
		Secondary	9	2	5	3	19
		NCE/OND	7	3	2	2	14
		HND/First Degree	12	18	16	11	57
		Post Graduate	6	9	10	13	38
	Total		35	33	34	33	135

Research Question 1:
Does the political status of the FCT make it a target for Boko Haram attack?

Research questions 1, 2 and 3 were used for computing a composite variable known as *political status*. The individual responses of the candidates on the three items were aggregated according to the five point Likert scale scores showing Strongly disagree – 1, Disagree – 2, Undecided – 3, Agree – 4 and Strongly agree – 5. The number of respondents who indicated *strongly agree* were 121, representing 60.5%. Also, 65 others were in agreement that the political situation of Abuja made it a target for Boko Haram. This number represents 32.5% of the total number of respondents. When this number is added to 66.5%, it translates to 93.0%. The number of cases in disagreement, as well as those that were undecided, is equal to 14 or 7%. By this result, it is clear that the majority of the respondents agreed that the position of Abuja as the Federal Capital of the country made it a target for Boko Haram violence. In the same way, the number of female respondents in agreement was 60 out of the total of 65, just as in the case of the males where 126 out of 135 were in agreement. This result is also an indication that there is significant agreement in the opinion of males and females with regards to why Abuja is a target for insurgency.

By its position as the seat of power of Government as well as the political hub of the nation, Abuja is placed at a disadvantage position when issues concerning revolt, insurrections and demonstrations come up. These occur when people are not satisfied with the government, perhaps as a result of the authorities not being able to meet their wishes and aspiration. They often express dissatisfaction through actions deemed against the law. When people affected by one concern or the other intend to make their feelings known to the government, the central seat of power often becomes the target, just like Abuja. It is no wonder, therefore, that Abuja became a target for Boko Haram. This description is further buttressed as in Figure 1 with the Bar Chart showing number of respondents and their levels of agreement on the political status of the FCT which makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks. The total bar in figure 1 shows that the male respondents had the highest number of responses who strongly agreed that the political situation of FCT made it a target for attacks.

Table 5: Showing Cross Tabulation of Respondents Scores on Reasons
Why FCT is a Target for Boko Haram

Gender			Political_status_2				Total
			Disagree	Undecid-ed	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	1	1
		Secondary	1	1	3	1	6
		NCE/OND	0	0	4	3	7
		HND/First Degree	0	2	12	12	26
		Post Graduate	0	1	3	21	25
	Total		1	4	22	38	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	0	1	1	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	0	0	2	2	4
		Secondary	0	0	10	9	19
		NCE/OND	0	2	9	3	14
		HND/First Degree	1	2	15	39	57
		Post Graduate	0	4	6	28	38
	Total		1	8	43	83	135

Figure 1: Bar Chart Showing Number of Respondents and their Levels of Agreement
the political status of FCT, which makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks

Research question 2:
Has the sect's activities invoked fear in the residents of the FCT?

Table 6 shows the level of agreement of respondents on whether or not the sect's activities invoked fear on the residents of the FCT. Ethnicity played the role of a moderating variable in this research question. Since the people living in these four areas within Abuja are made up of Nigerians with diverse ethnic inclinations, it will be appropriate to examine the opinion of these various people to ascertain if they all have the same opinion or if they differ.

The respondents were grouped into four ethnic groups. Analysis of the response pattern, as indicated in Table 6, shows that respondents from other tribes, other than Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa, had the highest numbers of affirmative responses with 51.5%. Figure 2 buttresses this with the Bar Chart which shows the level of agreement of respondents by ethnicity and location.

Table 6: A Cross Tabulation of Respondents' Scores on How Sects' Activities Invoked Fear on the Residents of FCT by Location and Ethnicity

| Ethnicity			Invoked_Fear				Total
			Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Yoruba	Location	Nyanya		1	4	6	11
		Abuja		1	2	7	10
		Suleja		0	2	11	13
		Kuje		0	0	14	14
	Total			2	8	38	48
Igbo	Location	Nyanya	0		3	6	9
		Abuja	1		1	8	10
		Suleja	0		0	15	15
		Kuje	1		0	17	18
	Total		2		4	46	52
Hausa	Location	Nyanya		0	2	7	9
		Abuja		1	5	6	12
		Suleja		0	0	3	3
		Kuje		0	0	4	4
	Total			1	7	20	28
Others	Location	Nyanya	2	2	4	13	21
		Abuja	1	1	5	11	18
		Suleja	0	0	1	18	19
		Kuje	0	0	7	7	14
	Total		3	3	17	49	72

Figure 2: Bar Chart Showing Level of Agreement of Respondents
by Ethnicity, Tribes and Location

Research question 3:
To what extent have the security measures in FCT allayed the fear
of Boko Haram from the minds of residents?

Table 7 shows the cross tabulation of scores by respondents according to location and gender. The intention of research question 3 is to find out the extent security measures put in place in the FCT has helped in allaying fear of Boko Haram from the minds of residents. The number of female residents that indicated "strongly agree" was 11, while those that indicated "agreed" were 16 in number. This translates to 27 (13.5%) out of 99 females. The numbers of females in disagreement were 39, while those that were undecided numbered 33. Of the 99 female respondents, 50 (25%) of them were from Suleja area alone. On the other hand, a good number of male respondents were in agreement that measures taken so far has gone a long way in reducing fear amongst the residents of the area. The number of males in agreement were 64 (64%) out of 100 male respondents. The number of undecided cases among this group is 21 (10.5%). Of this number of male respondents, 35 (17.5%) are from Nyanya area alone. With 91(45.5%) respondents in agreement out of 200 and 54 (27%) undecided, it is clear that about 55 others still believe that the measures put in place are not enough to allay fears of residents. However, nearly half of the residents are in agreement with the

measures put in place so far. The question, therefore, is whether this number of people in agreement is sufficient enough to say that the measures so far put in place has gone a long way towards allaying fears in the mind of the residents. Since only 55 (27.5%) are in disagreement as against 45.5%, one can rightly say that the measures so far put in place has alleviated fear from the residents in the four areas of Abuja.

Table 7: Cross Tabulation of Scores by Respondents by Location and Gender

Gender			Allayed_Fear_2					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Female	Location	Nyanya	0	2	4	4	5	15
		Abuja	0	0	4	10	3	17
		Suleja	1	2	6	3	4	16
		Kuje	0	8	4	2	3	17
	Total		1	12	18	19	15	65
Male	Location	Nyanya	0	4	5	19	7	35
		Abuja	0	2	5	17	8	32
		Suleja	0	2	5	16	11	34
		Kuje	3	6	11	7	6	33
	Total		3	14	26	59	32	134

Figure 3: Showing Level of Agreement by Gender and Location

Research question 4:
What are the responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism?

Table 8 shows the level of responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism. The table shows a cross tabulation of scores according to location and ethnicity. This analysis was grouped in this way in order to ascertain the views of the various ethnic groups within the four locations of FCT. The numbers of respondents within these four ethnic nationalities are: Yoruba – 48, Igbo – 52, Hausa – 28 and others – 72. The number of residents who responded in the affirmative on the Boko Haram terrorism was Yoruba (29), Igbo (35) Hausa (20) and others (41). The numbers when aggregated amounts to 125 or 62.5%. This result indicates that majority of the residents living within the four locations are conscious of the impact of terrorism.

The number of residents who did not agree on Boko Haram terrorism were 29 or 14.5%. Also, a good number of them were undecided about the Boko Haram terrorism and their number is 46 or 23% of the total population of respondents. What this means is that they were undecided as to whether the Boko Haram activities constitutes as acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, since the majority of 125 (62.5%) agreed, we can safely conclude that the activities of this sect really constitutes an act of terrorism.

Table 8: Cross Tabulation of Respondents' Scores According to Location and Ethnicity

Ethnicity			Boko_Haram_Attack					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Yoruba	Loc	Nyanya	0	2	1	3	5	11
		Abuja	0	0	3	4	3	10
		Suleja	0	0	4	5	4	13
		Kuje	1	4	4	2	3	14
	Total		1	6	12	14	15	48
Igbo	Loc	Nyanya		0	1	6	2	9
		Abuja		0	1	9	0	10
		Suleja		0	5	5	5	15
		Kuje		4	6	4	4	18
	Total			4	13	24	11	52
Hausa	Loc	Nyanya		0	2	4	3	9
		Abuja		1	3	6	2	12
		Suleja		0	0	1	2	3
		Kuje		0	2	2	0	4
	Total			1	7	13	7	28
Others	Loc	Nyanya	0	4	5	10	2	21
		Abuja	0	1	3	8	6	18
		Suleja	1	3	3	8	4	19
		Kuje	2	6	3	1	2	14
	Total		3	14	14	27	14	72

The responses of the residents of the FCT to the Boko Haram terrorism can further be shown as in Figure 4. The figure shows the Bar Chart of responses of residents arranged according to location and ethnicity. The length of the bars is used in representing the level of responses. The levels of agreement or disagreement have been differentiated using the color bars.


Figure 4: Bar Chart of Responses of Residents according to location and ethnicity

Research Question 5:
To what extent have the responses of the residents contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015?

Table 9 shows the number of respondents classified according to the ethnicity. The Hausa residents were the lowest in number amongst the residents, with 28 or 14%. The highest numbers of respondents were those from other tribes, with 72. The number of respondents who agreed that residents had contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015 was just 31 or 15.5%. The number of respondents who were undecided was 68 or 34%. This means that the rest others representing 101 (50.5%) responded in disagreement. By this result, it means that the residents of FCT are of the opinion that they have not contributed much towards preventing the Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since 2014.

Figure 5 shows a descriptive representation of the residents' response according to the level of agreement. The length of the bars represent the numbers of residents and their level of agreement or disagreement as to the contributions of the residents towards preventing attacks by the sect on the residents.

Table 9: Cross Tabulation of Respondents According to Ethnicity and Location

| Location			Residents_of_FCT				Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	
Nyanya	Ethnicity	Yoruba	2	1	5	3	11
		Igbo	0	2	4	3	9
		Hausa	0	3	2	4	9
		Others	1	5	12	3	21
	Total		3	11	23	13	50
Abuja	Ethnicity	Yoruba	2	0	3	5	10
		Igbo	0	4	3	3	10
		Hausa	0	4	6	2	12
		Others	0	3	10	5	18
	Total		2	11	22	15	50
Suleja	Ethnicity	Yoruba		13			13
		Igbo		15			15
		Hausa		3			3
		Others		19			19
	Total			50			50
Kuje	Ethnicity	Yoruba	0	8	6	0	14
		Igbo	1	4	12	1	18
		Hausa	0	2	2	0	4
		Others	2	7	3	2	14
	Total		3	21	23	3	50

Figure 5: Bar Chart of Residents' Responses According to Ethnicity and Location

Research question 6:
Have Boko Haram's activities affected the socio-economic
and political lives of the FCT residents?

Table 10 shows the residents responses on how the activities of the sect have affected the socio-economic and political lives of the people living in FCT. None of the respondents gave any affirmative answer. However, 79 or 39.5% of the respondents were undecided. Of this number, 54 (27%) of them were males. Many of the residents were of the opinion that the Boko Haram insurgency has not disrupted the social, economic or political life of residents of the areas. A total of 121 or 60.5% were in disagreement.

Table 10: Cross Tabulation of Respondents According to Location and Gender

Gender			Socio_economic_lifes_2			Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	
Female	Location	Nyanya	10	3	2	15
		Abuja	10	4	3	17
		Suleja	0	0	16	16
		Kuje	5	8	4	17
	Total		25	15	25	65
Male	Location	Nyanya	22	11	2	35
		Abuja	19	7	7	33
		Suleja	0	0	34	34
		Kuje	6	16	11	33
	Total		47	34	54	135

Figure 6: Bar Chart of Responses of Residents According to Level
of Agreement, location and gender

Hypothesis 1

H_1: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have made residents fearful

H_0: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful

Table 11 shows the one sample statistics carried out on the composite variable known as *Invoked Fear*. This variable is an aggregate of research questions 4, 5 and 6 bothering on how Boko Haram has invoked fear amongst the FCT residents. The minimum score expected from the three composite variables is 3, while the maximum score is 15. This composite variable Invoked_ Fear was later recoded to Invoked_Fear_2 with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. It is this later variable that is used for the final analysis. Of the 200 responses, one data which had incomplete data had the missing data replaced by the mean score from the distribution. The mean score generated from the 200 respondents is 4.6850 with a standard deviation of .65415. The standard error of mean is low with a mean of .04626. A test value of 5 representing the median score was calculated prior to carrying out the test. When the test value of 5 is subtracted from the calculated mean score of 4.6850, the mean difference of -.31500 is subjected to t-test.

The calculated t-test is = -6.810 at 199 Degree of freedom or 6.810 in absolute terms) is greater than the critical table value = 1.645. That is, t-calculated = 6.810 > t-critical= 1.645 at $p < 0.05$ is significant. Also p=.000 < 0.05 alpha level. By this result, it means that the hypothesis which stated that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted.

Table 11: One-Sample Statistics of Invoked Fear

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Invoked_Fear	200	4.6850	.65415	.04626

Table 12: One-Sample Test on Invoked Fear Variable

	Test Value = 5					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Invoked_Fear	-6.810	199	.000	-.31500	-.4062	-.2238

Hypothesis 2

H$_1$: There is no significant relationship between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT.

H$_0$: There is significant relationship between responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of FCT.

The intention of this hypothesis is to find out the relationship between the political status of FCT and the responses of the FCT residents towards Boko Haram attacks. Earlier in research question 1, a question was posed as to whether or not the political status of FCT makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks? This hypothesis is trying to establish a link between the political status of FCT and the responses of FCT residents towards the acts of terrorism. Attacks by Boko Haram on residents of the FCT depended on the political position of the FCT and so the political position of the FCT is the independent variable, while attacks by Boko Haram is the dependent variable as we earlier found out in response to research question 1. A simple regression analysis is used here in order to establish the level of relationship between these two variables.

Table 13 depicts the model summary of relationship between the political position of Abuja and responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram attacks. The R represents the coefficient of relationship and this is equal to .164 or 16.4%. The R2 represents the coefficient of determination or the percentage accounted for by the interaction of the two variables. This also means the contribution of the residents of Abuja to the Boko Haram attacks is 2.7%.

Since the F-change = 5.463 is greater than the critical F-ratio = 3.920 at 1, 198 degrees of freedom is significant. That is Significant F Change = .020 < p = 0.05 alpha level. Table 14 also depicts the coefficients of regression. The calculated t-value = 2.337 is greater than the critical t-value = 1.645 at p < 0.05 alpha level. Therefore, the hypothesis which stated that there is no significant relationship between responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of FCT should be rejected and the alternative accepted.

Table 13: Model Summary of Relationship between Political Position of Abuja and Responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram Attacks

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.164[a]	.027	.022	.64967	.027	5.463	1	198	.020

Table 14: Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	4.138	.172		24.094	.000	3.799	4.477
	Boko_Haram_Attack_2	.105	.045	.164	2.337	.020	.016	.193

Hypothesis 3

H_0: The security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful.

H_1: The security measures put in place by security agents has significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful.

Table 15 shows the one sample statistics carried out on the composite variable known as Security Agents Actions. This variable is an aggregate of research questions 2 and 12 bothering on measures put in place by security agents and pressure on the part of security agents to protect the FCT residents. The minimum score from the two composite variables is 2 and the maximum score is 10 for respondents who scored the questionnaire as strongly agreed. This variable *Security_Agents_Actions* was used for the final analysis. The mean score generated from the 200 respondents is 7.9600 with a standard deviation of 1.5846. The standard error of mean is low with a mean of .11205. A test value of 8 representing the median score was calculated and used as the *prio*r mean for carrying out the test. When this value is subtracted from the calculated mean score of 7.9600, the result yields a mean difference of -.0400 and this is subjected to t-test.

Table 16 shows that the calculated t-test is = -.357 at 199 Degree of freedom or .357 in absolute terms) is less than the critical table value = 1.645. That is, t-calculated = .357 < t-critical= 1.645 at $p < 0.05$ is not significant. This means that p=.721 > 0.05 alpha level. By this result, it means that the hypothesis which stated that the security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful should be rejected and the alternative accepted.

Table 15: One-Sample Statistics of Security Agents Actions in FCT

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Security_agents_actions	200	7.9600	1.58460	.11205

Table 16: One-Sample Test of Security Agents Actions

	Test Value = 8					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Security_agents_actions	-.357	199	.721	-.04000	-.2610	.1810

Data Analysis

Analysis of data was carried out using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Excel facility provided by the Microsoft Windows. Statistical tools such as cross tabulation, frequency counts and t-tests were used in providing answers to the six research questions and three hypotheses posed.

Discussion

In selecting the psycho-social theory for the study, we attempted to provide an explanation to why Boko Haram chooses to unleash terrorism on residents of the FCT. In analyzing its actions, it was clear that the sect deliberately targeted Abuja because of its political status as the nation's capital and as the gateway to the international community. Its choice of high profile targets, targets which were considered most secured (a military barrack, police force headquarters and the UN House) were also intended to boost its rating in the global jihadi network.

In deploying one of the most extreme forms of terrorism – suicide terrorism – the sect sent an unambiguous message to the residents, that it was declaring total war without rules, on civilians and the Nigerian State. The result was that fear was invoked in the residents, many of who started to lose confidence in the ability of the security agencies to protect them. More than 70 percent of respondents for this study admitted that they became fearful and insecure – feelings heightened because of the randomness of the adopted method of terrorism deployed in the FCT. It was clear that the each attack was meticulously planned for maximum impact and to inflict high casualty figures. Each attack left shock, fear and doubts in the minds of the residents. Residents became 'forcefully' conscious or aware of the impact of terrorism, and wanted security agencies to respond with all necessary might, to protect them. In such dire times, because of the level of threat perception, citizens are willing to overlook inadequacies of their government, demand concentration on enhancing security, and ridding the country of terrorism. This is also why issues of human rights violations or abuses by security agencies in the fight against terrorism, do not necessarily get the deserved attention, as safety remains the priority of citizens. Going by the findings of this study, it is, therefore, safe to emphatically state that Boko Haram achieved its political, ideological and psychological intentions in attacking the FCT.

This section covered the presentation of collated data, data analysis and discussion of the responses in relation to the study. Using tables and charts, we were able to determine the extent to which Boko Haram achieved its purpose of invoking fear in the residents of the FCT and its environs. This section analysed the responses to the items of the questionnaire, against the six research questions posited for the study. The results validated the main hypothesis of this study: that Boko Haram has made residents fearful.

Summary, Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

This study interrogates responses of residents of Federal Capital Territory to Boko Haram violence with a view to depicting, among other things, why Abuja is a target for Boko Haram, the extent to which the sect's activities have invoked fears in the residents of the FCT, the extent to which the security measures put in place by the statutory security agencies have allayed the fear of the sect in the minds of residents, the trends of the responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism, the extent to which the responses of the residents have contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015 and if the Boko Haram's activities have significantly affected the socio-economic, political lives of the FCT residents. Data were drawn from scholarly literature, newspaper reports, articles and internet-based sources. Data on activities of Boko Haram terrorism were collected from secondary sources, while primary data were sourced through the instrumentality of questionnaires (200). Collected data were content-analyzed and some were subjected to interpretative analysis. The study found out that the fear of Boko Haram among the FCT residents has declined over the years, especially with the coming into power of the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. This is because the administration is considered to be wining the fight against the Boko Haram. It also found out that despite a number of successful Boko Haram attacks in the FCT, the economic, social and political sectors of the city have not been significantly affected. This implies that Boko Haram violence in the FCT has more media publicity than actual losses. Conversely, in the North East region where Boko Haram recorded more casualties and losses, such gargantuan losses have generally been under-reported.

It needs be noted that the struggle of the Boko Haram is instrumentally linked to some ideology, as members of the group hold the view that the creation of full Islamic regime in some northern states, within the Federation of Nigeria will ensure that economic injustice and social inequality will be minimized and that Islamic welfare packages would be accessible to an average Muslim in the region. In subsequent sections, we reviewed the concepts of terrorism and the perspective of insurgency and political violence in the development of Boko Haram. We also discussed Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in global perspectives and the emergence of *Boko Haram* as a terrorist group. We specifically examined the historical trajectory of Boko Haram as an Islamic terrorist group. The historical survey reveals that Boko Haram, was very popular among economically

disadvantaged groups in the northern Nigeria, many of who enjoyed welfarist schemes set up by the leaders of the sect. Further, we presented the research methodology for this study, which employed the use of questionnaires (200) to test the perception of residents of the FCT to Boko Haram violence. Finally, we analyzed and discussed the responses we generated through the instrumentality of questionnaires, to validate the hypothesis of this study.

Findings of the Study

These findings are based on the results of the assessment carried out on the responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram violence between 2010 and 2015:

• **Question 1: Why did Boko Haram attack the FCT?**

The results indicated that the FCT is a target for the sect because of its political status, as a total of 93 percent of the 200 respondents, regardless of gender, location and ethnicity, agreed with the item.

• **Question 2: Has activities of the sect invoked fear in the residents of the FCT?**

The results indicate that more than 70% strongly agree that the terrorists activities of Boko Haram has made residents fearful, particularly because of the method of suicide terrorism and its random nature. This validates hypothesis 1, that the sect's activities have invoked fear in residents of the FCT.

• **Question 3: To what extent have security measures put in place in the FCT allayed the fear of Boko Haram from the minds of residents?**

The results indicate that despite the location, the majority of respondents are of the opinion that security measures put in place by the security agencies have alleviated some of the fear in the minds of the residents. It is however necessary to point out that this result is by a slim majority, with 55% agreeing while 45.5% disagree. Therefore, the hypothesis that measures taken by security agencies have somewhat alleviated the fear of Boko Haram activities, in the minds of the residents, should be accepted.

• **Question 4: What are the responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram violence?**

The item sought to determine change in behavioral patterns of residents. The results indicate that majority (62.5%) believe that the activities of Boko Haram clearly constitutes acts of terrorism, with residents conscious of the impact of terrorism and having had to alter their lifestyles to some extent, such as deliberately avoiding crowded places. Most of respondents indicate that they avoid crowded places – an indication of a pervasive sense of fear. In the same vein, respondents reported that they remain security conscious whenever they visit market places. Also, the respondents hold the view that their rate of attendance at public social events like shows and concerts have reduced in the FCT, because of the fear of possible Boko Haram attack.

- **Question 5: To what extent have the responses of residents contributed to prevention of Boko Haram attacks since October 2015?**

The results indicate that the while residents are conscious of the need for adopting personal security measures, they have not significantly contributed to the prevention of attacks in the FCT. Only 15.5% agree that residents, either by reporting suspicious movements or persons to security agencies, have helped to prevent attacks. It is necessary to point out that while 50.5% hold the opinion that residents have not contributed to prevention of attacks, 34% were undecided.

- **Question 6: Have Boko Haram's activities affected the socio-economic and political lives of FCT residents?**

The result for this item is interesting, as it indicates that despite the fear invoked in residents by the activities of Boko Haram and the opinion that measures taken by security agencies have not necessarily alleviated fear, the socio-economic and political sectors of the FCT has not been significantly affected. A total of 60.5% hold the opinion that socio-economic and political lives have not been affected, while 39.5% were undecided. No respondent believed socio-economic and political lives have been affected by Boko Haram violence. The implication of the foregoing is that although the fatality is huge, the economic, social and political sectors have not been seriously affected by the Boko Haram attacks. In effect, it can be said that Boko Haram attacks have more media popularity than having significant effect on the smooth functioning of the whole FCT.

Hypothesis 1 proposes that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful. Analysis was carried out and the result revealed that the calculated t-test in absolute terms was 6.810 and this value was greater than the critical table value of 1.645 at $p < 0.05$ alpha level. The result was significant at $p=.000 < 0.05$ alpha level. Findings therefore revealed that the hypothesis which stated that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful was rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. In other words, Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have made residents fearful.

Hypothesis 2 sought to find out if significant relationship exists between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT.

The simple regression analysis carried out was to establish relationship between the political position of Abuja and responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram attacks. The R represents the coefficient of relationship and this is equal to .164 or 16.4%. This means that the level of relationship represented by the correlation coefficient between the two variables was 16.4%. although this value is not high, but it is positive and significant. The F-Change = -020 was found to be less than the alpha level of .05 and again, the calculated t-value = 2.337 was greater than the critical t-value = 1.645 at $p < 0.05$ alpha level. Findings therefore showed that the hypothesis which stated that there is

no significant relationship between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT was rejected and the alternative accepted.

Hypothesis 3 is about security measures put in place by security agents and if this has not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful. With a calculated t-test = .357 in absolute terms, this is less than the critical table value = 1.645 at p < 0.05 was not significant. By this finding, it means that the hypothesis which stated that the security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful was accepted and the alternative rejected.

Conclusion

Arising from the foregoing, the study concludes that the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism has a historical trajectory which explains the religious, economic and political dimensions of the menace. Attacks in the FCT achieved their purpose, which was to give maximum international publicity to the activities of Boko Haram and instill fear in the residents. However, the attacks did not significantly affect social, economic and political spheres of the city. Based on this, the study submits that, fear responses of residents have subsided over the year especially with the coming of the Buhari administration on May 29th, 2015. Generally, Boko Haram capabilities to launch attacks have been largely contained militarily and now restricted to some areas in Borno State. At the same time, Boko Haram has lost its occupied territories due to sustained military operations.

Furthermore, the security forces have been effective in containing the spread of the Boko Haram group to the northern part of the region. This however, does not mean that the group does not have the capability of striking in other parts of the country. The fact that the number of successful Boko Haram attacks in the FCT has been significantly reduced over the years implies that the level of fear among FCT residents has been reduced.

Essentially, a study on Boko Haram cannot but mention its root causes. The struggle of Boko Haram Islamist group is majorly linked to poverty. This is because the group enlists the bulk of its members from the uneducated, poor and jobless young people in the streets in northern Nigeria. The best long term strategy against Boko Haram is therefore the deployment of non-military options. We hold the view that for such non-military options to be effective, there must be components that cater for the welfare of street children, also called *Almajiris* in the northern states, as their presence provided ready and easy recruitment pool for the sect.

Recommendations

From the foregoing, the following recommendations are suggested in order to further root out all scintilla of fear in the mind of FCT residents. Basically, the fear response among the FCT residents is just the fruit of the root causes of the Boko Haram violence.

Therefore, these recommendations are aligned to the root causes of the menace of Boko Haram violence.

1. The Federal Government should commence the process of negotiating with the members of Boko Haram with a view of identifying and meeting any reasonable demands. Some of the members, particularly those who were lured into joining the sect, can be granted some form of amnesty, if they are willing. For starters in this process, the security officers who were responsible for the extra-judicial murder of Yusuf should be prosecuted and brought to justice.
2. The Federal Government should establish an agency or commission that will address the issue of pervasive poverty in the northern part of the country (especially the North East, the poorest zone in the country). This position has been supported by several stakeholders, who hold the view that a Ministry similar to the Niger Delta Ministry, should be established.
3. Government at all levels, federal, state and local, should create job opportunities for the citizens. The State governments especially those in the northern part should invest massively in agriculture in order to address paucity of lucrative jobs in the northern parts of the country.
4. The Federal and state governments should re-invigorate their commitment to the Universal Basic Education and ensure that every citizen has free access. While recent efforts of the Federal Government in establishing special *Almajiris* school, for the street children in the northern region in commendable, more of such schools should be established in every local community in the North.
5. The organized private sector should be engaged in the propagation and popularisation of entrepreneurship education in all states of the federation. The young people should be encouraged to become job creators and not job seekers. Micro credit facilities should be made available to young willing and able Nigerians that are ready to become self-employed or job creators.
6. Nigeria should mind its notoriously northern borders since it has been proven that most of the foreign elements in the Boko Haram insurgency exploit the porous nature of the country's northern borders to infiltrate into the country to engage in terrorism and other criminal activities.

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APPENDIX A. Timeline of bombings in FCT

DATE	Target/AREA	MODE OF ATTACK	CASUALTIES
December 31st, 2010	Sani Abacha Barracks	bomb explosion	11 dead, several injured
June 16, 2011	Nigerian Police Force Headquarters, Area 11	suicide bombing	6 dead, several injured
August 26, 2011	United Nations House, Diplomatic Zone	suicide bombing	18 dead, 80 injured
December 25, 2011	St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, Suleja	suicide bombing	35 dead, dozens injured
April 25, 2012	Thisday Newspaper, Jabi	suicide bombing	9 dead, several injured
June 23, 2012	Crystal Lounge Night Club, Wuse 2,	explosives	None
April 14, 2014	Nyanya Motor Park, satellite town	explosives	100 dead, 243 injured
May 2, 2014	Nyanya	explosives	19 dead, 60 injured
June 25, 2014	Emab Plaza, Wuse 2	suicide bombing	21 dead, 17 injured
October 3, 2015	Nyanya	explosives	2 dead, 19 injured
October 3, 2015	Kuje Night market	explosives	13 killed, 20 injured

* Total of 11 successful attacks by Boko Haram in the FCT as at October 2016

Nigeria:
Breeding Future Terrorists. A Study of Almajiri of Northern Nigeria and Islamist Militia

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Obi Success ESOMCHI

Abstract. *Terrorism has become a catchword in humanities and social sciences and a global social problem that has led to loss of lives and property worth millions of dollars. In the past, specifically in the pre-colonial Nigeria, there was adequate provision for the welfare of the almajiri, which was later truncated by colonialism. The paper examines the relationship between almajiri and Islamist terrorist organizations which includes Maitatsine, Yandaba and Boko Haram. The paper found that the aforementioned terrorist groups use almajiri to perpetuate violence in Northern Nigeria. From this background, the designated Islamist militias have constituted themselves into a breeding ground for future terrorism. Other factors responsible for almajiri interaction with the terrorist groups include parental neglect and poverty. The paper recommended the criminalization of street-begging and parental neglect while poverty alleviation program be put in place in order to reduce juvenile delinquency in the study area.*

Keywords: *Terrorist, Almajiri, Miltia, Maitatsine, Yandaba, Boko Haram.*

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Introduction

The Almajiri system is as old as Islam in Northern Nigeria. Among the areas of West Africa into which Islam was early introduced is Kanem-Borno, some territory of which forms part of present day-Nigeria. Complex communication systems on land and water connected several areas which later came to be known as Nigeria (Balogun, 1980). It has been a medium of early child-

hood Islamic education in Northern Nigeria since the 11th century (Bolujoko, 2008). As far back as 1921, there were 30.411 Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria (Reichmuth, 1989). The Almajiri system, as an age-long tradition of Muslims across the globe, developed as a result of the instruction given by Prophet Muhammed that knowledge is a cherished value and that all Muslims should be encouraged to go in search of Islamic knowledge and scholarship irrespective of the distance (Khalid, 2000).

The term *Almajiri* is a Hausa word for pupil or student. The word is derived from the Arabic term *al-muhajir,* meaning the migrant. Historically, the term has its origin in the famous migration of the Prophet Muhammed and his compatriots from Makkah to Madinah in the early days of Islam (Khalid, 2006). In its Nigerian usage, the word *almajiri* means those who left their villages or town, parents, relations, and friends in search of Islamic religious knowledge and scholarship.

The Almajiri system was established as an organized and comprehensive system of education for learning Islamic principles, values, jurisprudence and theology. It was a replica of Islamic learning centers in many Muslim countries, such as the madrasah in Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Indonesia (Danbuzu, 2012). During the pre-colonial period in Northern Nigeria, the system was funded from the state treasury and 'zakkat' funds under the control of the emirs. Apart from this, the community supported these almajiri, most of whom came from faraway places to enroll in these schools. The students were at liberty to acquire vocational and occupation skills in between lessons and so were involved in farming, fishing, well construction, masonry, tailoring, etc. (Danbuzu, 2012). This is well captured by Bala (2014), who posited that the Almajiri schools, as practiced during the pre-colonial days, were maintained by the state, communities, parents, *zakkah* (almsgiving), *wagf* (endowment) and supplemented by the teachers and students through farming. Begging was completely unheard of.

With this background, the almajiri had no reason to beg for sustenance, as adequate support was given from the communal economic system, their parents, the extended family system, host community, the Qur'anic schools, as well as *Zakat(alms)* from wealthy citizens. The support was in the areas of feeding, clothing, shelter and other forms of welfare to both almajir and mallams. During this period, the almajiri found learning conducive and convenient in the performance of their functions which include transmission of the Islamic culture, entertaining people with the lyrics from recitation of the Holy Qur'an, offering prayers for people, running errands for women in *kunle* (purdah) and coordinating prayer sessions in Islamic functions, among others. Many of these almajir in the pre-colonial era later became farmers of the Northern Nigeria cotton and groundnut pyramids. They were the leather tanners and leather shoe and bag makers in the old Sokoto Empire, as well as cap weavers and tailors in Zaria city (Danbuzu, 2012).

In 1904, the British invaded and colonized the Northern Nigeria territories and took control of the treasury and abolished state funding of almajiri school system, which to them were mere religious schools. *Boko,* meaning western education, was introduced and funded instead. This development rendered Islamic scholars unqualified for employment and participation in politics. This created poverty situation, as mallam's lost their jobs because of lack of western education (the only criteria for white-collar jobs) which was only available for educated individuals.

With the loss of support from the government and the helpless Emirs and increasing number of pupils to take care of, as well as increasing level of poverty in the country, the care of the almajiri became overwhelmingly burdensome for mallams who were left with no choice but to send these little boys out to beg for alms. The level of poverty escalated with the oil boom in the 1970s which led to a decline in rural economy and was worsened in 1986, with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which brought about hardship to both parents and their children. This corroborates the World Bank Poverty Assessment which observed that the Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria has slowed down the economic growth, income and welfare declined and poverty increased. Real wages in agricultural and non agricultural sectors also declined. By 1995, the World Bank report posited welfare became lower and poverty far higher than before (Obene, 2012).

The foregoing is not at variance with the findings from a fieldwork conducted by Sule-Kano (2010), which concluded that the rapid degeneration of socio-cultural and economic support from the communities, coupled with the impact of structural adjustment programme, which brought with it the general withdrawal of government subsidies from the services sector, compounded the problems of the Qur' anic schools. Demographic issues, such as family care, health care, reproductive health, primary education and traditional processes of human development, were grappled with difficulties. Hoechner (2013) expressed the same trend, when he observed that the decline of the rural economy due to oil boom has contributed to perpetuate poverty in the almajiri system. In 1985, Lubeck wrote that by the end of the 1970s, the new wealthy class brought forth by the oil boom had already redefined the migrant quranic students as an embarrassing, dangerous and immoral set of people (Lubeck, 1985).

Begging is the most distracting aspect of almajiri system as it takes them out of the control of mallams and exposes them to negative habits as they come in contact with people of low virtue like prostitutes, cultists, drug addicts, traffickers, terrorists, arsonists, etc. These are some of the features of the almajiri of nowadays who are victims of neglect and exploitation. They are seen everywhere singing and begging for food and money, being vulnerable to abuse, drugs, trafficking and various forms of exploitation. Their conditions of living is less than average as reflected in their torn, dirty looking cloth, hungry stomach, and unkept body. These almajir are outside their place of domi-

ciliation in search of Islamic knowledge, which means they are not staying with their biological parents, who for religious permissiveness, marry as many wives as possible and produce scores of children. These children are dumped in Almajiri schools because Islamic education is free; some of the parents will not show up again, let alone caring for their children.

As demonstrated by Aluaigba (2009), an Almajiri, conventionally, is expected to be educationally oriented in the basics of Islam in his early childhood to prepare him for a chaste Muslim adulthood. But the common practice in Northern Nigeria today has deviated from this norm, giving way to a mass of bowl-carrying children roaming the streets in search of one thing or the other.

Almajiri Involvement in Terrorist Juvenile Delinquency

Juvenile delinquency has been one of the social problems in Nigeria, in general, and Kano State, in particular. For instance, the governor of Kano State, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, referring to the role the almajiri played during the Maitatsine crisis in Kano in 1980, urged parents to give their young ones good education which would move them away from juvenile delinquency that, he admitted, was a problem in the state (AbdulQuadir, 2003). The Maitatsine disturbance in Kano alone resulted in the death of 4.177 people between December 18 and 29, 1980. The main adherents of Maitatsine were almajiri (OnWar, n.d.).

In the same direction, between 1980 and 1985, Northern Nigeria witnessed four main religious crises and, according to Winters (1987), the participants in these riots were the almajiri. In the 2004 religious crisis in Kano city, the violence unleashed on innocent residents was successful because the participants comprised mainly almajiri (Human Rights Watch, 2005). On July 13, 2010, an attempt by a 19 year old almajiri, Usman Musa, to kill the Emir of Kano at the instance of a cleric, mallam Hamidu (who according to the culprit had been his spiritual advisers) was truncated by a smart palace guard. The almajiri equally admitted that he just came back from Abuja where he robbed an Igbo man of three million naira at Jabi garage. Malam Hamidu denied his involvement but both of them were detained.

Unlike the almajiri of the pre-colonial era, these new set of almajiri depend only on charity from caregivers while the older almajiri do some menial jobs for survival and the younger ones relying solely on begging. It is important to note that most of these children are as young as age three when they hardly know their parents. The need to examine the almajiri system and its delinquency-breeding capacity as exemplified in their participation in the Maitatsine riots of 1980 and their alleged contacts and social networking with Boko Haram and Yandaba subcultures, has necessitated this present study.

The Influence of Islamist Militia on Terrorist Juvenile Delinquency of Almajiri

The social networks and contacts of the almajiri and the criminogenic influences from such contacts in the course of engaging in a plethora of activities to secure their livelihoods has attracted the attention of scholars, traditional rulers and governments. For the purpose of this study, three major criminal groups were examined. These include the relationship between almajiri and Maitatsine, almajiri and Yandaba and almajiri and Boko Haram. These groups (Maitatsine, Yandaba and Boko Haram) are known for violent crimes. The interaction of almajiri with these groups is a breeding ground for juvenile delinquency among almajiri and future terrorism, as manifested in an almajiri's attempt to kill the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero (News24, 2013).

The contemporary Nigerian society is characterized by violent conflicts over ethnicity and religion, most especially in the Northern states of the country. Widespread violence and simultaneous sporadic and reprisal attacks have culminated into high level of insecurity and uncertainty to the continued existence of Nigeria as a federal state (Shehu, 2012). The alleged involvement of almajiri in the perpetuation of violence is not negligible as that has led to loss of lives and properties worth billions of Naira. The cost of managing insecurity in the north eastern Nigeria is enough to generate millions of jobs to employable individuals in the country. The recurring violent attacks have become a major phenomenon in day to day socio-political discourse in Nigeria.

Many scholars opined that the major causes of the upheaval stem from government neglect to address key issues at the point of incubation and as well as lack of good governance (Shehu, 2012). This is particularly true regarding the recent postponement of general elections in Nigeria, as the federal government promised to deal decisively with the Boko Haram in the North-East, what it had failed to do in many years. It is pertinent to note that the military has recorded a huge success in that regard. The question is why now and not before? How do we recover lost lives and properties? And to a larger extent, some scholars are already predicting civil war and the eventual disintegration of Nigerian society. The nature and composition of Nigerian state is both vital and central to the nature of various relationships that exist within it (Shehu, 2012).

Almajiri and Maitatsine

The Maitatsine disturbance in Kano broke out in 1980 with the main recruits drawn from the almajiri. In a research conducted by Shehu (2012), it was discovered that the main adherents of Maitatsine are almajiri who the leader of Maitatsine easily indoctrinated through his teachings and fake promises. Lacking the basic necessities of life was enough to make almajiri fall easy prey to any promise that is connected to bettering their lots, so as to have a face lift. Many lives and properties were lost including the members of the Police and the Army. This shows a direct influence of social network on juvenile delinquency among almajiri in Kano State.

Apart from Kano State, the study area, the Maitatsine equally took place in other parts of the North like Gombe, Kaduna and Yola, which were brought under control by the military forces. These uprisings have claimed so may lives and properties worth millions of Naira. The zeal expressed by these almajiri shows their level of involvement in out-lawed behaviour, which by virtue of their age, can be regarded as juvenile delinquency. Shehu (2012) found that the main disturbances started in Kano on the 18th December 1980. It broke out in Shahuchi playground and later spread to Yan Awaki, Fagge, Koki, Kofar Wambai and, later, to the entire city of Kano. With the devastating nature of the crisis, there is the need to check the activities of these children as Nigeria cannot afford to experience such ugly incidence again.

Almajiri and Yandaba

Yandaba gangs are political thugs in Kano State. It has been alleged that the today's almajiri are tomorrow's Yandaba. For instance, Zakari Yau (2000) discovered, from his study of Yandabas, that almajiri, from mere street beggars, do transform to street gangs known as Yandabas in Kano. This is demonstrated adequately by the Panel of Investigation on Kano October 1991 riot, which found that closely related to the issue of youth unemployment is the existence of notorious groups in almost every ward of the Metropolis of Kano, known as Yandaba. The activities of this group of thugs have led to the death of many in the past. Politicians have allegedly used this group to attack political opponents and to promote electoral fraud in their quest for power.

A study conducted by Salam (2011) is summarized to buttress this assertion. Seventy-one members of the Yandaba gang between the ages of 13 and 27 years (mean=18.7 years) were recruited for the study from the variety of the gang's locations and hideouts in Kano, using the snowballing technique. Adopting quantitative analysis, the outcome suggests that the majority of the gang members were school dropouts or had become involved through the process of almajiri. More than half the gang members also had a history of arrest and conviction. This shows the level of intimacy between almajiri and Yandaba. Furthermore, it shows that the difference between Yandaba and almajiri is age because the Yandaba are graduates of Almajiri schools. One should not be perturbed to hear that almajiri go to Yandaba hideouts to look for food and accommodation. Of course, it is a transition from childhood to adulthood as they are socialized from juvenile delinquents to adult criminals. The criminogenic influences from almajiri interacting with Yandaba gang cannot be ignored, as it could breed future terrorism in the society. It is like the madrassahs in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia producing the Talibans in Afghanistan and other terrorist groups in the Middle Eastern Asia.

In one of his studies, Zakari Yau (2000) discovered that the entry of almajiri into the Yandaba gangs has more to do with the issue of food and accommodation than with the failure to secure employment. Many ex-Yandaba gangs interviewed said that they

were attracted to the Yandaba hideouts because of food they could otherwise not get. He equally identified housing accommodation as one of the gains of staying in Yandaba hideouts. This speaks volume of the vulnerability of almajiri to social vices as they go to this group of criminals to seek for solace.

Almajiri and Boko Haram

The origin of Boko Haram, otherwise known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Ladda', is not certain. Two likely assertions traced the sect back to 1995, when it was called sahaba which was led by one Abubakar Lawan, who later proceeded to University of Medina for studies, paving way for Yusuf's take over. The second source traced the sect to Maitatsine of the 1980s (Ahizih, 2014). The relationship between the almajiri and Boko Haram is not farfetched, as demonstrated by Nigerians. The belief of most Nigerians is that Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group who proclaimed that Western education is a sin. This background is justified by the fact that the almajiri do not attend formal school.

According to Shehu (2012), there is basically nothing new in saying Boko is Haram. The perception that Boko is Haram has been with us since Boko (Western education) came to the North through Christian missionaries. Northern Muslims then, and some even now, feared the Christianization of their children if they enrolled them in Boko schools, hence the predominance of Almajiri schools. The products of these schools have often preached that Boko is Haram and in spite of this, decade after decade, the northern elites have allowed this system to flourish.

Onochie (2011) found that almajiri and Boko Haram are now like primary pupils graduating into secondary school. The two are inseparable and Boko Haram cannot exist without almajiri. If there is any difference between almajiri and Boko Haram, it should be a matter of semantics. Thurston (2013) found that the violent Northern Nigerian sect Boko Haram draw some of its recruits from the almajiri. Other scholars note that the almajiri system in the Northern part of Nigeria made the intensive membership mobilization of Boko Haram easy (Odoemelam, Kidafa, Onyebuchi, & Agu, 2014).

Linking the almajiri to Boko Haram should worry every well-meaning Nigerian because this Islamic sect has been adjudged the latest and deadliest of its kind as observed by Odoma (2014), who equally acknowledged that the activities of the sect has greatly affected the economy of Northern Nigeria. The sect has claimed responsibility for numerous deadly attacks on police formations, communities, churches, banks, markets, military, media, United Nation Building in Abuja, beer palours, etc. Car bombs have been a relatively recent addition in their operational strategy. Two Nyanya motor park bombs in Abuja and a Kano motor park bomb in late 2013 are still fresh in our memories (Ahizih, 2014). The postponement of the 2015 general elections from February 14 and 28 to March 28 and April 11 on the ground of insecurity in the North Eastern Nigeria shows the gravity of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The shift in the general

elections has attracted heated controversies from members of the opposition political parties, Civil Society Organisations and International Organisations and community. Efforts at rescuing Chibok girls who were abducted from their school in Borno State are yet to yield positive result despite international concern.

Abuh (2015) found that the rising insecurity in Northern Nigeria creates threat to economic and political stability. The spate of violence in the region, which has of late come under attack by the members of Boko Haram Islamists group, has worsened in spite of the opportunities offered by the return to democracy. Onwumere (2013) found that those who are not from the North are worried that while the almajiri wander the streets in search of support from people, they pose a threat to national security as they could be vulnerable to the indoctrinations of the Boko Haram terrorist group. This shows a strong nexus between almajiri and Boko Haram. Abdulrafiu (2009) observed that the problem with the current Boko Haram menace is unarguably traceable to the uncared for almajiri beggars who lost parental and governmental welfare. Another pre-disposing factor to the growing number of almajiri pupils in the North is the people antagonism towards family planning and child spacing citing the hadith of Prophet Mohammed which says, "Go forth my congregation, get married and multiply so that I will be proud of you". But Adamu Sani, a veterinary doctor, says this aspect of the Hadith has been grossly misrepresented. He says that under Sharia, some of the basic rights of a child are food, shelter, clothing and education and so any parent who fails in this direction has an explanation to give before Allah (Abdulrafiu, 2009).

To establish the above assertions, the Northern Traditional Rulers' Council (NTRC) recommended that the only solution to the festering wounds inflicted on the North and its people by the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect is to ban the current almajiri system. The council also recommended that begging should be made an offence, as part of measures aimed at securing the Northern region from what it termed "sustainable socio-economic developments" just as it called on the federal government to apprehend, prosecute and punish those behind what it described heinous crime.

It is important to note that the three terrorist groups, Maitatsine, Yandaba and Boko Haram, have left so many Nigerians dead from their violent criminal activities. Almajiri interaction with these violent criminals can breed future terrorists drawn from almajiri which is capable of perpetuating endless terrorism in Nigeria.

The social network and contacts of the almajiris and the criminogenic influences from contacts cover a whole gamut of criminal groups which include but are not necessarily limited to the aforementioned. For instance, Aluaigba (2009) found that begging exposes the almajiri to all sorts of vile and deviant behaviors and immoral acts because they interact freely with people of low virtue like prostitutes, drug addicts and gamblers. This study shows that almajiri are equally exposed to some victimless criminals which can also affect their mind set adversely.

Since the 1980s, both ethnic and religious crises have bedeviled Nigerian society, most especially the Northern part. Of the 19 states that constitute Northern Nigeria, there is virtually no state that has not witnessed one form of crisis or another. Since the middle of 1980s, the deluge of violence has continued to increase, and consequently has led to many losses of lives and properties (Shehu, 2012). This violence has continued to illustrate ethnic and religious colorations and delineate clear manifestation of criminality and frustration. This results from poor governance, resultant lack of hope and sociological and economical alienation, linked to wide spread poverty and unemployment. However, there are also others factors whose identity and character are somehow difficult to define (Shehu, 2012).

This factor has resulted in loss of lives and properties, some people sustained injuries of various degrees, some lost all they had and properties worth millions of Naira1 were either destroyed or looted; others were permanently displaced and psychologically depressed. These crises have created enormous tension and a general threat to security among citizens and as well resulted to violation of the rights of citizens. Many people feel disgruntled or unjustly treated as a result of lack of justice or failure of the state to prosecute perpetrators and agitators of these crises (Shehu, 2012).

Efforts at Improving the Condition of Almajiri

Despite the efforts made by government, traditional rulers, NGOs, individuals, as well as other agencies, the problems of almajiri persist partly because of lack of commitments from the stakeholders in Almajiri education. In 1984, the Kano State Government banned the migration of itinerant scholars from rural areas to cities, the pilot feeding scheme in three priority local government areas of Kano State in 2003, initiated by the governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, and the effort of the governor of Jigawa State, Sule Lamido, to modernize Qur'anic education were all in a bid to address the problem of child street beggars (Bolujoko, 2008; Aluaigba, 2009; Kurfi, 2010). As observed by Khalid (2000), despite attempts by some state governments, like Sokoto in 1986 and Kano in 1988, to eradicate, or at least regulate the *almajiri* phenomenon, the system continued to increase. Worthy of mention is the effort of the governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff, to integrate the *Tsangaya* (almajiri) system into western education.

Another recent efforts made by the federal government to build Almajiri primary schools for possible enrolment of thousands of almajiri wandering the streets of Kano is yet to significantly change the tide. A source at the Kano State Universal Basic Education Board, SUBEB, presented a document that where seven out of the ten federal government almajiri schools are completed. The other three are the Model 2 intervention schools that are about to be completed (Leadership, 2014).

In another development, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – Malama Adama Usman Foundation, Tanmiyya Foundation, Rochas Foundation, Jammatul Nasrul

Islam Foundation, NASFAT – and other well-meaning individuals help to take care of these children (Bala, 2014). The wife of the Katsina State governor, Hajiya Fatima Shema, distributed 5.000 sets of clothes to almajiri to enable them celebrate Eid-el-fitr happily in 2014. They were selected from the three senatorial districts of the state among who were orphans and other less privileged that deserve assistance from the general public (Elazeh, 2014). People like the late Malam Aminu Kano have, as early as the 1950s, advocated the establishment of *Islamiyyah* schools in place of *makarantar allo* (almajiri schools) so as to reflect the socio-economic dynamics of modern world. In this kind of arrangement, children can attend schools within their immediate vicinity under the watchful eyes of their parents and guardians (Khalid, 2000).

At another level, an advocacy campaign aimed at stemming the increasing abuse of almajiri has commenced work in Kano State. Sponsored by the Embassy of the United State of America, the program is specifically designed to combat labour exploitation of street child-beggars and de-escalate the state of insecurity in Kano and the North-West geo-political zone of the country (Abuh, 2015).

The project which seeks to complement the efforts of the Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso led administration and the people of Kano to solve the problems of child beggars is designed to reduce the exposure of almajiri to violence and anti-social behaviors, which would positively impact on the sustenance of peace and harmonious relationship among people of different socio-cultural back ground residing in Kano State. The program is being jointly implemented by two Kano based Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), the Justice Development and Peace/Caritas Advocates (JDPCA) Kano and Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education (CHRICED). Already, the initiative which aims at having four thousand families in complete charge of the welfare and well-being of their children have been endorsed by both Kano State, Kano State Hisba Board, selected members of House of Assembly, Civil Society Organisation and Religious leaders, among others (Abuh, 2015).

Prior to the above initiative, Kano State initiated a prohibition against almajiri by the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development (MOWASD) in order to reduce prevalence of child labor in Nigeria by 2015. This initiative which was meant to take almajiri off the streets of Kano has only succeeded in taking them off the major streets but the story is still the same in the interior and slum areas of the city as demonstrated by respondents in the interview conducted in Kano metropolis.

In another development, Kano State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, as well as United States Agency for International Development, equally supported Almajiri/Tsangaya schools centre for large numbers of these almajiri children originating from outside. This will complement the efforts of the federal government through Universal Basic Education (UBE) and Educational Trust Fund (ETF) intervention aimed at building one hundred and fifty (150) Tsangaya/ Almajiri schools across the country, in

which Kano State was one of the beneficiaries. This joint gesture is to reduce the problems of child street-beggars in Nigeria. It has been established by Onwumere (2013) that 30 percent of Northern youths were almajiri.

Of the contracts awarded by UBEC/ETF for the construction of ten (10) Almajiri/ Tsangaya Model Schools spread to 10 LGA in Kano State, seven (7) currently were 100% completed, while the remaining three (3) were at advanced stages of progress.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the paper has succeeded in exposing the relationship between almajiri and select terrorist organization and how the almajiri are used as instruments of destruction in times of ethno-religious and political upheavals by these terrorist groups, which, in return, is likely to make them future terrorists in Nigeria. Street-begging, parental neglect and poverty were identified as factors responsible for almajiri interaction with these terrorist groups. Against this backdrop, the paper recommended that both street-begging and parental neglect should be criminalized while poverty reduction programme be put place in order to reduce juvenile of almajiri in Northern Nigeria.

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Romania:
General Considerations on the Potential Use of Social Conflict Theory in the Context of Social Changes Occurring in Traditional Rural Communities

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Abstract. *The article overviews some aspects of the social conflict as seen through the lenses of Marx and Dahrendorf classical approaches on conflict, as an attempt of understanding the social changes occurring in traditional rural communities.*

Keywords: *Karl Marx, Ralf Dahrendorf, social conflict, rural communities.*

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Introduction

Within the conceptual phase of a research aiming to discuss conflicts in rural communities in Romania, we draw attention towards two set of sociological perspectives which will later on inform our empirical investigation. Currently, major social changes are occurring in rural communities from developing countries, such as Romania. Introduction of new technologies, marketing the shared resources, privatization of public services, increasing consumerism, implementation of new public policies and the decline of the local economy based on traditional principles exert a strong pressure on individuals and communities.

Studies identify several ways in which local communities are influenced by these social changes. In this respect, communities may fully accept global culture, they may reject it completely or they may partially adapt to changes (Swadzba, 2011). According to the same author, the main conflicts occur in the area of values related to family, work and religion. Romania makes a special case because of the persistence of some elements of rural traditional communities (Voicu, Arpinte, Petrescu, Preotesi, & Tomescu, 2010), offering an interesting setting for the analysis of specific social conflicts that may arise in these communities.

We argue that although numerous theories have attempted to explain social conflicts, particularly in relation to groups, social structure, values and power relations (Ritzer, 1992), the classic approaches on conflict cannot be overlooked. For this purpose, we overview some aspects of the social conflict theory as seen through the lenses of Marx and Dahrendorf. We compare these perspectives by highlighting what is more adequate for our future analysis.

Theories of Conflict

The conflict was always a central element of sociological theory and analysis. In a general acceptation, the conflict can be seen as an open opposition, a struggle between individuals, groups, social classes, parties and communities, countries with economic, political, religious, ethnic and racial interests, divergent and incompatible with disruptive effects on social interaction. So there is a conflict when two or more people or groups manifest the perception that they have incompatible goals (Kriesberg, 1998). In the literature, the concept of "conflict" has received various interpretations, depending on the author. Thus, making a review of these, Havenga (2004) states that, in turn, the conflict was considered dissent or competition by Simmel, social illness by Parson and determinant factor in defining small groups in Aaron acception, fundamental process of the social movement by Bruce F. Ryan, central policy factor, according to Barber, or disturbance generating new balances.

From a sociological perspective, conflict theory assumes that society, as a whole, or organization, operates in such a manner that their members, both individuals and groups, wage a constant battle to maximize benefits, which generates inevitable social changes, such as political changes and revolutions. Conflict theory seeks to explain the causes, evolution, expression, settlement possibilities, effects and the typology of it (Havenga, 2004).

Early approaches include the theory of ethnic conflicts of Ludwig Gumplowicz and theory of conflicts between masses and elites of Gaetano Mosca, but the writings of three theorists are the ones who really dominated the intellectual and academic atmosphere in the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth century – Charles Darwin,

Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The three personalities have explained the evolution of social conflict, focusing largely on the competitive and destructive aspects of it. Darwin emphasized the competition for existence and survival of the most powerful. Karl Marx highlighted the importance of class struggle in the emergence of social conflict, dividing society into two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Freud, in his vision of psychosexual development, concentrated on the continuing struggle between id, the root of biological child, and superego, the surrogate parental, internalized by social determination (Havenga, 2004).

More recently, after the Second World War, the term of conflict theory was used rather as a reference to the sociological writings of opponents' domination structural functionalism. Thus, relying to build their arguments on the economic conflict of Marx and conflict on the strength of Weber, subsequent theorists of conflict underlined the importance of the interest on the social norms and values. These interests are considered potential factors in generating conflicts, seen as normal aspects of social life and not as abnormal or dysfunctional appearances. An outstanding representative of the new vision is Ralf Dahrendorf, who in his "Classes and class conflict in industrial society" (1959) criticizes Marx's notion of class, arguing that the term of class in advanced post-capitalist societies emerges from the unequal distribution of authority and that this kind of society is characterized by disputes related to the participation or exclusion from the exercise of authority. Also, Lewis Coser proposes an integration model and one of conflict, but in terms of a positive conflict, functional in relation to the social system as a factor of change and progress (Havenga, 2004).

Unquestionable contribution to the development of theories of conflict and social conflict, in particular, had Machiavelli, Hobbes, Pareto, Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Wright Mills, Lewin (Stones, 1998), to name just the significant thinkers for their currents. In this paper we will focus only on the theory of conflict developed by Karl Marx and on its critics, and also the addition brought by Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), by comparing, in the same time, the vision of classical and modern theory of conflict.

Ralf Dahrendorf's Perspective on Social Conflict

Dahrendorf (1958) formulates a systematic theory of social conflicts around the idea that society is built on conflicts based on social changes taking place in society. This theory assumes that neither Marxist theory nor the structural functionalist can explain social conflict in advanced societies. However, following the arguments proposed by Dahrendorf (1958), he believes that artificial opposition between different theories on the conflict and, therefore, society must be overcome by accepting the juxtaposition of certain elements. The same author emphasizes the importance of adequate theorization of the concept of social conflict, to reduce the risk of simplification and empirical generalizations which reduced the empirical value of this concept.

In the model proposed by Dahrendorf, he attempts to highlight that in the functionalist vision the society is described exclusively in an integrated mode, or the society has a strong coercive aspect (Dahrendorf, 1958). The author argues that, in fact, the two models cannot describe separately the social reality and social conflict by default, so there is a need to understand modern society by integrating elements of both theories, focusing on understanding the relations of domination and subordination between individuals. In theory of the conflict proposed by Dahrendorf (1958), the focus is not on the economic sphere of society, as in Marxist theory, but on elements of the social structure in general, aiming to identify those social structures where there is some degree of control. The idea of class conflict and possession of property is replaced with the authority, where social inequalities are caused by withhold of authority or lack of authority. According to this theory, social conflicts have a structural origin in the distribution of social roles and implicit of the authority and social power. According to the author, class conflicts are explained by the structure of domination existing in a society, but, it must be taken into account the social, political and economic context of each particular society at a particular time.

For Dahrendorf, a systematic theory of the conflict should meet the following requirements: be made with reference to plausible explanations and demonstrable empirical phenomena; elements of the theory of conflict must not contradict the conflict model of society; categories used should, if possible, be consistent with the theory of integration or, at least, be in correspondence with them; a theory of conflict should allow the social conflicts that derive from structures and social arrangements; a theory of conflict should explain the multitude of conflict types and variations in intensity. The author continues his argument noting that achieving these requirements is only possible by developing a theory that discusses the structural causes of social conflict and conflict between groups. As with the theories presented above, Dahrendorf approaches the social conflict by formulating several central questions that the theory of conflict has to answer. a) How conflict groups are formed as a result of the structure of society? b) What forms can take conflicts between these groups? c) How does the conflict between these groups causes a change in the social structure?

Like most theorists of conflict, Dahrendorf also focuses on macro-social structure. Thus, group conflict is defined as an antagonistic relationship between individuals organized collectively that can be explained in terms of social structure and class conflict (Dahrendorf, 1976). In his analysis of conflict, Dahrendorf identifies the different roles of power in society, but it is very critical in terms of identification of conflict at individual level (Jehn, 1997). He says, also, that there are several preconditions in developing a theory of social conflict. First, it requires reaching a concept applicable to the phenomena and a distinction between the most important types. Another requirement would be to create a conception of society which is compatible with the study of conflict (Jehn, 1997).

According to McNeill (1965), Dahrendorf has identified preconditions of conflict by asking questions like: *What are the structural conditions that induce various forms of conflict?* or *How does the conflict develop starting from those forms?*

In theory, Dahrendorf, shifts the attention from the economic to the social structure of society and particularly on those social structures in which there is some degree of control. The core of his analysis is the power linked to the individual's position in life (Havenga, 2004). It is expected that people in positions of power to exercise authority over those under control. These people dominate others as a consequence of expectations and not as a consequence of psychosocial characteristics (Jordaan, 1993). Therefore, power is not a constant factor and requires subordination and control. Going forward, we can say that a position is invested with power and not a person. Power is a factual relationship, while the authority is a legal relationship characterized by domination and subordination. Authority can be seen as a legal power (Havenga, 2004). Referring to Dahrendorf's approach of "power", Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972) consider that "power" is a dichotomous character or a dual nature. Power management represents any coordinated association which can be split between two groups (Dahrendorf, 1976). He is not interested if people possess more or less power in a given situation. The biggest difference consists between individuals who have a certain degree of power and individuals who have no power. Starting from this premise, it is obvious that power can be a sustainable source of conflict (Havenga, 2004). Dahrendorf believes that social norms are not determined nor come from collective consensus. In his view, the rules are determined and maintained by power structures and the substance can be described in terms of the power of involved interests (Rummel, 1977).

Dahrendorf refers to two types of inequalities that are found in all known societies. The first is inequality factors of production, which is the cause of social conflict and change. One consequence of this type of inequality is what is called distribution of inequality. The second type is the power inequality. This inequality is derived from the inequality of production factors and generates class struggle. Unequal distribution of social rewards, as income, prestige and power, represents distribution inequalities basis. Thus, a clear distinction can be drawn between the classes who hold power, on one hand, and the prestige and wealth, on the other hand (Havenga, 2004). Social stratification leads to control social behaviour through positive and negative sanction and so eases the installation of power (Dahrendorf, 1976). Dahrendorf's theory is not limited to capitalist societies. Since the distribution of roles of authority is the difference between classes, classes and class conflict exists in communist or socialist societies. Classes exist because there exists the ones who dominate by the virtue of legitimacy provided by position (the plant manager, the party chief, the mayor or General, etc.) and those who are in subordinated positions (citizen, worker, peasant, etc.) (Rummel, 1977).

Summing, elements of the model proposed by Dahrendorf (1958), the concepts of power and authority, are central in understanding social conflicts. Also, social conflict has a

dual role in social structures, in the sense that is not only integrative force, but also a source of conflicts (Weingart, 1969). The main criticism of the theory formulated by Dahrendorf (1958) is that is not able to overcome the limits encountered in Marxist theory which tried to oppose, namely the incorporation of the concept of social change that transcends social structures (Weingart, 1969).

Karl Marx and the Theory of Conflict

In a Marxist framework, society is characterized by the relationship between social classes, which he divided into proletarian and bourgeois, and, especially, the fight between them, seen as the engine of change. His theory is not one of balance or consensus, but its relevance to contemporary theories of social conflicts is undeniable. In this regard, Ashley and Orenstein (1995) stated that: "In the twentieth century, many revolutionaries, workers and intellectuals agreed with Jean-Paul Sartre's opinion that Marxism is a philosophy needed our times. Both as a political philosophy and also as theory of revolutionary change ... this theory believed that it will change the world" (pp. 249-250). Jordaan (1993) argues that, despite that some concepts like "class antagonism", "revolution", "war" and "civil war" were commonly used by Marx, the concept of "conflict" is the one to whom it gives a comprehensive structure that has been used with greater freedom. The main features of Marx' conflict assumes that this is the result of confrontation of interests and antagonisms between the two sides. Although he used terms such as "conflict", "antagonism" or "fight" as synonyms, he did not suggest that they refer to "violence". Violence can be seen either latent or manifest in each of the various classes, that may be, in turn, in a passive state and an active one (Havenga, 2004).

Marx focused his work on the analysis of phenomena related to social conflict and change, reaching to create a simple concept of structuring the classes in the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Between them he introduced the intermediate class, the petty bourgeoisie, represented by owners of restaurants and shops, retailers and other similar groups. In the definition of classes, the bourgeoisie are those individuals privileged that have at their disposal various resources. On the opposite, the proletariat is represented by those underprivileged groups who have little or no resources, their work being the only resource they have and which they offer in exchange for material benefits and compensation (Dahrendorf, 1976). A possible definition of Marxist perception of classes is given by Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972) "class is a group of people who have a common relationship with the means of production, the structure of political power and ideas of time that inevitably in the situation of conflict with another group who has ideas and interests different about the economic and political structures" (p. 19). It may be deduced, therefore, that a conflict develops between different classes as a result that individuals or groups differs from them in several ways. According to Marx, the extreme form of conflict is violent revolution, which is a logical result of what he understood by materialist concept.

Marx's fundamental objective, in terms of conflict, was to find the necessary clarifications for a stability mechanism and social change that overthrows the capitalist system (Gruber 2000). To support his vision of conflict, Marx made some statements about the man and the world, well summarized by Cuff and Payne (1984). Throughout these statements, Marx acknowledges that the world, including the social world, is characterized by instability rather than stability. Moreover, change does not occur in society or in the world by chance, but occurs in an orderly manner, allowing observation of a certain degree of uniformity and settlement. In the same lines, economic order, or in other words, the world of work, allows identifying a pattern of change. Each community must earn its living and how they do this has a major influence on the community structure seen as a whole. Furthermore, community consists of different interdependent parts that interact based on economic considerations, while social institutions are seen as responsible for the attitudes and behaviour of individuals within communities. For Marx, the individual exists as a rational being, intelligent and sensitive. These characteristics can, however, be distorted if the community social rules are not sufficiently well developed. In this case, the man will put his own interests above the interests of others, and the result will be a conflict (Cuff & Payne, 1984).

Add to previous assumptions, a critical perspective on the conflict applies in the Marxist view on labour relations, especially when talking about the concepts of humanization and dehumanization through labour (Moberg, 2001). Accordingly, when consciousness of class is increasing, and also the exploitation and the alienation of proletarians by bourgeois, the polarization will occur more easily. This causes more intense conflicts and fierce competition among individuals or groups for scarce resources (Turner, 1991). In addition, as the limited sharing of resources between bourgeoisie and proletariat is uneven, the conflict between the two classes will be more virulent. The intensity of the conflict will determine the degree of redistributed resources.

We conclude that, in terms of the conflict, Marx was one of the most important promoters of this idea, accepting it as one of the dominant interactional processes of life. His approach to the conflict was transformed in an attempt to understand in a period of great institutional and political confusion, the mechanisms of development and control of social change.

Comparison Between Marx and Dahrendorf's Theories

A legitimate question is whether Marx's theory has any value to political and economic sciences. Any response must take into account the fact that, first, Marx's work should be analysed as a whole and then seen throughout the writings of his contemporaries (Stones, 1998). In this way, as well as Friedrich Engels' theories, Marx's theories explain institutionalized social inequalities and their complementary phenomena. Secondly, it can be said that his reflections don't hide the simple characteristics of the human con-

flict and social change which are inherent to the system of inequalities (Lopreato & Haselrig, 1972). According to McNeill (1965), the most influential theory of social conflict was Marx's, despite the fact that the approach was more hypothetical, rather than one demonstrated in practice. Even if his theory has not provided solutions to conflict, seen from all angles of approach, it nevertheless provides a real basis for the development of sociological theories of conflict. Havenga (2004) criticizes the conflict theory proposed by Marx and shows that Marx did not provide accurately certain changes that occur while the working class operates within a capitalist system. Moreover, he did not accept that human beings are by their nature subject to error.

Trying a comparative approach to the differences and similarities between the theories of Marx and Dahrendorf, Lopreato and Hazelrig, 1972 suggest that both approaches focused on the struggle between those who "hold" and those who „don't hold" as a central element for structural changes within communities. In contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf sees that the real difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is not that much the property ownership, but the authority, seen as a political power. The theoretical model of Dahrendorf is concentrated more on the social phenomena. Such a phenomenon is the „image" (perception) of a social structure that a community can accept and which can be considered a political association (Lopreato & Hazelrig, 1972). Bartos and Wehr (2002), consider that there is a lack in Dahrendorf's explanations on establishing clear lines of mobilizing the potential group conflicts. Regarding the logical structure of Dahrendorf's theory about class and class conflict, compared to that of Marx, the basic difference between the two lies in the structural determinants of classes. Dahrendorf considers Marx criteria related to private property as a mean of production not being viable because limits the application of the class theory. Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972), observing the differences between the two visions said that: "(...) no matter what evidence there is in favour of building a theory of conflict based on a dichotomous division class, Marx's theories are more favourable than those of Dahrendorf" (p. 30).

Furthermore, Turner (1991) states that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not the only ones responsible for the apparent changes, while power and interests are not the main motivations of social behaviour. Also, the conflict does not always lead to revolution, boycotts, riots and strikes. The sociologist believes that the power of proactive collective comprehension is underestimated by both Marx and Dahrendorf and by other theorists of conflict. In addition, Ritzer (1992) criticizes that the conflict theoreticians do not pay enough attention to the element of transformation in their approaches.

Concluding Remarks

Based on our theoretical discussion, we argue that Dahrendorf's theory is more general and so offers a broader explanation than that of Marx. While history proves that Marx was right when he spoke about the ruthless exploitation of workers in the capitalist

world of the nineteenth century, Dahrendorf observed that this did not happen only because capitalist owners had unlimited power and used it to their advantage, but also because they sought to achieve prosperity for their businesses, seen as a whole (Bartos & Wehr, 2002). Thus, incompatibility of objectives is not resulted just by the exploitation by those who have power, but also because the capitalist firms desire was to win prosperity, while workers sought to earn a decent salary. On the same lines, Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972), underline the important contribution of Dahrendorf and state that in the current trend studies of social stratification there is a lack of continuity regarding Marx's work. In this sense, even if Dahrendorf's theory does not necessarily add a new chapter to the period inspired by Marx, it brings new spirit and provides sufficient tools to confer credibility to the Marxist heritage.

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