

Development Induced Displacement and Arms Conflicts in Bangladesh

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Abstract. *Each year millions of people around the globe are forcefully displaced from their homes, lands and livelihoods in order to make way for large-scale development projects. It has really been a great challenge for the nations to resettle and rehabilitate them and to mitigate their adverse impacts of involuntary displacements. A number of research studies have been conducted by various scholars with regard to such issues, and among them, Michael M. Cerena in his study has excellently mapped out the adverse impacts of involuntary displacement. His study says that the displaced people face a broad range of 'impoverishment risks' and 'social exclusion'. But his study doesn't explain the whole range of risks of the involuntarily displaced people. The study on the displaced people of Kaptai Dam, Bangladesh has shown that involuntary displacement not only leads to certain impoverishment risks and social exclusion, but also, to loss of citizenship, to statelessness and arms conflicts.*

Keywords: *Kaptai Dam, Development, Displacement, Rehabilitation, Arms Conflicts, Statelessness, Bangladesh.*

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Introduction

Referring to the development strategy after the Second World War and economic growth as its indicator, all the countries both in developed and developing regions started to grow their economy. Thus, the availability of adequate infrastructure facilities is vital for the acceleration of economic development of a country. Governments across the world have given high priority to investment in sectors such as railways, roads, power, telecommunications, ports and industries, etc. Thus, dams are the outcomes of this process and symbols of development. It has multipurpose utility, such as generation of electricity, irrigation, flood control

and navigation that contribute at large to the growth of a nation. (Joyce, 1997: 1050-1055; Bandyopadhyay, 2002: 4108; World Commission on Dams, 2000: 1-15, 58-59; Deudney, 1981: 5-6; Khagram, 2004: 5-10; Milewski, 1999: 1-10, Zhang, 1999: iii-iv; Sanmuganathan, 2000: 22-57, Gritzinger, 1987: 14-15).

While many have benefited from the services dams provide, their construction has led to many significant social and human impact, particularly in terms of displacement and loss of livelihoods. Compulsory displacement that occurs for development reasons embodies a perverse and intrinsic contradiction in the context of development. It raises major ethical questions because it reflects an inequitable distribution of development's benefits and losses. Nevertheless, the involuntary displacements caused by such programmes create major impositions on some population segments. It restricts population rights by state-power intervention. This raises major issues of social justice and equity. The principles of "greater good for the larger numbers" justifies the displacements and thus some people enjoy the gains of development, while others bear its pains (Cerena, 2000: 3659; Baxi, 1989: 164-17; Hemadri, 1999: xxxii-xxxiv; Fernandes, 1999; Bartolome, 2000:9; Ramanathan, 1995; Sharma, 2003: 907-911; Dankalmair, 1999: 1; Robinson, 1999: 1-9; Bharati, 1999: 1374- 1375; World Commission on Dams, 2000: 102-104, 16-17, 110-118; Cerena, 1995: 266-267; Shylendra, 2002: 3289-3290, Mahapatra, 1991: 272-273, Jena, 1998: 822; Inter-American Development Bank, 1998: 26-27; Nayak, 2000: 79-108; World Health Organization, 1999: 4-11; Adams, 2000: 14-15; Gururaja, 2000: 13; Asian Development Bank, 2003: 1-6; Brandt, 2000: 2, 25-43, 52-58; Hemadri, 1999: xx-xxi; Bartolome, 2000: 27-32; World Bank, 1998a, b, c; Cerena, 1998: 184-185; Fernandes, 1989a, b; Mahapatra, 2000:121-134; Wet, 1999: 9-11; Jing, 1999: 16; Drydyk, 1999: 1-8).

There have been a number of studies on development-induced displacement by scholars. Among those scholars, the study of Michael M. Cerena on involuntary displacement and its socio-economic impacts is highly appreciated. His study says that displacement leads to 'Impoverishment Risks' and 'Social Exclusion' of certain social groups of people. It culminates in physical exclusion from a geographic territory and economic and social exclusion from a set of functioning social networks. Thus, affected people face a broad range of impoverishment risks that includes landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common resources and social disarticulation that result in a loss of socio-cultural resilience. But his study doesn't explain the whole range of risks of the involuntarily displaced people (Cerena, 2000: 3659-3678). Taking these facts into consideration, the study on the displaced people of Kaptai Dam, in Bangladesh, has shown that involuntary displacement not only leads to certain impoverishment risks and social exclusions as mentioned by Cerena, but also, it leads to loss of citizenship, statelessness and arms conflicts.

Development Projects and Displacement in Pakistan

Unlike other countries in the world, national development has been largely equated with economic growth in Pakistan and therefore large scale industrialization and massive infrastructural development took place in Pakistan soon after its partition from India, and it promised to set Pakistan on the path to modernization and development. Immediately after independence, a series of developmental projects were planned in East Pakistan (presently Bangladesh)¹ (Zaman, 1996: 692-696; Fernandes, 1997: 8-9; Government of Bangladesh, 1995; Amin, 2002; Vakil, 1950: 388-398). It was in the middle of February in 1950, the Development Board of Pakistan government decided for the establishment of paper mill in Karnafully in East Pakistan. The first large scale development project that hit the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) was the Pakistan National Pride 'Karnafully Paper Mill'. The paper mill started its production in 1953 and had been given 99 years to extract its raw materials (bamboo & softwood) from the forest areas. The Karnafully Rayon mill was constructed in 1966 (Gain, 2000: 30-36).

However, it caused large scale displacement in the region. The region located in the south-east of Bangladesh occupies a physical area of some 5,000 square miles (13,000 square kilometers) or ten percent of the total land area of Bangladesh, inhabited by twelve distinct tribal groups. They are the Chakmas, Marmas, Tipperas, Murungs, Tanchaungs, Kamis, Ryangs, Lusheis, Bawn, Khumi, Sak, and Pangkhua. They have their own language/dialect and all belong to the Sino-Tibetan descent group; they closely resemble the people of north-east India, Burma and Thailand, and greatly differ from the people of plains of Bangladesh. Among them, the Chakmas are the largest in numbers; they constitute about 85 percent of the total tribal population along with the Marmas and Tripuras. However, they have their rich cultural heritage irrespective of their diversified language and religion, and all commonly practice swidden or shifting agriculture, locally known as *Jhum* cultivation (Gain, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, Gankovsky, 1974: 220-230; Schendel, 1992: 95-97; Behera, 1996: 985-986; Khan, 2003: 9-15).

The government started the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric project in 1957 on the Karnafully River in the CHT (Parveen, 2002: 197-200 & see Banglapedia, 2008). The dam submerged area of about 400 square miles including 54,000 acres of cultivable land. About 90 miles of government roads and 10 square miles of Reserve Forest also went beneath the water. The lake took away 18,000 families and displaced 100,000 tribal people, of which 70 percent were Chakmas. The inadequate compensation and rehabilitation forced 40,000 hill men to migrate across the border of India and remain as stateless citizens in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Tripura. The rest of the displaced people remained as internal displaced people within the CHT and very

1 The present Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, known as East Pakistan. Bangladesh got separated from Pakistan in 1971 and declared herself as an independent nation.

few of them rehabilitated in Kassalong area (Sopher, 1963: 347-348; Mohsin, 1997: 102-103).

Compensation and Rehabilitation

The Government of Bangladesh set up the Revenue Compensation office at Kaptai to pay compensation for the displaced people of Kaptai Dam. The government set aside over US \$51 million for both giving compensation and rehabilitating them. But only US \$2.6 million was actually disbursed. The hill people allege that the public officials engaged in the compensation and rehabilitation work highly indulged in corruption and discrimination between the hill people and the Bengali resettlers and the latter were the first to get compensation. It was primarily due to the fact that the staff in charge of giving compensations were the Bengalis. After a short period of time, the programme of compensation stopped while the government declared all displaced tribal people were nomadic (Ahmed, 2002-2003: 21, Sopher, 1963: 349-362). Out of the 18,000 families displaced by the Kaptai Dam, only 4,938 families have been relocated (See Table 1). The dam submerged 54,000 acres of plough land but the Government of Bangladesh only replaced 24,801 acres of plough land to relocate the displaced. It signifies only 27.43 percent of families have been relocated by replacing them with 45.92 percent of plough land. The rest of 72.57 percent of displaced families remained as the internal displaced people (IDPs) (Sopher, 1963: 349-362, Parveen& Faisal, 2002: 201-202). There were several inadequacies in implementing the resettlement programme. The government could not keep its promise in compensating the lost arable land. Secondly, fertile land in the river valley was compensated by hilly lands, which was of no immediate use to the people, who had got accustomed to the plain land farming. Thirdly, monetary compensation was too little; for example, the displaced people received only Taka 500–700 per hectare as compensation whereas they had to pay Taka 5000 per hectare to buy similar arable plain land in other areas.

Table 1: Relocation of the Displaced People of the Kaptai Dam

Relocation Area	Land Offered		Households Moving to Area	
	Acres	% Total	Number	% Total
Kasalong	10,000	40.4	2,870	58.1
Chengri Valley	3,903	15.7	1,405	28.4
Myani Valley	1,287	5.2	99	2.0
FeniVally&Ramgarh	3,057	12.3	-	-
Circum-Rangunia	747	3.0	200	4.1
Karnafully-Sangu interfluve	374	1.5	183	3.7
Sangu&Matamuhari Valleys	5,433	21.9	181	3.7
Total	24,801	100.0	4,938	100.0

Source: Sopher, David E (1963): 'Population Dislocation in Chittagong Hills', *Geographical Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, July, p. 355.

Impoverishment Risks and Social Exclusion

Although the Kaptai hydroelectric project produced five percent of hydropower production of the country, tribal groups got little benefit out of it. The hydroelectric plant and other industrial projects in the CHT (Karnafully Paper Mill, Karnafully Rayonand Chemical Limited and Bangladesh Timber and Plywood Industries Limited) have neither provided new avenues of job opportunities to the tribal people nor brought any development to the region. The Karnafully Paper Mill provided 6,000 employments to workers and out of those, 40 workers are tribal people. The industries and factories in the CHT do not benefit the tribal people, as the employment goes to the Bengalis. More factories and industries mean more jobs for the Bengalis and more hardship to the hill people (Barua, 2001: 80-81). Submergence of extensive *Jum* land led to acute shortage of plough land in CHT and crisis of livelihood extended to a great degree among the tribal groups.

The tribal people who once produced all their necessities in their homes and sold them in their local markets have now been replaced by industrial goods. Now the business is totally in the hands of the non-tribal people. Consequently, the tribal people have to eke out their livelihood from new occupations. Such are fishing and horticulture, in which they have little experience (Barua, 2001: 80-82). The scarcity of lands to reside forced them into the forest areas, where they fell victim to various diseases. Among those Malaria has been rampant among them. Many people died of various diseases in the initial period of their resettlement due to the lack of treatment and medicines. Health problems often arise due to the remoteness of settlements and inadequate allocation of health staff and government health programmes (Chakma, 1995: 71-74, Norwegian Refugee Council 2006: 59-62, Skinner 2008: 26). The displaced people experienced a broad range of impoverishment risks like food security, joblessness, landlessness, marginalization, health problems and at last they are socially excluded from their own homeland and it led to loss of socio-cultural resilience. Thus, the relations between tribal people and the Bengalis gradually worsened in CHT and it turned into arms conflicts and insurgency (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2006: 27-28; Sopher, 1963: 339-362; Hassan, 1991: 24-25).

Kaptai Dam and Anti-Dam Agitation

Soon after the declaration of the construction of Kaptai Dam in CHT, the Chakma Raja (King) Tridev Roy, East Pakistan Legislative Assembly Member Kamini Mohan Dewan and a few other regional leaders registered their protests against the Kaptai Dam from their respective positions. Students like the Chakma-born fighter Manabendra Larma and Binoy Kanti Khisa of Chittagong distributed booklets explaining the ill effects of dam and mobilized the people to protest against the proposed dam to construct in the Kaptai. But they were immediately arrested by the policemen and thrown in jail.

The overall political situation of East Pakistan was stifled under the iron rule of Ayub Khan. Public protest against the authorities was an impossible phenomenon during that period. The protests were isolated and the participation of common people failed to stop the construction of the dam.

In response to the state repression, an underground political party was formed by the displaced people in the year 1966, known as the CHT Welfare Association. The main aim of this association was to protect the rights of the tribal people of CHT. However, the organized protest started after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, when they were denied the status of ethnic minority in the constitution and it alarmed their cultural identity. The CHT Welfare Association was dissolved in 1972 with the formation of Parbottya Chattagran Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) headed by Manabendra Narayan Larma (Kazi, 1980: 1510). He launched a struggle to get their rights in democratic and nonviolent ways. But later they changed their strategy of struggle from nonviolent to armed struggle when the Mujib Government proclaimed Martial Law in 1975. The democratic protests gradually evolved into rebellion (Chakma, 1995: 86-96).

Arms Conflicts and Insurgency

The well-organized guerrillas led by PCJSS attacked security forces, setting fire to security forces camps and villages of non-tribal people, killing them, kidnapping government officials and prominent citizens, sabotaged power grid lines, bridges and culverts, etc. The spread of insurgency caused large scale killing and kidnapping of people and many were injured (see Table 2). Such an act by the tribal people encouraged military persecution by the government in CHT and the conditions further worsened in the region. In such a situation, it was very difficult for the tribal people to survive in CHT under the

Table 2: Insurgency induced Casualty

Year	Killed		Injured		Kidnapped	
	Bengalis	Tribal	Bengalis	Tribal	Bengalis	Tribal
1980	87	08	75	05	57	07
1981	42	02	27	02	03	12
1982	16	07	20	-	51	18
1983	08	-	08	03	15	01
1984	108	07	45	08	18	27
1985	11	14	19	08	25	19
1986	248	33	118	16	33	04
1987	117	19	67	09	17	08
1988	128	16	65	14	131	27
1989	72	74	138	57	22	28
1990	47	20	38	12	18	22
1991	68	15	36	18	21	32
Total	952	188	656	152	411	205

Source: Shelley 1992, p.124.

constant threat of Bangladesh army and its persecution. As a result the tribal groups began to migrate crossing the Indian border as refugees. About 40,000 tribal people migrated to Mizoram in 1983 and 50,000 to Tripura in 1986 and the refugees stayed in camps (Kharat, 2003: 9-10; Bertocci, 1985: 163).

Genesis of the Protests and Armed Rebellion

The question regarding the causes of protests and armed rebellion in CHT that have been continuing till today arises. The simple answer is violation of their land rights, denial of their status of ethnic minority by the post-colonial government of Pakistan and later Bangladesh as well. The acquisition of land for Kaptai Dam by the Government of Pakistan dispossessed tribal people from their land and added fuel to the fire. The complex issue of conflicts in CHT will be better understood if we look at the history of CHT during the period of Mughal era and British rule and how it drastically changed in the post-independence era in every respect in CHT. During the post-independence era, both Pakistan and Bangladesh drastically changed the administrative structure of the CHT, denied their cultural status, and promulgated developmental projects in the name of national interest in CHT which threatened their source of livelihood and made them displaced and stateless as well.

Pakistan Period (1947-1971)

Soon after the independence of Pakistan, CHT came under the control of Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs and directly ruled by the central government. Although the constitution of 1956 and 1962 maintained the CHT as an “excluded area”, the constitutional amendment in 1963 abrogated the CHT Regulation of 1900, which had been introduced by the British earlier. Chakmas lost their ‘autonomy’ and their status of ‘excluded’ area, and it was a great shock for them (Bhattacharya, 2001: 329; Ahsan & Chakma, 1989: 963; Kukreja, 2003: 12-21; Behera, 1996: 988-989).

Land acquisitions and encroachment of forest land in CHT by the government has been one of the major reasons of conflict between the tribal people and the Government of Bangladesh. Under the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Land Acquisition) Regulation, in 1958, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan assumed all the powers for the acquisition of land in CHT, required for any public purpose and it violated the CHT Regulation of 1900 (Government of East Pakistan 1958). The CHT people were enjoying a variety of rights over land under the CHT Regulation of 1900 earlier declared by the British. There is a significant difference in terms of legal system between the CHT and in the rest of the country. Laws passed in the rest of the country do not automatically apply to the CHT, unless they are specially laid down in the CHT Regulation of 1900 (Roy, 1998: 56-79).

Along with the land acquisition, encouragement of commercial plantations (rubber & teak) by the government in the CHT area was another factor of discontent among

tribal people. Rubber plantations began in the CHT in 1959 on an experimental basis. In 1969 the government took over 40,000 acres of land to promote it on a commercial basis. But the plantations have become the source of conflict over land on which ethnic communities held customary rights. Such policies of Pakistan government threatened their source of livelihood, ethnic identity and culture. In this backdrop they began to put of armed resistance (Gain, 2001: 23-26; Nayak, 2005:39-40; Nayak, 2006: 61-62; Gain, 2002: 41-48). But, the Pakistan government saw it as guerilla activity spilling over the border from the hostile neighbor states of India and Burma and suppressed the struggle (Zaman, 1982: 78).

Bangladesh Period (1971-onwards)

Bangladesh emerged as a new country in the world map in the year 1971. The country adopted a multi-party parliamentary form of government and a secular polity for governance. The Awami League headed by Mujibur Rehman swept the power in the parliamentary election and became the prime minister of Bangladesh (Chakravarty, 1995: 7-15). On the other hand, the Chakma leaders also participated in the elections and gained a legislative seat from Chittagong, which indicated their interest of political participation (Kharat, 2003: 6). A deputation led by Manabendra Narayan Lama called on Sheikh Mujibur Rehman on February 15, 1972, and placed before him a four-point charter of demands to protect their cultural autonomy and rights, which had earlier been violated by the Pakistan government as well as by the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh. The 1972 constitution of Bangladesh declared Bengali to be the basis of nationhood in the new state (Mohsin 1997a: 18-19). These demands were: (1) Autonomy of CHT with its own legislature; (2) Retention of the 1900 Regulation in the Bangladesh constitution; (3) Continuation of the tribal chief offices and; (4) Constitutional provisions restricting the amendment of the Regulation and imposition of a ban on the influx of the non-tribal people (Zaman, 1982: 78).

But Mujibur Rehman was in no mood to listen to those demands, and clearly expressed 'we are all Bengalis, we cannot have two systems of governments' (Hazarika, 1995: 278). He advised them "to do away with their ethnic identities" and "emphasized on Bengali nationalism and culture" (Zaman, 1982: 78). The reason of such declaration made by Mujibur Rehman was the indifference of Chakmas and the pro-Pakistani outlook of Raja Tridev Roy, Chief of Chakmas in the entire episode of Bangladesh war of independence (Islam, 1981: 1219; Kharat, 2003: 6-7). Secondly, during the Pakistan regime, the CHT served as a training centre for the Mizos who had given their support to the Pakistani forces during the liberation war. The Mujib government identified the movement of regional autonomy as a "national security problem" and was taken as secessionist movement. Thus, the government took a number of measures to suppress the autonomy movement of the tribal people. Such are population transfer programme, militarisation of CHT, Islamization of CHT and religious persecutions (Mohsin, 1997: 18-20).

Population Transfer Programme and Land Alienation in the CHT

In 1973, the non-tribal people were encouraged to settle permanently in the CHT region (sparsely-populated area) by expelling the tribal people from their home and having agricultural land forcefully and distributed among the Bengali settlers (Zaman, 1982: 78). During the period of Mujib's government (6th December 1971 – 15 August 1975), 50,000 non-tribal people had been settled in the CHT area (Kharat, 2003: 8-9). This policy was further continued by the successive governments too.

Such policy has alienated the hill people from their land and forest resources through the state-sponsored project of Bengali settlement into the hills. The tribal people in the CHT constituted 91 percent in 1951 and they suddenly reduced to 59 percent in 1981 and 51 percent in 1991 (see Table 3). It is true that economic migrants from plains land of Bangladesh were coming to CHT through individual efforts for many years, but the migration that took place during the 1980s was claimed by the government as natural migrants. The population transfer programme made during 1979-80s not only violated the individual and collective land rights but accelerated the pace of economic and political marginalization of the hill indigenous people. The loss of their livelihood sources, non-recognition of their old practiced political institutions as well as the non-tribal cultural assimilation in the CHT led to the state of frustration among the tribal people (Roy, 1997: 167-191).

Table 3: Demography of Indigenous People and Bengalis in the CHT

Census Year	1872	1901	1951	1981	1991
Indigenous People	61,957	116,000	261,538	441,776	501,144
Bengali	1,097	8,762	26,150	304,873	473,301
Total	63,054	124,762	287,688	746,649	974,445
Indigenous People (%)	98%	93%	91%	59%	51%
Bengali (%)	2%	7%	9%	41%	49%

Source: Roy 1997, p. 182.

The 'detrribalization' policies followed by the government threatened the ethnic identity and their tribal rights. Thus the tribal people responded with increased armed resistance. The PCJSS headed by extremist leader Manabendra Narayan Larma soon launched its armed wing called as *Gana Mukti Fouj* (People's Liberation Army), popularly known as 'Shanti Bahini'. Therefore the increasing armed resistance of Santi Bahini alarmed the Mujib government. In 1976, the Santi Bahini first launched its first attack on Bangladeshi forces and the new insurgency had been born in Bangladesh (Hazarika, 1995: 279-280).

Development Programmes and Militarization in the CHT

In 1975, General Ziaur Rahman came to power after a series of military coups, and Martial Law was imposed in the country. The most significant step taken under Martial Law was a drastic revision of development strategy and investment policies. The new

leader rejected the Mujib's development strategy (Ahamed, 1978: 1168-1180) and he declared in 1976 that the problems in the CHT stemmed primarily due to lack of development in the CHT. Thus, he set up a development board known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) to carry out large scale development projects in that region (Anderson 1976: 467-473). Under this program, various commercial plantations and afforestation were undertaken, funded by various international organizations. Among those projects, one of the most celebrated projects is 'Social Forestry'; aimed to alleviate poverty and to increase the status of livelihood of the displaced people. But it did not boost up their livelihood; rather the monoculture plantations of teak, rubber and eucalyptus, etc., further alienated the hill people from their rich bio-diversified land and forests. Thus, the crisis of livelihood among them greatly extended (Roy & Halim, 2001: 5-38).

Expansion of reserved forests in the CHT by the government has become another major concern for the hill people, where the hill people are denied of their traditional rights of collection of fuel wood, and forest products. The Ministry of Environment and Forests deemed 217,709.3 acres of land as reserved forests in 1998, which violated the CHT Regulation (Gain 2000: 19-38). Bangladesh has been getting a considerable amount of development fund that flow to the CHT in the recent period primarily in the wake of globalization. The gas exploration and various mining activities in the recent years in CHT have been putting considerable impact to the self-sufficient features of their economy, traditional production methods, survival technique, culture of tribal people, and eventually the environment (Nayak, 2005: 41-42).

On the other hand, in the name of development and maintaining law and order in the CHT, the Government of Bangladesh deployed huge military forces and the CHT simply became a military camp. Estimation shows that 30,000 troops were operating in the CHT, which was one third of all regular troops in Bangladesh. It means one security force was deployed for every fifteen tribal people (see Table 4). The main purpose of operation of military in the CHT was a counter insurgency programme to suppress the Shanti Bahini and resettle the tribal people in the cluster villages under the control of the army. As a result, the huge military presence made the tribal people live in constant fear, terrorized in every aspect of their life (Arens, 1997: 56-66).

Table 4: Security Personnel deployed in the CHT

	Division	Number of Security Personnel
Army	24 th Infantry Division	80,000
BDR	6 Battalions	25,000
Ansars	4 Battalions	8,000
Navy	1 Battalions	1,500

Source: The Report of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, "Life is not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, May 1991, p. 41.

Human Rights Violation in the CHT

Apart from militarization and the total control of CHT, the military also grossly violated human rights in the region. The military has divided the entire area into three zones (white, green, and red). The white zones cover an area of two miles adjacent to the Army Head Quarters. Bengali settlement areas are identified as green zones and the hill people residing in the interior area are categorised as red zones, where military carries out counter-insurgency operations. In the CHT, rape has been inflicted upon the hill women by Bengali security personnel and it has been reported that between 1991 and 1993, over 94 percent of the rape cases of hill women were by the security personnel. Over 40 percent of the victims were women under eighteen years of age. Besides that, hill people have been forcibly evicted from their homestead in the name of counter-insurgency. As many as 263 houses of the hill people were burnt down by the army in between January 1991 to June 1992.

The military also often evicts people from their land for the purpose of its own extension. In Rangamati, the military has acquired 400 acres of land, 150 acres of land in Khagrachari for military camps and 11,446.24 acres in Bandarban for building a military training centre. In the name of counter-insurgency, hill people have often been detained and tortured by the army. There were 310 cases of torture and 135 cases of arrests of the hill people by the army in between January 1991 to June 1992 (Mohsin, 1997a: 177-188).

Islamisation and Religious persecution

Besides human rights violation by the military, the state also promoted religious conversion. The young girls of the CHT are being forced to get married to the local Muslim youths after converting them to Islam. It is alleged that the army officers stationed in the CHT are encouraged to marry tribal girls in order to assimilate the ethnic minorities. The government has established an Islamic Preaching Centre at Rangamati and big mosques are being constructed in the area, financed by Saudi Arabia. *Al-Rabita*, a Saudi Arabia based Islamic missionary organization has been funding for such activities and it has been working in the CHT since 1980 to convert the hill people to Islam. The Jamaat-e-Islami, the fundamentalist Muslim party, has been active in the CHT for the promotion of Islam through various programmes. The government has built hundreds of mosques and *madarsahs* (Islamic religious educational institutions) throughout the CHT as part of its plan to islamise the tribal homeland. A number of mosques and *madarsahs* have been mushrooming in the CHT (See Table 5) (Barua, 2001: 116-118).

Table 5: Growing Mosques and Madarsahs in the CHT

Year	Mosques	Madarsahs
1979	421	4
1982	525	35
1983	529	39

Source: Barua 2001, p. 117.

Apart from islamisation, there have been accounts of religious persecutions by the military on the Buddhists and Hindu temples, churches and religious images. It was reported that 54 Buddhist temples were destroyed within a period of eight months in nine upazillas. In 1986, 22 Hindu temples were burnt down by the army. Though Islam was declared as the state religion in Bangladesh in 1988, freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution of Bangladesh. But, the people of the CHT have been denied their freedom of religion and such type of contradictions in the state policy has been alienating the CHT people from the Bengali regime (Mohsin, 1997a: 179-180).

Peace Process and the CHT Peace Accord

Simultaneously, side by side, the government was also making various platforms of negotiations with the Shanti Bahini to settle the conflicts in the CHT. In February 1989, the parliament enacted the Hill District Act of 1989 within the framework of three "Hill District Councils", and Special Affairs Ministry was also constituted in July 1990 to look after the affairs of the CHT. The three Hill District Councils offered the tribal people facilitation of local self-government in the CHT within the unitary constitution of Bangladesh. A beginning was made in the direction of autonomy during the last part of Ershad regime (Chowdhury, 2002: 8). In spite of strong initiatives undertaken by the government of Bangladesh, the process of repatriation during the Khaleda regime was very slow. But it took turn in 1997, when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came to power in 1996 (Bhattacharya, 2001: 333).

Negotiations took place between the National Committee on the CHT and the PCJSS throughout the period 1996 and a historic Accord was signed on 2 December 1997. The Accord was signed by the government and the PCJSS (Bhattacharya 2001: 333). The Awami League claimed the CHT Peace Accord as a "landmark achievement", which would not only bring peaceful national integration but indeed open the plentiful natural resources of the CHT and enhance economic growth throughout the whole region. But the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) denounced the Accord as a "black pact" and alleged that it violated both the country's sovereignty and its unitary constitution. The pro-Islamic Jamaat-e-Islam and other right wing groups claimed that the Awami League had virtually sold the CHT by signing the treaty, an area which is very important for Bangladesh's national security and economic development (Rashiduzzaman, 1998: 654-656).

The long struggle of PCJSS and its 25 years of insurgency war since 1972 for virtual autonomy for its people in the CHT came to end after the peace treaty. The armed Shanti Bahini surrendered their arms and return to their normal life. The first batch of 739 soldiers of the Shanti Bahini surrendered their arms on February 10, 1998 at the Khagrachhari stadium. Each Shanti Bahini member received a cash compensation of Tk. 50,000 (US\$ 1,200) to begin a new life outside the jungle. The four main demands

of the PCJSS articulated since 1992 included (i) the constitutional recognition of the 10 ethnic communities speaking different languages (ii) removal of all Bengalis who entered the CHT after 1947 (iii) full regional autonomy to the CHT and (iv) removal of the army from the CHT. But the CHT Peace Accord slightly shifted from several of its vital demands. The PCJSS virtually sacrificed the former two demands and has been bargaining for the remaining two. The treaty remains silent about the constitutional recognition of the ethnic communities of the CHT, but however it considered the CHT as “tribal” people inhabited region (Raj, 1998: 1).

However, the accord divided the tribal people into two groups; one supporting the Accord and another opposing it. In 1998, the Jumma people activists who wanted full autonomy of the CHT launched a new political party, known as the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). It created conflicts between the UPDF and the PCJSS. Over 500 people belonging to the two groups were killed, and more than 1,000 people injured in clashes between them. Moreover, about 1,000 people of the two groups were kidnapped. The government of Bangladesh brands the ‘full autonomy’ activists as terrorists and again justified the continuing presence of military in the CHT and it went under the direct rule through its local representatives, the Deputy Commissioner and the army (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2006: 31-32).

Displacement and Migration Across the Border

About 40,000 displaced people by Kaptai Dam crossed the border of India and settled in different north-eastern states of India. The Government of India made a scheme to relocate them in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now known as Arunachal Pradesh. The settlement of Chakma refugees began in NEFA. Even those refugees who went to Bihar for settlement at Gaya district came back to join their brothers in NEFA in 1968. Thus the flow of refugee continued from 1965-66 to 1968 and they settled in the three districts of Tirap, Lohit and Changlang. The central government thought the NEFA was a sparsely populated tract, 4.1 persons per sq. km. against the national average of 434 persons and its climatic conditions and mountainous terrain most suitable for economic survival of Chakmas. It was the ideal territory for the rehabilitation of the Buddhist refugees in the Indian soil. As NEFA was administered by the central government, the settlement of the Chakmas came directly under the Ministry of the Home Affairs until 1972 (Chaudhury, 1997: 139-143).

For three decades after 1964, indigenous local youths in the NEFA did not raise any questions about rehabilitation of the refugees by the centre despite beginning of electoral activities in full swing since the 1980s. But surprisingly, when Arunachal Pradesh was raised to the status of full-fledged province in February 1987, the student union of Arunachal Pradesh known as Arunachal Pradesh Student Union (AAPSU) raised a political issue in the line of the Assam movement and drew the attention of the local

political parties to fight out the interest of the indigenous people of Arunachal Pradesh. On the other hand, the grant of statehood to Mizoram encouraged the AAPSU for the agitation demanding local Chakma Buddhists expulsion from the state. Initially, about 2,748 families of Chakmas consisting of 14,888 persons were settled in the NEFA purely on the temporary and the humanitarian ground by the Central government. In 1979, these figures rose to 3,919 families consisting of 21,494 persons. By 1991 the number of jumma increased around 30,064 and at present it estimates 65,000 persons. At the same time the indigenous population of just over 8,00,000 is also very small and causing great concern for the local population. In May 1994, AAPSU spearheaded the movement to project the Central government action of rehabilitation of the Chakmas during the 1960 as a serious bottleneck to the progress of the indigenous people. The body questioned the Central government propriety of such rehabilitation in NEFA and demanded their deportation from the state. Gradually the relation between the displaced Chakmas and the host communities began to deteriorate and they are staying as stateless people in India (De, 2005: 156-158, Chaudhury, 1997: 142-143; Prasad, 2007: 1375-1376; Limpert, 1998: 46-48; Ahmed, 2002-2003: 24).

Further, the large scale militarization and the religious persecution in the CHT by the Government of Bangladesh during the 1980s forced out a large number of Chakmas from the CHT and forced them to cross over to the Indian territories. Those who came to Tripura were given in six refugee camps of South Tripura sub-division. The government of India spent over eighty corers of rupees for the maintenance of Chakmas refugee camps in Tripura. There was no agitation during the period of their eleven year-stay (1986-1997) in camps. It was primarily due to the fact that the Tripura already had a local Chakma Buddhist population of 34,798 in its Southern districts (Belonia and Sabroom), where the refugees were settled. Thus, the Chakma refugees from the CHT were getting sympathy from the local Chakmas of Tripura. Thus, the Chakmas of the CHT who emigrated to Tripura did not get hostile opposition in Tripura (De, 2005: 153-154 and also see George (Ed): 151-154).

A large number of Chakmas failed to bear the expenses of journey to Tripura in the middle of the 1980s and who fled to the dense forest inside the CHT and at last they reached to Mizoram through the Jungle route on foot. Thus they became the suspected group of illegal migrants in the eyes of the Mizos. Because most of the Mizos are Christian and all the Chakmas are Buddhist. It is obvious that ethnic hatred was born in the above context and it later questioned their right to reside in the state. The growing numbers of Chakmas population in the western district of Mizoram basically became alarming after the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Mizoram had a local Chakma Buddhist population of only ten in 1941. But it suddenly sprang up to 15,937 in 1951, soon after the partition of India. It further increased to 22,393 by the year 1971. Within the two decades of emergence of Bangladesh it was found to be 39,905 in 1981 and 50,000 in

1991. Such increase of population was not normal and was not possible without the infiltration from Bangladesh, yet, there was no major agitation against the Chakmas in Mizoram, but excitement suddenly stirred the Mizo mind in the middle of the 1990s, when Chakmas in Mizoram claimed to have population of 80,000 as recorded 50,000 in the census report of 1991 and demanded for them a union territory in the autonomous district, which led Mizos to suspect a threat to their predominance in the state. Thus, political havoc is obvious in Mizoram and they were clearly against granting any political concession to the Chakma inhabitants in Mizoram. Mizos were apprehensive of their political consequences that Chakmas might raise a demand for an autonomous state within the Mizoram like the Khasis, the Jaintias and the Garos did in Assam. Further, the permanent stay of Chakmas in Mizoram obviously would lead to the resource constraint, employment scarcity, and all kinds of social and economic tribulations (De, 2005: 154-156 and also see Sangima (Ed) 2004: 95-106).

Conclusion

The study shows how development-induced displacement leads not only impoverishment risks and social exclusion but also to arms conflicts, insurgency and statelessness. The government of Pakistan in the initial years of post-independence brought numerous developmental projects in the CHT. Among those projects, Kaptai Dam on the river Karnafully River is a huge project displaced about 100,000 people and it became the root cause of environmental degradations and livelihood crisis. Compensation of their lost assets was very meager, and in many cases no compensation at all. Very few people were rehabilitated by the Government of Pakistan and thus resentment grew among the displaced indigenous people. Even if there were protests and movements against the project Kaptai Dam to restore their customary land, the movement was suppressed by the mighty state force of Pakistan. In response to such actions of the government, the displaced people gradually began to take arms to fight against the atrocities made by the government. The conflict was further extended by the Government of Bangladesh, when it forcefully acquired the customary lands of tribal people to suppress their autonomy movement to make the country a greater Bengal society by introducing population transfer programme in the CHT with the help of military persecutions as well as religious persecutions. The civil-military regime of Bangladesh undemocratically violated the customary law of the tribal people, and it was the responsible factor of large scale displacement and conflicts in the region. The government disrespected the sustainable management of environment, practiced by the tribal people, which had been providing their livelihoods for generations. Such factors led to acute shortage of resources for livelihoods, and hence the indigenous people or tribals were forced to cross the border as stateless citizens into the Indian neighboring states.

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