

Burundi: A Conflict Intervention Design During the 1990s

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Abstract: Among many various conflict analysis methods, Dennis J. D. Sandole's three pillar model presents a systematic road-map to identify the main issues, causes, and conditions of conflicts, as well as third-party conflict intervention approach. Three pillar model is also well suited to the analysis of complex conflict in Burundi and its intervention process by the third parties during the 1990s. This paper touches on the issues, causes, and conditions of Burundian conflict as Sandole's first and second pillars suggest, but primarily focuses on the intervention aspect in line with the third pillar of the model. In this context, the conflict intervention framework in Burundi is examined based on the regionally launched Arusha peace process, which resulted in a peace agreement. Following that, given the multi-level nature of the conflict in Burundi, it is discussed how an effective conflict intervention can be designed in order to resolve conflicts and ensure positive peace in the country.

Keywords: Burundi, conflict analysis, Sandole's Three Pillar Model, conflict intervention.

Introduction

A conflict intervention relies inextricably on a clear conflict analysis that reveals the causes, conditions, dynamics and actors of the conflicts. Sandole's three-pillar conflict analysis can be applied to any conflicts and their intervention by the third parties. The first pillar in this model examines the conflict elements such as parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict or conflict resolution orientations and environment. The second pillar focuses on conflict causes and conditions at four levels of analysis: individual,

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societal, international and ecological levels. The third pillar is about the conflict intervention and implementation based on the third parties' objectives and approaches. While their objectives could potentially be prevention, management, settlement, resolution or transformation of the conflicts, the approaches draw attention to competition/cooperation, negative/positive peace and Track1/Track2 methods (Sandole, 1998). This paper addresses the analysis levels in Sandole's three-pillar model as well as the root causes, conditions and core elements of the Burundi conflict during the 1990s, and mainly presents an intervention design with the objectives and approaches of the third parties to achieve positive peace in Burundi.

Burundi stands out as one of the leading intervention areas for conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa. Since 1962, when it gained its independence from the colonial rule of Belgium, Burundi has been the scene of many conflicts and military coups. A series of violent outbreaks occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, 1993 and 2015 in Burundi. However, the civil war between the years of 1993 and 2005 was the longest, most costly, most complicated and most dramatic one (Nkurunziza, 2018; Nkurunziza & Ngaruko, 2005). While the Hutus constitute 85 percent of the country's ethnic composition and the Tutsi 14 percent, problems arose in Burundi due to the ethnic appeals that enabled kinship-oriented certain groups among the Tutsi to keep the power, military, economy and resources under control (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; Rubin, 2006). Hutu-Tutsi issue in Burundi was compounded by the assassination of the first democratically elected and the first ethnic Hutu president of the country, Melchior Ndadaye. The political elites were unable to establish institutions and mechanisms in order to put an end to the unprecedented violence in Burundi, which led to the death of more than 300.000 people and displacement of over one billion people (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). This has resulted in a variety of conflict intervention efforts and actions involving third parties.

As well as many studies, the first pillar of Sandole's three-pillar model calls the conflict parties as primary, secondary, and third parties (Sandole, 1998). Among the primary parties directly involved in Burundi conflict were the government, Hutu and Tutsi groups, the armed forces and civilians. Hutu and Tutsi groups in neighboring Rwanda, regional actors and extra-regional or international actors, such as South Africa, the United States (US), France, Belgium and Canada are considered as secondary parties that support the primary actors. Moreover, in order to find a solution to the conflict, the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the individuals as mediators or facilitators were among the third-parties to intervene. The conflict issues are another part of Sandole's first pillar, and the issues on the structure, relationship, interests, and the resources were the key issues in Burundi conflict. Both the Hutu and the Tutsi had the conflict objectives of achieving political and economic dominance over one another

and of defending themselves from any extermination initiatives. The means used to achieve these objectives had an aggressive style like injuring each other, damaging the high-value symbol of each other, armed rebel-attacks and counter-attacks, forced displacement, assassinations and military coups. The underlying orientation of the armed conflict and political life in Burundi was competitive, and this was observed not only in the conflict process but also in any peace effort to deal with the conflicts. In addition, the inefficiency of internal mechanisms in Burundian violent conflict environment empowered the role of third parties such as neighboring countries, regional actors and international organizations (Özçelik, 2017).

After addressing the core elements of Burundian conflict in the context of Sandole's model, it is essential to concentrate on the root causes and conditions behind it. Under Pillar II, Sandole classifies them at four levels: The individual level including biological, physiological, psychological instruments; the societal level with its political, economic and social aspects; the international level and the global/ecological level. These four different levels are also identified with some potential causes and conditions varying from the violations of basic needs to the structural/cultural violence, ethnocentrism, Realpolitik, negative self-fulfilling prophecies and self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes etc. (Sandole, 1998). Regardless of their weight, all levels and most of the causes and conditions in Sandole's theory can be observed in Burundi during the 1990s. On the individual level, unfulfilled "human needs" such as identity, recognition and security (Burton, 1990) became important in the conflict by creating cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964) and frustration between the Hutu and Tutsi. The societal level focused on political, economic and socio-psychological perspectives such as stereotypes, prejudices, and the inter-group biases were appeared among the conflict parties. The international level was mostly related with colonial factors and spill-over effect highlighting the regional and international aspect of the conflict. The scarcity of resources, overproduction of land, overpopulation and environmental degradation have been the ecological level of the tension in Burundi (Sandole, 1998; Özçelik, 2017).

According to the three-pillar analysis, the conditions at different levels of a conflict are also considered in two categories as start-up conditions and as process conditions. Since most conflicts have a dynamic process, it is necessary to come up with solutions that address both conditions at each phase of the conflict, from the starting point to its escalation and resolution (Sandole, 1999). The nature and the starting conditions of violent conflict circle in Burundi seems just as an ethnic problem, but beyond its extremely significant ethnic dimensions, the start-up conditions are fundamentally political. Anyway, although ethnic differences are provoked between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, it should be remembered that both groups speak the same language, share the same culture and live in the same geography (United Nations Peacemaker,

2000; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000). The political circumstances include “divide and rule” colonial policies and post-colonial regimes that polarize politics and economy by using ethnic lines (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005; Piombo, 2010; Ndikumana, 1998). Henceforth, these conditions at individual, societal, international and ecological levels diversify by some socio-economic, institutional and sub/regional factors and transform into triggers of the conflict as a self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling process (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; Curtis, 2013; Sandole, 1998; Özçelik, 2017). Therefore, it can be said that a conflict intervention can only achieve peace in Burundi to the extent that it addresses all the start-up and process conditions at all levels.

Under Pillar III, Sandole eventually maps a model of conflict intervention of third parties in line with their objectives and approaches. The third parties have options from competition or cooperation, negative or positive peace, Track1 or Track2 diplomacy, but these are likely to be used together in certain conflicts (Sandole, 1998). The use of both competitive and cooperative conflict resolution mechanisms in Burundi would have an impact on the capacity for negative or positive peace, and would make the interventions more successful by addressing the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at each level. The endogenous conflict environment in Burundi has been also a critical factor in the duration and intensity of the conflict. Therefore, a conflict intervention in Burundi would also require a long-term collaboration of local, regional and international actors in order to affect the conflict transformation in the country (Özçelik, 2017). This paper mainly focuses on the Pillar III and the third-party intervention in the Burundi conflict during the 1990s.

Conflict Intervention Framework in Burundi and The Arusha Agreement

When a conflict arises, the parties have multiple choices for dealing with the conflict. These options might include unilateral or bilateral acts, as well as third-party interventions in various forms (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996). In the forms of fact-finding, chairmanship or facilitation, third parties might have remarkable roles by revealing the problematic issues between the conflicting parties, by defining the needs, interests, expectations and concerns of the conflict parties, by building ways of communication and dialogue between the parties, by introducing more efficient problem solving and negotiation procedures, or by drafting an agreement acceptable to the conflicting parties (Bercovitch, 1985; Moore, 2014). Third-parties also determine their priorities and objectives in an intervention, such as conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution or conflict transformation (Sandole, 1998). In this sense, it can be said that the intervention framework in Burundi was primarily comprised of conflict resolution and conflict transformation objectives and practices.

The origin of the conflict intervention in Burundi was a regional attempt launched by the neighboring countries mediated by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere in order to escape the negative effects of the conflict on the region, in terms of refugee influx, rebel activities and regional stability (Daley, 2007; Bruderlein & Erhardy, 1997; Reyhler & Langer, 2006). Following Pierre Buyoya military coup in 1996, neighboring countries imposed regionally sanctions on Burundi, and declared Nyerere as a mediator to facilitate and restore peace in the country as well as in the region (Vandeginste, 2009). After Nyerere died in 1999, the former South African President Nelson Mandela took over the mission. There were several negotiations in Burundi during this period, but the Arusha process was the most structured and comprehensive one. The Arusha negotiations -which the international community has tried to find a permanent solution and sustainable peace for the first time to the crisis (Nkurunziza, 2016) have succeeded in putting an end to the violent conflict both by involving a broad variety of participants from political parties to civil society, army, regional and international community, and by culminating in a peace agreement as a climax for the process (Piombo, 2010; Nkurunziza, 2018).

The Arusha Agreement (The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi / Arusha Accords) facilitated by Mandela was signed in 2000 by the government, the National Assembly and Burundian political parties. The cosignatories were the president of Uganda as the chairman of the Great Lakes Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, the president of Kenya as the region's elder statesman, and the president of Tanzania as the host, as well as the Secretary-General of the UN, the Secretary-General of the OAU, the representative of the EU, and the executive director of non-governmental Nyerere Foundation. Five protocols were accepted in the agreement. By analyzing the root causes, perceptions, practices and ideology in Burundi crisis, Protocol I addressed the nature of the conflict, genocide issues, exclusion and their solutions. Protocol II presented democracy and good governance as guarantors of security and justice without any exclusion, as well as specified the transitional period led by legal, judicial and administrative reforms in Burundi. The third Protocol pointed at achieving peace and security by peaceful means in the country, and ending all forms of violence to promote lasting peace, permanent ceasefire and cessation of any type of hostilities. Protocol IV focused on the principles, guidelines and transitional activities for Burundi's reconstruction and socio-economic development. Finally, Protocol V highlighted the importance of the effective implementation of the agreement, building on the road maps established and the lessons learned from previous initiatives (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000).

As an integral part of the agreement, the protocols have generated positive achievements in addressing the start-up and process conditions as well as the root causes and the tragic outcomes of the conflict. The agreement, which opposes any kind of division, exclusion and discrimination, seeks to establish a new political, economic, social and

judicial order in Burundi. In this context, certain arrangements are envisaged regarding the constitution, transitional and constitutional structures, good governance and democratic elections, as well as judicial, administrative and military reforms. The equal distribution of socio-economic opportunities; the prevention and investigation of recurrence of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity; the re-designation of state institutions, as well as defense and security areas based on power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi; the resettlement and reintegration of refugees; the formation of the principles of ceasefire; and the involvement of international community with its moral, diplomatic, technical, material and financial assistance are also discussed in the agreement. It is further planned to set-up an implementation monitoring committee and various commissions, such as truth and reconciliation (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000).

Despite covering numerous issues, it is worth noting that the agreement still has remarkable shortcomings in terms of both its scope and its implementation. One of the major shortcomings in the process is the exclusion of the chief armed Hutu rebel groups (CNDD-FDD and PALIPHEHUTU-FNL) from the negotiations and the agreement (International Crisis Group, 6 August 2002). Since the beginning of the talks, this exclusion has played an important role in slowing down the peace process and preventing a ceasefire from being achieved (Piombo, 2010). Another drawback of the agreement is that it served as a transition time guide and left the implementation details unresolved. The UN Secretary General's Special Representative for the Great Lakes, Berhanu Dinka, was appointed as chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee to oversee adherence to the implementation timetable and functions set forth in the agreement, and to arbitrate outstanding matters between signatories (UN SG/A752—AFR/277, 27 November 2000). Nevertheless, issues such as the leading transition government, ethnic balance in all areas including military, power-sharing in government, and coping with past genocide remained in Burundi (Piombo, 2010).

In addition to a general delay in implementation, there have been charges by Hutu of secret alliances and secret changes made to the agreement between the main Hutu party and the government. Regional leaders involved in conflicts in neighboring countries were accused of derailing process through funding, training and agitating rebel groups (Griggs, 1999). Moreover, the limitations include the lack of concrete mechanisms like an investigation committee, a truth and reconciliation commission, or an international tribunal (Hatungimana, Theron & Popic, 2007, p. 22); the major reservations of the signatories (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 72); signing the cease-fire with external pressure (International Crisis Group, 6 August 2002); the prioritization of ruling elites' interests; and the failure to recognize the importance of strong economic measures for sustainable peace and peacebuilding (Nkurunziza, 2016, p. 224–225). From the problem of exclusion to the agreement's implementation, all of those flaws had a negative effect on conflict resolution and transformation process as a tool for Burundi's conflict intervention.

Conflict Intervention Mapping and Design in Burundi

The Arusha Agreement has already put into place a framework for resolving the conflict and its transformation. However, it has been seen that certain other systems need to be placed for the parties to fulfill the objectives of the accord. The peace agreement had both competitive and cooperative components. The mandate for total restructure of the government, the mandatory integration of the government, particularly the military were illustrative of competitive processes. Cooperative processes must have complemented these competitive processes. The inability to take this approach was one of the reasons that the previous efforts to democratize Burundi failed in the past. Moreover, an effective response would have to operate at all levels of the conflict just as the causes and conditions were identified at different levels. Rather than a negative peace that can be achieved in the prevention or cessation of hostilities at those different levels, the root causes and conditions of the conflict as well as all forms of violence should also be eliminated in the long term by positive peace orientations in Burundi.

In order to affect negative or positive peace in Burundi, an integrated structures of conflict resolution networks which have vertical and horizontal dimensions should be accomplished in the country (Sandole, 1999, p. 161; Lund, 1996). Michael Lund's conflict curve focuses on the intensity of the conflict on the vertical axis and the duration of the conflict on the horizontal axis (Lund, 1996, p. 38). Vertical integration involves systems of conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution and prevention/transformation at local, societal, sub-regional, regional and global levels. A vertical system is also essentially a bottom-up one as described by Lund. Parties of the conflict bear direct responsibility and accountability at the sub-regional and regional levels. In this process, extra-local and extra-regional states as well as the international organizations would provide facilitative, technical, political and military support (Lund, 1996, p. 183). The horizontal axis would ensure that there is lateral coordination of the tasks and objectives between the actors at each level -local, regional and global- to make the most efficient use of available resources by maximizing their effectiveness, and preventing them from working at cross-purposes (Lund, 1996, p. 189; Sandole, 1999, p. 161). The Burundian peace agreement could have been implemented following this system.

There appears to be a need for both Track1 (military support and governmental) and Track2 (non-governmental) components at different stages of the conflict intervention process as well. In consideration of the fact that the negotiated agreement of 19 parties out of the 21 directly interested parties has not been successful in effecting a cease-fire, so it requires some need for the exercise of competitive or realpolitik measures in order to at least bring about a negative peace initially. This is the peacemaking or conflict management stage of intervention (Sandole, 1999, p. 161; Lund, 1996). Accordingly, it would be appropriate for the UN and OAU to send in a sufficient number of armed forces to bring the ongoing violent conflict under control and enforce a cease-fire. This

appeared necessary to break the conflict-as-process vicious cycle of strike and retaliation in which the rebels and the government are engaged. However, nothing short of forceful external intervention of sufficient power but without military objectives could be capable of stopping this quasi-deterministic conflict spiral to allow implementation of the agreement. This armed intervention would have been as somewhere between peacekeeping and a large-scale peace enforcement. Additionally, it was particularly true if some analysts' suspicions were correct that the remaining armed rebel opposition is being sponsored by outside governments, such as Rwanda, Tanzania or the Democratic Republic of Congo, and this is preventing the leaders of the groups from voluntarily agreeing to a cease-fire because of role conflict (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001, p. 112). These competitive measures were critical in attempting to prevent and control the spill-over effect of the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The use or threat of use of coercive forces was also consistent with Lund's observations that different types of intervention are appropriate under different circumstances, depending on what is going on at the time of the intervention (Lund, 1996). Furthermore, in their contingency model of third-party intervention, Fisher and Keashly condoned this approach and claimed that the overall strategy is to intervene at the appropriate time with the appropriate third-party system in order to de-escalate the conflict (Fisher & Keashly, 1991). Similarly, Vasquez has endorsed the idea of peace system that is prepared to prescribe a particular intervention to the specific stages, and combined additional interventions in appropriate sequences to de-escalate the conflict (Vasquez, 1993). After a cease-fire is effectuated, a sufficient number of peacekeeping forces must have then stayed on the ground for a substantial period of time while Burundi undergoes psychological, emotional, economic and democratic reconstruction of civil society. It has never been in place during previous democratic reforms that ended with the military coup d'états such as in 1996, when General Pierre Buyoya overthrew the transitional government leader and reclaimed the presidency that he lost in the last democratic election. This once again shows that negative peace in Burundi is essential but insufficient condition for the ultimate goal of positive peace.

In a positive peace initiative, the parties to the agreement must have sold the solutions presented in the agreement directly to the affected populations, otherwise it may lack legitimacy. This was demonstrated by the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord for Rwanda which purported to resolve the neighboring Rwandan conflict but was followed with the massive genocide of Tutsi in 1993. The agreement was made between political elites and was not inclusive of all conflicting groups in the society. Despite a wide participation, the Burundian Arusha Agreement in 2000 had also this potential, since it was the product of a political elite and did not include critical parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, a coercive solution imposed by political actors has proven that it may fail. In order to avoid a repetition of past peace initiatives' failures both in Rwanda and Burundi, the

implementation process must have involved all relevant parties, including Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals, civil servants, businessmen, and other civil society representatives (Griggs, 1999). The implementation plan must genuinely reflect the political will of all parties to the conflicts. Moreover, transparency and consensus from the bottom-up is essential (Burton, 1997). Through some representatives, establishing a national dialogue environment at the community level as well as conducting a series of village meetings where the agreement is clarified to the public and questions are raised could make this process more effective.

The attachment of certain economic incentives and sanctions as carrots and sticks by the international community including the UN, EU, US, Canada and some regional states as well as regional and sub-regional organizations would be necessary to ensure that the government implements the agreement (Daley, 2007). In the past, this strategy has succeeded in pressuring President Buyoya to make democratic reforms and to restore constitutional order, at least in the short term (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000; UN SG S/1996/660, 15 August 1996). The provision of consultative services, the granting of financial assistance and the inclusion in certain trade deals can be conditioned on the government's good faith progress toward the goals of the peace agreement. Furthermore, international governmental organizations and the Western powers that have been involved in Burundi conflict should endeavor to reduce the country's export dependency. Burundi's dependency on the export of coffee and tea to outside countries not only contributed to weak civil society, increased debt, environmental degradation and food shortages in the country, but also made the government more focused and responsive in its relationship with foreign actors instead of citizens (Griggs, 1999). When all these economic issues remained as competitive rather than cooperative, it is often unavoidable to consent to short-lived solutions that can only bring negative peace.

Once a negative peace is restored, then the focus must be on more cooperative processes such as the structural conflict transformation, the national reconstruction, and the reconciliation. These cooperative processes would not only be essential for the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, but also for addressing the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict as well as the deep wounds of the masses of Hutu and Tutsi civilians who have suffered the brunt of the ongoing violent conflict. Heretofore, ethnic strife was dealt with by attempting to impose ethnic unity on the people, for example, passing laws forbidding the formation of political parties based on ethnicity or any other exclusionary factor (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000). Actually, due to the Hutu and Tutsi's diametrically opposed interests, this competitive approach to reconciliation has failed, and the political parties remained split along ethnic lines. Moreover, the chosen trauma for both the Hutu and Tutsi that has been aggravated by the ongoing violence will require the use of creative cooperative processes to heal. Track2 would seem best equipped to fill this need. As the new rule of law is enforced, the leaders, government

officials and representatives from all facets of society should be involved in dialogs, problem-solving workshops, diversity and conflict resolution training programs, and other interactive processes aimed at promoting the inter-cultural and inter-ethnic understanding. This should be an attempt to break the pattern of the past wherein democratization along just majority lines failed because the oppressed minority seeks power by extra-judicial means, such as military or rebel coups.

Regional and sub-regional organizations might have also an important role in collaborative efforts to restore peace. Despite its notable efforts and achievements, the OAU's overall record in maintaining Africa's peace and security was poor. Lack of political will among the members, external interventions, and a lack of capacity, experience and financial resources were among this regional organization's main flaws (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000). However, "the policy of non-interference (OAU Charter, 25 May 1963)" in the internal affairs of member states was the most crucial, and this principle in the Charter hindered its position in resolving intra-state conflicts which have erupted especially in 1990s. The conflict in Burundi confirms that the OAU needs to make a substantial move away from the policy not to intervene in the affairs of its members. The paradigm shift would be experienced with the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and would bring the principle of non-indifference and right to intervene. At the same time, revealing the mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms at regional and sub-regional levels based on the understanding of "African Solutions to African Problems" would shape the peace and security architecture in the continent (Obasanjo, 2015). Particularly, if it was clearly stated when and under what conditions the conflicts would be intervened in OAU period, it would have been possible to prevent the genocidal level of violence in Burundi during the 1990s. So, it should be established the criteria for when interference into the internal affairs of a member state is appropriate and acceptable. In order to architect peace and stability in Africa, the OAU should also redefined itself with a specific mandate and certain standards of conduct as a guide for all members and for all of the acts of the union.

What is more, the sub-regional initiatives in the Great Lakes Region should be strengthened and expanded in scope and purpose. Political boundaries, land shortages, ethnic divisions (Griggs, 1999), social-ethnic cleavages, the fragility of multi-ethnic states, the problems on natural resources, large scale direct violence and mass killings, a high level of structural violence, and impunity were just a few of the prevalent Great Lakes regional challenges, in terms of both conflict sources and consequences. Since the peoples and countries in the region are inextricably interdependent with each other, any lasting peace process in a country must consider the social, economic, and physical linkages in entire region (Sida, 2004). The close proximity, ethnic population overlap, the scarcity of resources, the compelling needs of the masses, and the support of some neighboring countries for rebel groups make them interdependent (Griggs, 1999). In this context,

a Great Lakes sub-regional initiative should identify the common interests on both co-operative and competitive issues like basic needs, defense, security, ecology, economy, humanitarian concerns and stability. Besides, it is critical to determine if they have any other mutual interests, and the organizations should design an agenda for achieving these objectives based on the shared interests. A code of conduct could then be created according to the parameters of whether certain conduct serves or blocks the mutual interests. When it is decided that a member state is acting against the common good, the organization should have a process in place to take disciplinary measures ranging from official reprimands to imposition of sanctions, exclusion from the organization, or actual forceful interventions.

In the interest of maintaining positive peace, long-term efforts should be made to expand public and governmental thinking about the meaning of geographical boundaries. An enhanced understanding of how the boundaries were historically formed and how the regional countries were interdependent with each other will facilitate these efforts. The interdependency and transnational links not only explain the spread of conflicts in the region, but also reveals the importance of developing regional peace policies (Rubin, 2006). Exploration might be made concerning the region heading in the same directions as the trend of European Union. Under this approach, the Great Lakes Region would be designated as an entity composed of nations, tribes, municipalities, villages, ethnic identity groups and other structures. This entity could then monitor, manage and adjust boundaries, and exchange resources more freely to meet the basic physical and identity needs of the varied population in the region. This would have the effect of collectively strengthening all of the regional actors' security and competitive position in the global economy (Lund, 1996). It is also important to recognize the challenges and roadblocks to regional cooperation, such as lack of political commitment and capacity, current regional political and economic asymmetries, ongoing distrust and mutual suspicion among the states in the Great Lakes Region (Westerkamp et al., 2009). In that sense, many peace efforts from conflict prevention to conflict transformation will also depend on overcoming the barriers on the way of regional integration.

Another critical problem in search for peace in Burundi is about the governmental and political issues. As the most significant cause behind the African conflicts, the nature of political power in many African countries is built on certain characteristics, such as a winner-takes-all system, a lack of transparency, a breakdown of the rule of law, human rights violations, and the inability to replace leaders peacefully (UN A/52/871, 13 April 1998). The Burundian government, like the other major players in the region, has a highly centralized power. This has contributed not only to the government's corruption and lack of accountability, but also its engagement in humanitarian abuses and genocide more easily. For example, the past genocide in Burundi was the product of state-directed violence (Griggs, 1999). From this point, a conflict intervention process

should endeavor to dismantle corruption, as well as extensive bureaucratic power and dictatorship throughout the region. The reconstruction of the government must also seek to expand participation in the government and all affairs of the nation at a grass-root level (Burton, 1997). Thus, the intervention design in Burundi should put a greater emphasis on strengthening the local governments and reducing power centralization.

As well as dealing with the governmental issues, creating a reliable internal justice system in Burundi would be a strong supporter of any political efforts and peace initiatives in the long term. An effective intervention design must establish justice and reconciliation mechanisms that have the ability to address past grievances and prevent conflict from resurfacing as a start-up condition. The rationale for justice and reconciliation is the belief that confronting and investigating the past is an inextricable part of the post-conflict peacebuilding, and a key for a more peaceful future (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Approaches to justice are discussed in the literature in two ways: retributive and restorative. The retributive justice seeks to punish the past injustices like war crimes and human rights violations. Legal instruments such as criminal trials in national and international courts and tribunals, as well as reforming the current national justice system, are mostly included in retributive justice (Albin, 2009). In Burundi, a special tribunal should be formed to prosecute all warring factions for unspeakable war crimes and human rights abuses, and to prevent them from committing similar crimes in the future (Human Rights Watch, 2009). As a type of more or less physical compulsion, this legitimate force would serve the integration and adaptation functions of a political system (Almond, 1960). It is also consistent with Sandole and Lund's premise that both competitive and cooperative processes are essential to maintain positive peace, and they can be complementary to each other (Sandole, 1999; Lund, 1996).

The restorative justice approach focuses on repairing and compensating the victims, restoring relationships, and reconciling societies including former adversaries. The most popular restoration methods include truth commissions and truth telling, reparation and compensation, forgiveness and apologies (Albin, 2009). For example, Furlong uses the "triangle of satisfaction" to analyze the success of the peace and believes that psychological measures -like an apology- take place in one of the triangle's corners (Furlong, 2005). A truth and reconciliation commission could also help Burundi in dealing with the atrocities committed during the conflict. The Arusha Agreement states that the parties agree in principle to create such a commission, but the details or a timeline are not specified. Given that both the Hutu and Tutsi have been recognized as victims of genocide at different times, it is critical here to involve external actors like the UN, the OAU, and/or other regional actors in the peace process. This allows all sides a sense of trust and fairness in the integrity of peace process.

Furthermore, the Tutsi political elite dominated the existing judiciary in the country, and it is important to establish a truth commission independent from the government

authority or judiciary. According to David Easton, political life is a boundary-maintaining series of interactions embedded in and surrounded by other social systems. However, the political interaction differs from the others because its primary objective is to authoritatively establish the values for the society (Easton, 1965). The principal inputs in this political system are demands and supports, while the primary outputs are the decisions allocating systems benefits (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The truth and reconciliation commission would serve one of Easton's output functions based on previously established rules and criteria for decision. The manner in which it handled this role would further provide a model for society as an alternative way of conflict management and set standards for acceptable behavior based on cooperative as opposed to competitive process.

The people's belief in imagining a shared future for all by using restorative justice methods is further at the heart of reconciliation, as a necessary condition for positive peace (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Thousands of survivors of the violent conflicts have lost family members and they are permanently wounded emotionally or physically scarred for life. A national dialogue conducted through professionally facilitated town or village meetings would be helpful in eliciting acknowledgement and fostering mutual forgiveness among the masses (Saunders, 1999). Moreover, problem-solving workshops and sustained dialogues would be effective formats for government officials and policy makers to use together. The facilitated community meetings and dialogues can also be used as a mechanism for consensus building and as a feedback mechanism concerning the progress of the restructuring the society.

In moving from negative to positive peace, internal systems need to be put into place that allow for what Talcott Parsons refers to as an "ordered process" of change that maintains equilibrium (Parsons & Shils, 1962). One of the ways that Parsons' posits that order is maintained in systems as they undergo change is through the formulation of common values for all members of society. Parsons further articulates the need for the differentiation of interests among the varied peoples in society in a pluralistic fashion that cuts across historic lines of differentiation between them (Parsons, 1967; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). In some ways, this is what the Burundi government may have been trying to achieve when they mandated that political parties were not to be based on ethnicity. Nevertheless, when the government attempted to enforce this mandate, political parties were the only organized vehicle available to parties seeking change and fulfillment of their needs. Consequently, the people ignored the government's mandate and political parties remained divided along ethnic lines. On the other hand, most political interests tend to be aligned with ethnic identity due to the long-standing structural violence. As the parties gradually reached economic, educational and political parity, it might be possible to develop identities for more pluralistic interests. This is why the intervention program must also include affirmative action

to provide education, employment, economic opportunities and fair representation to the Hutus in the country. Gradual privatization of the country's economic resources could also open up new avenues for economic parity. Moreover, individual projects, self-sufficiency in food production, the growth of small and medium-sized businesses should all be supported in the intervention.

The intervention program for Burundi should not ignore the fact that Tutsi and Hutu share more in common than differences. Indeed, the Arusha Agreement emphasized the common beliefs, identities, substantial history, language and culture of all ethnic groups in Burundi. Therefore, the differences are largely the product of social construction and resulting social perception. To the extent possible, caution must be taken to ensure that the new social and political system developed in Burundi is structured from new images in order to preserve positive peace (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The existing enemy images and stereotypes that shape Tutsi and Hutu conflictual interaction patterns must be systematically counteracted with new information and images about one another (Öğretir & Özçelik, 2008; Özçelik, 2010). Kenneth Boulding discusses how members of a political system form a mass image referred as folk image, and he argues that political leaders' decisions are shaped by the folk image and the conflicting information is screened out (Boulding, 1959; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). As a result, the decision-makers make decisions based on distortions of perception and potential misinterpretation of information. Then, such folk image or knowledge is perpetuated in stereotypes and scapegoating of conflict parties in role defense by leaders (Sandole, 1999). In Burundi, the goal should be to establish a societal-value system centered on a social ideal and vision that promotes constructive behavior and harmonious relations between the Tutsi and Hutu which actually creates cognitive dissonance with respect to destructive behavior based on the old folk knowledge.

Such programs in the Arusha Agreement like imposition of quotas and certain proportional representation in the government or military are necessary and beneficial inasmuch as they address structural violence, foster interaction and expose Hutu and Tutsi to each other. They also counterbalance negative belief systems, promote interdependence and require the parties to collaborate toward mutual goals within the context of the organizations. Nevertheless, these programs are not sufficient alone to sustain positive peace in the long run because of the power of the society's collective memory, chosen trauma and folk knowledge which shape future decisions and actions. In Burundi, each group holds a deep-rooted belief that the other cannot be trusted. No matter how short-term action one's opponent takes, Hutu and Tutsi each believe that one will try to surreptitiously dominate or eliminate the other group. The Tutsi also foster the notion that Hutu are incapable of running the country. As well as ethnically differentiated access to resources and power starting from the pre-colonial period (Griggs, 1999), the imagined distinction between "Tutsi lords" and "Hutu serfs" and

the Tutsi dominance over the Hutu people by colonial practices bolstered that belief (Lemarchand, 1970). When it comes to financial success in agriculture, industry, business and mining, as well as placement in the military and government, there is still a great disparity between the two groups. Moreover, the Hutu are less educated and have few economic options aside from working on Tutsi-run plantations or engaging in illegal cross-border trade in ivory, gold, diamonds, heroin and guns (Griggs, 1999). Structural violence that occurs in various alienated forms in this environment such as failure to meet basic needs (Burton, 1990), rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964), or relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) brings with it the frustration (Sandole, 1998). Therefore, a conflict intervention design in Burundi should deal with the domination, frustration, oppression and the perception of longstanding oppression in society.

A behavioral-scientific approach would also be crucial in Burundi aimed at enhancing international cooperation and preventing conflicts between the two communities by launching a re-education and re-socialization initiative for both policy-makers and the masses. This initiative includes educational programs, cultural exchanges, and training of children, citizens and government officials with new methods (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The combination of programs to facilitate increased actual educational and economic parity between the Hutu and Tutsi and to change their belief systems is necessary to address both the physical and structural violence in the nation. Furthermore, reconditioning and indeed even transformation of the people's psychological attitudes toward each other and toward peaceful methods of conflict resolution can also be achieved through the use of mass media (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). The media can help to promote peace in a variety of ways, such as building bridges between peoples, improving governance, increasing true information on conflictual issues, providing early warning, and motivating people to resolve the conflicts (Idris, 2020). Nonetheless, as seen in the Rwandan genocide, it plays a negative role in the fostering of ethnic hatred by facilitating and legitimizing violence (Chalk, 2007). Subsequently, a "hate media" trial was held to prosecute those responsible for this media violence during the tragic period in Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2007; Biju-Duval, 2007). In this respect, a conflict intervention including re-education and re-socialization programs should make active use of the media in peacebuilding, but never underestimate the risk of its turning into a weapon of societal hatred.

Finally, reintegration policies must be seen as a part of the conflict intervention. The Arusha Agreement provides the principles of rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration for all displaced, regrouped and dispersed persons as well as returnees (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000). In 1996, thousands of Hutu civilians in the conflict-ridden provinces of the country were forced to leave their homes and a new category of displaced persons known as "regrouped" emerged in the camps. Along with the forced relocation, the regroupment process has resulted in severe human rights violations

in Burundi, such as extrajudicial executions, property destruction, undue restrictions on freedom of movement, disappearances, vulnerability to attacks and security risk, life-threatening and appalling camp conditions. This also means that the basic human needs related to health, safety, shelter, hygiene and nutrition were not met for those people (Amnesty International, 15 July 1997). It is difficult for people to address the societal rebuilding and reconciliation when their very survival is at stake and basic physical needs are not being met yet. So, the intervention process in Burundi must involve both internal social policies and immediate humanitarian assistance for food, health care, and shelter as well as the physical reconstruction of the villages. Coordination between Hutu and Tutsi in this phase may allow them to recognize a superordinate goal that will lead to a transformation of their relationship.

Conclusion

Given the international community has not been adequately prepared for civil wars in 1990s, and the discipline of conflict resolution has just begun to emerge as a multi-level, cosmopolitan and viable field of study, the Arusha process in Burundi was a remarkable achievement (Leonhardt, 2001). This regionally initiated and internationally supported conflict intervention process has been culminated in a peace agreement which proposes multiple solutions and mechanisms to the country's most dramatic and violent conflict by addressing the underlying causes and conditions. The Arusha Peace Agreement put an end to the atmosphere of strife and violence provoked by using of ethnic issues as a tool of strong political, economic and social dominance, and in the first place succeeded in bringing a state of negative peace to the country. However, the shortcomings of the agreement and the difficulties faced mostly in the implementation phase, reveal the need for multi-level conflict intervention and guide for positive peace in Burundian multi-level conflict. As Sandole's three pillar model classifies, the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict at the individual, societal, international, and ecological levels should have been addressed in an effective conflict intervention design in Burundi.

The Arusha Peace Agreement combines competitive and cooperative components, negative and positive peace approaches, as well as Track1 and Track2 methods in order to deal with the violent conflict in Burundi. Stopping the violence and achieving negative peace between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi is undoubtedly a vital step, but achieving positive peace by utilizing such competition, cooperation, Track1 and Track2 tailored to the circumstances, requires much longer-term strategies and preparation. Aside from physical violence, structural violence with its economic, political, social and psychological dimensions at any level must also be addressed in a conflict intervention in the long-term. Unfulfilled human needs such as security, identity and recognition; political, economic and social inequalities; human rights violations, chosen trauma, hate speech, enemy image and frustration are among the underlying causes and conditions

of the conflict in Burundi, and until these issues are resolved, it cannot be accomplished conflict resolution or conflict transformation objectives for positive peace. Overcoming such problems would also strengthen the conflict intervention and peace process in Burundi by preventing not only the occurrence of new conflicts, but also the recurrence of old ones.

Third parties would contribute to the country's peaceful future by supporting the legal reforms and tribunals, as well as establishing justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Burundi. Ensuring the rule of law in the country and developing a functioning justice system are integral parts of positive peace in an intervention process. This involves both punishing past human rights abuses, and healing the deep wounds of the society. Truth and reconciliation commissions, truth-telling, confronting the past, forgiveness and apologies, even if painful, could help society learn from its past experiences, and build a strong future by making the truth available when Burundian people were "ready". Tools such as problem-solving workshops, media, international aid, foreign assistance, economic incentives, as well as rehabilitation, social cohesion and disarmament programs are all among the instruments that can be used at this stage. Moreover, a conflict intervention in Burundi would inevitably be more effective if it appealed to a broad segment of the population, and civil society would have the potential to play a key role in fostering a dialogue environment.

Another important factor in an effective intervention was sub-regional and regional cooperation, which helped to prevent the conflict's spill-over impacts and neighboring countries' support for the conflicting parties. In this sense, Arusha process as a mediation launched by the neighboring countries and regional leaders was a clear example of regional cooperation and Africa's quest for solutions to its own problems. It is not easy to overcome the destructive impact of colonial policies and sowing discord among the people in the region, but a conflict intervention should emphasize the shared values and common interests rather than discrepancies both in the country and in the region. Regional and international organizations, as well as international community should also have contributed to this cooperation. However, despite the significance of any outside assistance or cooperation, the real solution to the conflicts in Burundi lies within the Burundian society itself. Remembering this, every group in Burundi who has lived peacefully together for centuries must work hard in a broad consensus and have a strong will to achieve positive peace by pushing the political elites to put into practice the required legal, economic, political and social structures. In fact, when this point is reached, conflict intervention efforts will be completed their mission in Burundi.

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