

Changing the Pattern of Warfare in Africa: Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

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Abstract. *The paper focuses on the changing pattern of warfare in Africa arising from the proliferation of armed non-state groups ranging from ethnic militias, Islamist fundamentalist, rebel groups and insurgent movements. It argues that the insurgency is rooted in the complex identity crisis as a result of pluralism of states in Africa. The paper seeks to advance our understanding of African conflicts, or warfare, by going beyond the conventional and fashionable analysis among Euro-centric and some Afro-centric scholars. Combining some theoretical insights and rich empirical details, the paper illuminates the forces and factors that are responsible for the insurgency in Nigeria and the effects on the socio-economic and political stability. Nigeria offers the most fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalization. In such environment, one aggrieved would unleash terror as a way to drive their demand. The data collected through secondary sources will be qualitatively analyzed. It concludes that a rich and culture-sensitive approach of neutralizing terrorist radicalization, promotion of religious moderation, non-violent approach to conflict resolution, mutual co-existence will be the basis for peace and stability in Nigeria.*

Keywords: *Warfare, War, Insurgency, Terrorism, Regular, Irregular, Guerrilla Warfare, Political Islam, Radical extremism.*

Introduction

In the last three decades, the pattern of warfare has changed in terms of targets, weaponry, tactics, lethality, ideology, and location with the increasing nature of intra-state wars. The changes that have been witnessed in the conduct of warfare are due to the following: first, globalization has made it easier for insurgent groups to travel, transfer information and transmit ideas from one region of the world to the other. The advancement of science and technology has contributed to the creation of weapons that

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are very handy and portable for the purpose of inflicting injury on the innocent citizens. In West Africa, the free movement of people within the region makes it possible for the terrorist group(s) to aid insurgency in northeast Nigeria. Secondly, the world of the Internet has further revolutionized the pattern of warfare as it opened the door for new channels of information flow. Through the use of the internet, it is easy for information to be gathered about the state by the insurgents.

In the past, African wars were fought with spears and arrows in the earlier centuries, before the use of firearms in the early 1432 when *harquebus*, a form of musket, was introduced into Egypt by Mamluks (Willie & Hunt, 2005). This also followed with the use of ship-mounted weapons in Africa. Firearms gradually became standard military weapons among African peoples. In the Ashanti Empire of Ghana, muskets were popular weapons of war. The pastoralist Maasai people of East Africa used traditional weapons: the long spear; the *rungu* – a club which is both a striking and throwing weapon, and the knife sharpened on both edges. The Bantu-speaking Zulu people of South Africa represented a major improvement in tactics and organization (Willie & Hunt, 2005). The Zulu warrior Shaka brought changes in weaponry, organization, and tactics in the 18th century which earned him the name “Black Napoleon” after the French general and tactician Napoleon Bonaparte.

Shaka changed the standard armament of his troops by replacing the use of spears used for conventional wars with long-bladed, short shafted stabbing spear called *assagai*. The *assagai* forced the Zulu soldiers to fight at close quarters. In the southern part of Upper Guinea coast the use of firearms slowly and unevenly developed. The use of bows, arrows and javelin was fashionable for fighting African wars in the 18th century. Although guns and gunpowder weapons were used, they were not as sophisticated as the modern guns which have high power force. The gunpowder was transformed in the art of war in the Gold Coast as was the case in Upper Guinea. It was also proved to be of some value to Dahomey (Thornton, 1999).

The United States Marine Corps in 1989 classified warfare into four generations. According to Lindstrom (2012, p. 32), the first generation warfare (1GW) started with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and went on until around 1860. During this period in Europe, states set up armies who clashed on traditional battlefields, using the tactics of line and column. At this time, it was possible to distinguish military from civilian with their uniforms, saluting, and gradation of rank. The weapons used were muskets and cannons just like in the traditional African warfare. Europe, during the Industrial Age, adopted second generation warfare (2GW), as military technology began to advance, weapons of war were produced on a massive scale. Military tactics were equally changed based on fire and movement coupled with massive arms acquired which invariably determine the success of the state in war. Instructively, weapons and communication systems and other logistics of war were developed to fight the war effectively. The third

generation warfare (3GW) emerged during the First and Second World Wars when the Germans introduced the concept of Blitzkrieg - to quickly overcome the opponent by "shock operations". In the case of fourth generation warfare (4GW), adversaries almost exclusively use non-linear tactics that are directed against both military and civilian targets. The activities and operations of the terrorist, guerrilla and insurgent groups fall under the category of 4GW, which are different from the conventional armies. These groups are insufficiently trained both physically and psychologically for any conventional warfare.

Indeed, in the 20th century, warfare in Africa has changed dramatically from the traditional conventional method to the use of conventional modern weapons in the conduct of warfare. The military technology has changed with rapidity in the areas such as aircraft, missiles, nuclear bombs and other weapons. As a result, there is a change in the method of waging war. The world generally is undergoing transformation in science and technology which has improved transportation and communication and facilitated interaction among people of different regions and religions (Wright, 1964). In other words, the movement of global ideas, cultures and resources have helped to shape how people fight (Reno, 2009, p. 7). The basic problematic is that because of the interdependent nature of the world, the shrinkage, rapid change in science and technology, the methods of carrying out warfare has equally changed. For a successful attack of terrorist, insurgency needs sufficient communications, an intelligence effort to gather required information, the ability to move people and raise and move necessary funds to support their operations.

The operations of today terrorists have remained largely conventional. According to Mahan and Griset (2008, p. 137), terrorists of the 21st century adhere to the familiar and narrow tactical patterns because they have mastered them. Equally important, they are likely to believe that conventional tactics optimize their likelihood of success. The four basic tactics of the terrorist insurgency are assassinations of public figures, the murder of civilians and genocide, hijackings, kidnapping, hostage taking and barricade incidents, bombings and armed assaults (Mahan and Griset, 2008). It is against this background that this paper examines the changing nature of terrorist insurgency as a form of irregular warfare in Africa. The paper is divided into five segments: the introduction and conceptual clarification, theoretical argument and framework, understanding the changing pattern of warfare, efforts towards addressing insurgency, and the conclusion.

Warfare Explained

Since the end of Second World War the concepts of subversive and revolutionary warfare have emerged in the lexicon of war study. It differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies in a battle (Trinquier,

1964, p. 6). Modern warfare is often less a matter of confrontation between professional armies than one grinding struggles between military and civilians in the same country. In this type of warfare, the enemy army is annihilated completely, but is no longer the case in subversive and revolutionary warfare. Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions which are political, economic, psychological, and military that aims at the overthrow of the established order and authority in a country and replacement by another regime (Trinquier, 1964). To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country, attacks ideological, social, religious, economic values and any conflict that is likely to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. In modern warfare, we are not grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

Wars can be defined as essentially low-intensity internal conflicts that last longer. Today, wars are fought from apartment windows and in lanes of villages and suburbs, where distinctions between combatant and non-combatant quickly melt away. Clausewitz defines war as:

An act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfil our Will... Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without impairing its power. Violence... is, therefore, the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object.... In such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application.... To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity (Trainquier, 1964, p. 22).

Similarly, conventional and unconventional warfare refers to the weapons and forces conducting operations. Thus, irregular warfare may be conducted by conventional or unconventional forces, or both, depending on the circumstances and the operational environment (United States Air Force, 2007, p. 3). The irregular warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of warfare distinctively different from traditional war. It includes among others activities such as insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism and counterterrorism. Thus, in this regard, a proper classificatory scheme of warfare can be made.

Typology of Warfare

Irregular/Asymmetric Warfare:

The concept of asymmetric warfare arguably relate to the concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare”, which refers to conflicts in which one of the parties in the conflict is not a state and where the state loses its monopoly to wage war against decentralized non-state actors not adhering to the rules of conventional warfare (Ferreira, 2011, p. 52). The irregular warfare can take a variety of forms and be practiced in different modes, even within the same conflict (Gray, 2007, p. 40). It can be described as unconventional warfare which has to do with a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogates forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source (United States Air Force, 2007, p. 2). It includes among others guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (United States Air Force, 2007). In the case of irregular warfare, anything goes, anything that might work.

Accordingly, the United States Air Force (2007, p. 2) defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy influence over the relevant populations. It favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will”.

In a more distinctive way, irregular war has the following features (Gray, 2007, pp. 43-44):

- a. Irregular warfare is warfare waged in a style, or styles, that are non-standard for the regular forces at issue. The enemy is unlikely to be in the service of a state.
- b. Irregular warfare is contrasted with common banditry, crime, or recreational brig-and and hooliganism; it needs an ideology. Ideas and culture usually do matter in warfare. But for an insurgency to mobilize and grow, it has to have a source of spiritual and/or political inspiration.
- c. Arguably, all warfare is about politics. It is the political dimension that gives meaning to the bloody activity. In the case of regular warfare, politics usually take the back seat until the military issue is resolved. In the case of irregular warfare, there will probably be no military decision except that military behaviour must be conducted for its political effects because those effects, in the minds of the public, comprise the true field of decision.

The principal difference between regular and irregular war is that regular or conventional war involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment, training, and doctrine. In the case of irregular war or insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetric and the weaker, and almost always a sub-state group attempts to bring about political

change by administering and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe through the use of guerrilla tactics (Kiras, n.d). The tactics adopted in an insurgent war are usually hit-and-run raids and ambushes against local security forces.

The regular or conventional warfare focuses on the government, the military and the people. Irregular warfare focuses on the people and the military. The main aim of two actions both from the regular and irregular warfare is to influence the government (Ferreira, 2011).

Irregular warfare can be distinguished from traditional warfare primarily by the approach and strategy used to achieve the effects desired. Traditional warfare seeks a change in the policies and practices, if not in the outright existence, of a government by coercing key government leaders or defeating them militarily. Conversely, irregular warfare seeks to undermine a group, government, or ideology, by influencing the population, which is often the centre of gravity (United States Air Force, 2007, p. 3).

Regular/Symmetric Warfare

Regular warfare, as the name suggests, is a conventional warfare that is symmetric in nature. In this type of warfare, the two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall. This is a situation where regular armed or combatant forces are present to undertake regular activities. This traditional warfare is characterized by the confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states (United States Air Force, 2007, p. 2). This confrontation typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The objectives may be to convince or coerce key military or political decisions makers, defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.

Insurgency

Insurgency may be defined as organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage and armed conflict to achieve aims. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to (i) overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution, (ii) establish the autonomous national territory within the borders of a state, (iii) cause the withdrawal of an occupying power, and (iv) extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means. Arguably, insurgencies have some enduring characteristics, that is, they are ultimately about politics, just as war is a continuation of politics. Second, no two insurgencies can ever be the same because political conditions are never alike. Third, insurgencies begin with criminal acts (Killebrew, 2012).

Insurgency is not conventional war or terrorism, but it shares the same attribute of the use of force to achieve political ends. The difference may simply be the scope and scale of violence. The insurgency more often than not enjoys the support and mobilization of a significant proportion of the population.

Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare can be defined as the overt military aspect of the insurgency. They exist alongside their counterparts, the auxiliary and the underground. Guerrilla warfare is a strategy used by non-state actors to impose costs on an adversary, who is usually the armed forces of the state as the main target. It is a hit-and-run tactics. The assumption is that since the guerrilla fighters strength cannot be equated with that of the regular and state military force, they device means of ambushing them. They often operate with the support of the local people who give intelligence information, food, and at times, shelter at night.

Terrorism

Terrorism rarely results in political change, but it may be a strategy for change in a violent way. Terrorism is defined as the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 defines terrorism as "...criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act..."(UNSC, S/RES/1566/2004).

The United States defines it as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Mahan and Griset, 2008, p. 3; Lindstrom, 2012). In the Code of Federal Regulations, terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Mahan and Griset, 2008, p. 3). Scholar Bruce Hoffman (2006) defines terrorism as the the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political change (cited in Mahan and Griset, 2008, p. 4). Laqueur (1977, p. 79) defines it as the use of covert violence by a group for political ends. The Global Terrorism Database and the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism classify terrorism as actions outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That means only acts which are contrary to international humanitarian law, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians, conducted by sub-national actors are viewed as terrorism (Global

Terrorism Index Report, 2014, p. 41). It invokes a distinct political and ideological message to be conveyed to a larger audience than immediate victims.

What is common in the definitions of terrorism is that they all share the view that it has to do with violence carried out by non-state actors. Although, terrorism can be employed by state actors against the citizens, that is, employing terror to compel obedience. It is also an act that is politically motivated, which may be subjective interest or motive. The definitional elements found in terrorism are violence or force, political motivation, engendering fear and terror, using a threat, psychological effects, and victim-target differentiations (Mahan and Griset, 2008, p. 5).

In view of these varied definitions, terrorism is one of the asymmetric/ irregular warfare. According to Thornton (1999), a terrorist organization is a typical asymmetric adversary, since it lacks in both number and military equipment, but can cause devastating damage to the society. Terrorists have been accorded the status of non-state actors that can influence or exert pressures on the international system. They tend to argue that they should be granted rights of lawful combatants and that the unlawful methods used are only a consequence of the superior opponent's excessive acts.

Distinctions can be found from these three definitions, but it must be noted that traditional and irregular warfare are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict. First, guerrillas are seen as a subcomponent of insurgencies that work overtly toward the latter's counter-regime goals, typically organized not too unlike general purpose forces. Second, each, of the five goals of an insurgency- the violent arm of a given resistance movement- centres on attacking regimes. In comparison, the goals of terrorists are not specific to governments but rather focus on broader ideological intentions. Perhaps, terrorists may not even feel the need to target governments. Instead, they may choose to attack societies directly in order to achieve a particular aim. Hence, by definition terrorists are not concerned with regime change, reallocation of power, or challenging existing social and political orders. In another way, we can say that insurgents use ideology to target governments, but terrorists target governments (or societies) to advance an ideology.

Boko Haram combined all the elements of terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare, therefore, these terms can be used interchangeably, but the appropriate word is insurgency since the rebellion is directed against constituted authority to achieve political or religious goals.

Analytic Framework

The logical sequence of the theoretical arguments of the insurgency are attributable to those factors that form the common narration of causes of conflicts in Africa. These are linked with domestic grievances or circumstances that may trigger insurgency. The theory of 'greed' and 'grievance' by Collier and Hoeffler are useful explanatory vari-

ables. These two contrasting models help us to understand the motivations for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The grievances model refers to inequality, political oppression, ethnic and religious motivations for conflict, which are domestic grievances (cited in Ferreira, 2011). Similarly, Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis (2005) considered four objective measures of grievance: ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.

While the greed model refers to the sources of finance to motivate the civil war, this will apply to the insurgency in the northeast Nigeria where the group rely on internal and external sources of finance from the perceived faceless politicians. No doubt, African intrastate wars are mostly driven by economic (greed) motivations in mineral-rich countries like Nigeria. It is argued that corruption in governance induces greed that motivates marginalized people to act for change. Thus, the marginalized group may seek political power for self-aggrandizement (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010, p. 221). Although, 'greed' thesis may be applied completely in the case of insurgency in the northeast since corruption is a product of greed it is, therefore, reasonable to say that greed can lead to grievance. It is the ethnic and regional politics of hegemony, exclusion, prebendalism that is the heart of the grievances in the northeast are the product of the greed of the ruling class (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010).

We can, therefore, link the theory of grievance to Ted Gurr psychological model of relative deprivation popularised in 1970. He emphasizes the relative deprivation gap between expectations and capabilities (Anifowose, 2011, p. 6). According to him, relative deprivation as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually believe they get. In this regard, the greed and grievance models can be combined to provide good analysis and understanding of motivations for the insurgency in most parts of Africa. To this extent, the models will be used as an explanatory variable for insurgency or irregular warfare in Nigeria (Ferreira, 2011).

Arguably, increasing loss of state capacities will provide the conditions for various ethnic militia or insurgent groups to rise to challenge the authority of the state. The absence of local authority can bring about the growth of safe havens for powerful non-state actors like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and other terrorist groups. The state has the primary responsibility for maintaining public order, organising and controlling the military, dispensing justice, managing conflicts among groups and individuals living in the territory, promoting general welfare, reducing inequalities among others (Adekanye, 2007, p. 139). The paradox of most African states is that they are not able to discharge their responsibilities to the people. This may result in groups organizing themselves as either militant or insurgent to draw the attention of the government on their plight. In other words, the grievance of the insurgent group against the government may be poverty, which has been ravaging the people since independence, especially in the northern Nigeria. The debilitating economic conditions of the country leading to a

number of youths who are unemployed to join the insurgent group in either in the Niger Delta region and northeast Nigeria. In this vein, we turn our theoretical lenses to the motivating factors such as political, cultural, religious, economic, and radical extremism.

The Changing Pattern of Warfare

In the 21st century, warfare has changed in tactics and weaponry. The modern warfare is based on technological adaptation which has resulted in its lethality and destructiveness. The new pattern of warfare is characterised by the following tactics:

1. Targeting civilians and vulnerable groups such as children, women, and refugees rather than the armed forces of the state. The deliberate attacks against civilians and increasingly turning children into primary targets of war who are not only recruited into armed groups but are abducted in large numbers as child soldiers. Often, the strategic areas are targeted by the insurgents such as health care centres, emergency services are disrupted and law enforcement agencies especially the police are targeted and private property of government officials and citizens. Modern warfare also creates refugees and internally displaced persons that are usually targets of attack (Allen, 1999, p. 369). Even humanitarian activities that were once safe from attack are now treated as legitimate military targets. Relief convoys, health clinics and feeding centres have all become targets. In 2013, Boko Haram targeted businesspeople like the Manager of the Nigerian Flour Mills, Senior Police Officers at the Divisional Police headquarters in Borno State, and people with government connections like the former Minister of Petroleum Resources.
2. Kidnapping, abduction and hostage-taking: The major feature of Boko Haram insurgency is the kidnapping and abduction. Kidnapping and hostage taking were major tactics by the insurgents in Niger Delta. Sexual abuse of women through raping, abduction and kidnapping are becoming more often a systematic policy and weapon of war. During the 1994 genocide in Rwandan women were subjected to sexual violence on a massive scale, perpetrated by members of the Hutu militia group. It has been estimated that more than 20,000 women have been raped since the Balkan war began in 1992 ("Patterns in Conflict: Civilians are now the target", n.d). In Nigeria, Boko Haram admitted abduction of more than 200 Secondary schoolgirls at Chibok in April 14th, 2014. The Boko Haram in its characteristic manner of admitting any attack carried by its operators announced that the girls were kidnapped to become slaves and wives for their members(Global Terrorism Index Report, 2014, p. 19).
3. Extreme brutality also characterised new pattern of warfare. This was the practice in the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone in recent African history. According to Allen (1999), all warfare involves brutal force, even barbarous acts. During the Liberian civil war, there was 'appalling atrocities committed by the rebel fighters, particularly the practice of cannibalism, while in Sierra Leone there was random slaughter and mutilation by chopping off hands, feet, ears, etc. of civilians. Women were brutally

abused as sex partners for the rebels who were forced in a brutal manner to live with them in the bush to satisfy the sexual desire of the rebels. Besides, the new warfare involves forceful conscription of individuals to participate in the killings of neighbours and family members. There were several cases of killing of father and mother in a family leaving their children by Boko Haram. In the past, in many African societies, there were rules and customs that in fierce battle it is forbidden to attack women and children. This is no longer the case in modern African warfare.

4. The new warfare has been characterised by looting, even though this was the pattern in the conduct of warfare in the primitive Africa. For instance, in the famous Benin Massacre of the 17th century, there was looting of the arts and artefacts by the British. In modern African warfare, looting was carried out in Liberia and Sierra Leone of their natural resources such as diamond, gold, and timber by the rebels. These resources were sold to buy modern weapons to prosecute the war.
5. Weapons and tactics have changed. There are more sophisticated weapons used now compared to the weapons used in the pre-colonial and colonial wars. Explosives, such as bombs, dynamites, black powder and Molotov cocktails, are now used as conventional tools of warfare. Although, bombs are also unconventional weapons as technology and innovation combine to create explosive weapons of mass destruction (Mahan and Griset, 2008, p. 141).
6. The technology of war has also changed in ever more deadly ways. Inexpensive new lightweight weapons have made it tragically easy to use children as the cannon-fodder of modern warfare. For instance, AK-47 is popularly used in modern African internal wars. This weapon is simple enough for a child of ten to strip and reassemble and be bought at low prices. In Nigeria, Boko Haram explosives and suicide bombers are adopted since 2009 and used as a common tactics of organized crime and gangs, focusing on armed assaults using firearms and knives apart from bombing or suicide tactics used by large terrorist groups. The armed assault has claimed 85 per cent of deaths in Nigeria while bombing or explosions account for five per cent of deaths (Global Terrorism Index Report, 2014).
7. Boko Haram is operating at a level short of the normal way terrorists operate in terms of the sophistication of weapons, rather they use simple improvised explosive devices commonly used to cause damage. The improvised explosive devices is a bomb that is made of either military components or commercially sourced explosive material, detonators, and trigger mechanisms (Lindstrom, 2012). Improvised explosive devices could be attached to vehicles with some substantial quantities undetected by security agents. The explosives have caused thousands of deaths in the northern Nigeria used by suicide bombers. From 2000 to 2013 there were 750 attacks carried out using explosives, bombs/dynamites and firearms. In some other countries where terrorism has reached its climax in terms of mode of operation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are used such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (Lindstrom, 2012, p. 37).

8. The internet has become a medium for the recruitment of terrorist group. It was reported that Al-Qaeda recruited individual cells by facilitating operations within Egypt through information sharing, training, and networking. The bombing in Cairo, Egypt, on 23 February, 2009 was inspired through the internet by an isolated group rather than a 'commanded' or 'guided' group.
9. Female suicide bombers/terrorists are said to be the ultimate asymmetrical weapon (Mahan and Griset, 2008). The Boko Haram is now using women as suicide bombers to kill and injure many people in the northeast Nigeria. The use of detonated explosives are now used by the female bombers. Suicides bombers account for five percent of all the attacks by Boko Haram (Global Terrorism Index Report, 2014, p. 33).

Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Historically, before the emergence of Boko Haram, there were groups such as the Maitastine sect, the Zakzaky Shiite movement, and the Nigerian Taleban in Yobe transformed into Boko Haram. The name has been interpreted to mean 'Western education is sin' or Western Civilisation is forbidden'. Literally in Hausa 'Boko' means "Western or otherwise non-Islamic education", while in Arabic word, 'Haram' figuratively means "sin" (literally means forbidden). Boko Haram cannot be said to be a new invention or creation as its existence can be traced to the early 1960s, but it began to gain the attention of the public in 2002 (Omotosho, 2014, p. 7). The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf from Girgir extraction of Yobe State. Boko Haram represents the uneducated, casual and unskilled labourers and the Almajiris. The Almajiris are derogatorily described as those boys who have no home and depend on the crumbs that fall from the rich people around to survive. The leaders of Boko Haram set up mosques and Islamic schools for the propagation of their faith.

The group began with a semblance of a terrorist group as members of a mosque in the north-east which sought to implement a separatist community under Wahhabi Principles (Global Terrorist Index Report, 2014, p. 53). Boko Haram was indeed founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect advocating a strict form of Sharia law. It developed into a Salafist-jihad group in 2009, influenced by the Wahhabi movement (Global Terrorist Index Report, 2014). The group became violent after the death of one of its leaders, Imam Mohammed Yusuf, who was in the police custody in 2009. A new group was formed after a dispute with police which killed 70 of the sect. The group reported to be responsible for 3,500 civilian deaths since the insurgency began (Global Terrorist Index 2014, p. 53).

The group's ideological plank is Sunni Islamist and seeks to abolish the secular system of government to implement Wahhabi interpretations of Sharia law in Nigeria. There was hullabaloo over full Sharia law implementation in nine states and partial implementation

in three of the 36 states of Nigeria, all of which are in northern Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is seeking the full application of Sharia throughout the entire country. They aim to use acts of terror to further the social divide between Muslim, and Christian groups. Not surprisingly, the group issued an ultimatum to Christians living in the north-east Nigeria to leave or die (Global Terrorist Index Report, 2014, p. 53).

The emergence and transformation of this group from a mere Islamic fundamentalist to political Islamism has been linked to the apparent dissatisfaction with the people of the debilitating economic base of the country. Besides, they contend that there is no separation between what is sacred and the legal system that governs them. The group attempts to pursue the course of Islamization of Nigeria. Since there is a linkage between Nigerian secular state and Christianity, there is no such link between Islamism and Nigerian secular state and, therefore, they vehemently opposed it and demanded for an Islamic state based on Sharia Law (Omotosho, 2014, p. 9). In the midst of this religious sentiment, the group was not unaware of the level of poverty, deteriorating social services and decay in infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising number of unemployed graduates and dwindling productive base of the northern economy among others issues.

The group also resented the democratic enterprise in Nigeria as it was skewed towards political leaders who lead by deception and use Islam as a mere slogan to win the sympathy of their followers. This is the actual twist in their agitation because many have interpreted the activities of the group to be directed against Christians. The group maintained that there is massive corruption in the electoral process that produced candidates based on consensus with the leadership that emerge lacked legitimacy. The group gradually and systematically changed its strategy of advocating for a strict compliance with Islamic laws and principles of Sharia to condemning Western education and secularism. It then began to target northern elites and Islamic clerics who have adapted to Western-styled democracy and secular ideology (Isa, 2010, p. 333). Theoretical reflections flows from grievance which is aptly summarized in the five motivating factors for the insurgency in the northeast Nigeria.

Motivating Factors for Insurgency

1. Political motivation

Insurgencies generally have political objectives. In line with the theoretical argument of grievances, political motivation for insurgencies results from perceived grievances with government's policies. In the case of Boko Haram, there is the general belief that the group is aggrieved because political power has slipped from the Muslims in the North (Hausa-Fulani oligarchs). Politically based insurgencies tend to use latent, underlying social and economic grievances to attract the emotion of the citizenry and even make the people to rebel against the government. The campaign they often carry out against

the government of Nigeria is that it is insensitive to the plight of the common man. This is a general perception among the citizenry which is not peculiar to the northeast where Boko Haram insurgents operate.

The 2011 Presidential elections which saw Goodluck Jonathan emerged as the President did not augur well among the northern elites who felt it was morally right for a northerner to complete the tenure of late Alhaji Musa Yar Adua who died in office before the expiration of his tenure. The argument was morally justifiable, but lack any constitutional merit because the constitution provides that the Vice-President should take over in the event that President is incapacitated.

Boko Haram was now seen as a group to protest the political injustice against the North. This was the situation in the southwest Nigeria in 1993 following the annulment of June 12 Presidential election which was presumed to be won by late M.K.O Abiola. The Yoruba ethnic militia group known as Odua People's Congress (OPC) began to operate in an insurgent manner by making the whole of the southwest Nigeria ungovernable. Thus, the insurgency has become a major weapon to remedy the grievances of marginalization, injustice and oppression. Similarly, in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the people raised militia groups to fight long years of neglect of the region where oil is explored. Ultimately, the insurgents offer alternatives to the people to draw the attention of the government and the emergence of the Presidency of GoodLuck Jonathan from the Niger Delta.

2. Cultural Motivation

Insurgencies may arise from cultural or ethnic differences between groups in a state. In a multi-cultural society, ethnic and cultural differences are explored by groups who want to assert their identity. Samuel Huntington in his famous article, "Clash of Civilization" argues that future conflict on the macro level will result from differences in culture between incompatible civilizations or cultures. The issue of Boko Haram is related to Islamic culture which the insurgents claim that they are protecting. In Sudan, before the independence of South Sudan, the issue of cultural identity compounded the problem of state ethnic relations. Kiras (2015, April 24) argues that in the fourth generation warfare (4GW), networks of warriors will utilize their social and cultural advantages to offset the technological advantages of Western soldiers. Boko Haram falls under the category of 4GW in that it is linked with other Islamic organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and Islamic State (ISIS) rebels.

3. Religious Motivation

Religious beliefs often shape insurgent and terrorist groups course(s) of action as they are used to garner support among community of the faithful. Religion is used as a mobilizing force in pursuit of political goals. In Nigeria politics, though contestable as-

sertion, religion is used to galvanize the members of a particular religious sect. In the just concluded Presidential elections in 2015, the pattern of voting shows clearly how religion could play a role in the choice of leadership compare to 2011 Presidential election where religion was not major decisive factor in the choice of GoodLuck Jonathan. However, the voting pattern still reflected religious dichotomy in 2011. The North is predominantly of Islamic religion, while the south is Christian. The outcome of the election confirms this hypothesis, as Gen. Mohammadu Buhari had overwhelming votes in the North while President Goodluck Jonathan enjoyed similar support in the southeast, southwest and south-south Nigeria in 2011.

It is without contradiction that religious ideology is a source of an insurgent group's political goals. This is apparently what Al-Qaeda is pursuing, that is, to re-establish a worldwide Muslim Caliphate. In the document "Irregular Warfare" (2007, p. 80), of the United States Air Defence, it is stated that: "For many Muslims, this invokes the golden age of Islamic civilization and helps mobilize support for Al-Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims while concealing the fact that Al-Qaeda's leaders envision the 'restored Caliphate' as a totalitarian state similar to the pre-2002 Taliban regime in Afghanistan". It is not surprising that Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria allegedly has a link with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) which goes to show that the group is pursuing a new Caliphate agenda of sending infidel Muslims and non-Muslim believers out of the north part of Nigeria.

4. Economic Motivation

The insurgents are also motivated by economic grievances. Criminal organizations may use irregular warfare to terrorize or influence government economic policies for their purpose. There is need to establish the interconnectivity between political and economic policies. The whole struggle among the political elites both in the North and South is to control the resources of the country. Whoever wins political power controls the economic goods after that. This is based on greed, not grievance. Besides, economic hardship, unequal economic development, and failure of economic development are reasons that may be adduced for the insurgency. It is important therefore to underscore the fact that the reward or consequences (real or perceived) of capturing and maintaining state power remains the key source of wealth and privilege. According to Osman (2007, p. 17), the African political system has been the main source of conflict as state power has always been a zero-sum game, where the winner gains all, and in this vein, the winner controls the resources and appropriate and misappropriate the resources to its cronies. Interestingly, the economic insurgents or terrorist groups rarely seek to overthrow or promote change in the existing government; rather they want to incapacitate government to enable them continue with the exploitation of the natural resources. In the case of Nigeria, the Boko Haram actually want to see a change in the power structure.

5. Radical Extremism

Radical extremist insurgents hold extreme viewpoints. They are ideologically rigid and uncompromising. The religious extremists are intolerant of the viewpoints of others and see themselves as “true believers” and brand those they consider to be “non-believers” as enemies. (United States Air Defence, 2007, p. 81). The Islamic teaching or doctrine is that a good Muslim must be willing to defend its faith. Even the Christian faithful will always be ready to die for Christ. So, the culture of martyrdom in defence of one’s faith is not limited to Muslims as the two religions tend to teach that dying for the sake of the kingdom has a reward attached to it.

However, in the contemporary world, there is the movement for the universalising and imposing of one’s own ideology. Marxism was a worldwide movement at a time before the demise and collapse of the Soviet Union. As the underlying principle of Marxism was opposition to materialism just as the religious extremists are averse to accepting the doctrine of pluralism and secularism in modern governmental arrangement. The Marxist views religion as a subterfuge that is only meant to induce fear in the masses of the people. Thus, its absolute nature only makes the people to acquiesce in the violent form it takes. Paradoxically, the religious extremists do not limit their activity to their believers, but to non-believers. The ultimate aim of the religious extremists is to achieve their political goals through a revolutionary and non-evolutionary change to the existing political system (United States Air Defence, 2007). Therefore, the fundamental motive for radical extremism is the underlying social and economic conditions prevailing in the society. When there is a wide gap between the rich and the poor, a large army of unemployed youth becomes a motivation for the insurgency.

The motivating factors for insurgency may vary from state to state, but there are common elements that predispose a group to engage in insurgency. Basically, a combination of poverty, marginalisation and extremist ideologies are common narration for insurgency. In the case of Nigeria, the number of unemployed and street children found in large numbers in urban and rural areas serves as a reservoir for religious bigotry to carry out violence. The Almajiri found in northern Nigerian cities lack western education. In Nigeria’s major urban and rural areas, there are millions of children without education or skill. These group of children are ready tools for insurgent movements.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper has analysed the various factors responsible for the insurgency in the north-east and extended our diagnosis of the problem of insurgency from different perspectives. It is important that due attention is paid to new patterns of warfare in Africa. The method adopted by insurgent groups in different internal wars have changed and totally different from regular or conventional war. It is established fact from this work that asymmetric warfare is fully utilised by the insurgent group in the northeast Nigeria and

indeed by other internal conflicts in Africa. It is deduced that religious fundamentalism across Africa arises as cover to rising poverty, bad governance, and politics of exclusion and marginalisation. The inability of the government of Nigeria to tackle the fundamental problems of poverty, inclusive governance and provision of infrastructure such as the school in the northeast has largely contributed to the emergence of the religious sect known as Boko Haram. This is why the Federal Government policy to establish Almajiri schools, even when the Boko Haram has reservation for Western education is a right step in the right direction. This is one of the ways to curb further radicalization of Islamic ideology and create a rich culture-sensitive approach to religious moderation and non-violent in resolving group differences. In the light of this, the following would serve as remedial measures to curtail Boko Haram insurgency.

1. The counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy is to mount vigorous surveillance and control through community policing. With the new trend of suicide by female bombers it is only community policing that will supply information to security agents.
2. There is need for the police and other security agents in Nigeria to exhibit mutual respect and trust between them and the communities. The police bear the primary responsibility for overseeing security in locations where the terrorist attacks take place.
3. The Multinational Joint Force established by countries in the Lake Chad Basin Commission should work with the local communities to be able to fish out insurgents as they live among the people.
4. The Multinational Joint Force must increase border patrols and intelligence gathering.
5. There is also need to trace the source of fund and ensure Boko Haram has limited funds and access to weapons. The more funds the group receives it has more access to weapons.

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