

Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement

Cihan DABAN

Abstract: One of the most significant problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the conflict involving the M23 Movement. This conflict is not merely a national security issue but also constitutes a major challenge at both regional and global levels. The name and continuity of the M23 Movement derive from the claim that the peace agreement signed on March 23, 2009, between the Congolese government and members of the CNDP was not implemented. This date played a decisive role in the group's adoption of the name "M23 Movement". The emergence of an armed group such as the M23 Movement in the DRC — one of Africa's largest countries — provides a critical case for understanding why ongoing conflicts in the country remain unresolved. In this context, the study aims to analyze the conflict between the M23 Movement and the Congolese army within the framework of conflict dynamics and cross-border regional interactions. The theoretical framework draws on conflict dynamics literature to examine how the conflict emerged and why it evolved into a protracted one. In particular, it considers Rwanda's direct and indirect influence on the M23-Congo conflict within the context of cross-border regional interactions. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative case study approach, employing document analysis based on United Nations reports, international news sources, academic literature, and both primary and secondary data. The findings indicate that the M23-Congo conflict cannot be explained solely by domestic factors; rather, cross-border regional actors play a decisive role in sustaining the conflict.

Keywords: Conflict dynamics, Congo, M23 Movement, Rwanda, national security.

Cihan DABAN

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics
and Administrative Sciences,
Mersin University
E-mail: dabanchihan@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-2890-2415

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Introduction

In the post-independence period, the Congo has experienced multifaceted internal conflicts in which political, ethnic, and economic dynamics are intertwined. While conflicts persist among different ethnic groups, they also continue between the Congolese government and various insurgent groups. Consequently, the Congo has become a focal point for both ethnic conflict and cross-border regional competition. In particular, the activities of armed groups operating in the eastern regions bordering Rwanda have negatively affected not only domestic security but also the state's territorial integrity and sovereign capacity.

The armed group known as the M23 Movement emerged from these historical and structural dynamics. It was established in 2012 by former members of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Given that its membership roots can be traced back to the 1990s, the movement rapidly gained influence in eastern Congo and seized strategic areas (Stearns, 2012). The M23 Movement took up arms, claiming that the Goma Agreement of March 23, 2009, had not been implemented by the Congolese government, thereby posing a threat to national security. Its actions have contributed to humanitarian crises and population displacement in eastern Congo, while also undermining regional security and state sovereignty. The group has targeted agriculture, mining sites, and trade routes, severely affecting local livelihoods. This situation highlights both social vulnerability and the inability of state security forces to effectively protect the region.

At the same time, the Congolese government faces challenges not only from the M23 Movement but also from numerous other armed groups. Allegations of bribery, corruption, political disputes, and economic inequality have further weakened the state's capacity. In particular, insufficient financial support for the military has limited its effectiveness. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult for the government to combat armed groups, contributing to a more complex, multi-actor conflict environment. In this context, the activities of the M23 Movement have extended beyond the national level, prompting the involvement of global powers, international actors, and the United Nations (Okello, 2025).

At the regional level, allegations that Rwanda has supported the M23 Movement remain one of the most controversial aspects of the conflict. United Nations and other international reports, as well as state statements, suggest that Rwanda has provided military, logistical, and intelligence assistance. Such support has enhanced the group's operational capacity, enabling it to carry out attacks, expand its membership, and maintain its presence in the region. These allegations have also strained bilateral relations between Rwanda and the Congo.

Against this backdrop, this study examines the drivers behind the emergence of the M23 Movement and its renewed offensive actions. It further analyses the movement's impact on security, population displacement, and political developments in eastern Congo, and explores why the conflict between the M23 Movement and the Congolese government remains unresolved, as well as the responses of global and international actors (Sterns & Vogel, 2017).

On Conflict: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The concept of conflict is inherently multidisciplinary and has been defined differently across academic fields. Within international relations, conflict is generally understood as a phenomenon shaped by interest-, power-, and identity-based disputes among state and non-state actors. In this sense, it is treated as a multidimensional concept that may manifest in the form of crises of varying intensity, with or without violence.

According to Coser (1957), conflict is a process that emerges among social groups seeking to establish dominance over identity, status, power, and scarce resources. Galtung defines conflict as a process arising when the goals of actors collide, conceptualizing it through forms of violence rooted in structural and cultural factors (Galtung, 1969). Dahrendorf, in turn, argues that conflict stems from inequalities in the distribution of authority and power, potentially leading to social change through violence (Dahrendorf, 1959).

In theoretical terms, conflict is most prominently addressed within realist theory. Classical realism views conflict as an inevitable outcome of human nature and the security dilemma inherent in an anarchic international system. In *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, Hans Morgenthau places power at the center of international politics, arguing that it defines states' interests and renders conflict a natural and enduring feature of the system (Morgenthau, 1985). Similarly, Waltz, in *Theory of international politics*, contends that imbalances in the distribution of power and states' pursuit of security structurally generate conflict, making competition unavoidable (Waltz, 2010).

Liberal theory adopts a more optimistic perspective, emphasizing that conflict can be mitigated through economic interdependence, international institutions, cooperation, and democratic governance. Nye, in *Soft Power*, argues that power in international relations extends beyond military capabilities to include cultural attraction, values, and legitimacy, which can help constrain conflict (Nye, 1990). Likewise, Keohane, in *After hegemony*, demonstrates how international institutions facilitate cooperation despite anarchy, thereby limiting conflict (Keohane, 1984). However, the rise of civil wars and non-state armed actors in the post-Cold War period suggests that the liberal notion of "constrained conflict" requires reassessment. In this regard, Galtung's distinction between structural and cultural violence highlights that conflict extends beyond armed confrontation and is also driven by inequality, exclusion, and institutional weaknesses.

Contemporary conflict theories, particularly those focused on conflict dynamics, shift attention from the origins of conflict to its persistence and transformation. Kaldor's "new wars" thesis emphasizes identity politics, war economies, and transnational networks as defining features of post-Cold War conflicts (Kaldor, 2012). Similarly, Buzan and Wæver's concept of the regional security complex highlights the role of regional interactions in sustaining and transforming conflicts (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). From this perspective, contemporary conflicts are increasingly multi-layered, protracted, and difficult to resolve.

Ultimately, contemporary conflicts do not arise solely from internal dynamics but are also shaped by cross-border interactions, regional security perceptions, and the involvement of non-state armed actors. In this context, the M23 Movement represents a multi-layered case shaped by weak state capacity, internal dynamics, and regional influences. Building on this framework, this article analyses the emergence and evolution of the M23 Movement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with particular emphasis on its historical background.

Historical Background of the M23 Movement

The historical origins of the M23 Movement — named after the March 23, 2009 agreement — can be traced back to the post-Cold War period. Armed groups remained active in the Great Lakes region throughout the 1990s, while the early 2000s were marked by intensifying ethnic tensions, internal unrest, security challenges, and weak state institutions in the Congo, all of which contributed to growing fragmentation.

One of the key groups to emerge under these conditions was the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), established in 2006. The CNDP claimed to protect the Tutsi-origin Banyamulenge population in eastern Congo. Founded under the leadership of Laurent Nkunda, it resulted from the merger of the Synergy for Peace and Reconciliation and the Military Council for the Defence of the People. Its core objectives included defending Tutsi interests, countering the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and facilitating the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda (Nzobakenga, 2024).

Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi, had previously fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and later joined the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), contributing to the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko during the First Congo War (1996–1997). Following Laurent-Désiré Kabila's rise to power in 1997, Nkunda eventually rebelled, accusing the government of tolerating the FDLR and failing to protect Tutsi communities in eastern Congo. He later aligned with Rwanda-backed rebel movements during the Second Congo War (Vlassenroot & Verweijen, 2017).

Relations between Nkunda and President Joseph Kabila were marked by ambiguity rather than open confrontation. While Kabila sought to consolidate state authority — most notably through the 2002 Sun City Agreement, which aimed to integrate armed groups into the national army — Nkunda pursued a competing vision centered on Tutsi security, close ties with Rwanda, and *de facto* autonomy in eastern Congo. These competing agendas culminated in the 2004 Bukavu Crisis, when Nkunda seized the city, prompting the government to label his actions as rebellion and a violation of state sovereignty (Verweijen & Wakenge, 2015). From 2005 onward, tensions evolved into a protracted and increasingly internationalized conflict. Nkunda consolidated control over North Kivu, while Kabila sought support from the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC).

Despite increased UN involvement, violence persisted, and Nkunda continued to accuse the government of failing to counter the FDLR.

In response, the Congolese government gradually shifted toward cooperation with Rwanda. From 2007, bilateral negotiations intensified, driven in part by international pressure on Rwanda and concerns over regional instability. The 2008 clashes around Goma marked a turning point, transforming the conflict into a regional security crisis. Rwanda, perceiving Nkunda as a destabilizing actor, ultimately agreed to cooperate with the Congolese government (Stearns, 2012). This cooperation led to a reciprocal arrangement: Rwanda moved to neutralize Nkunda, while the Congolese government targeted the FDLR and agreed to integrate CNDP forces into the national army. In 2009, Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda, and leadership of the CNDP passed to Bosco Ntaganda (International Crisis Group [ICG], July 2009). Ntaganda subsequently negotiated the integration of CNDP forces into the Congolese army, securing a senior military position in return.

However, this arrangement proved short-lived. Ntaganda maintained his autonomous influence and continued to advocate for regional control in eastern Congo. As a result, integration failed to resolve underlying identity and security-based tensions, instead postponing and ultimately reigniting conflict dynamics.

The March 23, 2009 agreement formalized cooperation between Congo and Rwanda and facilitated the integration of CNDP elements. Yet, in 2012, Ntaganda and former CNDP members established the M23 Movement, claiming that the agreement had not been implemented. This marked the beginning of a renewed phase of armed conflict. At its core, the conflict reflects a fundamental tension between state sovereignty and regional autonomy. While the Congolese government seeks to maintain territorial integrity and central authority, the M23 Movement has pursued de facto control and autonomy in eastern Congo. The absence of consensus on these issues has ensured the persistence of conflict (ICG, October 2012).

From National Insurgency to Regionalized Conflict: An Assessment in the Context of Conflict Dynamics

From the perspective of conflict dynamics, the M23 Movement illustrates that the persistence of internal conflicts cannot be explained by a single factor but rather by multiple, interacting variables. In this context, five main dynamics contribute to the transformation of a domestic insurgency into a regionalized conflict: identity-based linkages, the availability of safe havens, the financing of armed groups through natural resources, diplomatic protection, and the flow of arms and logistical support.

During the transition from colonial rule to independence, the redrawing of borders led to identity-based conflicts in many countries, with Africa representing a prominent example. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the underlying factors behind the conflict

between the government and the M23 Movement is associated with ethnic and identity-based dynamics. Historical and sociological ties between the Tutsi population in eastern Congo and Rwanda have facilitated interaction between the Rwandan administration and the M23 Movement. For this reason, the conflict is often viewed not solely as a domestic confrontation but as a transnational form of identity politics extending beyond national boundaries (Machibya & Sukabdi, 2025).

The security dimension has consistently remained central to the conflict. One key dynamic is the emergence of safe havens, which has enabled the M23 and its predecessor, the CNDP, to operate in areas near the Rwandan border. Such conditions provide spaces where the M23 Movement can withdraw under military pressure or reorganize after fragmentation or defeat. Weak Congolese border control and limited state authority have further facilitated the establishment of cross-border linkages by the M23. In this context, Rwanda is frequently described in the literature as a potential safe haven, although such claims remain politically and academically debated (Okello, 2025).

Another significant factor is the financing of armed groups through natural resources. Strategic minerals such as coltan, gold, and cobalt in North Kivu have not only funded armed groups but also strengthened cross-border collaborations among them. While the natural resource economy contributes to framing the conflict in identity terms, it has also transformed the dynamics into a political process shaped by economic interests. Accordingly, Rwanda's engagement with the M23 Movement is often interpreted as being partially motivated by these economic considerations (Laudati, 2013).

The provision of arms and logistical support has increased both the intensity and persistence of the conflict. What initially constituted a domestic insurgency has gradually acquired a regional dimension, involving the direct or indirect engagement of multiple actors. This has helped maintain M23's military capacity, sustain its operations, and expand its area of influence—key factors in prolonging the conflict (Nangini et al., 2014).

Finally, diplomatic protection has played a critical role. Regional diplomatic engagement has enabled the M23 Movement to maintain its presence, complicating efforts to dismantle or isolate it internationally. Rwanda's relations with the M23 are often assessed in this context. While such policies have drawn international criticism, they appear to have encouraged Rwanda to adopt a more balanced diplomatic stance over time (Brooke-Holland, 2025).

Taken together, these factors indicate that the emergence and activities of the M23 Movement reflect a conflict dynamic that extends beyond a purely domestic insurgency, highlighting a regionalized dimension. Weak Congolese state authority, deficiencies in border control, and the abundance of natural resources in affected areas are key factors shaping both the character and persistence of the conflict.

Conflict Dynamics and Main Areas of Disagreement Between M23 and the DRC

Significant differences were observed in the conflicts experienced by the two sides. Despite being a major power on the African continent, the Congolese government has been unable to halt or eliminate the M23 Movement within its borders. Key reasons for this failure include the M23 Movement's organized and systematic attacks, as well as internal challenges within the Congolese administration, such as corruption, divisions, weak command structures, and low troop morale. Additionally, disparities in mineral wealth and strategic territories have contributed to the M23 Movement's resilience. Economically significant resources, including coltan and cobalt, along with strategically important areas under M23 control, have strengthened the movement's position against the Congolese army. As a result, the armed forces have, at times, opted to withdraw from engagements with the M23 (Reuters, 2025).

High-intensity conflicts occurred between the two sides from 2012 to 2014, followed by a period of relatively low-intensity clashes between 2014 and 2021. From 2022 until the signing of the Doha Peace Agreement on October 14, 2025, in Doha, Qatar, intense confrontations resumed (Booty, 2025). In 2013, the M23 Movement was significantly weakened following a joint operation by the Congolese army and UN-backed forces. During the subsequent period until 2021, the group focused on regrouping and reorganization. By 2022, the M23 Movement had regained strength and launched attacks against the Congolese army in eastern Congo, particularly in Rutshuru and Bunagana. The Nairobi Peace Process initiated in 2023 ultimately failed to resolve the conflict. In 2024, the M23 advanced into North Kivu, approaching areas near Goma, and engaged in intense clashes with the Congolese army, establishing control over several strategic locations in the northeastern part of the country. In January 2025, the M23 Movement launched a large-scale offensive and captured Goma. By February 2025, it had also seized Bukavu, establishing significant territorial dominance in the region (Ebuteli & the Congo Research Group, 2024). Visual Map 1 illustrates the Goma and Bukavu regions, which are notable for both their mineral wealth and dense Tutsi-origin populations.


In March 2025, the M23 Movement seized Uvira and its surrounding areas and, during April–May, launched an offensive toward the Butembo region. Although the offensive did not result in the capture of the entire region, the fighting became more widespread. A Doha Peace Framework Agreement was subsequently signed between the Congolese government and the M23 Movement in Doha, Qatar; however, the agreement has not yet succeeded in ending hostilities.

In December 2025, the M23 Movement's continued occupation of Uvira and its surroundings both escalated tensions along the border and undermined the Doha Peace Framework Agreement process. In January 2026, under the framework of the Doha Agreement, a UN ceasefire monitoring mission was established, and the implementation phase of the ceasefire commenced. As of December 2025, areas under M23 control are shown in Map 2 (Ndushabandi, 2026).



Map 1: Central cities with dense Tutsi-origin populations where the M23 Movement has established territorial control

Source: Makumeno, 2025.



Map 2: Areas under the influence of the M23 Movement (December 2025)

Source: IPIS, n.d.

While all these clashes were ongoing, from the beginning of 2025 onward the United Nations issued calls for the termination of the fighting and for Rwanda to withdraw the support it had provided to the M23 movement. The statement issued by the United Nations further consolidates Rwanda's support for the M23 Movement.

Cross-Border Regional Interaction in the M23–DRC Conflict: The Case of Rwanda

Rwanda's influence in the clashes between the M23 Movement and the Congolese army can be traced back to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the post-genocide period, the withdrawal of Hutu-origin militia groups into eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo constituted a significant security threat for Rwanda. In this context, Rwanda developed relations with Tutsi-origin militias operating in eastern Congo, primarily to ensure border security. The CNDP and the M23 Movement are among these formations. Rwanda has sought to legitimize these relations through a discourse of protection against Hutu militias, suggesting that its links with Tutsi militias carry indirect or implicit strategic significance (Muleefu, 2013).

While border security is presented as a primary justification, Rwanda's policy toward the region extends beyond security concerns to encompass economic, geostrategic, and geopolitical dimensions. The presence of high-value natural resources in eastern Congo — particularly cobalt, gold, and coltan — has increased the economic importance of the region. Consequently, Rwanda's engagement with armed groups such as the CNDP and the M23 Movement is often interpreted as reflecting not only security considerations but also economic interests. These interactions are thus frequently analyzed in the literature within a framework of multidimensional regional interests (UN Security Council, 2024).

Rwanda's policies also align with its objective of maintaining regional influence. Factors such as the security vacuum in eastern Congo, the weakness of central authority, the limited capacity of the Congolese army, and the persistence of armed conflict have created conditions conducive to relationships with local armed actors. Moreover, security perceptions shaped during the 1994 genocide, along with the subsequent involvement of certain actors in eastern Congolese armed groups, contributed to historically rooted patterns of interaction between Rwanda and these groups. As a result, since the 1990s, Rwanda's relations with some armed formations in eastern Congo are generally evaluated not as direct support but as part of a broader strategy shaped by security concerns, historical experience, and regional power dynamics (Trancho, 2025).

In summary, multiple factors have influenced Rwanda's policies associated with the M23 Movement. These include the presence of Hutu militias perceived as threats to Rwanda's border regions, concerns for the security of Tutsi populations in eastern Congo, the weak internal structure of the Congolese government, the limited capacity of its national army, and the presence of significant natural resources. Additionally, Rwanda has sought to

enhance its regional influence. However, its policies — particularly regarding the M23 Movement — have been criticized by international actors and the United Nations. In response, the Rwandan government emphasizes its responsibility to ensure border security, presenting cross-border armed groups as the primary justification for its actions.

The Role of International Actors in the M23–DRC Conflict, the United Nations, and an Analysis of the Current Situation

The clashes between the M23 Movement and the Congolese army have extended beyond national boundaries, drawing significant attention from international actors and organizations. The primary geographical focus of the conflict has been eastern Congo, whose proximity to Rwanda and possession of globally significant raw materials have heightened international interest. The involvement of global powers, former colonial actors, regional states, and organizations such as the United Nations has shaped the duration, intensity, and trajectory of the conflict (Simura & Mutambudzi, 2025).

The United States evaluates the conflict through the lenses of regional stability, great-power competition, and pragmatic policy considerations. It pursues a balancing strategy in its bilateral relations with both Rwanda and the DRC, emphasizing regional stability and state security while countering the influence of Russia and China in the Great Lakes Region. Consequently, the US has refrained from directly targeting the M23 Movement, aligning its approach with UN policies and the positions of other international actors. Despite international criticism of Rwanda's support for the M23, the US has not imposed sanctions, largely due to Rwanda's pro-Western orientation. The US also endorses the Doha Peace Process and seeks the resolution of the conflict through multilateral diplomacy (ICG, December 2025).

Russia approaches the conflict more indirectly, seeking to expand its influence in Africa while cooperating with the DRC on military and security matters. Russia addresses the M23 conflict within the UN framework, emphasizing Congo's territorial integrity and criticizing Western interventionist policies. Its regional influence, however, remains limited compared with that of the US and France (Titeca, 2023).

China prioritizes economic and strategic interests over regional security, focusing on its investments in Congo's high-value minerals and infrastructure projects. While supporting UN peace efforts and condemning the seizure of key areas such as Goma and Bukavu, China avoids direct involvement or mediation, adhering to its principle of non-interference in African internal affairs (Lau, 2025).

The United Kingdom takes a more explicit stance, condemning the M23 Movement and providing humanitarian aid to Congo. It emphasizes human rights, regional security, and the humanitarian crisis, calling for the UN's recommendations regarding the conflict to be implemented (Davey, 2024).

France maintains a cautious approach, balancing support for Congo's territorial integrity with its bilateral relations with Rwanda. Drawing from its historical colonial experience and recent challenges in Africa, France emphasizes diplomatic initiatives within the UN framework and supports ceasefire efforts, reflecting a reduced regional influence compared to the past (Beloff, 2023; Petidis, 2024).

Belgium, as a former colonial power, advocates for Congo's territorial integrity and strengthening state capacity while condemning the M23 rebellion. However, Belgium exerts limited direct influence in shaping the regional balance of power (Mila, 2025).

The United Nations approaches the conflict based on international law, emphasizing Congo's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Through MONUSCO, it provides military support to the Congolese army but has achieved limited success in halting M23 activities. The UN's restricted mandate, weak state capacity, and divergent policies among major powers have constrained its effectiveness, indirectly enabling the persistence of the M23 Movement (Mishra, 2025).

Comparative analysis reveals that the M23 conflict has escalated into a transboundary regional crisis. While the US and UK stress Congo's territorial integrity, their strategic relations with Rwanda encourage a balanced approach. France and Belgium align more closely with Congo but avoid direct intervention. Russia focuses on security-oriented influence, whereas China prioritizes economic interests. These divergent approaches hinder coordinated international intervention, complicating efforts to resolve the conflict.

Current efforts under the African Union and East African Community frameworks aim to halt hostilities and restore state authority in eastern Congo. The M23 Movement is expected to withdraw from captured areas, while the Congolese government gradually reasserts control. However, these processes remain fragmented and temporary. Within the African Union's "African solutions to African problems" paradigm, durable peace is envisioned through continental, internal mechanisms rather than external intervention.

Conclusion

The actions of the M23 Movement have emerged as a significant security challenge in the region. This issue is not confined to the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone but has also manifested as a cross-border regional problem. Several factors underlie the persistence of armed conflict in the Congo, including the country's multi-ethnic composition, security vacuums along its borders, regional competition, and the government's weak policies toward the eastern provinces. Consequently, the M23 Movement has established itself as an effective force in areas where state authority is limited. Analyzing the M23 conflict solely within national boundaries is insufficient; the conflict must be understood as a multi-layered process shaped by cross-border regional interactions, which increasingly takes on global dimensions.

Findings indicate that Rwanda is the primary power actor behind the M23 Movement's active offensive operations. This assertion is reflected in both UN reports and statements from the international community. The conflict zone's proximity to Rwanda, combined with the Tutsi ethnicity of many M23 members, has facilitated the Movement's ties with the Rwandan government. This situation has weakened Congo-Rwanda bilateral relations and heightened security concerns among neighboring regional actors. The absence of a cohesive regional strategy has, in turn, enabled the persistence and expansion of the M23 Movement.

A critical examination of the M23 conflict reveals that the policies of global powers, international actors, and organizations have largely been reactive, short-term, and weak. These policy shortcomings have allowed the M23 Movement to consolidate its position as a major actor in the region. The conflict's continuity demonstrates that UN-led peace missions have not adequately accounted for the complex actor configurations on the ground or the cross-border dynamics at play. While these efforts have mitigated the humanitarian impact of the conflict, they have proven ineffective in producing a sustainable political solution. This has weakened regional security and expanded the operational space of the M23 Movement. Although the UN's policy emphasizes respect for the DRC's territorial integrity and sovereignty — a principle supported rhetorically by global powers and international actors — the lack of robust engagement has created a weak policy framework, facilitating the M23's continued operations.

Ultimately, resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot rely solely on military force. Achieving sustainable peace requires a combination of inclusive political dialogue, national cooperation, and cross-border regional coordination. Specifically, progress toward peace depends on the Congolese government undertaking sincere measures to strengthen national unity, implement security-focused policies in coordination with neighboring states, enhance local governance capacities, and pursue reforms that reduce social exclusion. At the same time, the limited engagement of global and international actors constrains the potential for sustainable peace. Without their active participation in formulating and supporting effective policies, the M23 Movement is likely to remain a persistent example of chronic conflict.

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