

Nigeria: Interrogating the Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Approaches of the Federal Government towards Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East, 2009–2015

Samson Adesola ADESOTE

Sunday Adekunle AKANDE

Abstract: The fight against insurgency, terrorism, banditry, militancy, and other forms of criminality has been viewed from two major perspectives by scholars, security analysts and security experts in the existing literature. While some argued in favor of the kinetic approach, others supported the adoption of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The main thrust of this paper is to interrogate both the kinetic and non-kinetic approaches initiated by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan led Federal Government to placate Boko Haram terrorists in the North East geo-political

zone of Nigeria between 2011 and 2015. Before the adoption of the non-kinetic approach, the government made use of a military or kinetic approach in its response to the nefarious activities of Boko Haram between 2009 and 2011. It argues that the inability of the kinetic approach to successfully address the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency forced the government to adopt a non-kinetic approach or carrot option, which took several forms such as the establishment of dialogue committees and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency. It submits that none of these kinetic and non-kinetic measures were able to curtail the heightened disruptive activities of the insurgent group as a result of inept political leadership, failure of good governance, problem of sabotage, lack of strong political will and commitment and so on.

Samson Adesola ADESOTE

Department of History & International
Studies,
Osun State University (Ikire Campus),
Osogbo, Nigeria
E-mail: solaade2007@ymail.com

Sunday Adekunle AKANDE

Department of History and International
Studies,
Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
E-mail: yokunde4ever@yahoo.com

Conflict Studies Quarterly
Issue 43, April 2023, pp. 3–17

DOI: 10.24193/csqa.43.1

Published First Online: April 05 / 2023

Keywords: Non-kinetic, government, Boko Haram, Insurgency, North-East, Nigeria.

Introduction


Insurgency or terrorism constitutes one of the social menaces confronting the world over since the birth of the new millennium. Although this form of social menace is not a new phenomenon, it generally took a new dimension since the birth of the 21st century. According to Mohammed and Abdullahi (2017), terrorism has not remained static but evolved over the years as it traces its roots back at least 2000 years. They further explain that it is an old form of warfare dating back to antiquity but rebranded in the 20th and 21st centuries to become a global phenomenon. However, September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group brought the world's attention to the phenomenon of terrorism like never before. In fact, the attack was said to have brought the world together to form a common front against terrorism (Ibrahim, 2017). The 9/11 attack forced the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution on 12 September 2011 known as UNSCR 1373, urging all member states (of the United Nations) to criminalize terrorism by legislation. The Al-Qaeda terrorist group, which was at the center stage at the turn of the 21st century, developed an ideology that later gave birth to other terrorist groups in other parts of the world such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar al-Islam, Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and on.

The emergence of this new form of insurgency or terrorism affected the nature of countries' security architecture, thus changing it from a solely military or kinetic approach to a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations. As argued by Onapajo and Ozden (2020), the military approach has contributed more to the atmosphere of violence arising from terrorism and caused extensive human rights violations rather than achieving the desired objective. They concluded that based on evidence from the extant studies, for a successful counter-terrorism/insurgency campaign to be possible, a combination of military and non-military strategies is paramount. Evidence from other countries such as the USA, Pakistan, and India, among others, revealed that the adoption of a military approach alone has increasingly been proven to be ineffective in the successive counter-insurgency operation. For example, the highly kinetic or military strategy adopted by the US Army in Vietnam did not lead to the attainment of the desired end state. As a result, the US decided to adopt a non-kinetic approach, which helped her to win the operation. With this experience, US military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially after the 2006 publication of the US Army Field Manual 3-24, emphasized a shift from an enemy-centric to a population-centric approach. This relevance of the non-kinetic approach since then has been incorporated into the US doctrine (Ibrahim, 2019).

The adoption of a non-kinetic approach in addressing insurgency and other forms of criminality is a global practice in most democratic societies. As argued by Okoro, the implementation of the content of the constitution is not only democratic but also

provides that non-kinetic deliberations and dialogues be allowed in resolving issues and conflicts (Okoro, 2022). Following the success of the adoption of the non-kinetic approach towards the insecurity challenge posed by the Niger Delta militants through the amnesty program by the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua in 2007, after several years of unsuccessful stick approach of successive administrations (both military and civilian), the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan was equally forced to toe the part of his immediate predecessor.

It is against this background that this paper interrogates several kinetic and non-kinetic interventions introduced by the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan towards curtailing the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East geo-political zone in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015. The North-East comprises six states, namely Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba. Although the campaign of terror of Boko Haram was felt in all these six states, it was more pronounced in only three, namely Borno (the main base of the insurgent group), Yobe, and Adamawa states. The map below shows the location of North East in Nigeria. The methodology adopted in this study is historical, analytical, and thematic, utilizing materials from both primary and secondary sources.



Map of Nigeria showing the North-East Geo-political Zone (Area of Study)

Conceptual Clarifications

In a discourse of this nature, it is imperative to conceptualize some concepts that are inherent in it. They are insurgency, kinetic and noni-kinetic approaches.

Insurgency: Insurgency is a major concept that has been viewed by scholars from different perspectives. In this paper, we argue that insurgency is a highly organized movement whose lofty goal is to weaken or undermine the existing authority and make it incapable of achieving its governance of the territory. This, therefore, qualifies the Boko Haram group in Nigeria to be classified as a violent insurgent group as well as a terrorist organization (Rosenau, 2007; Crenshaw, 1997).

Kinetic Approach: Kinetic approach is a major progressive and aggressive military action that involves active warfare and the use of physical and material means such as bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions against enemies or adversaries with the sole aim of neutralizing, capturing, or eliminating them (Marks *et al.*, 2005). The Federal Government of Nigeria, through the Armed Forces of Nigeria, had engaged and is still engaging in this form of kinetic targeting by going after the key leaders or commanders of Boko Haram terrorists.

Non-Kinetic Approach: Non-kinetic is a non-military strategy that involves the application of non-military and other capabilities against a potential enemy, like the employment of nonlethal strategies (such as civil-military operations, engagement, negotiation, information support operations, psychological operations and rehabilitation) and tactics with weapons that are “sublethal” or “weapons not intended to be lethal” (Ducheine, 2014).

Understanding the Kinetic Approach of the Nigerian State against Boko Haram Insurgency in the North East, 2009–2015: An Overview

It is imperative to point out here that the time that this insurgent group emerged in the Northeastern geo-political zone is yet unknown. This is because there were a series of conflicting reports both in the media and existing literature as regards the time the group emerged. While some argued that the insurgent group had emerged as far back as 1995, others said that it emerged around 2003 (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). However, one basic fact that is undisputable was that the campaign of terror of the group became pronounced following the slain of its spiritual leader, named Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 in Police custody, and subsequently, the emergence of a new leader, named Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad Shekau, who was said to have been the second-in-command to Yusuf Mohammed (Marc-Antoine, 2014). Since 2009, the insurgent group entered into a new transitional phase that extols extreme violence typified by bombings, kidnappings, mass killings, and destruction of symbolic public and private institutions, religious centers, and other terrorist acts, all in an attempt to repudiate western values and create an Islamic Caliphate in their North-East.

The nefarious activities of the group forced the Nigerian State to adopt several military approaches among which were the formation and deployment of military forces, the establishment of a joint task force, formation of Joint Task Force, the declaration of a state of emergency, the establishment of a new army division (7th Division in Maiduguri), training of armed forces in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, provision of more fund and new equipment and so on.

The first major combined military operation created by the government through the Nigerian Army under the leadership of the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt. General Abdulrahman Dambazau was Operation Flush II. This military operation was said to have been created by the government of Borno State, under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, against the high incidence of banditry in Maiduguri, in particular, and the entire state, in general. It was a special anti-robbery squad created purposely to flush out armed robbers that were terrorizing innocent residents of the State. The governor, who personally inaugurated the squad, which was made up of a combined team of security forces such as the army, air force, and police, tagged it "Operation Flush II" (Isa & Mustapha, 2009). In a bid to enforce and maintenance peace and security of the state, the personnel of Operation Flush II and members of the insurgent group engaged in a series of battles. Between 2009 and 2011, the personnel of Operation Flush II took frantic efforts to contain the activities of the insurgent group in Maiduguri. They succeeded in pushing them out of the State capital, Maiduguri.

The insurgent group, which temporarily went underground around 2010, later resurfaced by launching a series of attacks in 2011. The campaign of terror of the insurgent group was said to have taken another dimension in 2011. This was evident in the series of offensive attacks carried out by the insurgent group such as the bombing of police headquarters, Abuja; the bombing of the United Nations Office, Abuja; the bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, among others. This development forced the Federal Government under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in some local government areas in four states of Borno (Maiduguri Metropolis, Gamboru Ngala, Banki Bama, Biu, and Jere), Yobe (Damaturu, Geidam, Potiskum, Buniyadi-Gujba, and Gasua-Bade), Niger (Suleja) and Plateau (Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi, and Riyom) that were heavily affected by the menace of Boko Haram insurgency (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). As argued by Bamidele, the year 2011 was regarded as the deadliest year of Boko Haram's activities since 2009 in Northern Nigeria. His submission could be corroborated by the report of the United States of America on the global ranking for terrorism in 2011 (Bamidele, 2012). According to the report, Nigeria was ranked 9th in the global terrorist-country list in terms of attacks; 5th in the global ranking for terrorism-based deaths, and one of the top 15 countries in the world in terms of kidnapping and hostage-taking, suicide bombing, bomb blast and so on (which are elements of terrorism) (Oluba, 2014).

As the campaign of terror of the insurgent group continued to increase in 2011, occasioned by several attacks and bombings, the federal government took over control by creating a military-led Joint Task Force (JTF) codenamed Operation Restore Order (ORO I) under the new COAS, Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika. The JTF, which comprised personnel of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Nigeria Police, Department of State Security, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, and Nigerian Prison Service was created on 1 June 2011. The combined operation was deployed to Maiduguri and the neighboring Jere local government area to contain the Boko Haram insurgency. According to Lt. Col. Musa, the mandate of ORO I was to restore law and order to the northeastern part of Nigeria and Borno State in particular (Sagir, 2012). ORO carried out a series of operations in different locations such as Zanari and Gwange General. As the insurgent group widened its scope of attacks to other areas in the North-East, such as Yobe, Bauchi, and Gombe, the Nigeria Army created Operations Restore Order II and III. The new JTF, which is made of 3,872 personnel, comprised the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and other security agencies such as Nigeria Police, Department of State Security, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service and Nigerian Prison Service (Ogbazino, 2015). Abdulhamid explains that the mandate of the operations was to restore law and order in the affected areas (Abdulhamid, 2017). During the period of the existence of the operation relative success was attained. The JTF was able to cage the insurgents who were arrested and flushed out of Maiduguri, forcing them to find sanctuary in the Sambisa Forest, that later became their headquarters (Abdulhamid, 2017).

The campaign of terror of Boko Haram took a new dimension in 2013, in which several attacks were carried out leading to heavy casualties and monumental damage in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. For example, the insurgents attacked several schools and colleges in these states, killing and kidnapping many innocent people. There were also reports in the media that the insurgent group launched a robust attack to take over the 202 Battalion barracks in Bama, Borno State in May 2013, and subsequently razed parts of mobile police barrack in the town and set many cars and motorcycles ablaze, in which the death of 60 people, including 22 policemen, 2 soldiers, and 14 prison officials, was recorded (The News, 2014, May 26, p. 13). All these heavy attacks forced the Federal Government (FG) to declare a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States on May 14, 2013 (Osakwe & Audu, 2015). Following the declaration of a state of emergency in place in these three states, the then chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ola Sa'ad Ibrahim, was mandated by the FG to take the mantle of new operational leadership of an expanded ORO with a new coded name Operation *BOYONA*, with the mandate to restore law and order in the affected three states, including Nasarawa (which was then faced with communal and herder-farmer conflicts), created on 19 August 2013 (Abdulhamid, 2017). According to Brig Gen Christ Olukolade, the creation of *BOYONA* was in line with

the plans laid out for the conduct of the operations to execute the mandate spelled out in the state of emergency declared by President Goodluck Jonathan on May 13, 2013, which was to flush out the insurgents from the three North Eastern States (Wale, 2013). Operation BOYONA, which was a special operation, was a JTF, composed of troops drawn from the Services of the Armed Forces as well as other security agencies. Between 2013 and 2014, Operation *BOYONA* carried out counter-offensive successful operations against the stronghold of Boko Haram terrorists (like Sambisa forest) in which some were killed, arrested and several kidnaps were liberated. It was during this operation that Shekau (30th June 2013) was suspected to have been killed (Lugga, 2016).

Another major kinetic approach taken by the government in a counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram in the North-East was the creation of the New Army Division, known as the 7th Division, with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, in August 2013. The recommendation for the approval of the new Army Division by President Goodluck Jonathan was facilitated by Gen Azubuike Ihejirika. The new Army Division became the umbrella command for joint security operations in the North-East. With the creation of the new Army Division, Major General Obida Ethan was appointed as the pioneer General Officer Commanding (GOC). Its creation was to ensure the adequate presence of the military in the North-East region against the Boko Haram insurgency. The troops of the 7th Division intensified patrols deeply inside the forest areas of Damboa and Gwoza Local Government Areas to reach remote and isolated towns and villages to prevent further attacks by the insurgents in the region. Due to the success of Operation *BOYONA*, as well as the creation of the 7th Army Division, a temporary peace was said to have returned to the North-East. As a result of this development, the Nigerian Army, under the leadership of the new COAS, Lt. Gen Kenneth Minimah, decided to replace Operation *BOYONA* with Operation *Zaman Lafiya* (which translates to English *Operation Live in Peace*). The new military operation was organized and structured in the form of a close support command (Osakwe & Audu, 2015).

Despite the creation of the Army's 7th Division, the campaign of terror of the insurgent group did not subside. The insurgent group continued to launch coordinated attacks on several schools; villages and towns, which were later declared as the Islamic Caliphate, were another major campaign of terror of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in 2014. For instance, on 14 April 2014, over 270 Girls were said to have been kidnapped at the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok. The kidnapping of these girls generated the intervention of the international community. Also, on 24 August 2014, the insurgents took over Gwoza town, a vast territory in Borno State. Abubakar Shekau and his men declared the town a Caliphate and hoisted their flags in the Ashigashiya ward of the Gwoza Local Government Area. Following the capture of the town, the insurgents turned the Police College in the town into an academy for training their recruits (The News, 2014, September 15, p. 15). With

the capture of Gwoza, they marched on and maintained their suzerainty over Damboa, Bumi Yadi, Gomboru, and Dikwa Emirate. They equally invaded many villages in the Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State. Also, Mubi, the second largest city in Adamawa State, was invaded (The News, 2014, September 15, p. 15). As of November 2014, the insurgent group was said to have been in control of over 20,000 square kilometers of Nigerian territory in three Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The area under the control of the terrorists covers ten local government areas. The ten local government areas which were said to have been under full or partial control of the insurgents included Bama, Dikwa, Ngalla, Kala-Balge, and Gwoza (all in Borno State); (Madagali, Michika, and Mubi (all in Adamawa State); and Gujba and Gulani (both in Yobe State) (The News, 2014, November 24, p. 45).

As the campaign of terror of the insurgent continued to wasp stronger, with its spill-over effect in the neighboring countries, the Nigerian government decided to establish diplomatic military relations with the governments of Chad, Niger, and Cameroun to fight against terrorism and insurgency in the sub-region. With the encouragement and support of the African Union (AU), the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in May 2014. The MNJTF was set up as an offensive and stabilization mechanism to combat Boko Haram and other groups labeled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin. Its establishment under its current structure was determined by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) heads of state and government (which comprised Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, and Niger) during the Extraordinary Summit of the LCBC member states in 2014. On 25 November 2014, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) fully endorsed its activation. However, it was not until 29 January 2015 that the PSC formally authorized the deployment of the MNJTF for 12 months (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). The situation continued until the emergence of the new civilian administration, under President Muhammadu Buhari on 29 May 2015.

Understanding the non-kinetic Approach of the Nigerian State against Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East, 2011–2015

Following the inability of the kinetic approach of the Federal Government to effectively curtail the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram insurgency, it was forced to adopt a non-kinetic approach. Although the non-kinetic approach was not solely adopted by the government in its counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram in the North-East, it was adopted in conjunction with the kinetic approach. Generally, counter-insurgency operations in contemporary times comprise both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. Historically, one can trace the root of the non-kinetic approach back to the ancient Chinese theorist, Sun Tzu, who advised that direct methods were used for joining battle, but indirect methods were used to secure victory (Brimley & Singh, 2008). T.E. Lawrence and the strategist Lindell Hart echoed similar themes in the 20th century,

and the essence of their views is reflected in the latest Quadrennial Defense review:

To succeed in (irregular warfare), the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others. The indirect approach seeks to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are the strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked (Brimley & Singh, 2008).

Owing to the success of this non-military approach elsewhere such as Pakistan, the Nigerian State, under the Jonathan-led government, resorted to its adoption in her counter-insurgency operation in the North-East. Between 2011 and 2015, the government introduced several non-kinetic interventions towards addressing the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East. Efforts would be made to identify and analyze each of the non-kinetic interventions introduced by the administration of the former President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.

The first non-kinetic effort towards defeating the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast by the Federal Government of Nigeria was traced to the administration of former President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. As the campaign of terror of the BHTs continued to increase in the North-East, the Federal government under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, in 2011, set up a 7-member Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria. The committee, which was chaired by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari, later submitted its report to the Federal Government (hereafter referred to as the Galtimari Committee Report) in September 2011. In its White Paper issued in May 2012, the Federal Government accepted the recommendation of the Galtimari Committee which suggested the option of engaging, negotiating and dialoguing with the leadership of the sect, which should be contingent upon the renunciation of all forms of violence and surrender of arms to be followed by rehabilitation (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021; Omonobi *et al.*, 2011). Although the report of the committee was considered, it was not immediately implemented. As the BHTs continued to launch deadly attacks, there emerged local and international pressures on the Federal government to find a lasting solution to the escalating insurgency. This resulted in the adoption of a Dialogue Option which culminated in the setting up of another committee known as the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North on 16 April 2013. The committee, which was headed by Taminu Turaki, Minister of Special Duties, had the mandate “to identify and constructively engage key members of the Boko Haram sect” and develop a “comprehensive and workable framework for resolving the crisis of insecurity in the northern part of the country” (Adewumi, 2014; Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). The committee was equally mandated to develop a comprehensive victim’s support program and the mechanism for addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency to prevent future occurrences. The committee was also directed to develop a framework for amnesty and disarmament of the members of Boko Haram (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17).

The Committee, which initially comprised 26 members (made up of renowned Islamic scholars, academics, politicians, and retired military and police officers mostly from the northern part of the country) was inaugurated by the President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan at the Council Chamber of Presidential Villa, Abuja on Tuesday 23 April 2013, with three months mandate to carry out its assignment. Before the inauguration of the Committee, two members withdrew their membership, namely Ahmed Datti (an Islamic cleric) and Shehu Sani (a civil society activist). This development initially led to the reduction of the members of the Committee from twenty-six (26) to twenty-four (24). However, the President decided to appoint a new member to the committee, named Barrister Aisha Wakil, thus increasing the total number of the committee to twenty-five (25) (Usman, 2013). During the inauguration, the President acknowledged that the committee has an all but impossible task. He was quoted by the Nigerian press as saying:

“all Nigerians are expecting this Committee to perform magic and I pray that Allah should give you the wisdom to do so because, without peace, we cannot develop” (President Goodluck Jonathan, 2013).

He further urged the Committee to make suggestions as to how the underlying causes of the insurgency could be addressed to prevent similar outbreaks in the future (President Goodluck Jonathan, 2013). The below table shows the detailed names of the initial twenty-six members of the committee.

Table 1. List of Committee Members

S/N	Name	Position	S/N	Name	Position
1	Malam Taminu Turaki	Chairman	15	AVM A.I. Shehu	Member
2	Sheik Ahmed	Member	16	Mr. R.I. Nkemdirim	Member
3	Dr. Hakeem Baba Ahmed	Member	17	DIG P.I Leha	Member
4	Col. Musa Shehu (rtd)	Member	18	Prof. Nur Alakli	Member
5	Sheik Abubakar Tureta	Member	19	Malam Salihu Abubakar	Member
6	Dr. Datti Ahmed,	Member	20	Alhaji Abubakar Sani Lugga	Member
7	Senator Sodangi Abubakar	Member	21	Barrister Ibrahim Tahir	Member
8	Senator Ahmed Makarfi,	Member	22	Brig-Gen Ibrahim Sabo	Member
9	Hon. Mohammed Bello Matawalle	Member	23	Ambassador Baba Ahmed Jidda	Member
10	Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim	Member	24	Group Capt. Bilal Bulama (rtd)	Member
11	Comrade Shehu Sani	Member	25	Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi	Member
12	Hajiya Najaatu Mohammed	Member	26	A Representative of the Office of the Secretary General of the Federation	Secretary
13	Malam Adamu S. Ladan	Member			
14	Dr. Joseph Golwa	Member			

Source: Usman, 2013.

The constitution of the committee generated a lot of reactions, most of which were positive from different stakeholders in the Northern part of Nigeria. For instance, while some see the FG intervention in addressing the insurgency as political means rather than with hammer or stick, which the FG had been using since the insurgent group transformed into a violent group in 2009, others saw that the intervention might create space for more political and civil engagement in peacebuilding in the North. For example, Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, welcomed the development and reasoned that the militant group would be willing to end its deadly campaign if offered amnesty (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17). After its inauguration, the committee swung into action by visiting various states in Northern Nigeria where security challenges have been prevalent by interacting with different stakeholders such as governors, politicians, traditional rulers, religious leaders and so on. The Committee was calling on BHTs to come out for dialogue. However, less than a month that the Committee began its work, the FG declared a state of emergency in three focal states in the North-East, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The declaration of the state of emergency on 14 May 2013, was said to have been premised on the intensified raids and consolidation attempts by BHTs (Adewumi, 2014).

This development undoubtedly signaled an enormous challenge before the committee to identify the supposed 'faceless group', encourage its members to the dialogue table and provide a comprehensive long-term framework for resolution. This could be corroborated by the argument of the Chairman of the Committee who said that before the declaration of the state of emergency, the committee was frequent in its negotiation, but since its declaration, the discussion was not frequent (Adesote & Ajayi, 2021). Added to this vaulting challenge, which the dialogue committee was to contend with was the fact that it did not have the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the government. Before the Committee became comatose, it was reported that it met with some members of the sect including its spiritual leader, Abubakar Shekau who as well submitted a report of its findings to the FG. It was equally revealed that during the negotiation between the Committee and leaders of the insurgent group, while some of the leaders of the BHTs agreed to embrace amnesty, some refused (The News, 2014, March 24, p. 17; Adewumi, 2014). It was argued that this was what led to the emergence of a splinter group known as the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), under the leadership of Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar Albarnawi. Although it was reported in the media that the Committee submitted its report on 13 November 2013, its recommendations were not made public. It was rumored that one of the key recommendations of the Committee's report was for the government 'to set up a standing committee for continuous dialogue' with the insurgents. As of March 2014, members of the committee at different platforms indicated that the government 'had not acted on any of its recommendations'. Some even alleged that FG dumped the recommendations which were vital and tied to specific things (Adewumi, 2014). In all, the initiative failed to active its objective.

Despite the failure of the initiative, the FG, under the leadership of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, took another carrot step given the refusal of Boko Haram leaders to accept the amnesty deal by establishing a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), code-named National Security Corridor, to counter recruitment and mobilization into Boko Haram and rehabilitate defectors in 2013. The new agency aimed to tackle the root causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and create a process of rehabilitating defectors of the group (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). The agency was headed by Fatima Akilu, a Nigerian Muslim psychologist, who was formerly the Director of Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication at the ONSA. Akilu helped the FG to develop the Countering Violent Extremism Programme, which lasted between 2013 and 2015. The CVE Program was a multi-disciplinary intervention targeting ex-Boko Haram members, youth, and other vulnerable groups through social programs that provide them with positive alternatives to violent extremism. There was the deradicalization section of the CVE, which focused on the relationship between development and security at the community level and aimed to rehabilitate former extremists through workforce training, psychological counseling, faith-based interventions and health care. According to Felbab-Brown (2018), the CVE classified Boko Haram defectors into three categories, namely low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk defectors. While for the first two categories, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration methods were applied, the high-risk defectors were meant for prosecution. Following the assumption of a new democratic administration in 2015, under President Muhammadu Buhari, the CVE under Fatima Akilu ceased to coordinate the deradicalization and reintegration of the BH defectors. The program was later taken over by a new military-run operation, known as Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). It is important to point out here that during the period of the existence of CVE, it was reported that the program recorded limited success, especially in terms of the number of repentant BHTs that embraced it. For instance, it was revealed that the head of the program stated in her report submitted to the new administration upon assumption of office that 22 women and girls were undergoing rehabilitation after voluntarily surrendering to the program, while 305 victims of the terrorist group had been successfully rehabilitated and 47 former militants had joined the program (Onapajo & Ozden. 2020).

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing discourse has critically interrogated the two major approaches adopted by the Federal Government under the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan towards the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East geo-political zone of Nigeria between 2009 and 2015. It argued that both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches were adopted by the Nigerian State towards curtailing the nefarious attacks of the insurgent group during this period. The study revealed that the kinetic approach was the first major approach adopted by the government of President Goodluck Jonathan

toward the defeat of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. This approach was characterized by the formation and deployment of military forces, the establishment of the joint task force, formation of Joint Task Force, the declaration of a state of emergency, the establishment of a new army division (7th Division in Maiduguri), training of armed forces in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, provision of more fund and the purchase of new equipment. A thorough assessment of this kinetic approach showed that though the government made several attempts towards defeating the insurgent group through the Nigerian Army and other armed forces, the approach met limited success.

The kinetic approach could not successfully defeat the insurgent group, forcing the government to adopt a non-kinetic approach. The major non-kinetic approach introduced by the government of President Goodluck Jonathan toward defeating Boko Haram included the creation of the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria and the establishment of a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), which was code-named National Security Corridor. Despite the non-kinetic interventions introduced by the government during this period, the situation was far from being abated. The major reasons why these non-kinetic interventions failed to address the menace of Boko Haram insurgency were inept political leadership, corruption, lip service approach, lack of strong political will and commitment, the problem of sabotage and failure of good governance. It submitted that the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency can only be won if these problems are adequately addressed by the government. Evidence of countries who had encountered similar security challenges, such as Pakistan, Singapore and Malaysia, succeeded in defeating the insurgent groups through the vigorous pursuit of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.

The paper concludes that the Federal Government of Nigeria, under the leadership of former President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, introduced both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches toward defeating the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East geo-political zone of the country between 2009 and 2015. These two approaches recorded limited success. The insurgent group was neither incapacitated nor fully defeated by the government. This could be seen in several territories that were under the control of the insurgent group, described as their caliphate during this period.

References

1. Abdulhamid, Y. H. (2017). Before Operation Lafia Dole: Nigerian army in the counter-insurgency operations in the Nigerian North-East. In A. M Ashafa and H. Jibrin (Eds.), *The Nigerian Army in a democracy since 1999: A professional democratization of military subordination to civil authority. Essays in Honour of Lt. Gen. TY Buratai* (pp. 298–308). Pyla-Mak Services.

2. Abimbola, J. O., & Adesote, S. A. (2012). Domestic terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, issues and trends: A historical discourse. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, 4, 11–29.
3. Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 45(2), 95–108.
4. Adesote, S. A., & Ajayi, A. I. (2021). Boko Haram insurgency, refugee crises, and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria, 2009–2017: A preliminary assessment of Governments' response. *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research*, 2(3), 5–30.
5. Adewumi, A. A. (2014). The battle for the minds: The insurgency and counter insurgency in Northern Nigeria. *West Africa Insight*, 4(2), 3–11.
6. Bamidele, O. (2012). Boko Haram catastrophic terrorism – An albatross to national peace, security and sustainable development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 14(7), 32–34.
7. Brimley, S., & Singh, V. (2008). Stumbling into the future? The indirect approach and American strategy. *Orbis*, 52(2), 312–331.
8. Crenshaw, M. (1997). Unintended consequences: How democracies respond to terrorism. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 21(2), 153–160.
9. Danjibo, N. D. (2009). *Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' crises in Northern Nigeria*. Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series. Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
10. Ducheine, P. (2014). Non-kinetic capabilities: Complementing the kinetic prevalence to targeting. *Amsterdam Research Paper No. 2014-26*. Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam.
11. Felbab-Brown, V. (2018). Nigeria case study. In *The limits of punishment. Transitional justice and violent extremism* (pp. 83–125). United Nations University and Institute for Integrated Transitions.
12. Ibrahim, M. Y. (2019). Winning hearts and minds in counterinsurgency operations: Operation Lafiya Dole in perspective. *NARC Journal*, 2(1), 21–26.
13. Ibrahim, S. (2017). Historical perspectives of terrorism. In M. Mohammed and L. F. Abdullahi (Eds.), *Global terrorism: The Nigerian experience in Taming Boko Haram* (pp. 30–38). Army Headquarters.
14. Isa, U. G., & Mustapha, I. K. (2009, February 7). Nigeria: In Maiduguri, 'Operation Flush' men brutalize residents. *AllAfrica*. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/200902090198.html>.
15. Lugga, S. A. (2016). *Towards Peace*. Lugga Press.
16. Marc-Antoine, P. M. (2014). *Nigeria's interminable? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis*. Research Paper. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
17. Marks, S., Meer, T., & Nilson, M. (2005). Manhunting: A methodology for finding persons of national interest. Unpublished Master of Science, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

18. Mohammed, M., & Abdullahi, L. F. (2017). Introduction. In M. Mohammed and L. F. Abdullahi (Eds.), *Global terrorism: The Nigerian experience in taming Boko Haram*, (pp. 1–5). Army Headquarters.
19. Ogbazino, E. M. (2015). Joint operations in the Nigerian armed forces: An appraisal of operation of Zaman Lafiya. MA Dissertation defended at the Department of Political Science and Defence Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna.
20. Okoro, A. O. D. (2022). Historicising and understanding banditry in Nigeria, 1960–2021. *NARC Journal*, 5(1), 24–50.
21. Oluba, M. (2014). The Nigerian military and the fangs of Boko Haram. *The Fronteira Post*, 10, 1–15.
22. Wale, O. (2013, August 19). Military dissolves North-East JTF as Army creates new Division to crush Boko. *Daily Post Nigeria*. Retrieved from <https://dailypost.ng/2013/08/19/military-dissolves-north-east-jtf-as-army-creates-new-division-to-crush-boko-haram/>.
23. Omonobi, K., Okoli, A., Ndujihe, C., & Idionor, D. (2011, September 27). Boko Haram: FG panel calls for Amnesty. The Vanguard Online. Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/boko-haram-fg-panel-calls-for-amnesty/>.
24. Onapajo, H., & Ozden, K. (2020). Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization strategies and challenges in countering Boko Haram. *Security Journal*, 33, 476–492. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00238-2>.
25. Osakwe C. C. C., & Audu, B. J. (2015). Nigeria's military professionalism in complex military operations. In C. C. C. Osakwe (Ed.), *Leadership and complex military operations* (pp. 170–174). Nigerian Defence Academy Press.
26. Sagir, M. (2012, April 2). Nigeria: Understanding JTFs operation restore order in Borno State. *AllAfrica*. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/201204020163.html>.
27. Rosenau, W. (2007). *Subversion and insurgency*. National Defense Research Institute.
28. Usman, T. (2013). Boko Haram Amnesty Committee: Jonathan approves inclusion of a new member. Premium Times. Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/130909-boko-haram-amnesty-committee-jonathan-approves-inclusion-of-new-member.html?tztc=1>.